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Abstract 
 
Taking as a starting point the belief that Western societies live a period of normality/stability 
with regard to their general understanding of justice (based on consensual ideas of equal 
liberty, communal/national responsibility and democracy), the present thesis appeals to a 
reinterpretation of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium as the approach to improve justice in 
Brazil. An ideal-non-ideal equilibrium is outlined by this thesis; in addition, the 
developments of certain knowledge about civic virtues and how to cultivate them through 
formal education serve as important tools to favour the theoretical-practical equilibrium, only 
achieved in the public sphere. The debate on justice is structured upon the idea of (non-
idealised) hypothetical social contract. Through appealing to economic, cultural and decision-
making dimensions, this debate outlines an equilibrium between philosophical ideals of 
justices and historic, biological, economic and sociological empirical observations (as on 
human natural and cultural developments, as on specificities of Brazilian society). From this, 
a feasible theory of how to improve justice in Brazil is proposed, and seven important civic 
virtues to be cultivated in Brazilian people are suggested. Then, a new ideal-non-ideal 
equilibrium between philosophical ideals of how to develop five different levels of 
citizenship curriculum and empirical observations about how this curriculum is actually 
carried out in three different Brazilian schools is also outlined. 
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PART ONE: THESIS’ STRUCTURE 
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1. Introduction 
 
The practice of democracy can stimulate people‟s reflections on justice. And, the more 
people‟s desires become fundamental for determining the destiny of a nation, the more their 
civic virtues become important. After the Second World War, in Western Europe, the US and 
Latin America (though, in the latter, with oscillations), the victory of democratic regimes 
over totalitarian ones forced governments to increase their respect for individuals‟ wishes, 
and liberal theories of justice gained importance as they represented this growing aspiration. 
From 1971, the reinsertion of the idea of (hypothetical) social contract by Rawls put 
individuals‟ desires once again at the centre of political reflection, which replaced a more 
“totalitarian” view. However, this turn was understood by many as a “super-
individualisation”1 of society. As a reaction against this tendency, community values and 
civic engagement arose in political theory, and, later, in the public sphere. For example, in 
England, the introduction of citizenship education as a mandatory subject in schools in 2002 
showed a movement aiming to reflect a spirit of community – strong at the end of the Second 
World War and arguably lost after decades of peace and individualisation of society. This 
thesis agrees with what seems to be a current perception of these Western nations‟ 
policymakers that individual rights and communal responsibilities are unbalanced, and that 
citizenship education can be a good tool to re-establish this balance. Thus, it defends the 
position that a feasible idea of justice in democratic nations is inextricably linked with a 
feasible idea of citizenship curriculum. Researching each one of these fields can occupy a 
whole academic career. However, the present work aims to outline this connection by 
investigating both fields through philosophical and empirical perspectives focused on the 
Brazilian reality. This introductory chapter presents how this project is organised and justifies 
such an ambitious choice. At the beginning, (1.1) the motivations behind the present work are 
presented. Then, (1.2) the main questions which orient this investigation are exposed. Next, 
(1.3) different research methods and the approach applied by this thesis are summarised. 
After this, (1.4) all chapters are briefly introduced and linked. Finally, (1.5) this thesis‟ 
weaknesses and strengths are presented. 
 
1.1. Motivations behind this thesis 
 
                                                          
1
 The doc-series Century of Self, directed by Adam Curtis and produced by BBC, is one example of this 
narrative. 
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Situating the discussion, this thesis takes as its starting point the evident Brazilian 
institutional crisis. In 2016, the impeachment of the re-elected president Dilma Rousseff led 
by the congress divided the country and questioned the strength of Brazilian democracy. 
Moreover, according to Latinobarómetro Corporation, in 2010, though in a period of 
reasonable political stability, Brazilians had the lowest level of trust in their institutions in 
Latin America, the top region in the world in terms of people‟s distrust in their institutions 
(EFE, 2011). Brazilians‟ distrust in their politicians is justified. Scandals of corruption exist 
amongst almost all political parties. The mass media, a private oligopoly, in turn, is very 
partial and, according to many, is associated with the private sector which rules the country in 
order to influence people‟s political views and maintain the status quo (Souza, 2017, p.213-
4). Moreover, private relations invade the public sphere which results in partiality and 
injustices of public decisions (Holanda, 1955). Nevertheless, the resigned behaviour of 
Brazilian people towards improving social justice makes mobilisation for changes difficult
2
 
(Carvalho, 2002). 
 
Taking this scenario, two different ways to change the Brazilian reality can be considered: 
maintaining the main structures of Brazilian democratic institutions; or through a revolution. 
This work is committed to the former. A revolution only makes sense when the political crisis 
is so intense that a complete change in the institutional structures is the only way to advance 
the fostering of justice. This does not seem to be the case in Brazil. Moreover, it may be 
naive to think that a revolution would solve institutional problems in a short period, since, 
usually, such an extreme attitude may cause many problems for almost everyone for a long 
time before promoting positive results – which are not guaranteed. Nevertheless, avoiding 
appealing for a revolution does not mean accepting the status quo. Though Brazilian 
institutions are potentially just, their tendency to benefit the few people who control them 
justifies the need to improve individuals‟ social awareness – which, in turn, helps promote 
social progress – through civic education.  
 
In order to lead this process, it is important to identify the main social practices that Brazilian 
people consider just, and ways to implement them. In this respect, this thesis defends that 
Brazil is embedded in Western values historically built which are founded in broad ideas of 
equal liberty, communal responsibility, and respect for democratic procedures (chapter 2). 
                                                          
2
 Few times, as in 1985 and 2013 mass mobilisations, Brazilian people appeared to show a less resigned 
behaviour. However, this behaviour did not seem enough to really change the political scenario.  
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Obviously, Brazil has peculiarities that differentiate it from other Western countries 
(Huntington, 1996), and these peculiarities are also taken into account. 
 
The Brazilian 1988 Constitution strongly endorses these values and considers that one of the 
two aims of education is to cultivate citizenship: “Education, a right of all and a duty of state 
and family, will be promoted and encouraged with collaboration of society, aiming at full 
development of the person, his/her preparation for the exercise of citizenship and his/her 
qualification for work” (Article 205)3. Regarding this, it should be noted that citizenship can 
and should be taught/learned in different spheres of society: by parents, peers, mass media, 
advertisements, etc. (Levinson, 1999, p.7). Following this point, it is possible to say that 
“[t]here is a profound difference between education in general and schooling in particular, in 
that the latter represents only one small part of the former” (Levinson, 1999, p.7) However, 
though education is very broad, this thesis focuses on formal curriculum (or schooling) as a 
way to fully explore at least one educational sphere. 
 
Thus, based on these reflections on Brazil‟s political situation and focusing on schooling, it 
seems evident that justice and education are mutually dependent. Actually, there is a belief 
shared even by anti-interventionists like Galston that “[l]iberal democratic citizens are made, 
not born” (2002, p.15). This claim is founded on the idea that people‟s behaviours and 
opinions about justice are not totally predetermined, and can be oriented towards different 
directions (Bloom, 2013). However, “education can function as a substantive, directed 
practice only if it is embedded within a broader practice or set of goals” (Levinson, 1999, p.4) 
From this perception, it is possible to say that even alleged neutrality in education is not 
neutral (Freire, 1970a; Gutmann, 1987). Avoiding cultivating civic virtues in schools does 
not imply that children will have a neutral education on these regards. If these virtues are not 
cultivated in a school, something related to them will be cultivated by parents, media and 
friends, etc. Thus, a kind of idea of justice, even if diffuse, always orients the cultivation of 
civic virtues from different societal actors. However, looking from the opposite perspective, 
it is impossible to develop a theory of justice without starting from a certain idea on how 
citizens think and behave in this regard. Philosophers build their theoretical arguments 
presupposing certain virtues in the individuals who constitute their imagined society. Rawls 
(1971, 1993) departs from certain values associated with a sense of justice towards co-
                                                          
3
 All translations from Portuguese to English are made by me. 
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citizens; Gauthier (1986), from an accepted egoism. But, considering that even 
egoism/individualism is partially constructed, it seems true that individuals are not born with 
all civic virtues printed in their DNAs (Bloom, 2013). Thus, education is part of the reasoning 
behind philosophical ideas related to this.  
 
Regarding this, the first half of this thesis investigates Western (particularly Brazilian) 
societies‟ organisation towards justice, while the second examines citizenship curriculum in 
formal education. Indeed, the evolution of the debate on justice in the last five decades makes 
evident the connection between these two fields. In 1971, Rawls published A Theory of 
Justice, the most important reference in twentieth-century analytical philosophy debate about 
the theme. The book presents innovative and elegant reasoning based on social contract 
theory defending the idea that liberty is the good that should be equally distributed in a just 
society. However, mainly during the 1980s, the apparent excess of individualism of Rawlsian 
ideas promoted several reactions of a new group of philosophers broadly called 
communitarians, for example, Sandel (1982). In general, they accused Rawls of paying little 
attention to an important attribute of human beings, namely, their attachment/belonging to 
communities. The debate between egalitarian liberals and communitarians had positive 
effects resulting, in the 1990s, in a successful junction of these views. What emerged at that 
time was something usually referred to as “citizenship theory” (Kymlicka, 2002, p.284). 
Thus, though since Plato there has been a long debate about citizenship and education, the 
current liberal-communitarian debate started paying attention to philosophers like Galston 
and Macedo and how they propose ways to cultivate/teach citizenship and keep liberal values 
in order to build a just society. These debates are currently strong in most philosophy and 
education departments in the Western world, particularly in Europe and North America. 
 
However, few researchers try to balance ideal proposals with empirical observations of 
reality and people‟s opinions about justice and citizenship education, though Levinson‟s 
Demands of Liberal Education (1999) is one notable exception. This is exactly the aim of the 
present thesis. In order to foster a more just society, it is fundamental to reflect on the 
possibilities and limitations of citizenship education in loco, in the case of this work, in 
Brazilian schools. Furthermore, an important way to think about this is through a dialogue 
between theoretical ideas on justice, the citizenship curriculum and current observations 
about how people and curricular planners understand these ideas. In this sense, this thesis 
involves the exploration of theoretical approaches to justice and curriculum, as well as 
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empirical data collection. Naturally, combining both methodologies implies various 
challenges, but the main strength of this attempt is precisely to avoid focusing only on top-
down theories – avoiding listening only to experts about how a just state and a good 
educational system should be – or only on bottom-up ideas about these topics – avoiding 
simply following most people‟s “wishes” for these ideas. 
 
Thus, drawing on the curricular transposition framework (McCowan, 2009), this reflection 
considers four distinct stages of investigation: (i) what an ideal society would be like (ideal 
end); (ii) what a citizenship curriculum would be like (ideal means); (iii) the way these 
curricula work in practice (real means); (iv) the way society thinks about justice (real end). 
This reflection depends upon a dialogue between ideal projects on what a just society and a 
citizenship curriculum should be and an observation of how these things really take place in 
Brazil. It is precisely this “reflective equilibrium” (chapter 2) – a concept proposed by Rawls 
(1971) and further explained in 1.2 – which allows possible improvements in our society. 
 
An outline of the connections between these four different stages is presented in the 
conclusion. For now, as an introduction to the explanation developed in 1.3, it is important to 
highlight two main differences between McCowan‟s and the present thesis‟ approaches. 
Firstly, while the former proposes a linear development from an ideal end to an ideal means, 
then to a real means, and finally to a real end (McCowan, 2009, p.90 – Figure 1), this thesis 
develops knowledge about justice and citizenship curriculum in a different way. As seen in 
the conclusion, in the first stage, “feasible4” theories of justice and curriculum are developed 
through the dialogue between their ideal and real approaches. Only at the end, a dialogue 
between these two “feasible” theories is established. Thus, the order is not linear. Moreover, 
it is suggested that there is an intermediary stage between the ideal and the real reflections of 
justice and curriculum. This stage is called ideal-real. These two differences can be identified 
in figure 2: 
 
                                                          
4
 In this thesis, “feasibility” is understood in its ordinary meaning. For example, Oxford Living Dictionary 
defines “feasibility” as “the state or degree of being easily or conveniently done” 
(https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/feasibility). As developed during the thesis, mainly in the 
conclusion, a feasible theory (of justice or of citizenship curriculum) is a theory built by ideal suggestions that 
gives the opportunities to advance on these ideas, but, at the same time, are not too idealistic, taking into account 
learning and restrictions from observations of reality. The attention for these issues make the proposals quite 
“easily or conveniently” achievable. 
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Figure 1     
 
 
Figure 2
5
 
 
This less linear approach does not mean that a theory of justice has no priority over a theory 
of curriculum. A just society is “the end” of this reasoning, while designing a good 
curriculum is only “the means”. This thesis, then, agrees with Hirst‟s (1974) defence that a 
curriculum can only be effective if it starts from a set of clear aims and Levinson‟s claim that, 
“[f]rom a liberal perspective, modern education policy should be led by liberal theory, not 
vice versa” (1999, p.5). However, through establishing a multidirectional dialogue between 
justice and education, the role of the curriculum in this process can be emphasised. It is made 
clear in the conclusion that improving social justice depends in part on improving formal 
education. 
 
                                                          
5
 Areas of study developed in each part: PHI = philosophy; HIS = history; SOC = sociology; PSY = psychology; 
ECO = economy; EDU = education. 
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In addition, observing these two areas of reflection (justice and curriculum), it is possible to 
say that the reality reduces the possibilities of idealistic changes, and ideals challenge the 
reality. Thus, what this thesis outlines in its conclusion is something in between ideal and 
actual practices. In this sense, the present work proposes an innovation of actual practices of 
justice and education, which is less radical than propositions from several academics (for 
example, Pateman (2007) in the field of justice and Freire (1970a) in the field of curriculum), 
specifically seen in the social sciences. As explored in chapter 6, throughout history, 
Brazilian society has been oriented towards conservatism on moral values and towards the 
capitalism of ties (chapter 6). On the other hand, most theses in political philosophy and, even 
more so in education, at least in Brazil, are oriented towards avant-garde moral values and 
against neoliberal ideas. This thesis, however, positions itself between these two tendencies. 
On one hand, it calls attention to the need to promote social justice and improve the 
citizenship curriculum in Brazilian society, but it also aims to question academics on the 
feasibility of their desired achievements and that many achievements already conquered have 
to be celebrated.  
 
One of the main characteristics of this work is its constant effort to reach middle grounds, 
spaces for dialogue, agreement and, ultimately, consensus. It is defended that some important 
elements of citizenship education are shared by almost all individuals that reflect upon them, 
even if they have widely different political positions on economics, cultural values or even 
democratic procedures. This thesis understands that only those who deny reflecting about 
these matters in order to maintain their privileges, or those who believe only in a revolution 
led by “enlightened” people, are not fully convinced by the attempt of improving societies 
through a pacific process. 
 
1.2. Research questions 
 
After this introduction, it is possible to present the main question behind this thesis: 
 
How can a dialogue between “feasible” ideas of justice and the citizenship 
curriculum contribute to building a more just society (in Brazil)? 
 
As mentioned above, this work aims to present a coherent connection between academic and 
ordinary ideas of justice and citizenship curriculum. The thesis is built upon egalitarian 
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liberalism and citizenship education literature, analyses of research on human ideas and 
behaviours regarding justice, and observations about how citizenship is already being taught 
in Brazilian schools. Thus, it proposes to develop feasible ways to improve justice and the 
citizenship curriculum in Brazil from a dialogue between theoretical ideas and real people‟s 
understandings of these ideas. 
 
However, this main question is very broad. To better understand the aims of this thesis, it is 
important to divide it into some sub-questions (SQs) that orient the present investigation: 
 
SQ1: In what ways does the development of ideal proposals and empirical studies 
contribute to build “feasible” ideas of justice and citizenship curriculum? 
 
The present work aims to answer this question using two different procedures. In 2.2, this 
idea is justified theoretically through defending that stability is usually fundamental to the 
development of knowledge. Complementing this theoretical reflection, the rest of this thesis 
focuses on presenting a possible way to explore theoretical and practical areas regarding 
these two subjects and link them in a reasonable way. Showing the richness and complexity 
of these different areas and a possible connection between them (in the conclusion) is a 
powerful way to justify such an effort.  
 
SQ2: What are the basic characteristics of “feasible” ideas of justice and the 
citizenship curriculum? 
 
Theories of justice and citizenship curriculum proposed by scholars have an intrinsic 
characteristic: they present an ideal situation to be reached – even when they start from a non-
ideal position, like in Mills‟ (2005) proposal developed in 3.8. In this way, these normative 
(philosophical) theories aim to orient people‟s reflections regarding the directions of their 
practices (chapters 3, 4, 8 and 9). However, individuals and societies are often not motivated 
by their reasons, and the understanding of these natural and social characteristics behind their 
behaviours (chapters 5, 6 and 11) is also important in order to identify “feasible” ideas of 
justice and curriculum. Therefore, descriptive studies on biology, psychology, history, 
sociology, economics, etc. are added to normative reflections aiming to balance normative 
proposals. 
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SQ3: How can a “feasible” idea of justice and a “feasible” idea of citizenship 
curriculum improve each other? 
 
Evidently, reflections on how a just society should be are important to orient the 
identification of civic virtues, such as critical thinking and compassion, expected from its 
citizens. In chapter 8, these virtues are presented, marking the transition from a discussion of 
justice to a discussion of the citizenship curriculum. Since the identification of such virtues 
consequently allows a discussion about the citizenship curriculum, the reflection on justice 
improves the reflection on curriculum. On the other hand, since in democratic societies, 
important decisions regarding justice are influenced by ordinary people‟s and policymakers‟ 
practices in the public sphere, the development of their civic virtues through formal education 
is fundamental for improving justice. Through this dialogue, this thesis intends to showcase 
ways in which reflections on both areas can improve the other.  
 
1.3. Methodological approach 
 
Having presented the main questions which orient the thesis, the methodologies behind it are 
now introduced. “Methodologies” is presented in its plural form, since different chapters deal 
with distinct areas of knowledge, each requiring their own methods of finding knowledge. 
Some are normative and very theoretical; others descriptive and based on empirical analyses 
about people‟s opinions and practices on justice and education. These empirical analyses, in 
turn, are sometimes quantitative, other times qualitative. They are obtained through primary 
data, but also through secondary data.  
 
The reflection on methodologies starts by presenting how to link different areas of knowledge 
which sustain this thesis. In the above mentioned method of curricular transposition, 
McCowan (2009) proposes that reflections on justice (end) and citizenship curriculum 
(means) are interconnected. Moreover, he suggests that ideal discussions on these two 
subjects must be directly connected with their real practices. McCowan designs three leaps 
that should be analysed in the following order: from ideal end to ideal means, from ideal 
means to real means; from real means to real end. 
 
However, even through this analytical lens, McCowan considers that these four stages are 
further interconnected, and therefore, their linearity does not work so easily in practice. He 
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then introduces and defines a concept named “seamless enactment”, “an approach to the 
curriculum in which there is a harmonious movement between ends and means, and between 
the ideal and the real, both in terms of the underlying principles and the human agents 
involved” (2009, p.180). Following Dewey (1916), McCowan‟s normative attitude is based 
on the idea that ends and means in education do not necessarily have a unidirectional 
relationship (2009, p.93).  
 
This thesis‟ approach that orients interactions between different methods of analysis of reality 
is inspired by the analytical effort of differentiation (curricular transposition) and by the 
interdependence of ideal and real, means and ends (seamless enactment). Firstly, as discussed 
above, such an approach considers that discussions of justice (end) and citizenship 
curriculum (means) improve each other through refining possibilities and limits of 
developing civic virtues. Balancing ideal and real is more sophisticated and demands the 
development of two different reflective equilibria in the fields of justice and citizenship 
curriculum: one between normative and descriptive understandings of society; another 
between theory and practice. In fact, the concept of reflective equilibrium created by Rawls 
(1971) guides the main reflections on justice, whilst Dewey‟s similar ideas are mostly 
oriented towards reflections on education. 
 
Specifically, this thesis appeals to two types of reflective equilibria, one named “ideal-non-
ideal”6 and another named “theoretical-practical”, a similar division named by Rawls (2001) 
as wide and general reflective equilibria. However, this thesis‟ equilibria make two main 
departures from Rawls‟. First, unlike Rawls, in this work such equilibria are explored not 
only in debates on justice but also in debates on the citizenship curriculum. Second, the 
definition of ideal-non-ideal equilibrium is distinct from Rawls‟ wide equilibrium, and is 
based on Mills‟ (2005) proposal. As is developed in 2.6, ideal-non-ideal equilibrium intends 
to promote a dialogue between philosophical ideas and empirical studies about people‟s 
opinions and practices on justice and citizenship education. Wide equilibrium, on the other 
hand, is only concerned with comparisons between different philosophical theories of justice 
(Rawls, 2001), not with the dialogue between philosophical and empirical findings. However, 
if Rawls‟ wide reflective equilibrium and this thesis‟ ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium 
are different, the same cannot be said about Rawls‟ general reflective equilibrium and the 
                                                          
6
 This expression is taken from Mills‟ non-idealised theory that is opposed to Rawls‟ idealised theory.  
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equilibrium referred to here as theoretical-practical, both of which defend the importance of 
dialogue between theories and people‟s/state‟s actual practices in public sphere (Rawls, 
2001).  
 
Regarding how these two equilibria are related, it important to call attention, as discussed in 
1.5, that only an outline – that summarises a broad view on this subject represented by the 
analogy of the world map, introduced below (another original contribution of this thesis) – of 
the ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium is achieved by this thesis. The theoretical-practical 
reflective equilibrium is not developed by this thesis, since it can only be done in public 
sphere. Even so, it can be said that the outline of the ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium is 
a first step to the implementation, in the public sphere of the theoretical-practical reflective 
equilibrium. The outline of the former and its connection with the latter are the main original 
contributions of the thesis. 
 
In summary, the ways in which theory and practice, ideal and non-ideal theories about justice 
and citizenship curriculum balance and correct each other orient the approach behind this 
thesis.  
 
This distinct approach allows the use of different research methodologies. This format, 
among other things, challenges the classic format of empirical theses – literature review, 
research design/methods, and data analysis – since many different approaches are applied. 
Even the process of writing was non-linear, since the idea of reflective equilibrium was also 
applied during this back and forth processes of improving ideas from new “discoveries”. In 
other words, though the empirical research was oriented by theoretical ideas, some ideas that 
came from the former also oriented further research on topics developed in the latter. 
 
In philosophy, there is a clear and structured method to how research is conducted. Certain 
themes are elected by the researcher, and normally, a tradition of thought is chosen as the 
main bibliographical source. Then, a reasoning which clarifies some concepts and defends 
some ideas through rational arguments is developed. This reasoning is based on reading the 
most important scholars and secondary literature in those areas. Thus, the philosophical 
components of this thesis (chapters 3, 4, 8 and 9) clarify concepts and use them to build the 
main arguments. Regarding the debate about justice, the ideas of equal liberty, communal 
responsibility and democracy are clarified and some interpretations are used to present a 
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more accurate description of how a just society should be. Regarding the debate about 
education, reflections on the ideas of citizenship and indoctrination, the absence of 
citizenship education giving room for other types of education and on the limits of the rights 
of parents, state and children in this field are also discussed. Additionally, the philosophical 
activity can also accomplish the task of defining new concepts.  Thus, other original 
contributions of this thesis are certain new categories to deal with reflections about justice 
(economic, cultural and decision-making dimensions) and citizenship curricula (supra 
official, wide official, narrow official, unofficial and hidden), as well as a list of civic virtues 
(civic knowledge, critical thinking, cognitive empathy, compassion, fighting for justice, 
following rules and competition in a cooperative system) that serve as conceptual tools to 
build the main arguments presented. (Particularly, the tripartite division of reflections about 
justice favours a double gain: firstly, it makes easier to develop a theoretical analysis of what 
is fair; consequently, the understanding of this multiplicity also avoids a polarisation of the 
political debate and increases the possibilities of dialogue in public sphere, as discussed in 
4.1).  
 
Different methods were used to conduct the empirical analyses covered in this thesis. In order 
to describe people‟s opinions and behaviours associated with their ideas of justice, the present 
work opted for secondary data, since conducting a research study to obtain this data would be 
overly demanding and there was neither the time nor the material resources to do so. Thus, 
conclusions about people‟s opinions and behaviours towards justice are based on historical, 
psychological, biological, sociological and economic analyses of Western (particularly 
Brazilian) individuals and societies. 
 
Regarding reflections on moral development (psychology/biology) and on empirical social 
choice (economics), thinkers like Bloom (2013; 2016) and Gaertner and Schokkaert (2010) 
analyse several empirical types of research (normally quantitative) and put 
psychology/biology and economics in dialogue with philosophical theories of justice. 
However, this thesis does not consider that such empirical research is enough to describe 
people‟s actual practices. Careful observations of the dynamics of the public arena are also 
fundamental. Thus, the history of Brazilian society‟s political development and the current 
laws, policies, public opinion and structure of the Brazilian state are presented in chapter 6 
through analyses of historical and sociological data. Both chapters, thus, produce data that 
allow the achievement of the above mentioned ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium. 
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In the previous topic, only reflections on methods for dealing with empirical knowledge 
about justice are presented. However, this thesis is also interested in empirical data about 
formal citizenship education. Thus, it is necessary to describe empirical research achieved to 
understand school communities‟/state‟s opinions and practices towards the application of 
citizenship curriculum. This part of the thesis draws upon primary data collected through 
qualitative research. Such a methodology was adopted because there is a belief that a precise 
choice of few schools and school actors could provide an in-depth and contextualised 
perspective that would be impossible with broad quantitative research. Moreover, the fact that 
different types of schools are being observed captures some of the diversity of the Brazilian 
educational system. In this sense, this empirical research offering primary data on how 
citizenship education happens in Brazilian schools, is also an original contribution of this 
thesis. (Here, this empirical research is only briefly described, since chapter 7 is almost 
exclusively focused on explaining in detail the methodology behind this study.) 
 
1.4. Chapter structure 
 
The present work is divided in four parts. The first one presents the main structure of the 
thesis. The introduction is obviously important for this, however, it is in chapter 2 that the 
approach behind this thesis is presented and justified. Chapter 2 introduces this thesis‟ 
metaphysical-epistemological understanding of reality. It explores and supports the idea of 
reflective equilibrium and its association with pragmatism. A parallel between studies of 
natural sciences and of justice is established and the importance of finding paradigms to 
develop them is defended. A historical analysis of the Western world is undertaken in order 
to identify its current paradigm: a broad belief in equal liberty, communal resposibility, and 
democracy. Finally, citizenship education is deemed fundamental to mediate people‟s 
dynamics through the refinement of this paradigm. 
 
The second part of this thesis reflects about justice. Chapter 3 clarifies the main concepts 
discussed and defends that they are somehow consensual. In parallel, it defends that the 
hypothetical social contract and social choice theory are the best available frameworks to 
theoretically structure Western societies. However, despite these consensual ideas, others are 
quite disputable. Chapter 4 reflects on these disputable ideas. In this way, different theories 
that can be classified as reasonable are presented. This aims to favour a view that, if these 
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ideas are well justified, it is possible to achieve a dialogue amongst them that keeps stability 
and improves justice. Chapter 5 approaches the discussion of justice from a different 
perspective. Whilst the previous chapters focus on philosophical discussions of justice, this 
chapter explores empirical data about real human practices towards justice based on their 
natures and cultures. However, since it equally identifies that people‟s rationality helps to 
determine these practices, this chapter puts real and ideal understanding of justice in 
dialogue. Discussions of natural selection and moral psychology are central. Chapter 6, in 
turn, focuses on descriptive elements of Brazil‟s peculiar history related to its people‟s 
development of their sense of justice and civic values. Moreover, historical and current data 
about inequalities are analysed. 
 
The third part of the thesis discusses the citizenship curriculum. Chapter 7 explores the 
different methodological elements which structure the other chapters: the reasons behind the 
choice of a specific list of virtues; the unusual division of the curriculum; the choice of laws 
and policies analysed; and, mainly, how the qualitative research based on primary data was 
developed. Thus, after discussing these methodologies, chapter 8 marks the middle point 
between reflections on justice and citizenship education, and represents an effort to identify a 
list of civic virtues to help to fill this gap between ideal and real practices towards justice. 
The ground for further discussions in the educational field on how to cultivate these virtues 
is, thus, prepared. Chapter 9 turns the discussion towards citizenship education from a 
philosophical point of view. Reflections on ways to deal with political debates, limits for 
teachers‟ and parents‟ interference in the cultivation of virtues in students, students‟ 
autonomy, and other issues. Chapter 10 analyses the history and the current situation of laws 
and policies that orient the citizenship curriculum in Brazil. Laws and policies, since they are 
based on ideal theories but equally aim to have an impact on reality, are identified in between 
ideal and real. Chapter 11 describes the previously mentioned three schools‟ actual dynamics 
towards citizenship education. Thus, their educational structures, projects and effectiveness 
of the teaching-learning processes are analysed. Chapter 12, on the other hand, is focused on 
collecting school communities‟ opinions on how citizenship education should be. It has a 
dual intention: to better understand the views of head teachers, teachers and students on how 
citizenship education should be conducted in order to enrich the understanding of the real 
process; but also to produce new ideas that are normally lost if only ideas produced by 
academics, often distant from school realities, are followed. Thus, chapter 12 is also in 
between ideal and real. 
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Finally, the forth part (the conclusion) outlines a connection amongst all these ideal and real 
perspectives on justice and education, and delineates feasible and interdependent theories in 
both fields. Moreover, such a chapter allows the establishment of the interdependence 
between reflections on justice and education, which is hardly presented in liberal egalitarian 
literature. In this way, the conclusion is the room for a reflection about the integration of 
different ideas presented in the previous chapters, all of them almost expressed as 
independent papers. This integration between chapters is illustrated in Figure 3. Through this 
new schema (a development of Figure 2), it is possible to identify the role of each one of the 
chapters in the main structure of this thesis. 
 
 
Figure 3
7
 
 
1.5. Weaknesses and strengths of this thesis 
 
Reflecting on the weaknesses and strengths of the present project, it is worth comparing it to 
other theses. PhDs normally deal with very specific issues, something justifiable, since 
current societies demand precise and specialised knowledge. However, overall knowledge is 
also needed. Some may say that, even if very wide research is needed, it is inappropriate to 
                                                          
7
 It is important to reinforce that only the ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium is developed by this thesis, 
though achieved in two different moments – through putting in dialogue reflections of justice and citizenship 
curriculum from ideal and ideal-real points of view (A and C), and the results of these reflections and exclusive 
observations of reality (B and D). The theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium is only developed in the public 
sphere. This idea is further developed in chapter 2. 
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PhD studies. Such research should be a lifetime project and/or developed collectively. The 
lack of time and experience of a PhD student would make this kind of attempt 
methodologically weak and without any scientific value. I partially agree with this. Since the 
beginning, I was aware that it would be impossible to explore deeply most issues discussed in 
each chapter. This can be perceived throughout the text, since counterarguments for any point 
taken as correct are almost always briefly developed. Moreover, important elements that 
connect these different areas are not investigated. The main absence is related to studies on 
real people‟s ideas about several central elements that allow a deep understanding of what the 
population consider fair. For example, no statistics of Brazilians‟ current opinions on 
redistribution of resources, cultural issues and democratic practices is presented. Parents‟ 
opinions on citizenship education are also absent.  
 
However, I have two strong reasons to insist on the matter. First, PhD research usually orients 
academic careers. In my personal experience, the main example is the exaggerated 
specialisation of the Philosophy Department at my university in the South of Brazil (Federal 
University of Rio Grande de Sul, considered to be one of the most reputable Brazilian 
universities, ranking in the top five in the country
8
). This fact seems to generate a lack of 
internal discussions and interactions with other departments. For example, publications 
produced by this department in association with sociology, psychology, history, economics, 
education, etc. are rare. In my view, this is related to the fact that almost all 
lecturers/professors have written very specific theses and this has oriented their careers. My 
impression is that something similar happens in most other departments in Brazil and 
unfortunately this causes very narrow interpretations of social dynamics. Thus, opting for a 
different path, I hope that the wide knowledge acquired through this process will help me and 
other people to connect different fields during our entire careers.  
 
The second reason is based on an effort to create new ways to connect different areas. 
Theoretically, philosophers of science like Kuhn, pragmatist educators like Dewey and 
political philosophers like Rawls defend developing knowledge from the dialogue between 
theory and practice. The idea of reflective equilibrium explored above summarises this point. 
However, it is uncommon for research to fully explore both sides. There is an attempt here to 
further the application of reflective equilibrium, though it cannot be fully applied in a PhD 
                                                          
8
 http://ruf.folha.uol.com.br/2016/ 
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thesis, since theoretical-practical equilibrium depends on the interchange between theoretical 
ideas and real people‟s and policymakers‟ opinions and attitudes in the political arena, as 
discussed in 2.6.  
 
In addition, it is important to say that the attempt to fully connect so many areas related to 
reflections on justice and citizenship curriculum is highly demanding, and can be considered 
naive. However, though “by nature” incomplete, the present work makes more evident to the 
readers which gaps have to be filled. Thus, it is at least a guide for future research that can 
depart from the literature and ideas (some likely wrong) presented here. In the same way, the 
structure of this thesis is only a suggestion of how to organise the debate about justice and 
citizenship curriculum. Through reflecting on this approach, by comparing this thesis with 
their own structure of thinking, the readers can at least identify with more clarity their own 
ideas about the discussed point. 
 
In order to reinforce these justifications, it is interesting to mention that the connection 
between philosophy and education is rarely found in research on citizenship education in 
Brazil. Using the Scielo journal article database and CAPES database of theses, several 
works from 2004 to 2014 were found. However, most of them are only concerned with 
research about practices of citizenship education. In most of these, citizenship is directly 
associated with health (Ferreira et al, 2014; Guimarães & Silva, 2010), sustainability 
(Kondrat & Maciel, 2013; Reigota, 2008), culture (Silva, 2014; Gruman, 2012); and with 
work (Tanji et al, 2010; Geisler, 2006; Lima, 2006). Regarding philosophical theories behind 
this discussion, it was possible to find a limited number of works. Some of them only analyse 
public policies (Piassi, 2011; Mangue, 2008), a few try to present a dialogue between 
theoretical ideas and practices (Maia & Pereira, 2014; Silveira, 2013; Gorgen, 2013; Jacobi, 
2008; Jimenez, 2007; Rodrigues, 2006) but, even amongst these, none tries to connect 
practical discussions with a deep philosophical investigation of the idea of egalitarian 
liberalism, one of the most prominent political theories of our time. 
 
As a final observation, the idea that studies on very specific subjects are unimportant is 
obviously not one supported in this thesis. They are and must be stimulated. Nevertheless, it 
is being claimed that the proportion of wide investigations connecting different areas have to 
increase, otherwise, holistic views – central for political decisions – will be relegated to a 
second plane. Academia has the task of providing technical support for such decisions, and 
27 
 
these holistic views can provide some orientation to collective research that combines 
different areas and can have significant impact in the public sphere. This observation is 
particularly important in the Brazilian context, where educational projects are mostly linked 
with political parties‟ projects. In this context, the voices of more impartial experts are not 
given room. Thus, consensual subjects are rare and sustainable advancement on these 
discussions are hardly accomplished. This thesis tries to help reach this consensus. 
 
Regarding the weaknesses and strengths of this holistic approach, an analogy with 
cartography can be used. There is no doubt that maps with different scales are important for 
dealing with distinct situations. A friend walking in Estrela, a beautiful city of Brazil, who 
wants to find the house of my grandmother will use the map of Figure 4, while a pilot who 
wants to go from São Paulo to Johannesburg will use the map of Figure 5: 
 
Figure 4 
Figure 5 
 
Obviously, in the map of Figure 5, it is very difficult to see even huge rivers like the Amazon. 
On the other hand, in the map of Figure 4, it is impossible to situate Estrela in its state or 
country. In other words, both maps have advantages and disadvantages when compared with 
each other. 
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Moreover, when the first cartographers (not necessarily the great ones) started designing 
world maps, they presented distorted views. Yet, erroneous maps were quite important for the 
whole process of designing the actual maps, since, based on those first drawings, the next 
cartographers could fix the problems and present improved ideas. In this sense, the 500 A.D. 
map of Figure 6 was important for the evolution in cartography and for the design of the 1620 
map of Figure 7: 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
Figure 7 
 
This analogy is useful for representing this research. Probably with similar imprecisions to 
those presented in Figure 6, the present thesis connects studies in philosophy, history, 
sociology, psychology, biology, economics and education in order to allow the future 
researchers – cartographers – to better design these connections. 
 
As a final issue related to the analysis of weaknesses and strengths of this thesis, considering 
the fact that personal characteristics somehow influence thinkers‟ ideas, I briefly describe 
myself and my personal experience. I am a white middle-class able-bodied cis heterosexual 
man. This means that I am undoubtedly someone who is very privileged in a society which 
carries elements of structural racism, classism, homophobia and sexism. Some people may 
think that this thesis proposes a self-interested model of society in which I can retain some of 
my privileges. However, I can at least promise that this is not my conscious intention. My 
29 
 
aim is to work towards reducing injustices in a way that seems effective. Nevertheless, maybe 
because I do not feel the injustices discussed in this work in my everyday life, I am not able 
to describe them properly. Thus, perhaps this less radical proposal is yet another 
reinforcement of the status quo, even if it is not my conscious desire. 
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2. Political revolutions, paradigms, and reflective equilibrium 
 
The defence of Rawls‟ reflective equilibrium as the best procedure to reach a more just 
society and a partial achievement of such a procedure is the main contribution of this thesis. 
The theoretical reflection about this is presented in this chapter. In this way, it starts by 
exploring (2.1) the possibilities and limits of an analogy proposed by Rawls between the 
improvements of sciences and just societies. This analogy is the first step towards his 
understanding of reflective equilibrium. However, to better explain such a concept, (2.2) 
Kuhn‟s project regarding the development of science is summarised: natural scientists, in 
periods of normality (unlike moments of crisis usually followed by scientific revolutions), 
accept certain paradigms and their sciences are developed through a reflective equilibrium 
between theory and personal observations. This fact reinforces the idea that sciences are 
developed from a “deliberative consensus” (eventually broken). (2.3) Dewey‟s pragmatism 
is, then, associated with this idea and some important virtues of an intelligent way to develop 
science are presented to escape from post-modern criticisms of it. Then, a shift from natural 
to political sciences is made: it is suggested that, (2.4) in a very broad sense, Western 
contemporary societies, after a long political revolution, live under the paradigm based on the 
main ideas of equal liberty and communal responsibility developed based on democratic 
procedures. This fact is far from meaning that Western societies are just. Thus, (2.5) a brief 
reflection about several remaining injustices in the post-revolutionary period is presented. 
From this, finally it is proposed that (2.6) Rawls‟ method of reflective equilibrium between 
theories (based on equal liberty and communal responsibility) and people‟s considered 
opinions (obtained by democratic procedures) is even more important in developing a just 
society than a similar method is for developing natural sciences. At the end, (2.7) only as an 
indication of an idea which is developed in the following chapters, a proposal of civic 
education (later in this thesis, also developed through a kind of reflective equilibrium), is 
presented as the means to helping people to improve their judgments about justice (based on 
the aforementioned Western values) and better contribute to democratic decisions reinforcing 
a communal spirit. 
 
2.1. The developments of sciences and just societies  
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Rawls opens A Theory of Justice saying that “[j]ustice is the first virtue of social institutions, 
as truth is of systems of thought” (1999[1971]: p.1). The obscure nature of this sentence 
requires further investigation. Thus, in order to develop some ideas honouring the Rawlsian 
project – restated in Political Liberalism (1993) and Justice as Fairness (2001) – this thesis 
suggests rephrasing and dividing the sentence in two parts: (i) “looking for justice is the first 
virtue of societies, as looking for truth is the first virtue of scientific communities”; (ii) 
“promoting a well-ordered society (stability for the right reasons) is the first virtue of social 
institutions, as promoting a situation of normal science (for the right reasons) is the first 
virtue of systems of thought”. 
 
The main aim of the first rephrased sentence is making clear that virtuous societies – and not 
virtuous social institutions – are those that look for “justice”. Social institutions have a 
different function, as explored in the next paragraph. This comparison shows how Rawls (and 
this thesis) understand justice. “Looking for justice”, that is, “trying to treat all individuals in 
a just way”, is a characteristic of a virtuous society, not of a virtuous individual. Of course, 
ordinarily, individuals are classified as just or unjust. However, here, “just” is a quality 
exclusively related to social decisions. In this sense, “justice” means “social justice”. 
Moreover, societies can look for other virtues, like efficiency, but justice is considered as the 
most important one
9
. Nevertheless, since well-ordered societies are composed of individuals 
who take decisions in the public sphere, to be just, these societies depend on individuals with 
certain virtues
10
. One of the aims of this thesis is to investigate such virtues and how to 
cultivate them. 
 
The second sentence serves to explain, through another analogy, the role of virtuous 
institutions in Rawls‟ project. According to him, virtuous social institutions are those which 
preserve conditions for a society to progress politically towards “justice”, exactly as, 
according to Kuhn, virtuous systems of thought are those in which knowledge progresses 
towards “truth”11. In 2.2, it is shown that, in Kuhn‟s view, a virtuous system – a virtuous 
paradigm – is associated with a period of normality. In these moments, scientists have a basis 
                                                          
9
 Other approaches can claim that, for example, eliminating oppression or suffering, increasing average welfare, 
or perpetuating the culture are more important than promoting justice. However, as explored in chapter 4, these 
ideas are somehow contemplated by the current proposal. 
10
 The same distinction can be applied for scientific communities and scientists. 
11
 “Truth” and “justice” are mentioned between brackets, because, for pragmatism (the metaphysical-
epistemological approach behind this thesis), they only exist within a consensual context. This idea is explored 
in 2.2. 
32 
 
of common beliefs which allow them to collaborate towards producing new methodologies 
and data, creating plenty of new knowledge. It is claimed here that, according to Rawls, 
virtuous institutions are those which guarantee social stability. Such a moment allows citizens 
to live in a system of social cooperation, which helps them to develop just societies in a well-
ordered way (2001, p.27-8).  
 
Though this analogy seems interesting, there are also some limits to it. Firstly, the 
development of natural sciences requires a different type of precision from what is needed in 
social sciences. Actually, the identification of a paradigm in social sciences is much more 
difficult and controversial than in natural sciences. Furthermore, it is far from obvious that 
some specific values associated with the idea of justice are shared by individuals in Western 
contemporary societies. Even so, 2.4 presents the historical development of a shared belief in 
broad ideas of equal liberty, communal responsibility and democracy.  
 
Reflecting specifically on theories of justice, two other limits can be identified. Invariably, 
theories of justice – unlike theories about the natural world – do not intend only to describe 
phenomena, but also to actively influence the way societies are organised and individuals 
behave. Finally, as explored in 2.2, the range of consensus in natural sciences is quite small, 
since the agreement is expected only between “principal” researchers‟12 theories centred in 
specific fields and “minor” researchers‟ findings. On the other hand, political consensus, as 
aimed by Rawls (1993; 2001), is general, that is, such equilibrium has to reach (almost) all 
society – something much more difficult. This depends on a dialogue between principal and 
minor researchers from different areas (philosophy, sociology, psychology, history, 
economics, etc.) and the translation of their ideas to the population; at the same time, people‟s 
ideas have to reach academic debate (this point is explored in 2.4). This dialogue is essential 
for refining ideas and solving political puzzles. More than this, since political discussions are 
much less precise than scientific debates (and, as discussed in 2.3, scientific ethos seems to be 
more developed than social ethos), mechanisms for dealing with dissensus in political theory 
are imperative. It is also possible to say that, following Honig (1993) and Mouffe (1993), 
dissensus is inherent to (democratic) politics. Actually this idea is also explored by Alnes 
(2017) in his reflection about the room of dissensus in Rawlsian idea of overlapping 
                                                          
12
 This concept is presented in a broad sense: they are not necessarily those who lead funded research projects. 
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consensus (2.6). Then, it is not expected that equilibrium in politics is based on the same 
level of consensus as in natural sciences. 
 
Having presented initial possibilities and limits of investigations in natural sciences and 
political philosophy, it is also interesting to show that the inspiration behind the Rawlsian 
idea of reflective equilibrium comes directly from reflections on the development of sciences. 
Though this expression was invented by Rawls, it is based on Goodman‟s works on 
philosophy of science (1999[1971], p.18). Through proposing such equilibrium, Rawls tries 
to capture the idea of a “virtuous circle” between basic ideas and justifications proposed by 
Goodman to solve a problem about how sciences are developed. As discussed in 2.2, this 
proposal is closely connected with Kuhn‟s and Dewey‟s ideas on the development of 
knowledge. 
 
2.2. Entrenched paradigms, crisis and revolutions  
 
Before Kuhn published The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), two different ways of 
theorising how science is developed were considered: the standard empiricism that 
understands science as an accumulation of knowledge about reality; Popper‟s defence that 
science is a process of falsifying ideas that were otherwise accepted as true (Benton & Craib, 
2001, p.50). Despite this difference, both approaches believe that the scientific process is 
somehow linear. That is, they suggest that sciences are developed without “clashes”. 
 
Kuhn (1962) proposes something different. Based on historical observations of different areas 
of natural sciences, he claims that they progress through the interchange of two completely 
distinct moments. Most of the time, a certain paradigm is accepted by the scientific 
community and almost all researchers in that area follow those ideas. In these cases, 
researchers‟ work attempts to advance these ideas. Kuhn calls this period “normal science”. 
Paradigms are based on two elements: basic principles and methods of research. 
Nevertheless, anomalies are sometimes identified: the development of such ideas begins to 
reveal inconsistencies within the paradigm, phenomena forecasted by the theory are refuted, 
equipment built based on its principles do not work, etc. When situations like these 
accumulate, the scientific community slowly starts to suspect that such a paradigm is wrong. 
A moment of crisis arises until a new paradigm, through a “scientific revolution”, replaces 
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the previous one. After this new paradigm is established, scientists progress again within a 
period of normality. 
 
The Copernican Revolution, in which the geocentric paradigm shifted to the heliocentric 
paradigm, is one of many historical cases when this process of paradigm-crisis-revolution-
(new)paradigm has occurred within the natural sciences. In 1543, Copernicus proposed to 
replace the idea, systematised by Ptolemy, that Earth is the immobile centre of the universe. 
The fact that many important astronomers at the time recognised that the Ptolemaic paradigm 
was failing was a prerequisite to Copernicus‟ quest for another paradigm (Kuhn, 1996[1962], 
p.69). The redefinition of the concept of “planets” as “objects that turn around the Sun” – 
instead of “objects that turn around the Earth” – made the concept of a planet much simpler 
and could solve all the astronomical problems of that time.  
 
Based on this, science can be understood as a social construction which supports a certain 
paradigm. However, this social basis sometimes changes its view and starts endorsing a new 
paradigm. In summary, according to Kuhn, sciences are developed under a consensus, which 
is then eventually broken. For the purposes of this thesis, it is fundamental to understand the 
centrality of scientists‟ behaviour during the period of normal science in Kuhn‟s proposal, 
behaviour that counters Popper‟s “falsificationist” understanding of the development of 
science. Lakatos‟ (1970) suggestion that science is developed by “research programmes” 
supports Kuhn‟s idea. He argues that “scientists may be justified in holding on to their basic 
propositions, or hypothesis (the „core‟ of the programme) in the face of apparently adverse 
evidence”. Otherwise, a constant doubt about their findings would create excessive instability 
and difficulty in advancing knowledge (Benton & Craib, 2001, p.62-3). As developed below, 
this idea is also found in the foundations of Dewey‟s pragmatism. 
 
This thesis does not explore the main arguments in favour of epistemological and 
metaphysical ideas against Kuhn‟s and Dewey‟s proposals. The main point here is to show 
how useful this approach is to frame reflections about two specific subjects: justice and 
citizenship curriculum. Thus, an analogy is proposed between Kuhn‟ idea of development of 
normal science and Rawls‟ idea of development of a theory of justice in a stable (for the right 
reasons) society. In order to do this, it is important to start by observing two characteristics of 
the Kuhnian approach to the progress of science that challenge the usual idea, based on a 
linear development of it: the rejection of the distinction between the context of creating new 
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ideas and the context of justification; the conclusion that science is never neutral, but that a 
“democratic” development of it can mitigate this biased process. The first point is associated 
with Goodman‟s understanding of the development of science, and both points also connect 
Kuhn‟s project with Dewey‟s pragmatism. 
 
Reflecting on the first point, it can be said that the new idea that Earth and other planets turn 
around the Sun was not only a new “fact”, but it changed the way scientists viewed the 
scientific process itself. For example, rather than thinking that entities naturally move 
towards the Earth (as Aristotle proposed in his Physics), the movement of objects were 
thought about in relation to their mass. This discovery subsequently helped to challenge the 
notion that the natural world has an “intention”, changing the way that scientists looked at the 
world around them. The scientific community, based on this new paradigm, was stimulated to 
build new tools and to think of new experiments to discover new “facts”. For example, after 
Copernicus, many observatories of astronomy were built, and the observations achieved in 
these places gave reliability to the new paradigm. In summary, changes in what the scientific 
community considers to be “facts” change the method of justification for these “facts” (and 
vice-versa). 
 
By examining the history of these processes, one notices that some concepts modify their 
meanings over time. Reflecting again on the Copernican Revolution, the definition of 
“planet” changed from “entities which revolve around the Earth” to “entities which revolve 
around the Sun”. The explanation for such a change is neither logical nor scientific. What 
happened was that, after such revolution, the second concept merely became more 
entrenched, that is, it started to make more sense to notice the same “pattern” among these 
“new” planets than among the “old” ones. This was because, in the sixteenth century, the 
only way to keep the basic idea that Earth is the immobile centre of universe was to admit 
that patterns of movement of some considered “planets” were very weird. Questioning these 
weird patterns of movement made scientists question their former definition of planets. For 
example, as Figure 8 shows, the observations at that time allowed scientists to imagine the 
movements of Earth (E), Sun (S) and Mars (M) in two different ways: the first (I), in which 
Earth is immobile; the second (II), in which the Sun is immobile. Over time, scientists 
changed their views from (I) to (II), for two reasons: the second could explain better different 
phenomena, and its taxonomic division seemed to be much more intuitive – in (II), “planets” 
turn “circularly” around the Sun; in (I), some of them (in the figure, Mars) turn around Earth 
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in a “weird” way. Respectively, these changes in the basic idea of what a planet is and the 
justification of their movements supported each other, that is, together, they made the new 
concept of planet more entrenched. This made the new theory – and the law of universal 
gravitation (1687), developed by Newton more than 100 years later – more projectable by 
establishing more valid rules of justification. 
 
 
Figure 8 
 
The connection between the entrenchment of concepts and the projectability of theories was 
presented by Goodman (1955). According to him, these ideas are extra-logical notions based 
on people‟s (in this case, scientists‟) habits. In this sense, a concept (basic idea) is more 
entrenched if it is more projectable by the valid general rules of justification used by science. 
(In the case of the movement of “planets”, the circular trajectory made much more sense as a 
justification than the weird trajectory as observed for Mars.) However, if it is impossible to 
precisely identify the Uniformity of Nature (1983[1955], p.ix), what are valid general rules of 
justification? Surprisingly, Goodman‟s answer is that they are the rules of justification which 
are historically practised in science. There is an evident circularity here, but, as Putman says, 
“What we have in Goodman‟s view […] are practices, which are right or wrong depending on 
how they square with our standards. And our standards are right or wrong depending on how 
they square with our practices. This is a circle, or better a spiral, but one that Goodman, like 
John Dewey, regards as virtuous” (1983[1955], p.ix).  
 
This virtuous circularity – or spiral movements – between basic ideas and justification shows 
that the epistemology based on this equilibrium is associated with a metaphysical project that 
understands “truth” not as the correspondence with reality – as proposed by Aristotle 
(Metaphysics, 1011b26-27) – but as a consensus of the community about the best way to 
explain phenomena and forecast new events. This association is at the core of Dewey‟s 
pragmatism which rejects the “idea of knowledge as a mirroring of an eternal, static reality. 
Instead he took his point of departure in the ever-changing organism-environment 
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transaction. Knowing is not outside of this process but part of it” (Biesta & Burbules, 2003, 
p.55). In this way, according to Dewey, a claim is true if it is accepted by a certain 
community. As he says, “reality […] for pragmatism is still in the making” (1908, p.99). 
 
In this sense, for a pragmatist like Dewey, truth is associated with context and has a practical 
function. In Dewey‟s words, “[t]he agreement, correspondence, is between purpose, plan, and 
its own execution, fulfilment” (1907, p.84). This idea deciphers the connection between 
Dewey‟s pragmatism and Kuhn‟s and Goodman‟s ideas: 
 
For Dewey, therefore, truth is not about the correspondence between descriptions of reality 
and reality itself. The correspondence, in other words, is not static or descriptive. For Dewey 
the correspondence is active and temporal; it is included in the cycle of action-reflection-
action. (Biesta & Burbules, 2003, p. 69) 
 
This suggestion is in accordance with the idea of reflective equilibrium between basic 
scientific ideas and their justification. It is important to notice that, from this process, new 
scientific puzzles are suggested and new approaches to solving them are tested (Kuhn, 
1996[1962], p.38-9). In this sense, reflective equilibrium is an approach that endorses the 
correlation between ideal theories and empirical studies – both of which are dependent on 
their proper methods of research.  
 
2.3. Pragmatism and Enlightenment 
 
Such a virtuous circularity between basic ideas and justification is oriented towards the 
understanding that there are no theory-neutral observations in science. An alternative to the 
positivist aspiration towards neutrality is, then, presented (Benton & Craib, 2001, p.14). This 
alternative to the attempt to be neutral admits that our observations are always biased by what 
the scientific community claims as “true” (the paradigm). However, given the fact that 
knowledge is always biased, it seems fundamental to follow Dewey‟s suggestion that the 
scientific community‟s agreement has to be built in an intelligent way. This begs the 
question: what should be done to develop consensual knowledge “intelligently”? 
 
Reflecting on this, it is important to start by recognising that, many times, consensual ideas 
are established by agents other than those in the scientific community. It is quite common for 
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external factors to promote a stable situation that would otherwise not be consensual. In this 
sense, such external factors can sometimes slow the progress of science. Contextualising the 
period before the Copernican Revolution, “[b]ecause the astronomical tradition was 
repeatedly interrupted from outside and because, in the absence of printing, communication 
between astronomers was restricted, these difficulties were only slowly recognized” (Kuhn, 
1996[1962], p.68-9). In this case, the Catholic Church had for a long time boycotted much 
research opposing its own “scientific” dogmas. This is a typical example in which consensual 
“truth” was determined by certain structures of power.  
 
Thus, Dewey considers objectivity/clarity and the democratic interchange of plural ideas 
fundamental characteristics of intelligent habits (Biesta & Burbules, 2003, p.70). “Objective 
and democratic ethos”, thus, mitigate problems linked to self-interests and external interests 
which bias scientific research. In scientific debates, then, access, clarity and plurality must be 
stimulated. In general, the influence of structures of power over knowledge as denounced by 
Foucault is only mitigated if widespread ideas are equally considered. For this reason, though 
the positivistic dream of “the neutrality of science” is a chimera, scientific knowledge 
currently appeals to the basic ideals of Enlightenment, that is, the incessant search for 
clarifying ideas. 
 
Even so, Foucault‟s criticisms against the negative impacts of power structures over the 
development of knowledge cannot be ignored. Concerning political ideas, authoritarian (and 
pseudo-democratic) regimes maintain control over individuals not only through physical 
oppression, but also through manipulation of their thoughts. A summary of Foucault‟s ideas 
on this is: “agency and subjectivity [are] constituted and manipulated by relations of power. 
So there is little space in [Foucault‟s] account for agents to acquire and exercise autonomous 
agency” (Benton & Craib, 2001, p.49). In this sense and in partial agreement with Marx, 
Foucault understands that the social structure alienates the individual (Benton & Craib, 2001, 
p.116). 
 
In Animal Farm (1945) and 1984 (1949), Orwell creates metaphors for these two types of 
control
13
. However, he suggests that reinforcing clarity and objectivity of ideas is the way to 
                                                          
13
 In Animal Farm, manipulation comes from the pigs‟ domain of written language and the oppression from 
their control over the dogs‟ army; in 1984, manipulation comes from the tactics of double-thinking and the 
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overcome authoritarian manipulation: “[f]reedom is the freedom to say that two plus two 
make four. If that is granted, all else follows” (1949, p.81). The importance given by Orwell 
to clarity and logics which is viewed as fundamental to human liberty sets the tone of this 
thesis. The incessant search for the meaning of “justice”, despite its unreachable nature, 
permeates this entire work and, thus, a pragmatic attitude towards it is proposed. In this 
sense, even given the importance of Foucault‟s warnings about manipulation, post-
structuralist relativism about the idea of justice is denied, since relativism impedes the 
evolution of debates about this concept. In the end, the belief in Enlightenment seems to be 
the way to continue developing knowledge about sciences and justice: 
 
[t]rying to abandon vast and complex bodies of thought […] cannot be done. One cannot 
think new thoughts from nowhere, and critiques of the Enlightenment can only come from 
within the Enlightenment and be based upon Enlightenment principles. [Post-modernist and 
post-structuralist thinkers] argue for their positions; in other words, they employ reason, the 
very reason they are criticising, and they are thus placed very firmly within the tradition they 
are criticizing, while the radical politics that some of them uphold – notions of democracy, 
tolerance, multiculturalism, the equality of sexes – all of these things can be argued for from 
within the traditions they criticize and in many cases these ideas are generated from these 
traditions. (Benton & Craib, 2001, p.171) 
 
Whilst objectivity and democratic interchange in the development of science is fundamental, 
Dewey also defends the idea that, in some degree, it is intelligent to take very seriously 
established knowledge: 
 
Although there is no guarantee that “old” knowledge will be successful for the solution of the 
problem at hand, it can at least suggest a variety of different approaches for understanding the 
situation, interpreting observations, and possible action. (Biesta & Burbules, 2003, p.61) 
 
In this sense, the existence of some ground is important for developing science (Biesta & 
Burbules, 2003, p.67). As claimed in 2.2, Kuhn, by saying that scientists normally insist on 
established beliefs, sees in this kind of attitude an important element towards progress of 
science. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
oppression from torture. Orwell also wrote Politics and English Language (1946) in which he presents examples 
of manipulation in real politics. 
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2.4. Communal/national responsibility and equal liberty (basic ideas) and democracy 
(basic method) 
 
The development of scientific knowledge is taken as a good archetype for the development of 
just societies. Following Dewey‟s suggestion about developing knowledge in an intelligent 
way, it is important to identify current established political values/knowledge (main ideas) 
about justice and procedures (main method) in order to refine them. In this thesis, only 
Western values and procedures are analysed, since, widely speaking, there is a belief that it is 
possible to find some consensus towards basic values and procedures in Western societies 
that are not necessarily shared by the non-Western world.
14
 It does not mean, however, that 
values and procedures of other societies are wrong or inferior. In this thesis, they are only 
considered different and less useful as foundations for improving the idea of justice in 
Western socio-political organisations. Thus, from a historical investigation, it is defended that 
contemporary Western individuals consent in defending the values of equal liberty and 
communal/national responsibility, and take democracy as the best way to improve justice
15
. 
The stability and legitimacy of political decisions in these societies come from the respect of 
this tripod. These things are directly related to what Harari (2012) calls “imagined orders” or 
“imagined communities”, and the importance that he gives to “devised scripts” in such 
processes, something developed below. To clarify these points, 2.5 presents a brief narrative 
of Western societies‟ historical ideas of justice which culminated in political revolutions that 
solidified these three pillars. 
 
Before starting to present this historical narrative, it is important to say that, even though it is 
very difficult to define Western societies, it is possible to broadly understand them as 
societies that have their roots in Greco-Roman civilisation and Christianity (Perry, 2012), 
with strong influences of Enlightenment thinking (Kurth, 2003, p.5). Obviously, Western 
                                                          
14
 Obviously, it would be problematic if, aiming at studying improvements regarding justice and education in 
Brazil, this thesis only focuses its analysis on “Western values”. Though it is possible to find some elements of 
homogeneity in this idea, many Western countries also have influences of other cultures. Specifically, Brazil has 
influences of indigenous and African values. On the other hand, it is equally true that Brazil is fundamentally 
based on Western values. The existence of other influences, nonetheless, obliges a careful look at the 
development of a multiplicity of values and practices through Brazilian history. In this way, chapter 6 is written 
to accomplish this analysis.  
15
 Different lists of characteristics which define Western societies can be found. Ferguson (2011), for example, 
identifies six institutions that made Western countries dominant in the world: competition, scientific revolution, 
property rights, modern medicine, consumer society, and work ethic. This thesis, however, is interested in 
finding some general ideas that orient the participation of Western citizens in public sphere. Some important 
elements highlighted by Ferguson – competition, property rights, consumption, and work ethic – call attention 
for the capitalist ethos associated with the idea equal liberty developed throughout this thesis.  
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history is much more complex, but this reductionism is helpful in identifying a few 
consensual ideas that defend the suggested shift in the political paradigm and the stability of 
the current one. Additionally, aiming to present a more concrete idea of West, Huntington‟s 
(1996) proposal of world territorial division in different civilisations seems promising. This 
proposal includes under the concept of Western societies most European countries (excepting 
Russia and some areas under its influence), and places that received vast number of 
immigrants from Europe, such as countries in North America and Oceania. Huntington 
considers Latin America and East Europe different civilisations, but admits that they can also 
be considered part of Western civilisation. In this thesis, some Latin American countries 
(especially Brazil) are taken as part of Western civilisation. First, they were colonised by 
Western Europeans, native peoples and African slaves were catechised by the Christian 
doctrine. Moreover, their country‟s independence was rooted in Enlightenment values. That 
is, broadly speaking, Western values are shared by Brazilian people.  
 
Moreover, it is also important to make a differentiation. The present reflection identifies 
political values and procedures that sustain the current Western political paradigm.  This does 
not mean that these values and procedures should be universalised – even less that they are 
already universal and definitive, as Fukuyama (1989) claimed through declaring “the end of 
History”. It is not even being said that the current Western paradigm is permanent. In fact, 
agreeing with Huntington‟s (1996) idea of the current “clash of civilisations”, it is difficult to 
believe in such a universalization, at least for the time being. Besides, the tensions in Western 
societies symbolised by Brexit and Trump‟s election threaten the stability and legitimacy of 
the Western paradigm, something that possibly threatens the rationale of this thesis as a 
whole. 
 
However, putting aside for a while the analysis of Western societies‟ current challenges 
(these challenges are investigated in 2.5), the first aim is to present a historical investigation 
that shows the existence of a unified narrative in the West that resulted in a fundamental 
political shift with the liberal revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thus, 
this investigation starts at the birth of Western civilisation placed in Ancient Greece and 
Rome. 
 
Scholars agree that Ancient Greece and Rome fundamentally shaped some key values that 
continue to orientate Western societies‟ political organisations. First, it is widely known that 
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the Ancient Greek development of rationality strongly influenced thought during the 
Renaissance, and Athens‟ practice of democracy was fundamental for the development of the 
idea of liberty, even if only the liberty of political participation (Constant, 1819). Moreover, 
the sense of duty towards the city identified in Greek communities is at the root of the idea of 
citizenship explored by the Enlightenment (Guarinello, 2003, p.46). Second, the Roman 
development of a legal system detached from religion is at the root of Western secular states 
(Siedentop, 2014). Ironically, as discussed below, the roots of current secular states are in the 
recovery of the Roman legal system by the Catholic Church‟s canon law. It is defended that 
this process is at the root of the establishment of strong nation-states and individuals‟ feeling 
of attachment with their co-citizens. 
 
However, it is also possible to observe characteristics of these societies that go against the 
current Western paradigm. The most relevant one is that, in Ancient Greece and Rome, 
individuals possessed “naturally” different social statuses (Siedentop, 2014, p.51). Greek 
societies were politically organised in city-states, at the beginning nothing more than 
associations of landowners (Guarinello, 2003, p.32). During those times, there was a clear 
distinction between public and domestic, rather than the current idea of separating public and 
private. This fact favoured inequalities within the family, since the state did not interfere in 
unequal domestic structure (Siedentop, 2014, p.18). In their public affairs, city-states were 
also extremely unequal and, even in Athens‟ democratic experience, few people were 
considered citizens and allowed to take part in the democratic process – only men who did 
not belong to subordinated groups or were not personal slaves (Guarinello, 2003, p.35). 
Roman city-states had the same characteristic until Rome became a powerful empire, in 27 
BC. In that time, it reached one million inhabitants (Guarinello, 2003, p.42), and its social 
organisation was much more complex, but a strong social divide remained. In its apogee, 
differently from Athens, almost all were considered citizens and theoretically were under the 
same legal system. Even so, this was only so in theory, since few had access to justice system 
and received benefits from the government (Guarinello, 2003, p.44). The sense of community 
was not behind this idea of citizenship anymore. Thus, though Greek societies were very 
unequal, the model that inspired Enlightenment thinkers was the Greek sense of belonging 
towards city-states and not this “extended and amorphous citizenship of Roman Empire” 
(Guarinello, 2003, p.46). 
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During the Roman empire, however, the spread of Christian doctrine reached the socially and 
economically marginalised and developed in them a communal feeling of attachment. 
Christianity has its roots in Judaism, a religion that had, two thousand years ago, a 
characteristic that was new in Western world: “the conception of a God that was not satisfied 
in helping armies, but that demanded an ethical behaviour [based on solidarity] of their 
followers” (Pinsky, 2003, p.16). However, Christianity was more comprehensive: “while 
synagogues only helped Jewish, Christian communities welcomed anyone” (Hoornaert, 2003, 
p.92)
16
. In this way, Christian doctrine about the primacy of being a son or daughter of God 
over unequal social roles was fundamental in changing the previous notion of natural 
inequality (Siedentop, 2014, p.62). Associated with this, the idea that “God had created 
„rational creatures endowed with the faculty of free choice‟” (Siedentop, 2014, p.70) was 
central in Christian doctrine and opened room for people, based on their own will, to become 
followers of God. This spirit of solidarity and openness that protected the worst-off made 
Christianity spread very quickly around the Western world (Hoornaert, 2003, p.94)
17
. 
 
However, in medieval times, with the fragmentation of the Western Roman Empire, this 
process of spreading the idea of equality amongst the sons and daughters of God and their 
free will did not have a linear development. Different feuds used to have their own 
organisations, thus “legal systems” developed independently of each other (Siedentop, 2014, 
p.253). These systems did not necessarily consider all individuals to be equal. Even so, given 
the fact that Christian doctrine continued to spread, centuries later, the Catholic Church 
developed a unified legal system based on its canon law: 
 
Drawing on Roman law, and under the patronage of the papacy, canon lawyers from the late 
eleventh century began to create a system of law for Christians founded on the assumption of 
moral equality. This system was to privilege the conception of what has been called 
„subjective rights‟, that is, rights inhering in the individual, starting with the claim to freedom. 
That claim amounted to a rejection of the ancient assumption of natural inequality. (2014, 
p.357) 
 
                                                          
16
 Islam is a dissidence of Christianity and, at least regarding this point, works based on the same logics.  
17
 Obviously, it is possible to find passages in the Bible that give the idea of different types of unequal 
treatments. For example, sexism is quite common: “But I would have you know, that the head of every man is 
Christ; and the head of the woman is the man; and the head of Christ is God” (Corinthians, 11:3 – King James‟ 
version: http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/). In response, it is possible to say that the main idea of its words 
is a defence of equality amongst individuals. Interestingly, Martin Luther King, Jr. appealed for these words in 
his fight for equal civil rights in 1960s (Karnal, 2003, p.151). 
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This unification of canon law made all Christians feel ruled under the same law
18
. Such a 
feeling is at the root of Absolutism, which was based on the idea of equal subservience to the 
same king‟s commands – that is, the same nation. In the Ancient world, the situation was 
completely different, since the unequal family sphere had much more importance. In this 
way, during absolutism, “„equal subjection‟ to a sovereign was perceived not as loss but as 
gain” regarding claims of equal treatment (Siedentop, 2014, p.346). The seeds of national 
commitment under the protection of the same king were, then, planted. 
 
Of course, though the idea of equality was spread by Christian doctrine, the very hierarchical 
organisation of the Catholic Church somehow maintained the idea of natural inequalities 
amongst people. For example, “in 1198, [Pope] Innocent III declared that he was „lower than 
God, but higher than man‟” (Siedentop, 2014, p.322). During absolutism, the higher members 
of the Church were partners of the royalty in keeping the political superiority over the plebe. 
Thus, the canon law mentioned before, though based in the Christian doctrine of equal 
liberty, kept the privileges of those considered and accepted as superior beings. 
 
However, during the Renaissance (the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries), this hierarchical 
state of affairs suffered internal and external criticisms (Mondaini, 2003, p.115) that prepared 
the terrain for the political revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These 
criticisms are linked with the faster and more democratic spreading of information, which had 
previously been mostly restricted to the Church‟s circles. The main symbol of this change is 
the invention of the printing press by Gutenberg (1439). In this context, the internal criticism 
came from a priest, Martin Luther (1517
19
), who fought against, amongst other things, the 
fact that biblical words were deliberately hidden by the Catholic Church from the faithful, 
and demanded that Bibles were printed in a language that the faithful could read (Karnal, 
2003, p.140). This was one of the challenges of the Reformation, which also required that the 
practices of the Church be realigned with the words of the Bible. Externally, the rise of 
scientific methods and of the bourgeoisie – a new social class that developed economic power 
through expansion of commerce, though did not have the same political status as the clergy 
and royalty – also lobbied for change. They argued for rationalisation and were against birth 
privileges, forcing the secularisation of socio-political relations (Mondaini, 2003, p.115). 
                                                          
18
 In the same period, Magna Carta (1215), the first secular document that guaranteed a series of individuals‟ 
“civil rights” against arbitrary decisions of a powerful king, was signed. However, this document was not totally 
embodied in that time, being recovered by the Glorious Revolution (1688) (Hindley, 2008). 
19
 In this year, he engraved into the door of All Saints‟ Church, in Wittenberg, his 95 theses. 
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The ideas of equality and free will came, then, from the resumption of original Christian 
doctrine that was in accordance with a new capitalistic ethos in which hierarchical society 
and inequality based on God‟s will were not accepted anymore (Mondaini, 2003, p.116). 
Moreover, the invention of the printing press, the capitalist perception of the profit of selling 
books and the limited market of Latin language readers, solidified distinct modern languages 
in different regions of Europe (Anderson, 2006[1983]).  
 
Such elevation of the importance of local languages as languages of power in absolutist states 
contributed to decline of the “imagined community” of Christendom, which was based on the 
Latin language (Anderson, 2006[1983]). The linguistic diversity in distinct feudal societies 
was huge, though some languages were similar. Thus, via documents that started being 
printed in local languages, people who spoke different English (or French, etc.) dialects 
“became capable of comprehending one another” (Anderson, 2006[1983], p.44). This 
printing process “gave a new fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that 
image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation” (Anderson, 2006[1983], 
p.44). This was increased, during the Renaissance, with the growth of printed poems and 
epics, which spread among people the idea of “a sociological organism” moving through 
time, in opposition to Medieval times, when people had no idea of history and lived in 
instantaneity. The rise of printed literature helped to establish in people the idea of an 
imagined nation moving through history (Anderson, 2006[1983], p.26). 
 
The terrain for a political revolution towards equal liberty and based on communal/national 
responsibility was prepared. However, for a while, it was useful for the bourgeoisie to accept 
absolutist regimes and their hierarchical structure not because they considered inequalities as 
natural, but because they felt protected by the King from their “enemies” (internal and 
external). Thus, royalty members had more socio-political rights, not based on 
natural/ontological differentiations, but for practical reasons. 
 
This incongruence is identified in Hobbes‟ social contract theory. In Leviathan (1651), he 
abandons the ontological differentiation among individuals, but maintains the justification of 
a regime in which people have to be differentiated – a politically superior king is considered 
fundamental for maintaining the order. This is a perfect example of the mismatch between an 
idea of ontological/natural equality among individuals and an unequal way to take political 
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decisions based in the absolute power of a superior being, the King. As mentioned in 2.2, 
increasing incongruences in between the idea of geocentrism and its justifications resulted in 
a scientific revolution; the incongruence mentioned in this paragraph, in different political 
revolutions.  
 
The absolute power of the King was, however, ending. Following Anderson (2006[1983]), 
absolutist states were not the locus of the formation of communal responsibility, what he calls 
an “imagined political community”. In absolute states, kings had the monopoly of decisions 
and their “legitimacy derived from divinity, not from people” (Anderson, 2006[1983], p.19). 
Thus, though an imagined nation formed by people that do not know each other was basically 
established during absolutism, an imagined political community based on people‟s 
sovereignty – as opposed to “divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynasty” – and on their 
cooperation based on a deep, horizontal comradeship (Anderson, 2006[1983], p.7) was not 
yet established. It was only possible with the liberal revolutions.   
 
Thus, the Glorious Revolution (1688) was the first liberal/bourgeois/capitalist victory over 
absolutism (Mondaini, 2003, p.116) in which a secular Bill of Rights (1689) limiting the 
power of the King was implemented in England (Mondaini, 2003, p.129). No doubt, this 
document, inspired by the Magna Carta and that remains one of the pillars of British legal 
system, presented limitations: for example, it gave power only to landowners; however, it 
was also the first consistent step to overcome the idea that individuals had only duties 
towards the King, since, from this, they also have rights (Mondaini, 2003, p.131). 
   
Improving this change in political consciousness, Locke‟s (1690) and Rousseau‟s (1750) 
developments of social contract theory do not appeal to the Hobbesian figure of a king 
politically (though not naturally) superior. In this way, they were theoretical inspirations for 
the American (1776) and French (1789) Revolutions. Both theoretical ideals and real 
movements, through neglecting the need for a king and reducing the importance of the 
Church, established the first formulation of contemporary secular democracies. 
 
Regarding this, Nussbaum justifies why the new idea of the social contract was so important 
in that period: 
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The tradition [of social contract] thus bequeaths to us a procedural understanding of political society in 
which the equal worth of persons and the value of reciprocity among them are central features. 
This understanding of political society is a prominent part of classical liberalism‟s assault on feudal and 
monarchical traditions. (2006, p.10-1) 
 
Somehow, it is possible to say that the Glorious, French and American Revolutions were the 
symbols of the culmination of a long shift in the socio-political paradigm in Western 
societies. The three main pillars that sustain current Western ideas of justice were finally 
joined in comprehensive political organisations: the main political value passed from an 
accepted natural inequality to the overall accepted idea of equal liberty; the political unity 
passed from patriarchal families‟ commitment to their city-states and feudal societies to 
individuals‟ sense of belonging to their nation-states; the political way to take decisions about 
public issues passed from different types of totalitarianisms to democracies.  
 
Only as a last observation, regarding the communal ties inherited from Christianity, it is 
fundamental to say that, if this doctrine reinforced communal and national spirits, it did not 
change significantly another very strong value of these societies: family ties. In parallel to the 
idea of community, the centrality of the family is still present. Actually, as also defended 
from a biological point of view (5.1), human beings are mammals and very dependent on 
their connections with their parents, especially with their mothers. Thus, family ties are 
hardly ignored by any real society. In the case of the Christian tradition, weddings are one of 
the most important celebrations, marriages are expected to be respected for all life, parents 
have special responsibilities towards their children (and vice-versa), etc. However, families 
are not considered any more monolithic blocks in which, for example, aggressions inside 
them are accepted by the rest of the community. The separation is now in between public and 
private (a space for special affection, for privacy, etc.), rather than in between public and 
domestic (a space where total inequality was the rule, at least until a recent past). 
 
2.5. Injustices in the post-revolutionary period 
 
However, against this idea of paradigm shift, the first criticism is quite obvious: the two main 
documents of that time – the US Constitution (1787) and the Declaration of Man and of the 
Citizen (1789) in France – were very restrictive regarding the scope of people they protected. 
For example, the US Constitution allowed slavery and denied political participation to 
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women and non-land owners. It seems the same type of restriction identified in Ancient 
societies. Nevertheless, the spirit of those documents allowed these minorities to invoke a 
type of society in which they have the same rights as affluent white men (Karnal, 2003, 
p.144). In the same way, it was based on the respect of Christian values and the respect of the 
Constitution that Martin Luther King, Jr., claimed, in the 1960s for equality of rights (Karnal, 
2003, p.151). Equally, it can be said that Enlightenment ideas inspired (at least the first and 
the second wave of) the feminist movement (Pinsky & Pedro, 2003, p.266) 
 
Thus, the claim that a political shift was completed after the three liberal revolutions 
mentioned does not imply that all ideals sustained by the new paradigm were (or are) fully 
applied in real Western societies. The idea of the individual in the eighteenth century was 
very abstract and real injustices were far from being eliminated (Karnal, 2003, p.143). 
However, an analogy with the Copernican Revolution is, once more, useful. When Newton 
consolidated this scientific revolution through presenting the law of universal gravitation 
(1687), he did not solve all astronomical challenges of that time. Many centuries of consistent 
advances of scientific knowledge in this area followed Newton‟s “discovery”20. The same is 
happening with advances in the three political pillars above mentioned: problems regarding 
social commitments, strong inequalities of liberty and inefficiency of democratic processes 
are evident in Western societies. 
 
In this way, though it is obvious that several injustices still have to be fixed within this 
paradigm, it is also true that this is an ongoing process. Analysing specifically English socio-
political development after the consolidation of this new socio-political order, Marshall 
(1950) presents an interesting portrait of the evolution of civil, political and social rights that 
are directly related to this. After the Glorious Revolution, the development of modern 
national consciousness in the eighteenth century consolidated the idea of equal civil rights. Of 
course, this did not mean that a just society was fully reached. However, it started to 
represent a sense of “loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession. It is a loyalty of 
free men endowed with rights and protected by a common law. Its growth is stimulated both 
by the struggle to win those rights and by their enjoyment when won” (Marshall, 1950, p.41). 
 
                                                          
20
 Actually, such a progress culminated in the Einsteinian Revolution, but this is another story. 
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According to Marshall, it was the first “logical” step towards a long journey from civil to 
political and then social (still ongoing) equal consideration in the public sphere. The 
nineteenth century was the century of the fight for political rights. Gradually, after the 
American and French Revolutions, both linked with the idea of democracy, the range of 
people allowed to vote in Western societies was increased. However, only after a strong fight 
for universal suffrage, at the beginning of the twentieth century, did European democracies 
include women and poor people in the democratic sphere. In the US, racial segregation 
further delayed the process, and only in the 1960s did the Civil Rights movement see 
progress for black people‟s real political rights, since they previously suffered several 
practical restrictions on access to voting. 
 
Finally, in the twentieth century, Marshall identified a logical movement based on popular 
participation in public decisions towards increasing social rights and reducing inequalities. In 
his words, “a general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilised life, a general 
reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalisation between the more and the less fortunate” 
(1950, p.56). Thus, the twentieth century was the century of the fight for social rights, what 
some call the century of citizenship (Coggiola, 2003, p.311). The idea of the welfare state 
was born in England in 1911 (Singer, 2003, p.237), though truly achieved only after the 
Second World War as a response to demands for compensating war efforts and pressures of 
socialist ideas (Singer, 2003, p.237-9). Thus, the 30 years between 1945 and 1975 were 
considered the golden age of social rights, the UK National Health System becoming a model 
of equal protection of all citizens‟ health for all Europe (Singer, 2003, p.251). 
 
From this development of social rights, it is possible to say that the idea of equality of 
opportunities, a concept developed in 4.1, has been consolidated in Western societies. For 
example, in UK, when the Prime Minister Theresa May, in the 2016 Conservative Party 
convention, reflected on the situation after Brexit, she appealed for the increasing of equality 
of opportunity for British citizens (of course, excluding immigrants)
21
. Representatives of the 
Labour party, in turn, disagree with her policies: they, for example, claim that the rich have 
many more opportunities than the poor, but they agree that equality of opportunities is one of 
the most important aims to be promoted by the state. In the US, it is in the basis of the 
“American dream”. This expression was coined by Adams, who said that it means “that 
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dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for everyone, with 
opportunity for each according to ability or achievement” (1931, p.214). The point, then, is 
not about the value defended, but about what equality of opportunities really means and how 
it should be implemented. 
 
According to this narrative, it is possible to identify the process of refinement of the main 
ideas that have founded the current Western paradigm. However, it is quite obvious that, 
though this narrative presents a logical development, none of these rights have been fully 
implemented in most of Western societies. Moreover, this picture is not sufficient for 
guaranteeing that this ongoing process is stable in its improvement. Thus, it is interesting to 
observe possible regressions related to these different rights and, in parallel, to reflect on 
whether the pace of the eventual advances is tolerable or if more drastic interventions are 
needed.  
 
Regarding this, it is fundamental to analyse how social rights were (not) developed from the 
1980s. For example, in the UK, after the mentioned golden age of social rights (1945-1975), 
a new era led by Thatcher (1979-1990) and her so-called “neoliberalism” is considered by 
many as a regression in these rights. According to some interpretations (Coggiola, 2003, 
p.339), these new policies – which were implemented at the same time in the US by Reagan 
(1981-1989) and spread to many Western countries – provoked a regression in social rights. 
Some other understandings that disagree with this idea (Singer, 2003, p.256), at least consider 
that neoliberalism made social rights‟ progress much slower (Singer, 2003, p.253).  
 
Actually, it seems a matter of fact that big multinational corporations pressure governments 
to reduce social rights.  Governments, afraid of “capital flight” from their borders, follow 
these corporations‟ “orders” (Coggiola, 2003, p.335). From this perspective, global 
neoliberalism would be a regression, since it eliminates the ethical dimension of social life 
(Luca, 2003, p.490). 
 
However, since political structures are still based on national sovereignty, this type of 
globalisation is creating several internal problems in Western societies. Nationalist discourse 
is joining left and right supporters, or, even worse, is making workers disbelieve in any 
political discourse. The idea of people‟s attachment to their nation is part of the current 
Western paradigm. Nonetheless, even Fukuyama, who, in 1989, claimed that liberalism had 
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won, now sees that bellicose nationalisms can challenge this order. Currently, Fukuyama is 
quite concerned with demagogue/populist nationalist leaders‟ promises that are beyond their 
scope of actions. In his view, taking the recent American elections, workers do not feel 
represented either by Republicans (committed to neoliberalism) nor by the Democrats 
(basically committed to identity minorities such as women, black people, the LGBT 
community, etc). In this scenario, an anti-establishment leader like Trump becomes the 
workers‟ symbol of hope22.  
 
Despite these regressions related to neoliberal or populist agendas, it is important to realise 
that political debates are still being grounded broad on Western ideas of equal liberty, 
communal/national responsibility and democratic procedures. Yet there is a mismatch or gap 
between ideal and real. Indeed, at the beginning of the twentieth century, after being asked 
about the project of Western civilisation, Gandhi joked that “it would be a good idea” 
(Fonseca, 2016, p.66). This mismatch is a source of instability and contributes to the apparent 
lack of legitimacy of Western regimes. For this reason, besides improving public policies, 
identifying civic virtues needs to connect ideal and real (chapter 8) and reflect on ways to 
cultivate them (chapters 9 to 12). This is fundamental in order to not stay paralysed by 
Gandhi‟s provocation.  
 
2.6. Reflective equilibrium and democracy 
 
After presenting these remaining injustices in the post-revolutionary period, Rawls‟ method 
of reflective equilibrium between theories (based on equal liberty and communal 
responsibility) and people‟s considered opinions (obtained by democratic procedures) seems 
an important way to improve these theories and considered judgments sustainably, through 
keeping stability. Regarding the pursuit of stability, Rawls considers stability for the right 
reasons – rather than based on oppression or brainwashing (1993, p.xiii), “in other words, not 
by mere habit or grudging acceptance, but because of a real endorsement of the principles and 
institutions of the society” (Nussbaum, 2013, p.8-9) – fundamental for the improvement of 
justice. According to him, analogously to natural sciences, which in periods of normality are 
developed based on scientists‟ trust in their paradigms, the development of justice depends on 
finding consensual (paradigmatic) political values and procedures. It is people‟s perception of 
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the respect of the institutions for these values and procedures that guarantees stability for the 
right reasons, and, therefore, legitimacy. In Western societies, there is a consensus towards 
equal liberty, communal/national responsibility and democratic processes, and this consensus 
makes reflective equilibrium even more fundamental than it is for the development of natural 
sciences. In sciences, reflective equilibrium between the main theories and ordinary scientists 
is a tool to protect the development of knowledge from the imposition of powerful interests 
(2.2). In the case of politics, listening to people‟s opinions is not only a powerful tool but also 
consensually accepted as the just process to develop political decisions. Based on this, Rawls‟ 
contribution to this reasoning is presented below and, in the conclusion, one type of 
equilibrium is achieved. 
 
To fully understand how Rawlsian reflective equilibrium is applied to discussions about 
justice, it useful to observe a shift in Rawls‟s political project. In A theory of Justice (1971), 
he imagined that, in essence (metaphysically), all individuals believe in and look for liberty in 
their public and private lives. However, in his latter works, he changed substantially the basis 
of his proposal and assumed that, in people‟s private lives, they do not necessary follow 
liberal values. Rawls‟ new argument takes as its starting point what he considers two political 
facts. The first one is that Western societies are reasonably plural, that is, people have 
different comprehensive beliefs which are equally strong and reasonable (2001, p.25). For 
instance, some believe in religious principles (Christian, Islamic, etc.), others have certain 
metaphysical but non-religious convictions, etc
23
. The second political fact is that, though 
individuals do not share the same comprehensive doctrine that gives meaning to their lives, 
they (at least citizens in contemporary Western societies) are reasonable and share the belief 
in democracy as a method to cope with these differences (2001, p.25) – again, a secular 
shared belief of Western people in consonance with what above is presented. In this way, 
they agree with the idea that all reasonable individuals have to be free to present their own 
opinions in the public debate. For this reason, it makes total sense to consider decisions made 
by democratic processes as more justified than those imposed by a dictator. 
 
                                                          
23
 This point does not contradict the claim made above that Western values were built over, among other things, 
Christian values. One thing is the history behind building Western political values, another is the fact that 
different cultures live in Western countries now and have to be respected. Obviously, since there is a reasonable 
consensus around what was historically built, all doctrines in Western countries have to conform to these 
minimal demands of equal liberty, communal/national responsibility and democracy.  
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These two ideas are closely related. The fact that most people are reasonable guarantees the 
proper functioning of democracy and makes them believe that democracy is the best political 
procedure. The spread of reasonableness is, then, fundamental for the consensus regarding 
democracy. Even assuming that people have different views on several things does not negate 
this. For example, a defender of the ontological superiority of a race or religious group is not 
part of a reasonable consensus and should not be admitted in the political debate – in the 
same way that a “mad scientist”, for example, an alchemist, is not legitimated in debates in 
the natural sciences. This “transcendental consensus” provides the basis for a reasonable 
political debate that, for instance, counterposes Rawls‟ idea of justice and the mere 
aggregation of people‟s preferences. (The centrality of this idea is discussed in 3.7.) 
 
It is within the realm of consensus, based on a broad idea of being responsible for 
guaranteeing co-citizens‟ equal liberty and reinforcing democratic processes, that – as in 
normal science (2.2) – new political puzzles can be created and solved. Social scientists can 
think of new experiments, and new social demands about specific political ideas can be 
clarified. People can also express their ideas more clearly. It is quite obvious that, if people 
want to advance the promotion of a more just state, it is not enough to accept vague ideas of 
community and equality of liberty. Chapter 4 proposes some directions for such a theoretical 
development. Here, the intention is only to defend the idea that democracy is the method 
which constitutes a virtuous circle with the basic ideas of communal responsibility and equal 
liberty – similarly to what is suggested by Goodman regarding natural sciences. 
 
In 2.2, it is suggested that science in general is not neutral and that “democratic” procedures 
which guide scientific activities can mitigate biased processes. Reflecting specifically on the 
contemporary Western values of communal responsibility and equal liberty, the appeal of 
democracy seems even more obvious. In order to consider peoples‟ communal 
responsibilities and equal liberty of all, societies have to have an open, equal space for all to 
effectively participate in public decisions. 
 
Rawls‟ first theoretical project, however, underestimated the actual democratic process. His 
first metaphysical assumption was that all citizens possess the powers of reason and 
reasonableness and, after achieving an individual back-and-forth reflective process (wide 
reflective equilibrium), would share the same considered judgments on how their society 
should be organised. Based on this, only a simulation of this democratic process of decision-
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making would be needed in order to design the basic structure of society. In A Theory of 
Justice, Rawls assumes that almost all individuals are reasonable and possess a sense of 
justice: they “have the ability, the opportunity, and the desire to reach a correct decision” 
(1999[1971], p.42). Thus, in that stage of his research, this internal back-and-forth reflective 
process (wide reflective equilibrium) was considered enough to give practical foundation to 
his theory. In his mind, he was using the same method as in natural science: the mitigation of 
biased research through openness to different theories. 
 
Nevertheless, Rawls realised that this wide reflective equilibrium did not favour a general 
social consensus, given the fact that societies are much more plural than he had originally 
considered and differing significantly from scientific communities. Thus, since a 
comprehensive doctrine cannot be imposed and since a consensus is a necessary condition for 
just stability, Rawls expanded his proposed dialogue between theory and practice, 
introducing the idea of a general reflective equilibrium. Through this, his aim was to reach 
stability for the right reasons. It is suggested above that almost all people consider that 
societies should be democratic. Then, accepting this and the fact that Western contemporary 
societies are very plural, Rawls‟ latter work proposes that political theories and the 
considered judgments of people should be balanced in two different ways: theoretically, 
through a reflection about different theories (wide reflective equilibrium), and in the public 
sphere, through a dialogue, based on the theory, between reasonable people (general 
reflective equilibrium) (2001, p.31). 
 
Rawls, thus, introduces into his theory this theoretical-practical sphere of dialogue, since he 
realises that the opinions of reasonable people, though based on different comprehensive 
doctrines, have to be balanced by theoretical reflections. If this real discussion is led in the 
right way, he thinks that the acceptance of what he calls “public reason” can be developed in 
all reasonable citizens. Scanlon defines this Rawlsian proposal as “a norm of political 
justification: a specification of the kind of justification that citizens must be able to offer in 
political discussion when constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice are at issue” 
(2003, p.160). 
 
Reducing his demands for agreement, Rawls understands that the overlapping consensus 
between reasonable individuals (the majority of the population) is increased and guarantees a 
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stable public space for discussions. In this way, it is wrong to imagine that Rawls is 
proposing the existence of a total consensus in the public sphere: 
 
[D]espite the impression to the contrary, encouraged by the term “overlapping consensus” and 
other reasons, political liberalism does not exclude or even unjustifiably restrict politics, and 
that it is consistent with politics of dissensus‟s empirical-historical and less normative 
approach to politics (Alnes, 2017, 838). 
 
Through this, Rawls‟ proposal is in accordance with a field of studies which says that 
“[d]issensus instead of consensus then becomes the raison d’être, the conceptual condition 
for the intelligibility of parliamentary [but also ordinary] politics” (Palonen et al, 2014, p.2). 
Thus, it is important to realise that “political liberalism gives a model for the logic and limits 
of deliberation and it is not a consensus theory of politics” (Alnes, 2017, p.838).  
 
Of course, total consensus is impossible and even unhealthy. Expecting this agreement is 
defending the existence of (or the hope for) a “super” comprehensive doctrine, something 
denied by Rawls. Moreover, societies evolve from disagreement, which is a standard norm in 
the political sphere. Rawls, getting closer to the famous argument of Mill, says: 
 
[T]he ideal of public reason does not often lead to general agreements of views, nor should it. 
Citizens learn and profit from conflict and argument, and when their arguments follow public 
reason, they instruct and deepen society‟s public culture (1996[1993], p.lvii). 
 
Obviously, many times, disagreements happen because one side is simply wrong about an 
issue. Rawls, however, thinks that the right side has to develop ways to understand people‟s 
limitations on seeing the “truth”. In his view, political knowledge is very complex and there 
are burdens of judgment (1993, p.54-8) that have to be understood. When Rawls analyses 
discussions related to the just redistribution of goods, for example, he says that this is far 
from being simple, since it is not easy to identify the best way to improve the lives of the 
worst-off – in his view, the correct criterion of redistribution. A further reflection on criteria 
of redistribution of goods is explored in chapter 4, but it is already possible to agree with the 
importance of taking seriously people‟s difficulty to judge correctly (burdens of judgment) in 
order to develop a healthy democracy. 
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On the other hand, constitutional bases have to be consensual. Thus, Rawls understands that 
all contemporary Western societies need constitutions based on these values (1993, p.227). 
As developed in 3.2, he proposes that, within the public sphere, individuals have to respect 
both basic constitutional values and a reasonable pluralism about other less consensual ideas. 
Constitutional values come directly from the established paradigm. Other disputed ideas are 
transformed through laws and put into practice depending on what is decided democratically 
in the public sphere, the space in which theories and people‟s beliefs are in dialogue through 
this wide and general reflective equilibrium. As explored in 2.6, this Rawlsian approach 
seems to be less idealised than the kind of deliberation proposed by Habermas (1981; 1998). 
The latter suggests that, if the deliberative process is well achieved, consensus is always 
reachable. Rawls sees consensus about some values, but admits that there are many issues 
that belong to a sphere in which dissensus is always present. 
 
However, though the approach that sustains this thesis is inspired by the Rawlsian proposal, it 
suggests a slightly different understanding of these two reflective equilibria. Following Mills 
(Pateman & Mills, 2007), it is claimed that wide reflective equilibrium, instead of only taking 
into account different theories of justice exclusively based on normative approaches 
(utilitarianism, egalitarian liberalism, libertarianism, etc.), should consider sociological, 
psychological, economic and historical understandings of the society analysed. In this sense, 
this balance is named here “ideal-non-ideal” reflective equilibrium. This balance is different 
from the general or, as named by this thesis, “theoretical-practical” reflective equilibrium, 
which puts in dialogue the results of this first equilibrium and people‟s and governments‟ 
positions about justice in public sphere. Figure 9 is useful to clarify how these two equilibria 
are understood by the present work: 
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Figure 9 
 
Mills (2005) suggests developing the ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium through taking 
into account empirical knowledge in the theoretical reasoning and, then, enriching public 
debate. The importance of this idea is explored in 3.8 and some empirical data are presented 
in chapters 5 and 6. Nevertheless, this agreement also depends on how the methodology 
associated with theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium is presented. For the purposes of 
this methodological analysis, Sen‟s ideas regarding the improvement of social choice theory 
and Habermas‟ idea of deliberative democracy are investigated. As also shown in 3.7, 
reflections on these ideas are essential for the development of the back-and-forth process of 
reflective equilibrium and democracy.  
 
Actually, the idea of this thesis is to develop some theoretical reflections from ideal 
reflections and empirical observations in order to help ordinary people‟s and policymakers‟ 
real reflection on justice. In addition, the aim is also to propose ways to develop in these 
ordinary people and policymakers civic virtues that help them to better reflect on justice. In 
this way, when applied, the proposed theories of justice and citizenship curriculum end up 
establishing a virtuous circle which serves to improve both.  
 
2.7. Education and theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium 
 
The reflection on how to create equilibrium between theory and practice orients the 
discussion towards identifying civic virtues that make this dialogue possible (chapter 8). 
People‟s good will towards promoting justice is not enough if individuals do not have clarity 
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and determination to improve social institutions. In democratic states, changing unjust 
institutions depends on people‟s perception of these injustices and their initiative to act 
towards changing them. On the other hand, though states are founded by potentially just 
institutions, if their individuals have not developed important civic virtues, these institutions 
are in danger, and injustices are perpetuated in practical situations. For example: 
 
If white and black people (or Protestants and Catholics, long-time residents and recent 
immigrants, etc.) tolerated but did not respect each other, for example, then they would „live 
and let live‟, but presumably not hire each other, attend similar private schools, or socialize 
together. (Levinson, 1999, p.103) 
 
Assuming that there is a consensus regarding the importance of avoiding this, and supposing 
that these virtues are, at least partially, not innate, the task is thinking of how to cultivate 
them. Civic virtues are cultivated in different ways: through family, media, community‟ 
interactions, schooling, etc. (Levinson, 1999, p.7) Sandel, for example, calls attention to the 
importance of public spaces in this process (2009, p.267). 
 
This thesis restricts its investigation to how schools can contribute to this. Levinson connects 
the idea of sharing spaces with two points presented above, the importance of active public 
participation and peoples‟ internalisation of values defended theoretically and institutionally. 
Moreover, she considers that this intervention is fundamental to guarantee the stability of 
Western regimes based on a communal spirit and equal liberty in which public decisions are 
taken democratically (1999, p.101-2). This thesis agrees with this point and with Levinson‟s 
claim that, since “civic identity is „thick‟” encompassing “a complex combination of 
commitments, practices, beliefs, rituals, etc.”, “a common curriculum, including a common 
language or languages, history, and literature, a common civic identity” is needed to 
guarantee the social integration referred to above
24
  (1999, p.133). Formal civic education is, 
thus, fundamental. 
 
Having introduced the importance of schooling for cultivating civic virtues, and given the 
fact that the approach of reflective equilibrium is discussed in this chapter, it is important to 
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 Reflecting specifically on the Brazilian reality, as discussed in chapter 6, there are many issues regarding 
social integration that have to be discussed. Though, in Brazil, a vast majority of people speaks the same 
language, this country presents an obvious problem of integration associated with a huge socio-economic gap, 
lack of common spaces, and lack of knowledge about historical reasons behind inequalities. 
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note that reflective equilibrium also inspires the way that this thesis reflects on civic 
education. Knowledge about how to cultivate citizenship can be seen as something in 
between knowledge about natural sciences and about justice. Then, since it is defended that 
reflective equilibrium is an appropriate approach to develop knowledge about natural 
sciences and justice, it is also defended that knowledge about citizenship curriculum should 
be developed through this.   
 
It is suggested in 2.2 that, in the natural sciences, reflective equilibrium happens between 
principal and minor researchers. In 2.4, on the other hand, it is defended that theoretical-
practical (or general) reflective equilibrium about justice has to happen between experts, 
policymakers and ordinary people. Regarding knowledge about citizenship education, this 
thesis also defends a dialogue between experts and a larger group of people involved with the 
process. However, it is proposed that the group of “non-experts” has to be larger than the 
group of minor scientists, but smaller than the whole population. Observing school 
communities‟ dynamics and interviewing its members (head teachers, teachers, students and 
parents) seems to be a good way to balance what theories about citizenship curriculum 
propose. Subsequently, a feasible theory of curriculum can be proposed. 
 
*** 
 
Chapter 2 proposes an analogy between Kuhn‟s proposal of scientific revolutions, a certain 
understanding of the development of sciences, and the development of ideas of justice in 
Western societies. From this analogy, it is proposed that Western societies live a period of 
normality/stability with regard to their general understanding of justice. The history of the 
development of these societies is presented in order to claim that this stability is based on 
three pillars: communal/national responsibility and equal liberty (basic ideas) and democracy 
(basic method) that are the result of the liberal revolutions. This does not mean that there is 
nothing to be improved. However, the existence of this paradigm favours the improvement of 
these ideas through achieving the two reflective equilibria proposed: an ideal-non-ideal 
equilibrium outlined by this thesis, and a theoretical-practical one achieved in public sphere 
and favoured by certain knowledge proposed here. This is the approach that orients the 
development of the next chapters.  
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PART TWO: JUSTICE  
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3. Foundations of egalitarian liberalism: the hypothetical social contract 
and reflections about democratic procedures 
 
After reflecting on what are the main values that define the Western ethos, this chapter 
investigates how they are assimilated by political philosophy by showing that hypothetical 
social contract theory is in consonance with people‟s right to equal liberty and their 
communal/social responsibility towards co-citizens, and that social choice theory and 
deliberative democracy help to develop democratic procedures. Thus, initially, (3.1) equality 
is defended as prior to liberty in reflections on justice, though liberty is presented as the good 
that has to be equally distributed in a just society. From this, (3.2) classical social contract 
theory is proposed as a strong candidate to ground the understanding of principles which give 
basis to constitutional principles. Then, different criticisms against this theory are put in 
dialogue with Rawls‟ defence of the hypothetical contract. Firstly, (3.3) the defence of 
maximisation of utility and Rawls‟ response based on people‟s individual rights are 
presented. Next, (3.4) Rawls‟ incorporation of the communitarian claim towards a “holistic” 
view of society based on people‟s duties towards co-citizens is discussed. Then, (3.5) Sen‟s 
opposition to closeness and parochialism of contract theory and (3.6) to Rawlsian 
transcendentalism are presented and responded to. However, though these criticisms are 
arguable, there are two improvements from the capabilities approach that must be considered. 
On the one hand, (3.7) Sen‟s social choice theory and Rawls‟ and Habermas‟ vindications of 
deliberation in the public sphere are seen as fundamental to improve democratic processes to 
sustain the liberal project. On the other, (3.8) Mills‟ defence of non-idealised theories, which 
highlights the importance of expanding the observation of factual injustices in order to build a 
theory, is considered as a very important development of Rawls‟ idealised theory. This 
reflection orients the conclusion that (3.9) transcendental and political liberties are those that, 
consensually, have to be equally guaranteed for all citizens. 
 
3.1. Priority of equalising liberty 
 
Regarding the principles of liberty and equality, it is common sense to consider them as 
rivals. From the Russian Revolution to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world was divided by 
two economical models: capitalism and socialism. The free market and the planned economy 
symbolise their extremes. Roughly speaking, free market supporters consider individual 
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liberty of entrepreneurship as the fundamental value to be preserved within a society. In this 
model, the government must have minimum interference in people‟s lives allowing them to 
exercise their free will. Defenders of the planned economy, also presented in a simplified 
way, sustain that the correct social organisation must be founded on the promotion of equality 
of material resources among citizens and that the government should have a strong and 
centralised role in this process. However, the former can say that they are also concerned 
with equality, since the free market guarantees that the free will of all is equally respected, 
while the latter can say that they truly promote liberty through guaranteeing to people the 
minimal material conditions to be free. In between these two extremes, it is possible to 
identify several models that try to balance some redistribution of wealth and opportunities to 
people, also allowing free enterprise, as discussed in 4.2. 
 
However, is the integration of equality and liberty a matter of gradation? Sen does not think 
so. According to him, it is possible to solve this dispute between equality and liberty by 
realising that they are not opposite principles, but rather inter-related ones. Sen claims that: 
 
strictly speaking, posing the problem in terms of [the contrast between liberty and equality] 
reflects a „category mistake‟. They are not alternatives. Liberty is among the possible fields of 
application of equality, and equality is among the possible patterns of distribution of liberty 
(1992, p. 22-3). 
 
Moreover, Dworkin claims that, at least for those committed to the values of contemporary 
Western societies, there is an evident priority of equality over liberty (2000, p.128). An 
intuition based on historical orientation of moral and civic values makes Sen also claims that 
“every normative theory of social arrangement that has at all stood the test of time seems to 
demand equality of something” (1992, p.12), a rephrased way to mention his famous idea of 
“equality of what” (1980). According to him, “[t]he absence of such equality would make a 
theory arbitrarily discriminative and hard to defend” (1992, p.17). Regarding this, Sen adds: 
 
[T]he need to justify disparate advantages of different individuals in things that matter […] 
frequently takes the form of showing the integral connection of that inequality with equality 
in some other important – allegedly more important – space. (1992, p.18-9) 
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As explored in 2.4, “[u]ntil the eighteenth century, it was assumed that human beings are 
unequal by nature – i.e., that there was a natural human hierarchy. This postulate collapsed 
with the advent of the idea of natural right and its assumption of an equality of natural order 
among all human beings” (GOSEPATH, 2007). 
 
Several theories of justice are anchored in different ideas of distribution of distinct specific 
goods. The most simplistic thesis claims that everyone should have the same income. The 
famous communist motto quoted by Marx, “[f]rom each according to his ability, to each 
according to his needs” (1891, p.11), goes in this direction, though takes into account the 
proportionality of people‟s needs. On the other extreme, there is a theory that supports that 
only civil and political liberties should be equally guaranteed by the state. According to 
libertarians, such as Nozick (1974), there is no reason for limiting legal and civic liberties, 
but any attempt to redistribute goods is against people‟s natural right over their property. In 
between these two extremes, substantive equality of opportunities that tries eliminating (or at 
least reducing considerably) natural and social differences is proposed. The liberal egalitarian 
tradition (Rawls, 1971; 1993; Roemer, 1998; Dworkin, 2000; Sen, 2009a; Nussbaum, 2011, 
and so on) presents different formulations to this.  
 
From this analysis, it seems that all theories already presented, from different perspectives, 
are concerned with guaranteeing equal liberty for all. Why should equal income be 
guaranteed if not to allow people equal liberty to do what they want? Why should more be 
given to the most needy if not for the same reason? Why should property be protected if not 
to guarantee the equal liberty of people to do what they want with their goods? Why should 
equal opportunities be promoted if not for giving to all people equal liberty to decide their 
own destinies? Why should equal political participation be assured if not to give all the same 
voice (equal liberty) in public affairs?  
 
Thus, different theories are compatible with the historical analysis presented in 2.4 that there 
is a consensus amongst Western individuals that “liberty” must be the “good” equally 
distributed in society
25
. The importance given by people to liberty, however, can be 
questioned. Dostoyevsky (1880) reflects on this through the fable of The Great Inquisitor. 
This passage of The Brothers Karamazov describes a hypothetical meeting between an 
                                                          
25
 This claim is strong. Transcendental liberty, the type of liberty that should be equally distributed, is better 
defined in 3.9. 
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inquisitor of the Catholic Church and Christ in the fifteenth century. In this meeting, the 
inquisitor accuses Christ and God of making human beings desire liberty without being able 
to deal with it. Thus, the inquisitor defends that the Church‟s “brainwashing” is good for 
humankind, that clergymen are the real humankind saviours. In his words: 
 
Oh, never, never will [human beings] feed themselves without us! No science will give them 
bread while yet they are free, but the end of it will be that they will bring us their freedom and 
place it at our feet and say to us: „Enslave us if you will, but feed us.‟ At last they themselves 
will understand that freedom and earthly bread in sufficiency for all are unthinkable together, 
for never, never will they be able to share between themselves! (2007[1880], p.277) 
 
This description puts a choice between liberty and food. However, when Rawls talks about 
justice, he considers that such a choice does not exist. According to him, a theory of justice 
only makes sense under circumstances of “moderate scarcity” in which “[n]atural and other 
resources are not so abundant that schemes of cooperation become superfluous, nor are 
conditions so harsh that fruitful ventures must inevitably break down” (1999[1971], p. 110). 
 
However, though this extreme situation is discarded and liberty is taken as the good to be 
equally guaranteed, this concept is very complex and allows different understandings. Thus, 
it is not simple to define in which direction a society should go in order to promote an equal 
distribution of liberty. The following sections advance on this point. 
 
3.2. Social contract and constitutional principles 
 
In 2.4, equal liberty, communal responsibilities and democracy are presented as ideas 
historically developed in Western countries (not necessarily only in these countries) and align 
with “very strong” principles, normally expressed by their current constitutions. It is very 
difficult for individuals (or their representatives) to change this situation. That means that 
constitutional principles are not changed by ordinary democratic processes. These processes 
eventually serve to change governments, but not to change the main principles that orient the 
nations.  
 
Of course, throughout history, several constitutions have been rewritten or amended. Such 
processes, however, are exceptional and normally demand strong popular mobilisation. 
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Unlike ordinary laws, constitutional principles are based on tradition and, though they are not 
totally above current political debate (it is unusual, but shared beliefs can change with time), 
they tend to be agreed upon by different political groups – which, mostly only interpret these 
principles differently. 
 
As equally investigated in chapter 2, the existence of a consensus (paradigm) is as helpful in 
sciences as it is in politics, since it guarantees the stability needed to refine, respectively, 
“truth” and “justice”. Regarding reflections on “truth” in natural sciences, Kuhn (1962), 
defends that periods of normality, when a paradigm is widely accepted by a scientific 
community, are beneficial for the improvement of that area. Through the agreement of a main 
theory, scientists can join forces in order to refine the knowledge that comes from it. In 
Rawls‟ theory (1971, 1993, 2001), this stability comes from an “overlapping consensus” of 
basic ideas, though he admits lots of dissensus regarding several important discussions, from 
abortion (1999b, p.169) to redistribution of wealth (1993, p.229-30). In this sense, 
constitutions – the symbol of overlapping consensus – give stability for the current political 
debate.  
 
Having said that, it is necessary to better understand the meanings of equal liberty, 
communal/social responsibility and democracy, upon which Western constitutions are 
founded. This section associates such values with a strong theoretical idea. Social contract 
theory claims that fair states are founded on some type of consensus of free people, rather 
than being grounded on arbitrary principles (or based on the wishes of one dictator). 
 
The three founding fathers of the social contract theory are Hobbes (1651), Locke (1690) and 
Rousseau (1750). Locke basically endorses a seminal idea proposed by Hobbes: 
 
Men being, […] by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this 
estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way 
whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, 
is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community, for their comfortable, safe, 
and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a 
greater security against any that are not of it. (Locke, 2003[1690], p.141-2.) 
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However, despite this common idea, Locke differs significantly from Hobbes, since the latter 
starts with the premise that human beings are egoists, while the former considers that 
individuals are concerned about the good of the others (Nussbaum, 2006, p.35). Rousseau 
(1750), suspicious of individuals‟ behaviour in society, suggests that a “general will” should 
be developed in order to avoid egoism and allow people to cooperate in a way that benefits 
all, through defining common goals. For this reason, democracy and moral education play a 
central role in his project. Thus, Rousseau‟s (1762) particular defence on how to educate and 
control people is considered “non-liberal”, and philosophers like Nussbaum say that he does 
“not conceive of the social contract as a contract among independent individuals” and is 
therefore in opposition to “liberal theorists [like] Locke and Kant” (2006, p.25). 
 
In fact, Rawls and other contemporary sympathisers of social contract like Nussbaum 
establish some limits to the liberal project. Equal liberty, communal responsibility and 
democracy – central ideas in their view of social contract theory – are combined through 
cultivating civic virtues, that is, through avoiding neutrality regarding moral/civic education. 
In other words, according to these social contract theorists, a just social organisation is the 
result of mutual agreement among all citizens, based on their freedoms of choice and their 
sense of belonging to a communal project, both built through the educational process. This 
claim indicates that the social contract is dependent on people‟s civic virtues, something 
presented in order to answer certain criticisms against the idea of contract. 
 
3.3. Utilitarianism and hypothetical contract 
 
However, before exploring how the acceptance of social contract theory is dependent on 
people‟s possession of civic virtues, it is interesting to analyse several criticisms of its 
classical format and some of Rawls‟ reinterpretations of social contract. It is possible to start 
such an analysis by understanding the distrust in the applicability of tacit contract and the 
solution offered by utilitarianism to it. Of course, people are born in states already constituted 
and they do not have the option to disagree with them. “In fact, all major social contract 
theorists – Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau – rely in different ways on arguments based on tacit 
consent. Here the central thought is that by quietly enjoying the protection of the state one is 
giving it one‟s tacit consent” (Wolff, 1996, p.46). Hume (1748), however, claimed that this 
tacit consent with the state‟s laws does not make sense, since common people do not have a 
real alternative of abandoning their original states if they disagree with them. In Hume‟s time, 
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as today though to a much lesser extent, it is difficult for an individual to move away from 
their country of birth. Thus, to say that people agree with the idea of a social contract, 
additional reasoning is needed. 
 
This lack of guarantee that people tacitly agree with the social contract gives way to a 
solution beyond tacit consent. Bentham (1780) introduced classical utilitarianism, a theory 
that dominated philosophical discussions for two centuries – and, at least in the field of 
economics, still has many supporters – and relegated social contract theory to a secondary 
role. This new theory, in its classical format, presented two main characteristics. First, 
utilitarianism considers pleasure (well-being, happiness, etc.) and not liberty as the main 
good human beings look to achieve. Moreover, because of this, people‟s consent on the 
state‟s decisions is also considered less important (actually, this is not a Bentham‟s real 
concern). Thus, classic utilitarianism is focused on the maximisation of pleasure and not on 
consent about how the state should be organised. Rawls summarises classical utilitarianism 
by claiming that its “main idea is that society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its 
major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction 
summed over all the individuals belonging to it” (1999[1971], p.20). Thus, classical 
utilitarians do not demand that such social arrangement be promoted democratically, since it 
is most important for them to increase the average satisfaction of individuals
26
. In this sense, 
the problem of consent is solved and there is no need to create conditions for people to 
abandon their states, since the best situation for all would be guaranteed. 
 
However, amongst political philosophers, this theory started losing sustainability, as it allows 
obvious injustices and does not present a real concern with social stability. According to 
classical utilitarianism, some people, at least theoretically, could be made slaves (or receive 
very low salaries, etc.) if doing so improves people‟s average well-being. This obviously 
promotes an unacceptable lack of consideration of individuals‟ dignity. Moreover, this 
practice would promote social instability, since oppressed people would develop awareness 
of their lack of liberty and dignity and eventually not accept this situation.  
 
                                                          
26
 Classical utilitarianism is being mentioned instead of investigating more complex utilitarian proposals. Mill, 
for example, inserts demands on liberty and democracy in his theory and takes “utility in a largest sense, 
grounded on the permanent interest of men as a progressive being.” (1859). (A further reflection aligns Mill‟s 
ideas with virtue ethics (Sandel, 2009), but such analysis is out of the scope of this thesis.) 
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Giving this scenario, Rawls (1971) reinserts the central idea of equal liberty associated to 
social contract theory, but adds something new to the notion of people‟s free agreement. 
Instead of developing a reasoning based on the tacit agreement among real people, he defends 
a theory based on a hypothetical contract. His innovative proposal suggests that people 
should imagine themselves in a fictional original position of putting their own life plans into 
practice, though they are covered by a “veil of ignorance” which inhibits them from knowing 
their positions in society (1999[1971]). Thus, this idea takes into account the two main 
current Western political values investigated in 2.4 that sustain all this reasoning: equal 
liberty, since all people are morally allowed to seek their own life plans; and communal 
responsibility, since, by accepting institutions built through this veil mechanism, all people 
agree to not only defend their own privileges. These two values ground theories of justice, 
while democracy is the political procedure accepted in West to guarantee the effectiveness of 
these values. Through respecting people‟s right to follow their own life plans, their liberty 
and dignity are guaranteed and stability is reached. 
 
3.4. Communitarianism and hypothetical contract 
 
However, there are criticisms against social contract theory closely related to a problem 
identified by communitarians. They defend a “holistic” view of the ontology of societies 
through which social organisations are taken as organic wholes, rather than an “atomistic” 
understanding of societies, in which societies are seen as a mere aggregate of individuals 
(atoms) (Sandel, 1982; Taylor, 1995a). Communitarian thinkers such as MacIntyre (1981) 
and Sandel (1982) defend that the feeling of belonging to a community (eventually a nation) 
comes before the consent of individuals. In this sense, communitarians are not necessarily 
against the idea of a social contract, but they consider that people‟s attachments to their 
communities come prior to the idea of contract. Actually, this idea converges with the 
suggestion that communal responsibilities are the basis of Western contemporary shared 
beliefs.  
 
More radically, Pateman
27
 sees the metaphor of the contract as useless to describe social 
relations based on justice, as she criticises the identification of social contract with something 
similar to the atomism mentioned above. Aligned with Hegel‟s (1820) description of civil 
                                                          
27
 Pateman is not clearly identified with communitarianism. However, her point against classic social contract is 
based on typical communitarian interpretation. 
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society in opposition to the state, Pateman understands contracts as simulations of consents of 
self-interested people. Thus, “[c]ontract has a valuable commercial place, but […] it should 
be kept in that place […] and to insist that „contract‟ is the metaphor for a free society is a 
very narrow view of humans and what they create” (Pateman & Mills, 2007, p.15). 
According to Pateman, the excessive individualism symbolised by the idea of contract is the 
main problem of this theory. 
 
Contractualists like Hobbes surely sustain their theories in an atomistic view. Certain readers 
of Rawls identify the same characteristic in his project. The two main reasons for this 
understanding are: Rawls‟ definition of a just society as “a cooperative venture for mutual 
advantage” (1999[1971], p.4); and the suggestion that, under the veil, individuals seek self-
advantage (1999[1971], p.123). In this sense, Rawls would be departing from a similar 
premise used by Hobbes. Nevertheless, this understanding is wrong. According to Nussbaum 
(2006, p.64), the “Veil of Ignorance is intended as an abstract model of benevolence. [Rawls] 
explicitly says that, by combining self-interest with ignorance, he hopes to get results that 
approximate to what we would get from benevolence with full information (TJ 148–149)”. In 
order to avoid this confusion, in Rawls‟ Political Liberalism (1993), “the locution „a 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage‟ is replaced by „society as a fair system of 
cooperation over time‟ (14 and elsewhere), and mutual advantage is not mentioned” 
(Nussbaum, 2006, p.59) 
 
Gauthier (1986), a neo-Hobbesian, through denying this Rawlsian abstract appeal to 
benevolence, imagines that individuals would accept to cooperate based only on their self-
interest, because, in the end, the result of cooperation would be good for them. Nevertheless, 
in a society where only self-interest is stimulated and civic values are not considered, some 
individuals or groups would probably be excluded. It is easy to imagine – and identify in our 
realities – obviously unjust societies in which rich people live in luxurious gated 
communities, while poor people live without any social benefit. Regarding this problem, 
Rawls proposes something different. His theory appeals to an intuition of the idea of justice – 
with historical roots – that respects people‟s life plans but limits their self-interest. This 
appeal makes Rawls‟ theory dependent on a certain sense of compassion/benevolence linked 
with a communal responsibility. This dependence can be better understood through the 
development of these concepts in chapter 7. 
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Thus, Rawls‟ reinterpretation of the social contract embodies the communitarian claim to 
consider people‟s communal attachment before the idea of contract. It is this attachment that 
produces the feeling of benevolence towards co-citizens. Only if individuals somehow feel 
responsible for their co-citizens they will accept to imagine society covered by the veil of 
ignorance. The idea of contract, however, serves to respect people‟s liberty to define their life 
plans. In this sense, it provides a reasonable answer to Pateman‟s accusation that the 
metaphor of contract is always associated with pure self-interest. For example, the appeal to 
the veil of ignorance in political reasoning allows arguments for protecting poor people from 
self-interested individuals who are only concerned in locking themselves in gated 
condominiums ignoring the rest of the society. 
 
3.5. Impartial spectator and contract focused on the nation 
 
Sen, contrary to the previous criticisms, appeals to a bipartition between two groups of 
Enlightenment thinkers to criticise the idea of contract. According to him: 
 
The [contractarian] approach has two distinct features. First, it concentrates its attention on 
what it identifies as perfect justice, rather than on relative comparisons of justice and 
injustice. […] Second, in searching for perfection, transcendental institutionalism 
concentrates primarily on getting the institutions right, and it is only indirectly concerned with 
the societies that would ultimately emerge. […] 
In contrast to the social contract approach, a number of other Enlightenment theorists took a 
variety of comparative approaches that were concerned primarily with removing identifiable 
injustices in the world – such as slavery, or bureaucracy-induced poverty, or cruel and 
counterproductive penal codes, or rampant exploitation of labor, or the subjugation of women. 
(2009b, p.xv-xvi). 
 
This distinction allows Sen to present two criticisms against contractualism: closeness to 
“other people‟s interests”; and “underscrutinized parochialism of values and presumptions in 
the local community” (2009b, p.xviii). In order to understand these criticisms, it is important 
to reflect on how Sen appeals to Smith‟s idea of impartiality, also defined here as fairness. 
Impartiality/fairness, at least in Western cultures, is strongly associated with the Christian 
golden rule “as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise” (Luke 
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6:31
28
)
29
. During the Enlightenment, Smith and Kant gave slightly different interpretations of 
this principle. Kant kept the idea of social contract, while Smith proposed his impartial 
spectator to guarantee such fairness. 
 
Sen sees an advantage in Smith‟s proposal, since its impartiality/fairness is open, while social 
contract restricts this concept to a certain culture. This attitude would expand people‟s 
concerns towards foreigners and present a plurality of ideas that go further than parochial 
notions of justice. Through the impartial spectator device, we would “view our sentiments 
from „a certain distance from us‟ […] scrutinizing not only the influence of vested interest, 
but also the impact of entrenched tradition and custom” (2009a, p.45). Appealing to this basic 
principle of justice, Sen intends to deal with issues not contemplated by social contract 
theory.  
 
However, Sen‟s point against what he calls closed impartiality of Kantian/Rawlsian social 
contract can be countered by saying that some closeness is needed, since the heuristic device 
behind the reasoning about impartiality/fairness aims to simulate the establishment of 
constitutions that are restricted to local nations. In the end, decisions are taken within nation-
states where people pay taxes, vote and receive benefits. Since most individuals‟ political 
actions happen within the nation-state sphere, it makes sense that the theoretical reasoning 
regarding justice takes the nation as the main limit for reflections in this way. Challenging 
this view, cosmopolitans say that people‟s political actions should reach the whole of 
humankind. However, even if they have a moral point associated with a philosophical 
idealism, this goes against some world social structures based in nation-states built in the last 
centuries (4.3).  
 
Regarding this, Ben-Porath claims that “nations are not a philosophical necessity, but a 
political reality that philosophers who focus on politics must contend with”, because the 
“nation-state provides a unique set of opportunities [of belonging] that neither global nor 
subnational forms of membership currently provide” (2013, p.81-2). She departs from a 
factual observation in order to derive normative political implications. The idea is that 
individuals have to feel some commitment towards their national co-citizens, not because 
                                                          
28
 King James‟ version: http://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/ 
29
 This claim does not mean that other cultures do not have different narratives to defend the same principle. For 
example, “When Confucius was asked for a single word that summed up morality, he responded, „Is not 
reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.‟” (Bloom, 2013, p.212) 
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they have some natural duty associated with the same religion, ethnicity, etc., but exactly 
because they are gregarious, and were accidentally born within the same political structure. 
Ben-Porath calls this accident a “shared fate” and argues that “by understanding citizenship 
as a matter of shared fate, we can achieve a rich view of commonality while simultaneously 
respecting the depth diversity in a pluralistic democracy” (2013, p.84). 
 
Nussbaum‟s criticism against the exclusion of foreigners in social contract supports the view 
of those who consider her a defender of cosmopolitan citizenship (Callan, 2004, p.77-80). 
However, even Nussbaum recognises the relevance of patriotism, which she defines as “a 
strong emotion taking the nation as its object […] It is a form of love, and thus distinct from 
simple approval, or commitment, or embrace of principles […] This love involves the feeling 
that the nation is one‟s own” (2013, p.208).  As she understands it, the love from which 
patriotism derives is important because it inspires people to “support the common good in 
ways that it involves sacrifice” (2013, p.209). According to her, “good patriotism” is based 
on a kind of compassion that makes individuals “stand for the well-being of all people” 
(2013, p.210), within the nation‟s frontier or outside it. In this sense, Nussbaum 
acknowledges the major importance of patriotism for the health of nations and democracies 
and advocates that people should be educated so they may develop good patriotism. Agreeing 
with this, the present thesis defends that patriotism, if properly cultivated, is the key to the 
development of communal responsibilities which are important to improve the lives of people 
within the nations.  
 
Of course, it also makes sense to think of global justice and moral duties towards foreigners. 
However, world justice is far from being reached and it is not clear on which basis it should 
be founded. Thus, problems as climate change, human trafficking, fiscal paradises, however 
important to be known by global citizens, are not under the scope of this thesis. Different 
ways to expand people‟s concerns towards foreigners have been proposed. Nussbaum (2013) 
talks about cosmopolitan education. Sen (2009) appeals for the idea of the impartial 
spectator. On the other hand, the debate above is focused on theoretical justifications for 
constitutional principles, and an idea of world constitution is far from being a reality.  
 
Besides this discussion on the importance of patriotism, it is possible to reply to Sen‟s 
criticism against the closeness of social contract by saying that it does not necessarily 
generate parochialism. World-wide communication is a reality and the hypothetical contract 
73 
 
does not demand that nations only follow their internal practices. In this way, ideas outside 
Western cultures – for example, less consumption and more connection with nature – can 
improve Western societies‟ principles of justice. In the information technology era, people 
from the most diverse parts of the world – including from non-Western cultures – are 
connected. Information spreads quickly and, now more than ever, it is possible for people 
from different cultures to share their own values and customs and to somehow be close to 
each other. Modern world Western nations are not isolated from the rest of the world. Thus, 
the idea of a hypothetical contract does not exclude the possibility of viewing and considering 
distant points of view.  
 
In addition to these responses to Sen‟s criticisms, it is also possible to address a criticism 
against how Sen uses the idea of the impartial spectator. The exercise of the impartial 
spectator requires individuals to engage in an impossible process of constant scrutiny of their 
moral judgments, since it entails people continually judging their own moral decisions as if 
they were not part of their own community or nation, in other words, as if they were an 
outsider. On the other hand, a collective decision that inspires the model of hypothetical 
contract, which is also founded on an impartiality device – the veil of ignorance – seems to be 
a more effective approach. Through simulating real-decision-making practices, such a device 
allows people to understand their societies‟ foundations and their rights and duties towards 
their co-citizens. 
 
3.6. Transcendentalism 
 
Related to his previous point, Sen also criticises what he calls “transcendental theories of 
justice”. Sen understands that “transcendental” theoretical projects pay little attention to 
people‟s real understandings of this issue (2009a, p.xi-xii).  Then, Sen focuses his ideas on 
how to improve democratic processes and to address obvious injustices. Thus, he is 
concerned with presenting a set of basic rules (impartiality) and a theoretical approach (social 
choice theory) behind the idea of equal liberty. In this way, it is correct to say that Sen does 
not develop a theory, unlike Rawls and Nussbaum, who propose, respectively, three 
principles of justice and a list of ten central capabilities
30
.  
                                                          
30
 Nussbaum is more aligned with Rawls. In her words, “[t]he primary task of my argument will be to move 
beyond the merely comparative use of capabilities to the construction of a normative political proposal that is a 
partial theory of justice” (2010, p.6). 
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However, it is possible to defend Rawls (and Nussbaum) by remembering that his (and her) 
project is sustained on the idea of reflective equilibrium. In his view, since some political 
issues are consensual in Western countries but other issues are disputable, a public debate to 
improve people‟s views about these issues is needed. If an effective back-and-forth process – 
in which people‟s opinions and political theories are balanced – is established, practices 
towards justice can be refined and social stability guaranteed. 
 
Roughly speaking, this process defined by Rawls (1993, 2001) as general reflective 
equilibrium (chapter 2) depends on the development of two different things. On the one hand, 
ordinary people must ultimately decide the destinies of their states. Since democracy is a 
shared value in Western contemporary societies, it is important for the stability of these states 
that people participate in public decisions. On the other hand, political thinkers have an 
important role in designing theories in order to help the real political debate, offering 
ordinary people possible strategies to tackle political affairs. This is because, on average, 
people do not have the time to delve into questions about justice, since they are consumed by 
daily life activities. In this sense, the intellectual work of thinkers who dedicate their 
professional lives to these questions – in academia or not – is fundamental. Santos (2004, 
p.31-6) and McCowan (2009, p.89), for example, claim that academic institutions should help 
nations design their own national projects. 
 
Taking this into account, Sen‟s criticism underestimates the role of transcendental theories, 
since theoretical principles are useful to help individuals in the political sphere take real 
decisions. Regarding this, it is important to say that agreeing with the importance of 
transcendental theories is not the same as agreeing with a specific transcendental proposal. 
Actually, a plurality of theories makes reflective equilibrium more powerful, since such 
plurality enriches the real political sphere with different theoretical ideas. 
 
3.7. Social choice theory and deliberative democracy 
 
These different defences to Rawls‟ ideas against the criticisms presented above do not mean 
that his social contract theory does not have failures or limits. Actually, though 
transcendentalism is useful/necessary to develop people‟s ideas of justice – making Sen‟s 
criticism exaggerated – it is important to defend Sen‟s claim that transcendental theories are 
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not sufficient (2009a, 98-101). Thus, Sen‟s appeal to social choice theory – the study of the 
link between “the aggregation of interests, or judgments, or well-beings, into some aggregate 
notion of social welfare, social judgment or social choice” (Sen, 2008, p.579) – is welcomed, 
as it complements Rawls‟ project through developing the democratic dimension of general 
reflective equilibrium. Actually, such a complement ameliorates Rawls‟ theory through 
introducing reflections on how democratic decisions should happen. Through appealing to 
social choice theory, Sen correctly attempts to design a system of decisions in a context in 
which complete consensus is impossible. Thus, he helps to advance the practical (democratic) 
aspect of general reflective equilibrium. 
 
Regarding this, Sen‟s main concern is to develop ways to deal with challenges to democracy 
introduced by Arrow‟s impossibility theorem (1963[1951]), explained in an oversimplified 
way, a development of Condorcet‟s paradox of voting (1785). Condorcet (and Arrow, in a 
more sophisticated way) proves that, in an election, majorities can prefer A over B, B over C, 
and C over A, that is, partial preferences (which, in this case, exist) may not represent the 
preference of the whole society (which, in this case, does not exist). Regarding this paradox, 
Sen claims: 
 
[T]he demonstration of [Arrow‟s] impossibility has opened up investigations of the various 
limitations that constrain the format of traditional welfare economics (e.g., the avoidance of 
interpersonal comparisons of well-being). One result of this has been to draw welfare 
economics closer to moral philosophy. (2002, p. 344) 
 
In his own attempt to overcome Arrow‟s impossibility result, Sen (1969; 1970; 2002) pointed 
out some important problems with Arrow‟s formulation. Sen‟s main criticism is related to the 
fact that richer informational spaces can provide different results in elections. One of the 
main reasons presented by Sen to justify the inadequacy of Arrow‟s formulation to a wide 
range of policy-concerned problems is the possibility of voting rules based on majority 
decisions being incompatible with minimum requirements of individual liberty and, 
consequently, of minority rights – Sen‟s (1970) “liberal paradox”. An example of this kind of 
problem can be found in societies that prevent some minorities – such as the LGBT 
community – from having basic rights – for example, same-sex civil unions. Although it is 
possible that, in many cases, the majority of people in these societies would agree in 
restricting the civil rights of these minorities, there is a broad superior consensual idea, at 
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least in Western societies, that these people‟s individual preferences, choices and freedom to 
lead the life they value should be respected regardless the opinion or preferences of others.  
 
Thus, the main issue for Sen is how to aggregate individual choice in such a way that 
generates social choice concerned with these broad superior notions of justice. In this sense, 
Sen (1970; 2002) claims that, if individuals only pay attention to their personal preferences 
when taking decisions on a political and policymaking level, it can produce distorted results, 
especially regarding issues concerning important matters such as poverty and civil rights. As 
Sen explains: 
 
To try to make social welfare judgments without using any interpersonal comparison of 
utilities, and without using any nonutility information, is not a fruitful enterprise. […] Once 
interpersonal comparisons are introduced, the impossibility problem, in the appropriately 
redefined framework, vanishes. [...] [S]uch comparisons are staple elements of systematic 
social welfare judgments. (2002, p. 273) 
 
Through appealing to individuals‟ concern with inequality to solve this impossibility 
theorem, Sen introduces the need for founding individuals‟ choices on moral judgments and 
not only on their personal preferences. Thus, although Sen does not establish a set of 
desirable moral values, he affirms, in his attempt to understand to what extent majority rule 
could produce results that harm individual liberties, that “[t]he ultimate guarantee for 
individual liberty may rest not on rules for social choice but on developing individual values 
that respect each other‟s personal preferences” (1970, p. 155-156). There are many different 
ways of developing these values. Sen‟s (2009) appeal to broader individuals‟ knowledge 
about other people‟s life conditions is one option. Other scholars, such as Nussbaum (2010; 
2013), go further and propose cultivating not only knowledge about other people‟s 
preferences but also other civic knowledge, skills and values (chapter 7). How to do this 
through formal education is explored in chapter 9. 
 
Defenders of deliberative democracy, propose a different way to improve democratic 
processes, even though they are also concerned with developing democratic individuals‟ 
awareness of other citizens‟ interests. They understand that citizens “cannot simply state their 
preference in public dialogues; they have to be prepared to provide reasons and arguments in 
support of their points of view” (Leung, 2012, p.25). Habermas (1981; 1998) believes that the 
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“force of better argument” can minimise one-sided opinions. “Ideally speaking, in 
Habermas‟s communicative theory [1981], consensus can be achieved in distortion-free 
conditions by long lasting debate by responsive citizens” (Leung, 2012, p.37). The “second” 
Rawls (1993; 2001), through appealing to his general reflective equilibrium (chapter 2 and 
above in this chapter) also puts a heavy weight on the importance of public deliberation by 
understanding “that public reason should filter the political arguments within society and lead 
those based on the interest of the common humanity of free and equal citizens to form the 
basic social structure for liberal democracy” (Leung, 2012, p.45). Kymlicka describes this as 
an “important shift in contemporary democratic theory, from „vote-centric‟ to „talk-centric‟ 
theories of democracy” (2002, p.290). Leung sees three positive aspects of stimulating 
deliberation: it “can enhance citizens‟ understanding of public debates”; “is more capable of 
comprehending complex problems than individual contemplation”; “helps transcend the 
language of interest to the language of reason” (2012, p.25). 
 
Those who support the centrality of deliberation consider that it is a better way to reduce 
problems of aggregation – like the dictatorship of majority – than through simply cultivating 
civic knowledge (Sen), skills and values (Nussbaum). Nonetheless, of course, when conflicts 
are unsolvable, voting is needed. Those who are suspicious of deliberation consider that 
minorities are manipulated in the deliberative process (Young, 2000; Levinson, 2003). Thus, 
sceptics argue that this process has to be avoided and ordinary people only have to learn how 
to identify representatives who fight for their rights. In this way, even these critics of 
deliberative democracy would agree that, in a second moment – the legislative sphere – 
deliberation achieved by representatives is needed. The point defended by this thesis, 
nonetheless, is that, since deliberation in higher levels is unavoidable, and it can be useful in 
lower levels, such a practice has to be stimulated in all levels of political debate. The 
importance of cultivating critical thinking and democratic knowledge, skills and values is 
presented in chapter 8, and, from chapter 9, this thesis investigates how schools (should) 
cultivate these values. 
 
3.8. Non-idealised theories  
 
While Sen claims that people should observe real injustices to improve their participation in 
the democratic sphere, Mills, in order to deal with the other side of reflective equilibrium, 
proposes that thinkers should observe real injustices to improve their theoretical reflections 
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on this issue. Although a defender of the hypothetical social contract, Mills criticises 
idealised elements of Rawls‟ proposal. As he says: 
 
In modelling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and human 
society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply different this is from 
ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our 
comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social 
institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved 
(2005, p.170). 
 
Mills is not against abstract theories tout court, but against Rawlsian and alike “deficient 
abstractions of the ideal-as-idealized-model kind” (2005, p.173). Thus, he claims that past 
and present patriarchy and white supremacy (heteronormativity, etc. can also be added) have 
to be seen by theories as central vectors of current injustices. Unlike Rawls, who does not 
mention historical gender, race, sexual orientation, etc. inequalities, Mills proposes to design 
a theory of justice “starting from an already-existent non-ideal unjust society, to prescribe 
what ideally would be required from rectificatory justice. Nonetheless, such correction 
requires factual characterisation of past and present injustices, that is, a description” (Pateman 
& Mills, 2007, p.232-3). In Mills‟ view, the elimination of racism is under the current 
overlapping consensus (Pateman & Mills, 2007, p.121). He seems right, since this prejudice, 
though it is still being practiced, is not legally tolerated in any Western country
31
. Thus, since 
this problem, consensually condemned, still exists (mostly through unconscious practices but 
also through shameful conscious behaviours), such a description of structural racism has to be 
considered in the hypothetical contract – the same can be said about structural sexism and 
homophobia. Mills‟ improvement of Rawls hypothetical social contract is, then, welcomed. 
 
Rawls‟ proposal is only focused on creating an ideal way to redistribute wealth and political 
power, and thus cannot “capture the essentials of the situation of women and nonwhites” 
(Mills, 2005, p.173), and additionally other minorities, such as the LGBT community. 
However, constant vindications from women, black people, the LGBT community, etc. in the 
                                                          
31
 The question of sexism seems to be similar. Much more discussion regarding how homophobia is being 
treated by law in Western countries is needed. However, at least in UK, the Equality Act 2010 was implemented 
in order to protect people against discrimination in education, employment and provision of goods and services 
based on at least one of nine different characteristics (age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil 
partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion and belief, sex, and sexuality). This act is directly 
associated with equality of opportunity, something within Western people‟s consensus. 
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last half-century show that these prejudices are still felt and social tensions are far from being 
solved. Thus, in order to guarantee social cohesion, developing policies towards eliminating 
prejudices against women, non-whites, the LGBT community, etc. is as important as 
increasing the material conditions of the poorer members of society. 
 
Mills, then, is not against ideal aims towards justice, but he “suggest[s] that a non-ideal 
approach is also superior to an ideal approach in being better able to realise the ideals, by 
virtue of realistically recognising the obstacles to their acceptance and implementation” 
(2005, p.181). In the same way, Nussbaum suggests that “we must scrutinize Rawls‟s account 
of primary goods, with its commitment to measuring relative social positions (once the 
priority of liberty is fixed) with reference to wealth and income, rather than by some more 
heterogeneous and plural set of indices, such as capabilities” (2006, p.64). Thus, Nussbaum‟s 
(2011, p.33-4) list of ten central capabilities is an attempt to go further than the principles of 
justices presented by Rawls and to be more specific about social injustices
32
. 
 
3.9. Transcendental, ordinary and political liberties 
 
Returning to the analysis of social contract, it is possible to further discussions through 
endorsing Nussbaum‟s positive view of its hypothetical form. She writes: 
 
The idea of basic political principles as the result of a social contract is one of the major 
contributions of liberal political philosophy in the Western tradition. In its various forms, the 
tradition makes two signal contributions. First, it demonstrates clearly and rigorously that 
human interests themselves – even if we begin with an artificially simplified conception of 
such interests – are well served by political society, a society in which all surrender power 
before law and duly constituted authority. Second, and even more significant, it shows us that 
if we divest human beings of the artificial advantages some of them hold in all actual societies 
– wealth, rank, social class, education, and so on – they will agree to a contract of a certain 
specific sort, which the theories then proceed to spell out. Given that the starting point is in 
that sense fair, the principles that result from the bargain will be fair. (2006, p.10) 
 
Following this idea, hypothetical contract intends designing the basic structures of a cohesive 
society based on liberal ideas. 
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 The ten central capabilities are: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; 
emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; control over one‟s environment.  (2011, p.33-4) 
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It is fundamental to this reasoning that hypothetical contract is associated with people‟s 
defence of transcendental liberty, an ideal liberty that is beyond real circumstances associated 
with individuals‟ class, gender, race, sexual orientation, etc. Transcendental liberty can be 
defined by opposition to ordinary liberty, since the former is based on “[a]n „ideal‟, or 
„inner‟, or „higher‟, or „rational‟, or „true‟, or „transcendental‟, or „noumenal‟ or „moral‟ self”, 
while the latter on “an „empirical‟, or „lower‟, or „irrational‟, or „emotional‟, or „phenomenal‟ 
or „base‟ self” (Swift, 2014, p.61).  
 
This transcendental definition of self tries to respect a certain way that societies understand 
how individuals should make choices in the personal and social spheres. In this sense, some 
constitutional constraints even to democratic practices are justified. Swift illustrates this as 
follows: 
 
Imagine two societies. In one, there is a democratic vote on what religions people are to be 
permitted to practice. In the other, there is a constitution granting every individual the right to 
practice the religion of her choice. Which society is better? The second. Which is more 
democratic? I think the first. (2014, p.18) 
 
According to the current Western paradigm, liberties of religion, of sexuality, and so on, are 
fundamental for people‟s self-determination. Thus, these liberties have to be guaranteed by 
constitutions even in contexts where the majority considers some religions or sexual practices 
wrong. On the other hand, also respecting current Western paradigm grounded on democratic 
procedures, constitutions have to protect some practices that are fundamental to guarantee the 
health of democracy. This attempt to combine transcendental liberty – which gives room for 
people freely chosen their religions, sexualities, etc. – with democratic liberty – which 
guarantees free association, expression, etc. – summarises the foundational elements of 
Western constitutions.  
 
Constant (1819)
33
, somehow keeping this distinction, counterposed the understandings of 
liberty of ancient Greek democracies and of his contemporaries – French, British and 
American peoples, the “moderns”. According to him, the ancients desired the liberty to rule 
                                                          
33
 This famous lecture was presented when the political situation in France was a bit more “stable”, after the 
Revolution and Napoleonic Era. 
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social affairs while moderns were looking to protect free decisions within the personal 
sphere. Constant summarises the virtues and vices of the understanding of liberty in the two 
historical moments saying that, “among the ancients the individual, almost always sovereign 
in public affairs, was a slave in all his private relations”, and “[a]mong the moderns, on the 
contrary, the individual, independent in his private life, is, even in the freest of states, 
sovereign only in appearance” (1819). 
 
Though Constant sees virtues in the ancient idea of liberty, he also considers that certain 
social changes made its instantiation impossible in his time. The nineteenth century (and 
current) states were and are much more populous than Greek city-states. In this way, each 
person individually has less power of decision. Moreover, because individuals no longer have 
slaves and since women also participate in civic and public life (though with restrictions from 
double shifts, less economic resources, etc.), all citizens have less time to participate in 
politics. Thus, it was and is impossible to achieve the ancient times‟ political liberty in the 
nineteenth century and current societies. 
 
However, Constant was not resigned to the nineteenth century attitudes of neglecting ancient 
liberty. According to him, “[p]olitical liberty, by submitting to all the citizens, without 
exception, the care and assessment of their most sacred interests, enlarges their spirit, 
ennobles their thoughts, and establishes among them a kind of intellectual equality that forms 
the glory and power of a people” (1819). This claim is similar to the Aristotelian view 
presented in Nicomachean Ethics idea that “man is a political animal”; that is, that politics is 
a condition for people flourishing as individuals. Moreover, contrary to those who consider 
that a dictatorship can guarantee liberty for individuals to achieve their personal life plans, 
Constant says that private liberty is dependent on political (the social sphere) liberty. Since 
these two liberties are essential (and even interrelated) and since Constant identifies the 
importance of fully preserving both, he proposes the representative democratic system as the 
solution to their symbiosis. 
 
Following Constant, it seems currently consensual that institutions have to be designed in 
order to guarantee individuals‟ liberty in the personal and social spheres. Constitutional 
principles and current ideas related to equality of opportunities, of cultural recognitions and 
of democratic participation go in this way. In the next chapter, these points are developed 
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through the presentation of alternative dissent ideas and some consensual limits on these 
regards. 
 
*** 
 
Chapter 3 presents a hypothetical social contract based on transcendental liberty as the best 
theory to explain how the ideas of equal liberty and communal/national responsibilities have 
founded current Western societies. Social choice theory and deliberative democracy serve as 
bases to think of improvements of democratic processes, and a non-idealised approach of the 
contract is defended as the best way to appeal to this theoretical tool. This hypothetical social 
contract is presented as consensually accepted by Western individuals. Thus, it serves as the 
starting point to investigate the possibilities of dialogue and limits of the ideas of justice 
presented in chapter 4.  
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4. Investigating justice from economic, cultural and decision-making 
dimensions 
 
The ideas of equal liberty, social responsibility and democracy defended previously are 
complex. This complexity allows different proposals on how to refine laws and social 
practices in order to design social institutions which truly represent them. This chapter 
focuses on mapping this debate by observing different dimensions related to social justice, 
and establishing some limits to alternative proposals associated with each of these 
dimensions. Thus, at the beginning, it is defended that (4.1) the debates on justice should turn 
around three central and independent dimensions. Then, each one of these dimensions is 
analysed separately. (4.2) From the economic point of view, planned economy and free 
marked are seen as opposite theories. (4.3) The cultural dimension counterposes conservative 
and avant-garde views about social practices. Finally, (4.4) regarding how decision-making 
processes are conducted, systems based on direct democracy and on experts‟ decisions are 
taken as rival paradigms.  
 
4.1. Disagreements on justice 
 
As presented in 2.5, Marshall (1950) identifies in the development of Western liberal states – 
after the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries‟ revolutions – progressive equalisation of civil, 
political and social rights amongst all individuals. Thus, equal civil rights represent an 
avoidance of arbitrary differentiation guaranteed by a solid rule of law (1950, p.41). The 
equalisation of political rights comes from universal suffrage, and equal opportunity of 
people being elected (1950, p.20-1). In Marshall‟s view, equalisation of social rights also 
comes from the reduction of the gap of life conditions and of inequalities of opportunities 
between the more and less fortunate (1950, p.56). In this way, being a citizen is being an 
individual who has these three rights guaranteed. Recent constitutions include these three 
types of rights, while old ones are usually restricted to the first two, neglecting issues of 
social rights. The Brazilian Constitution (1988), which guarantees (at least theoretically) 
these three spheres of rights for all, is called the “Citizenship Constitution”, an indicator that 
citizenship is currently associated with promoting equal civil, political and social rights. The 
American Constitution (1787), promulgated two centuries before, focuses only on civil and 
political rights. Still, though not represented in the Constitution, equality of opportunities and 
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other ideas related to social rights are also consensual amongst American people, as indicated 
by the notion of the “American dream”, a narrative that focuses upon equality of 
opportunities (Adams, 1931, p.214), which depends on some social rights, such as access to 
good education. 
 
Whilst Marshall has identified previous advances in equalising civil, then political, and 
finally social rights, there are disagreements on how much these rights have been equally 
shared. Reflections on social rights still lead to oppositions between “left” and “right” 
supporters – groups that disagree about how to produce and redistribute social goods. While 
pressures towards the expansion of democratic practices culminated in the universal suffrage 
at the first half of twentieth century, claims for guaranteeing effective voice for different 
minorities in the political sphere are constant.  In the second half of the twentieth century, 
women, ethnic minorities, LGBT members and other groups increased their struggles for 
social recognition, something that is still in course. This historical summary of Western 
reflections on justice presents three different dimensions of the debate that, though 
empirically correlated, keep fundamental distinctions and make the discussions about this 
issue much more complex. These dimensions counterpose: free market and planned 
economy; conservatism and avant-gardism; the defence of decisions based on specialists‟ 
expertise and on direct democracy.  
 
Thus, different concerns about justice are contemplated. Largely, through the twentieth 
century, thinkers focused the debate on justice around the opposition between the capitalist 
model, based on liberty of entrepreneurism but inequality of life conditions, and the socialist 
model, based on centralisation of production and an attempt to equalise life conditions. 
Western societies, where capitalism has been the production model/system since the 
establishment of nation-states, are influenced by socialist practices and have made central 
discussions on social rights associated with collecting and redistributing material goods. The 
opposition of the liberal egalitarian/welfarist project (Rawls, 1971; Roemer, 1998; Dworkin, 
2000) and libertarian/neoliberal ideas (Hayek, 1960; Friedman, 1962; Nozick, 1974) 
grounded this debate. 
 
However, it seems simplistic to reduce reflections on justice to different proposals on how 
societies should deal with material goods. In the last third of the century, discussions on 
women and ethnic minorities‟ rights, symbolised by the sexual revolution and civil rights 
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movement, were introduced at least in the US and Europe. Walzer (1983) expanded the 
debate on justice through claiming that reflections on this subject have to take into account 
different spheres of distribution such as: “membership, power, honor, ritual eminence, divine 
grace, kinship and love, knowledge, wealth, physical security, work and leisure, rewards and 
punishments, and a host of goods more narrowly and materially conceived” (1983, p.3). Also, 
considering that debates on justice at the end of the twentieth century were excessively 
focused on how to share material resources, Fraser (1996; 2000) proposes two fronts for 
reflection: how material goods should be redistributed and how individuals‟ social practices 
should be recognised.  
 
Young (1990), rather than proposing different types of distribution of goods, “focus[es] most 
of [her] discussion on three primary categories of non-distributive issues that distributive 
theories tend to ignore: decision-making structure and procedures, division of labor, and 
culture” (1990, p.22). Walzer deals with all these three issues, but without making them 
central. Redistribution of labour duties and attention to cultural issues are directly 
contemplated in Fraser‟s proposal, but decision-making structure can be seen only as a by-
product of her proposal. However, according to Young, “the [current] decision-making 
structure operates to reproduce distributive inequality and the unjust constraints on people‟s 
lives” (1990, p.23). For this reason, she displaces “the distributive paradigm in favor of a 
wider, process-oriented understanding of society, which focuses on power, decision-making 
structures, and so on, likewise shifts the imagination to different assumptions about human 
beings” (1990, p.37). Young is concerned with social atomism (3.4) of the distributive 
paradigm “inasmuch as there is no internal relation among persons in society relevant to 
considerations of justice” (1990, p.18). Following Heller (1987, pp. 180-2), she claims that 
the distributive paradigm implicitly defines human beings as primarily consumers, desirers, 
and possessors of goods” (1990, p.36).  
 
These three proposals explore the main elements of reflections on social justice but none of 
them tries to combine theoretical understandings of justice with reflections that happen in real 
democratic processes. As explored in 2.6, the “second” Rawls (1993; 2001), through adding 
general reflective equilibrium to his theory, goes in this direction. This improvement on his 
idea of reflective equilibrium turns decision-making structures into one of the central points 
of his proposal, but keeps also the centrality of reflections on distribution, which differs from 
Young‟s position. However, as discussed in 3.8, through disregarding differences of social 
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statuses of minority groups like women, black people and LGBT members (Pateman & Mills, 
2007), Rawls does not give enough attention to injustices related to lack of recognition. Thus, 
in order to join all these proposals, the present thesis reflects on justice from three different 
perspectives: economic, cultural and decision-making. In 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4, these perspectives 
are explored in more detail. From this, a certain consensus that establishes limits over 
extreme proposals is presented and some non-consensual ideas are broadly defended.  
 
The classical free market versus planned economy debate about collecting and redistributing 
material goods serves to introduce reflections on the economic dimension of justice. In the 
one extreme, free market defenders consider that the state should not participate in this 
process; in the other, planned economy supporters understand that the state should actively 
regulate it. Both opposite theories claim to be in favour of equal liberty. Defenders of free 
market economics consider that, through minimal intromission of the state over the lives of 
its citizens, no one would be impeded to put his/her life plans into practice; that is, all 
individuals would be formally free for deciding what to do with their gains (equal formal 
liberty) and, in this oversimplification, there is no state redistributive practices. On the other 
hand, planned economy supporters understand that only with equal material conditions 
guaranteed by the state people would have access to goods that allow them to put freely their 
life plans into practice (equal effective/material liberty)
34
. In between these two extremes, 
different shades of liberalism can be identified, which dispute how best to balance formal and 
effective/material liberty. Regarding this, Western societies can be more oriented towards 
more neoliberal policies that give greater importance to formal liberty or welfare policies that 
focus more on promoting effective/material liberty. The amount and progressivity of taxes 
collected associated with comprehensiveness of health and educational services provided by 
the state define this difference. Figure 10 organises the different positions: 
 
 
Figure 10 
 
                                                          
34
 It is important to notice that this is only one way to understand the socialist proposal. It can be said that 
socialism is being presented through using liberal capitalist principles. Another interpretation of socialism 
defends that its difference in relation to capitalism is not only in a more effective allocation of resources for 
fulfilling individual life plans. It is about a decentring of individual life plans in favour of a collective interest. 
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However, apart from material resources, individuals‟ liberties depend on how the culture in 
which they live is organised (cultural constraints). This second dichotomy is about how much 
societies should conserve their moral values based on cultural practices or implement avant-
garde 
 
cultural changes based on rational individual/human rights
35
. Some people are very 
attached to traditions; others think that, if it is rationally possible to identify superior moral 
values than the current ones, then they should be implemented. For example, currently, 
religions are against same-sex marriage, however it is almost impossible to oppose 
homosexual relationships based on reason. This situation confronts religious/conservative 
positions based on the majorities‟ practices and secular/rational positions which protect 
individuals (minorities). There is an extensive debate regarding the extent to which cultural 
beliefs should be respected. It seems, nevertheless, obvious that the weight of rationality in 
public debates that protects individuals over cultural practices – at least until the rising of 
post-truth era – was increasing. The expansion of LGBT rights seems a proof of this. Thus, in 
between these two extremes, some people, though quite sure about the rationality of their 
positions, accept that implementing them depends on public deliberation. These people are 
also avant-garde, but more moderated. They are in favour of same-sex marriage, but 
understand that the implementation of these demands requires a transitory process. There are 
others who think that, since, regarding many controversial issues like abortion, it is not 
possible to present a rational answer, and that conservative arguments that respect traditional 
practices have to be taken seriously into account. Figure 11 below presents these distinct 
positions: 
 
 
Figure 11 
 
The two previous reflections – on redistribution of goods and cultural recognition – are 
related to the contents of justice. Reflections on democracy, on the other hand, are related to 
the best procedures to implement justice. Simplifying the debate, in the one extreme, certain 
people defend that majority‟s will should be strictly respected. The extreme opposite idea 
                                                          
35
 Hans-Georg Gadamer, in Truth and Method (1975[1960]), proposed this differentiation. Instead of 
counterposing conservatism and progressivism, the choice for counterposing conservatism and avant-gardism 
seems more accurate, since the idea is to avoid presenting any of the extremes as something necessarily good. 
The term “progress”, however, has this connotation. 
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considers that societies should be designed by a few specialists, not by listening to the 
majority‟s will. Specialists capable of identifying what is the common good should take the 
decisions instead of consulting these heterogeneous people‟s opinions. In this direction, some 
people even believe that a strong leader (a benevolent dictator, a philosopher king, etc.) are 
needed to decide how the nation should be organised. A series of problems are generated 
from both extreme views. In order to analyse them, these views are called here direct-
democracy-based and specialist-based approaches. Of course, similarly to the previous 
debates, the present discussion has intermediary positions in between extreme direct 
democracy and total trust on specialists. These people consider that certain decisions should 
be only discussed by specialists but others should be discussed publicly. Figure 12 illustrates 
these opposed ideas:  
 
 
Figure 12 
 
After introducing these three oppositions, it is interesting to explore their correlation. This 
thesis suggests that all these combinations of opinions regarding these three dimensions are 
possible. Thus, it is defended that, at least theoretically, someone could support different 
positions. Individual “A” could be extremely pro planned economy (A1), slightly 
conservative (A2), a defender of decisions taken by specialist (A3); an individual “B” could 
be pro free market (B1), extremely avant-garde (B2), and slightly in favour of direct 
democracy (B3). Thus, it is accepted that people‟s political positions are multidimensional, 
and spread in any of those points of the three dimensions‟ graph presented below36 (figure 
13):  
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 The inspiration of this proposal is a website called “The Political Compass” (www.politicalcompass.org/) 
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Figure 13 
 
This different way to present the debate about justice suggests the existence of many different 
possible combinations of political views (each of them being distinct points in the three-
dimension graph of the figure 13). Through this, it is possible to help people‟s understanding 
of their political views and the establishment of a more fluid and less polarised debate. Thus, 
individuals can think better, agree on certain points and disagree on others. This different way 
to debate has the power to change a real-life phenomenon, such as reducing the formation of 
“tribes” of individuals that agree on everything – by taking their agreed ideas as the truths – 
and disagree with all ideas of the opposite pole. 
 
4.2. Economic dimension 
 
As mentioned above, issues related to collecting and redistributing material goods are central 
in the debate about justice. In Western capitalist societies, it is consensual that people should 
not keep all their wealth and that part of it (though, for some, a small amount) ought to go to 
the worst-off. Thus, certain radical theories, such as extreme free market (which is against 
any intervention of the state in the redistribution) but also extreme planned economy (which 
considers that the state should collect and redistribute all goods), are disregarded. In between 
these two extremes, neoliberals and welfarists basically disagree on how the state should 
collect and redistribute material goods. In this regard, though neoliberals and welfarists are 
both concerned with equalising civil and political rights
37 , named by Swift as “formal 
liberty”, welfarists are much more concerned with reducing inequalities of material/effective 
liberty (Swift, 2014, p.64). 
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 These rights are summarized by Constant (1819): “the right to be subjected only to the laws, […] to express 
his opinion, […] to come and go, […] to associate with other individuals, […] to profess the religion […] to 
exercise some influence on the administration of the government”. 
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This disagreement is present in reflections on how to consider merit (equality of 
opportunities, rewarded effort), to improve society‟s material goods, to respect property 
rights, and to protect the most vulnerable. Thus, some questions arise: is equalising 
opportunities prior to increasing the goods of all? If not, should at least the socially 
disadvantaged have to be protected? To what extent should people keep the goods produced 
by or transferred to them? All of these questions are connected with two different 
understandings of the ontology of societies (3.4). Neoliberals are usually against any duty of 
solidarity/compassion towards co-citizens (even those who donate to charity, since they 
consider that they do not have any duty to do so). They support an atomist social ontology 
and defend that people should not be forced to care about the whole society. The holist idea 
behind welfarism, on the other hand, indicates that, in some measure, people have social 
duties/responsibilities towards their co-citizens. 
 
This disagreement introduces a reflection on the extension of people‟s rights of enjoying the 
goods they produce. Neoliberals consider that people have the right to decide how to spend 
the money they receive (Hayek, 1960; Friedman, 1962; Nozick, 1974). Welfarists, on the 
other hand, usually consider this view too individualist and defend partial redistribution 
grounded on the ideas of holism and solidarity. However, regarding the protection of the 
worst-off, most neoliberals agree with welfarists that very vulnerable people should receive at 
least some health care and education from the state. Some neoliberals have remnants of belief 
in solidarity and consider that the better-off have minimal duties towards the worst-off. 
Others simply think that the lives of all are improved through establishing this threshold of 
protection.   
 
However, only protecting the worst-off is not considered enough for welfarists. They demand 
that equality of opportunities is also promoted (or, at least, highly increased). Regarding this, 
neoliberals give more weight to personal achievement, while welfarists think that external 
conditions have much more implications on people‟s life achievements. According to many 
neoliberals, being rich or poor is much more a matter of effort and choice of what to do. 
According to welfairsts, it is much more a matter of circumstances, whether they be natural 
(being born with more or less skills) or social (being born into a wealthy or poor family) 
circumstances. 
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Roemer (1998) claims that neoliberals defend a non-discrimination principle in which 
equality of opportunities should take place only at the formal-legal level. Following the non-
discrimination principle, individuals‟ capacities should be judged only by relevant attributes – 
for example, in a process for selecting a judge, individuals‟ knowledge about the law should 
be taken into account, rather than the colour of their skin or their gender. Roemer, however, 
defends that equality should also be applied through the “level playing field principle”. This 
principle is based on equalising individuals‟ backgrounds: for example, the rich and the poor 
should have access to the same educational level so that, in the future, they could compete in 
real equal conditions. Roemer (1998) opens his most important book on this subject quoting 
Ortega y Gasset: “Yo soy: yo y mi circunstancia” (I am: me and my circumstances). This 
quotation explicitly indicates that Roemer‟s theoretical construction is based on the 
assumption that an individual is not determined only by his/her free will (yo) and that factors 
beyond his/her control are fundamental in the determination of who he/she is (mi 
circunstancia). 
 
Dworkin, going in the same direction, makes clearer this point through distinguishing choice 
and circumstance. People‟s “choices reflect their personality, which is itself a matter of two 
main ingredients: ambition [tastes, preferences, and convictions as well as his overall plan of 
life] and character [application, energy, industry, doggedness, and ability to work now for 
distant rewards]”. People‟s circumstances are personal resources such as “physical and 
mental health and ability” and impersonal ones as “wealth and the other property [they] 
command, and the opportunities provided to [them]” (2000, p.322-3). 
 
If societies eliminate inequalities caused by natural and social circumstances (personal and 
impersonal resources) but not those caused by choices, only more or less effort and 
willingness to perform hardworking or non-pleasurable jobs (such as being a brain surgeon or 
a garbageman) would be rewarded and individuals would no longer accuse their societies of 
being unjust with them. Once this difference is addressed, the individual bears exclusive 
responsibility for their actions.  
 
Dworkin, thus, understands that promoting equality of opportunities means eliminating 
natural and social luck, and accepting that the only criteria that justify people‟s differing 
earnings are their choices and their effort to achieve their jobs. His proposal partially fits with 
neoliberals‟ defence of rewarding choices. Neoliberals, however, almost disregard influences 
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of circumstances in their reasoning. Thus, though they usually appeal much more than 
welfarists to a certain view of equality of opportunities, by disregarding differences in 
people‟s background, neoliberals do not propose a true meritocratic society where everyone 
has equal opportunities. 
 
Nevertheless, regarding this discussion, it is interesting to observe that even a perfect equality 
of opportunities can be criticised. Young (1973), who coined the term “meritocracy”, claims 
that even those societies that truly try to eliminate all social and natural differences amongst 
individuals to create a field for fair competition are deleterious to the development of 
solidarity and care amongst people. In his view, when competition is stimulated, even if fair, 
individualism – rather than holism – is stimulated38. This claim shows how complex is the 
association in between meritocracy – even in its most perfect instantiation – and welfarism. 
 
This reflection makes evident that an eventual defence of meritocracy and equality of 
opportunities has also to be balanced with the defence of the improvement of social goods of 
all. The reflection associated with the fair attitude beyond this discussion is related to the fact 
that certain people are born with natural characteristics that, if developed, can increase 
significantly the goods of all. This situation seems to give rise to a dilemma: either talented 
people are more stimulated than the average (with scholarships and so on) or equality of 
opportunities, in which natural and social differences are eliminated, is promoted. 
 
Defenders of neoliberalism are normally those who consider that in between increasing the 
goods of all and equalising circumstances, the former has priority. Swift (2014) goes deep 
into this reflection on the functionality of inequalities to economic growth. He claims that not 
only do the most talented have to receive economic stimulus to achieve their skills, but all 
people who have jobs that demand study and dedication, and produce stress. For example, 
following this reasoning, societies gain overall by paying a brain surgeon (and a garbageman) 
more than a poet. It is this better payment that makes the former sacrifice himself/herself to 
achieve a much more demanding job
39
 (2014, p.27-8). (Welfarists normally agree with this 
idea of differing gains and opportunities, but to a lesser extent.)  
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 Thus, his text about meritocracy is a satire. 
39
 This reasoning rests on a set of assumptions about human rationality and motivation, which themselves are, 
arguably, linked to a view of “homo economicus” and have been challenged both empirically and theoretically 
(notably by Marx.) 
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This reasoning can be related to the determination of the size of the state. Neoliberals believe 
that diminishing the size of state (and, in turn, reducing direct duties of rich towards poor) is 
good for everyone, since, through this, proactivity/effort of everyone is stimulated: 
“ambitious” people make effort and choose highly paid, but not necessary enjoyable jobs, 
because they want to gain more and more; “non-ambitious” people are obliged to make some 
effort, otherwise their own situation would be bad. In the end, more goods are produced and 
everyone benefits. Interestingly, this argument in favour of free market, though based on 
atomism, is also based on some idea of the common good – the increasing of Gross Domestic 
Product, a classic utilitarian argument. According to utilitarianism, it is more important to 
increase the measure of happiness, in this instance national wealth, than to try to equalise 
distribution of it. 
 
4.3. Cultural dimension 
 
The second dimension of reflections on justice is related to cultural recognition, rather than to 
collection and redistribution of material goods. Though some thinkers consider the debate on 
recognition less important than reflections on redistribution (Swift, 2014, p.99), many others 
see equalisation of cultural recognition as one of the key aspects of reflections on justice. As 
discussed in 3.8, Mills (2007) defends that, though currently everyone aims towards building 
a society in which all cultures are equally recognised, neutrality in this regards does not 
guarantee justice. He correctly claims that some minority groups have suffered historical 
oppression and neutrality does not nullify this situation. Thus, based on actual circumstances, 
rectifications have to be promoted in order to reduce oppression over groups such as women, 
black people, ethnic minorities, the LGBT community, disabled people etc. 
 
Depending on how the state deals with this situation, individual liberties can be increased or 
decreased. As introduced in 4.1, on the one extreme, conservatives defend that the state 
should only preserve cultural values historically built by the society, while, on the other, 
avant-gardists consider that the state should defend values that are rationally superior and 
protect the individuals regardless of their difference in cultures. In between these ideas on 
how to deal with moral values, there are intermediary positions that combine respecting 
tradition and protecting individuals through observing reason. 
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Two types of communitarianism defend that peoples‟ traditions have to be respected. One, 
named “republicanism” or “republican communitarianism”, supports patriotic traditions that 
encourage communal/social responsibility. The other, named “multiculturalism” or 
“multicultural communitarianism”, sees that the fact of people identifying themselves with 
certain communities is enough justification for the state doing something in order to preserve 
these communities and to make other people recognise and respect them. From a perspective 
that does not focus on conserving cultures, though that not necessarily is against preserving 
patriotic spirit or encouraging minority cultures, it is possible to reflect on cultural values 
only based on rational individual rights. This perspective normally considers individuals less 
determined by their cultures and more by their self-consciousness.  
 
Chapter 2 defends the idea that, since the seventeenth and eighteenth century liberal 
revolutions, a certain tradition was solidified and refined in Western societies. This tradition 
has been grounded on the ideas of equal liberty, social responsibility towards unknown 
members of the nation and democratic participation of all. Identifying this, however, is 
different from defending that patriotic traditions have to be reinforced by the state. Even so, 
given the fact that political systems are based on nation-states structures – something called 
by Ben-Porath (2013) as “shared fate” (3.5) – it seems helpful to stimulate people‟s feeling of 
social responsibility towards their co-citizens. In this sense, cultivating patriotic traditions is a 
powerful way of establishing such a connection. Thus, as republicans like Taylor
40
 (1995a) 
propose, a somehow holistic view of society is more aligned with Western values than a view 
based on a simple aggregation of individuals (atoms). 
 
Obviously, patriotism can be very dangerous. Associated with this idea, nationalistic attitudes 
can be degenerated towards isolationism, cultural imposition and xenophobia. A first problem 
of patriotism is, then, that, in a world in which the economy is progressively globalised and 
the effects of public policies are not restricted to national borders, these issues orient debates 
on global justice. Thus, any patriotic feeling has to take into account the existence of these 
dynamics. The challenge is of how nations should see their neighbours: either as “players” 
whose interests can conflict with theirs, something that demands certain compromises; or as 
“brothers and sisters” whose interests are also theirs and whose destiny inexorably goes to the 
formation of a global society? These reflections on global justice are out of the scope of this 
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 Some do not classify Taylor as a republican. However, at least in the mentioned paper, his defence of 
societies in which people have strong responsibilities with unknown co-citizens is evident. 
95 
 
thesis, since this thesis‟ main aim is to think of how to better guarantee stability within 
Western nations. It is questionable if stimulating patriotism is good or bad in order to develop 
cosmopolitan values and, if the premise is accepted that cosmopolitanism should be 
cultivated, this point has to be further explored. 
 
Moreover, it is quite common through history that the dominant groups impose their values 
over the others. Thus, it is a challenge for republicans to create the conditions that stimulate a 
sense of belonging and solidarity/compassion among co-citizens without oppressing minority 
groups. Based on this, certain conservative attitudes towards preserving minority cultures 
within the nations have to be cultivated. Regarding this, Taylor (1995b, p.249) complains 
against the fact that liberalism calls itself “blind to cultural values”, though Christian values 
are evident in its everyday Western policies. This fact oppresses other religious groups within 
these nations. More room for minority religions should be opened and/or the participation of 
Christian practices and symbols should be reduced. In the same way, as is explored in the 
final chapters, it is so important that the history of minorities is also taught in Western 
schools, as black history is in the US and Brazil. As Taylor says, “enlarging and changing the 
curriculum is therefore essential not so much in the name of a broader culture for everyone as 
in order to give due recognition to the hitherto excluded” (1995b, p.251). In this way, based 
on the need to stimulate social responsibility and, at the same time, respect people‟s self-
identification, a room for different types of cultural conservatism has to be guaranteed in state 
practices. 
 
However, many times, dominant and minority cultures cultivate values that oppress some of 
their members. It is true that black people (for example, in US and Brazil) or indigenous 
peoples (in Chile and Australia) are subjugated by the white majority. However, it is also true 
that women and LGBT people suffer discrimination regardless of whether they belong to 
dominant or minority groups. Being all cultures sexist and homophobic (though in different 
degrees), women and LGBT people fight for equal recognition appealing not to the respect of 
the tradition, but to rational individual rights. Interestingly, such an appeal is directly related 
to the development of the idea of equal liberty from the Western liberal revolutions. Okin 
takes exactly these Western consensual values to defend gender equality based on reason and 
criticise the extreme appeal to multiculturalism: 
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[W]omen in more liberal cultures are, at the same time, legally guaranteed many of the same 
freedoms and opportunities as men. In addition, most families in such cultures, with the 
exception of some religious fundamentalists, do not communicate to their daughters that they 
are of less value than boys, that their lives are to be confined to domesticity and service to men 
and children, and that their sexuality is of value only in marriage, in service of men, and for 
reproductive ends. (1999, p. 17)  
 
In this sense, Okin‟s criticism focuses much more on cases in which women have their 
individual rights violated by practices of certain cultural groups. According to her, advocates 
of violence and oppression against women often support their points by building “cultural 
defences” which, among other things, support polygamy, abortion ban, sexual abuse, violence 
against homosexuals and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM).  
 
Kymlicka‟s solution to this conflict balances multicultural demands and human rights derived 
from Enlightenment ideas. According to him, following a multiculturalist demand, different 
cultures must be protected from external threats such as the imposition of a dominant culture; 
however, following a requirement of defenders of individual/human rights, this protection 
should be limited by internal constraints, by ensuring protection to the weakest members of 
the culture against the oppression of the members who are in a position of superiority (2002, 
p.342-3). 
 
4.4. Decision-making dimension 
 
If 4.2 and 4.3 reflect on certain ways that governments have to treat individuals to promote 
justice, here, the political process of determining what is just is analysed. As introduced in 
4.1, the third opposition on how a just society should be organised has, on the one extreme, a 
model of society ruled by few specialists (technocracy) and, in the other, a proposal that 
avoids interference of specialists in democratic processes
41
. Through history, however, both 
models were exceptional, since societies used to be ruled by the most powerful without any 
popular participation in the decisions. And, though most states were grounded on totalitarian 
regimes, few appealed to optimisation of efficiency to justify such practices. Direct 
                                                          
41
 This dichotomy can be found, for example, in Ranciere (2014[2005], p.96) 
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democracy was also rare – certain cities in ancient Greece are some of these exceptions42, 
where city-states were sufficiently small, there were not complex decisions to be taken 
(compared with current sophisticated issues related, for example, to the globalized economy) 
and citizens had time to deliberate and vote (only free landowner men (in Athens, 30,000) 
were considered citizens, and slaves and women used to do the ordinary work (Thorley, 2005, 
p.74)). 
 
This thesis, however, is focused on Western contemporary democracies. In 2.6, t is claimed 
that democratic procedures, which somehow presuppose people‟s participation in states‟ 
decisions, are the consensual means to apply and refine certain principles of justice. 
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to realise that Western states have characteristics that make 
direct democracy impossible: they are formed by millions of people, all of them with an equal 
right to vote and with very complex problems to solve. Thus, in local, regional and national 
levels, certain people are chosen (and paid) to spend time thinking and debating in order to 
find the best alternatives for solving the problems of the societies they represent 
(representative democracy). They, through deliberation and aggregation of interests (two 
ideas discussed below) elaborate laws and policies, and check executive power (theoretically) 
on behalf of their voters.  
 
Thus, a healthy representative model depends on people‟s trust in the political class. 
However, two recent phenomena from countries where this system seemed to work well have 
been considered important threats to representative democracy: in the UK, against most MPs‟ 
and specialists‟/experts‟ opinions, people voted for Brexit. A comment of Michael Gove, a 
former Education Minister and an important leader of Brexit, makes it evident: “people in 
this country have had enough of experts”43; in the US, Trump, as discussed below, appealed 
to the same rhetoric. Interestingly, in both cases, amongst many other things, it is possible to 
identify a strong desire of unarticulated people, who normally do not belong to the central 
political system (the “establishment”), to question these centralised decisions.  
 
Thus, neither extreme direct democracy, nor extreme specialist-based governments seem 
plausible, and the real alternatives are the different combinations of ordinary people‟s 
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 Other non-Western examples, but also related to small communities, can be also identified (Graeber, 2004; 
Barclay, 1996; Clark, 2016) 
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 https://www.ft.com/content/3be49734-29cb-11e6-83e4-abc22d5d108c 
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opinions and specialists‟ knowledge in decision-making processes. On the one hand, as 
presented in 3.7, peoples‟ opinions obtained through democratic processes are important for 
two reasons. First, currently, it is consensual in Western societies that all individuals should 
participate in the public decision-making. This consensus gives legitimacy for democratic 
governments and, then, stability for the society. Second, based on the debate on social choice 
theory, since many specialists have difficulty in understanding people‟s wills, consulting 
people‟s opinions seems to be the best way of identifying important characteristics of the 
common good. 
 
On the other hand, specialists are important in order to ensure that democratic decisions are 
not simply aggregations of individuals‟ will. Specialists help to refine theories, translate them 
to ordinary people, and guarantee the respect of entrenched constitutional principles. Through 
reinforcing these principles, a common good is favoured and the danger of a dictatorship of 
majority groups is significantly reduced. Thus, some people have to be designated to think on 
what is just. They are, in the theoretical domain, humanities academics, opinion-makers, etc. 
and, in the practical domain, policymakers
44
. They are deliberately hired by the society to 
develop ideas that individuals in their ordinary lives do not have time or interest to develop. 
 
In this way, academics and opinion-makers work towards increasing consensus, though often 
it is not produced: obviously, there are many disagreements amongst specialists, but, through 
theoretical debate, they look for consensus (even if they never reach it). In debates on justice, 
academics look forward to reaching minimal agreement that at least sustains constitutional 
principles. Voters and their representatives deal with dissensus. When debates reach the 
public sphere, it is because it is being accepted that consensus was not possible and people‟s 
opinions have to be consulted. Of course, through debates in the public sphere (pre and post 
elections), sometimes consensus is produced, though, many times, disagreements result in 
disputes ended by voting. 
 
Thus, certain states‟ practices towards justice are guaranteed by constitutions, while others 
come and go through democratic decisions. Throughout history, societies developed very 
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 Nichols (2017) differentiates experts (knowers) from policymakers (deciders). For the present discussion, this 
differentiation is not relevant, since policymakers are taken as specialists in governance. However, it is 
important to differentiate between deciders that are specialists in governance (and are chosen because of these 
qualities) from those who are only born into privilege (and are chosen because of their political influences). 
Many people consider that the deciders are far from being specialists in governance and, then, completely 
distrust them. 
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different ways of combining direct participation and certain mechanisms of limiting majority 
will. They are usually differentiated by the higher or lower importance given to central power 
in comparison to local power, by more or less direct connection between the leader and the 
voters (the dispute between presidentialism versus parliamentarism symbolises this), and by 
the ways that representatives are chosen. 
 
An way to reflect on how to give voice to the people in spite of the size of the nation is 
through comparing presidentialism and parliamentarism. Each system has advantages and 
disadvantages depending on people‟s level of trust in their local representatives. When this 
trust is low, it may be preferable that people choose directly the president, since they feel 
that, at least the choice of the president is based on their will, and, then, their voice is listened 
to. However, presidentialist regimes are normally based on the image of the leader as a 
saviour and get close to totalitarian practices. From this, undemocratic actions achieved by a 
bureaucratic establishment are recurrent. On the other hand, when people feel represented by 
their MPs, the channels of dialogue with the government, parliamentarism may be a better 
option, since representatives are in superior position to support but also to supervise and 
criticise the prime minister. Thus, the process of representatives‟ choice also deserves 
reflection. 
 
Since a representative system seems essential to current democratic practices, it is important 
to identify good ways to achieve it. Three alternatives are, then, briefly compared. District 
representation is a system in which the nation (also municipalities and states) is divided in 
districts where citizens choose a single candidate for representing them. The most positive 
element of such a system is the stronger ties established by the candidate and the voters 
(Strom et al, 2006). In proportional representation systems, on the other hand, citizens vote 
for a party, rather than for a specific candidate. The main advantage of this system is that 
people vote based on a national project, that is, on a broader project, rather than basing their 
choices in local concerns. Group representation (Young, 1990) is a type of affirmative action 
that aims to guarantee some seats in parliament for groups historically excluded (for different 
reasons) from political representation. There is a long debate in these regards, but it seems 
that these three alternatives can be combined, being such a combination the best alternative to 
improve the efficacy of the representative system. 
 
*** 
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Chapter 4 examines and shares the current Western debate about justice in three dimensions 
(economic, cultural and decision-making). This analytical option favours a more focused 
observation of different views of justice, and reduces the polarisation of the debate about 
justice. It is not the aim of this chapter to defend “the” just practices related to each 
dimension, but only to identify some reasonable limits on these regards. These limits added to 
empirical observations about human behaviours (chapter 5), especially Brazilian people‟s 
(chapter 6), help the identification of civic virtues that make people participate more 
effectively in the public sphere (chapter 8).  
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5. Natural and cultural developments of ideas of justice  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 develop reflections on justice from a theoretical point of view. However, 
many times, theories of justice are excessively idealistic and present proposals that are not 
perfectly compatible with real people‟s practices. Observing how human beings feel and are 
predisposed to act in the social sphere help to define how a just society should be. The focus 
of the present chapter is to dwell upon this reflection, from the empirical side of reflective 
equilibrium. Thus, it starts investigating (5.1) the role of natural selection and cultural 
practices in the development of people‟s notions of justice. Then, (5.2) humans‟ rationality 
and reasonability to advance from what is determined by nature and cultures is then 
presented. This reflection orients the discussions related to (5.3) moral developments of 
people towards both more concrete and more abstract ideas of justice. Finally, (5.4) this 
reflection on human nature and cultural constructions is organized through the three 
dimensions of justice introduced in chapter 4. 
 
5.1. Natural and cultural influences 
 
Constructivists/non-essentialists and essentialists/naturalists represent two opposite views on 
how to understand the way that people actually form their ideas of justice (Winsor, 2003; 
Amundson, 2005; Bloom, 2010; Berg-Sorensen et al, 2010). The former understand that 
individuals‟ ideas of what is socially fair or unfair are mainly based on social constructions. 
On the opposite side are those who believe that these ideas are basically printed in their 
DNAs. Of course, there are those who believe that individuals are partially defined by their 
genes, partially by their cultures. It seems a more reasonable position and it is adopted in this 
thesis, as the further discussion makes evident. Related to this debate, a distinct opposition is 
explored here: are people‟s ideas and actions towards what they consider fair or unfair 
oriented by their rational capacities or by their feelings? 
 
According to thinkers like Hume, sentiments have a central role in this process: “reason is, 
and ought only to be, the slave of the passions” (1817, p.106). This view is classified as a 
sentimentalist theory of justice in opposition to rationalist theories (Frazer, 2010). The two 
previous chapters focus on the latter, which defends certain features of just societies 
grounded on current Western values derived from rational reflection. People‟s natural 
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feelings and predispositions for action are not deeply analysed. However, Haidt, following 
Hume, claims that “moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning 
is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached” (2001, 
p.834). Haidt says that moral intuitions based on emotions are superior to moral reason by 
saying that a series of experiments show that people insist with their ideas based on their 
emotions even when they do not have any rational reason to support them (Goya-Tocchetto, 
2014, p.113). 
 
Supposing that Haidt is at least partially right, it is possible to investigate the origins of 
people‟s feelings. Do they come mostly from human beings‟ biological development, from 
the way that their cultures have been developed, or from a combination of both? Here, this is 
investigated. However, considering that Haidt is not completely right, it can be claimed that 
individuals are also rational and this fact establishes some limits to the consideration of their 
sentiments in trying to identify the basis of people‟s ideas of justice. As explored in 5.2, if 
people simply followed their natural predispositions or their cultural tradition, they would 
keep reinforcing gender inequalities, prejudices against other races and homosexuals, and 
would not care about strangers. However, currently, even those who “benefit” from these 
social practices built throughout history are (in higher or lower degrees) against them, since 
rationality also has a place in people‟s understanding of justice.  
 
Nevertheless, before exploring the impacts of rationality in people‟s understanding of justice, 
their feelings are investigated. The idea is roughly to identify to what extent Haidt‟s claim 
towards the priority of feelings over reason is correct. As Haidt, Bloom considers that 
“developmental psychology, supported by evolutionary biology and cultural anthropology, 
favors the view […] that some aspects of morality come naturally to us” (2013, p.5). 
Focusing most of his studies on babies and children, Bloom shows that “[o]ur natural 
endowments include […] some capacity to distinguish between kind and cruel actions” and to 
feel “empathy and compassion – suffering at the pain of those around us and the wish to 
make this pain go away” – “a rudimentary […] tendency to favor equal divisions of 
resources”, and “a rudimentary […] desire to see good actions rewarded and bad actions 
punished” (2013, p.5). In summary, what he says is that “certain moral foundations are not 
acquired through learning […]; they are instead the products of biological evolution” (2013, 
p.8). 
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This understanding identifies some natural roots in people‟s practices related to justice, and 
therefore that not all of these practices are socially constructed. In this way, the first point 
explored here is to what extent the “natural endowments” mentioned above orient actions that 
are beyond self-protection. It seems that it is exactly when people, based on different 
motives, stop only protecting themselves and start taking others into consideration that the 
idea of justice emerges. Concerns towards others can be investigated in evolutionary/natural 
and in reflective/rational terms. The former, explained here, is related to certain behaviours‟ 
natural/instinctive orientation. The latter, investigated in 5.2, is related to conscious decisions 
taken by individuals. 
 
The first reflection associates natural altruism, a type of altruism related to natural selection, 
with the interest in taking others into consideration. From this, by now, “[a]ltruistic behavior 
is defined, in the evolutionary sense, as all behavior that simultaneously involves a cost to the 
donor and a benefit to the recipient” (Goya-Tocchetto, 2014, 70). Opposing such an altruism, 
egoism is an attitude that implicates benefits for the agent and costs for the recipient. 
Regarding this, it is possible to expand this definition through imagining that some altruistic 
attitudes can involve short term costs to the donor but long term benefits to him/her.  
 
Firstly, reflecting at the individual level, Alexander (1987) claims that an altruistic/beneficent 
individual, though having some costs, has more chance of spreading genes, since such an 
individual would be rewarded by the community and have more chance to find partners, and 
his/her attitude would help the success of the whole group and, as a consequence, his/her own 
success. The first reason for altruism is based on the direct advantages that an altruistic 
individual could have. In other words, it presents some advantages of altruistic over egoistic 
individuals in spreading their genes. The third reason deserves more reflection, since it is 
related to certain sacrifices for the group‟s good. 
 
Regarding this third reason, several puzzles of Game Theory show that in a group interaction, 
the ideal schema for optimisation of individual‟s profit/advantage is one in which everyone 
else cooperates and he/she does not (Harrington Jr, 2009). In this scenario, egoistic 
individuals would have an advantage. This would make them more prone to survive than 
altruistic individuals. However, as soon as these egoistic individuals proliferate, their 
societies would be weaker than societies in which individuals, through cooperation, sacrifice 
part of their personal gains to favour the group. Thus, the latter societies have much more 
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chance of surviving. The same happens in societies in which individuals care more about 
their offspring, since, mainly amongst primates, young individuals are very fragile and would 
die without extra care. Thus, individuals naturally programmed to dedicate themselves to 
their offspring have a better chance to perpetuate their genes. In the same way, in-group 
protection makes the group stronger and the perpetuation of genes is equally favoured. 
 
It is, thus, being suggested that the feeling/propensity to act partially towards the other 
members of the community can be something natural in human beings, that is, it can have 
evolutionary explanations. In this way, sympathy and compassion (concepts defined below) 
can be rooted in such a development. However, it is also possible to say that people‟s rational 
skills allow them to learn that they should care about the others. Studies in primatology give 
interesting clues about the rise of this process. Fleck & De Waal (2002), through studying 
habits of food sharing amongst some primates as a broader system of mutual obligations that 
generates mutual benefits, defend the “reciprocity hypothesis” (Goya-Tocchetto, 2014, p.68). 
 
In some sense, this claim is still strongly related with evolutionary advantages that make 
cooperative individuals more likely to transmit their genes. However, it is being said here that 
the most prone to survive are those individuals that have the capacity to learn that 
cooperation gives an advantage for them. Fleck and De Waal identify in these practices that a 
proto-social system based on “[prescriptive] rules that are generated when members of a 
group learn to recognize the contingencies between their own behavior and the behavior of 
others, are formed. The existence of such rules and, more significantly, of a set of 
expectations, essentially reflects a sense of social regularity, and may be a precursor to the 
human sense of justice.” (2002, p.9) In the same way, “proto-empathy” and “proto-
sympathy” arise in this context, that is, a “proto-morality” (Goya-Tocchetto, 2014, p.67) 
Related to this, analysing small groups as hunter-gatherer communities, it is possible to 
identify, as a result of such cooperation, a reduction of material inequalities (Boehm, 1999). 
 
It is possible to identify in these small communities the roots of an idea of justice through 
associating them with natural selection. However, these communities, though “egalitarian 
when it comes to relationships between adult males”, are “hierarchical otherwise: parents 
dominate their children and husbands control their wives”. Moreover, these “societies are 
hyperviolent – there‟s violence against women, violence between men competing for mates, 
and violence against rival groups” (Bloom, 2013, p.67). In addition, it is possible to say that 
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rejecting malformed offspring is a common practice aligned with natural selection (Bloom, 
2013, p.143-4). Harari (2012), observing the long journey of development of Homo Sapiens, 
agrees with these three claims. Thus, if human beings are partially naturally altruistic, they 
naturally also disrespect current basic principles of justice.   
 
Moreover, apart from in-group practices against the idea of justice, it is even clearer that 
natural selection does not explain why individuals should care about those who belong to 
other groups. People‟s “natural reaction when meeting a stranger is not compassion. 
Strangers inspire fear and disgust and hatred” (Bloom, 2013, p.103). This claim is supported 
by Diamond‟s observation in the small-scale societies of Papua New Guinea: “to venture out 
of one‟s territory to meet [other] humans, even if they lived only a few miles away, was 
equivalent to suicide” (1992, p.229, Apud. Bloom, 2013, p.102-3). Bloom says that: 
 
While the force that drives the evolution of morality toward kin is genetic overlap, and the 
force that drives morality toward the in-group is the logic of mutual benefit, the force that 
drives morality toward strangers is … nothing. (Bloom, 2013, p.177-8) 
 
Thus, based on natural selection, individuals do not have reasons to care about unknown 
people. In this way, it is possible to identify that babies have rudimentary development of 
compassion, but “while we do see all sorts of spontaneous kindness by babies and young 
children – soothing, sharing, helping, and the like – these are directed toward family and 
friends” (Bloom, 2013, p.178-9). In this respect, if natural selection can be seen as the first 
source of morality, it is not enough. 
 
Actually, respecting members who do not belong to in-group seems a practice that was not 
developed through an evolutionary process – the same can be said, for example, to the 
promotion of gender equality. In this way, individuals and societies achieve these practices 
after reflecting about the fairness of them. That is, such practices depend on rationality, a type 
of consciousness about equality that is beyond instinctive characteristics. 
 
Though unfair, it is possible to understand that inequalities amongst men and women within 
the group, preferences towards healthier and attractive individuals and towards in-group 
members are based on natural selection. Firstly, if someone is programmed to protect his/her 
genes, putting more effort in protecting the healthier (or the attractive, those who look like 
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they are healthier) offspring seems a correct attitude. Moreover, as discussed above, in-group 
protection has the same natural justification. However, there are two types of attitudes that 
are against the current ideas of justice and, at the same time, do not produce gains from a 
natural selection perspective. They are racism and homophobia. 
 
Regarding racism, Bloom used to consider that natural selection provokes repugnance 
towards other races – or at least selective empathy only towards those of the same race 
(Bloom, 2013, p.108). However, from the perception that people raised in mixed-race 
environments do not develop such prejudices, Bloom concludes that racism has no relation 
with biological development. Actually, what individuals really protect are their in-group 
members (rejecting their out-group), not necessarily their own race (2013, p.109). Thus, 
according to him, racism is only based on cultural values conditions transmitted across 
generations. 
 
If racism, though unnatural, can be associated with in-group protection that helps genes 
preservation, homophobic behaviour does not have even this justification. Actually, regarding 
individual advantage, homosexual men make it easier for heterosexual men find female 
partners. In this way, only women who want to spread their genes should be bothered by the 
existence of homosexual men (and men, by the existence of homosexual women).  Regarding 
the collective advantage of enlarging the whole group, only female homosexuality should be 
condemned, since few men are enough to guarantee that a large group of women have 
children. From this reasoning, basically only lesbian practices should be disapproved of 
(Bloom, 2013, p.143-4). 
 
It is being said that homophobic individuals have more biological disadvantages than 
advantages. While lots of feelings like (at least) small scale altruism are useful for 
individuals‟ and genes‟ survival, homophobia does not have the same effect either in 
individual, or in group levels. Thus, if there is an explanation grounded in people‟s nature, it 
has to be different. Currently, behaviour psychologists are finding the roots of homophobia in 
the feeling of disgust (Dasgupta et al, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro & Bloom, 2009). Thus, 
homophobia “is a biological accident. It just so happens that evolved systems that keep us 
away from parasites and poisons respond in a certain negative way to [homosexual] activity” 
(Bloom, 2013, p.153).  
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However, as Bloom claims, the association of homophobia and disgust is only at the 
beginning of such a prejudice: “Over the course of history, this aversive reaction has been 
reinforced, directed, and sanctified by various cultural practices, including religion and law” 
(Bloom, 2013, p.153). Bloom actually claims that “assessment of gay people might be 
influenced by bad smell in the room, and this supports a certain theory of the relationship of 
disgust and morality […]. But it‟s hardly clear that this matters much when people interact 
with one another in real world” (2016, p.225). Thus, if there is a biological explanation, 
though accidental, for the historical prejudice against homosexuals, cultural practices seem to 
feed much more such a prejudice. This argument gains further support, of course, from the 
fact that at different periods in history (for example, ancient Greece), homosexuality was not 
the subject of moral disgust/disapproval. 
 
Regarding this “dispute” between nature and culture related to homosexual relationships, 
Harari claims that the superiority of equal consideration over in-group protection does not 
have biological roots:  
 
The handful of millennia separating the Agricultural Revolution from the appearance of cities, 
kingdoms and empires was not enough time to allow an instinct for mass cooperation to 
evolve. 
[…] 
While human evolution was crawling at its usual snail‟s pace, the human imagination was 
building astounding networks of mass cooperation, unlike any other ever seen on earth. 
(2012, p.115-6) 
 
As already mentioned in 2.4, this is linked with the facts “that humans created imagined 
orders and devised scripts. These two inventions filled the gaps left by our biological 
inheritance” (Harari, 2012, p. 149). 
 
Regarding this, it is important to highlight that, for Harari, “[t]he imagined orders sustaining 
these networks were neither neutral nor fair. They divided people into make-believe groups, 
arranged in a hierarchy. The upper levels enjoyed privileges and power, while the lower ones 
suffered from discrimination and oppression. Hammurabi‟s Code, for example, established a 
pecking order of superiors, commoners and slaves.” (2012, p.149)  
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This thesis, on the other hand, believes that these facts helped people‟s development of their 
rationalities and reinforced a certain idea of justice explored in 5.2. However, certain cultural 
practices go against this ideal. In this way, such oppressions and prejudices mentioned above 
that still exist in the West simultaneously clash with the Western tradition which is based on 
rational ideas of equal liberty in the social sphere. 
 
5.2. The role of reason 
 
It is suggested above that natural characteristics and cultural practices have influence over 
individuals‟ behaviour. Even so, their rational capacity also has influence over this. 
Regarding this, differently from Haidt (4.1), Bloom says that “innate preferences do not 
define us: we are rational, as well” (2016, p.8). According to him, for example, “[w]e often 
favour those who are adorable more than those who are ugly. This is a fact about our minds 
worth working. But we can also recognize that this is the wrong way to make moral 
decisions” (2016, p.229). In the same way, Bloom claims that: 
 
our moral circle has expanded over history: Our attitudes about the rights of women, 
homosexuals, and racial minorities have all shifted towards inclusiveness. […] 
But this is not because our hearts have opened up over the course of history. We are not more 
empathic than our great-grandparents. […] [O]ur concern for others reflects more abstract 
appreciation that regardless of our feelings, their lives have the same value as the lives of 
those we love. (2016, p.239) 
 
Thus, without disagreeing that emotions have impact on people‟s notions of justice, Bloom 
suggests that reason also has an impact on how people understand justice. 
 
In this regard, it is important to say that, according to Bloom, reason does not mean self-
interest. In his view, it is rationality that makes individuals capable to adapt themselves, to 
learn from what is developed in their cultures. Rationality, however, goes in a different 
direction to self-interest only if associated with compassion:  
 
Evolution […] [gave] rise to sentiments such as compassion for those who suffer, anger at 
cheaters and free riders, and gratitude to those who are kind. These are inspired solutions, 
evolved over millennia, to the problems that faced us as humans living in small groups. As 
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individuals who now live in a much different world, we can build from this, stepping away 
from our own specific circumstances and developing and endorsing moral principles of broad 
applicability. Such principles reflect values that, as rational and reflective beings, we are 
willing to sign on to. This deserves to be called wisdom. (2013, p.156-7) 
 
It is the possession of rationality and compassion that grounds Rawls‟ claim that most people 
are not only rational, but also reasonable: in his view, when people reflect about justice, they 
agree that they have to go further than self-interest and have to respect some duties towards 
the others (3.4). This is associated with the idea of social responsibility, a widespread 
Western value as defended in 2.4. 
 
This reflection on the idea of reasonability orients the reflection towards the impacts of 
empathy and compassion over individuals‟ sense of social responsibility. Empathy is a 
central concept for Smith‟s “theory of moral feelings”, though he used to call it 
“sympathy” 45 . Bloom, following Smith‟s understanding, defines empathy as “the act of 
coming to experience the world as you think someone else does” (2016, p.16), something 
similar to the popular phrase “putting oneself in other people‟s shoes”. Empathy has been 
presented by many as the type of feeling that orients social responsibility (De Wall, 2010; 
Baron-Cohen, 2012). This is a “common sense” idea and, for example, Baron-Cohen says 
that evil is the deficiency of empathy. 
 
Bloom, however, considers that empathy does not make the world a better place. Actually, he 
presents data proving that high empathy does not increase good behaviour and does not 
reduce aggressive behaviour (2016, p.83-4), and that empathy works as a spotlight narrowing 
people‟s minds (2016, p.87). One interesting example is that, if individuals feel more 
concretely the difficulties of a certain person, they tend to wish that that specific situation is 
solved, rather than defend a more abstract idea of justice.  
 
Despite this, Bloom is not against cognitive empathy, the capacity to understand other 
people‟s feelings, something that, in his view, is an amoral skill, similar to intelligence (2016, 
p.37). However, this does not mean that Bloom considers that only reason makes people 
being fair. His “alternative to emotional empathy includes compassion for others, so any 
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 Actually, Smith goes further and includes the notion of impartiality in his understanding of sympathy, 
something different from the current understanding of empathy. This idea is further explored. 
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rational decision-making process would take happiness and thriving and suffering into 
account” (2016, p.138). Bloom borrows the differentiation between empathy and compassion 
from Buddhism, which considers that “sentimental compassion” causes exhaustion, while 
“great compassion”, “more distant and reserved, and can be sustained indefinitely” (2016, 
p.138). 
 
Obviously, it can be said that what Bloom does is much more to mix empathy with reason 
than denying the former skill. The result of this mix would be compassion, something that 
moves people to act towards others, but wisely. Chapter 8 explores deeply this debate, and 
suggests knowledge, skills and values that individuals should possess in order to improve 
justice. Additionally, in 5.3, this point is further developed through the analysis of the debate 
between Kohlberg and Gilligan regarding people‟s “correct” moral development through 
their lives. 
 
Before exploring individuals‟ moral development, it is interesting to explore how the notions 
of reason, compassion, impartiality, and equality of opportunity are linked. The reflection 
presented above defends the idea that the natural process of protecting genes and some 
elements of what different cultures transmit across generations make it difficult for people to 
be impartial in their ordinary practices. However, people‟s rational capacity added to the 
feeling of compassion towards strangers orient them to understand that, in the social sphere, 
they have to be impartial and that it is fair to defend state impartial attitudes. The moral 
development of individuals seems to go in this direction as Kohlberg further claims. 
 
As discussed in 4.2, the idea of equality of opportunities seems to represent people‟s notion 
of impartiality/fairness. And, though different peoples understand luck in distinct ways, it is 
consensual that equalising opportunities is related to reducing the role of luck in disputes for 
jobs, good earnings, etc. Several empirical studies investigate which factors ordinary people 
consider acceptable and unacceptable with these regards. Through developing ideas proposed 
by Freiman and Nichols (2011), Goya-Tocchetto shows that ordinary people “tend to find 
social advantages and disadvantages to be much more problematic than genetic advantages 
and disadvantages” (2016, p.171), that is, they tend to consider unfair differences in earnings 
based on social luck, but accept differences based on natural luck. Following a similar 
reasoning, Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012) also appeal to empirical data, and advance in one 
point. While they find that ordinary people think that differences in resources should be 
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compensated, they consider that, if different earnings are caused by distinct choices made by 
individuals, this should not be compensated. In other words, if two people put the same effort 
to get a good job, but have different educational resources, the one that studied in the worst 
school should be compensated; on the other hand, if two people put the same effort, but one 
choses to do something that the society considers less important and is willing to pay less, 
this person does not deserve to be compensated. Moreover, Gaertner and Schokkaert 
identified that most ordinary people consider that bad luck should not be fully compensated: 
“Even in the case of genetic defects, less than 30% of the respondents go for complete 
equality of the personal contributions. Much more common is what the authors call 
„intermediate compensation‟” (2012, p.104). 
 
Though these data show some approximation between philosophical ideas defended in 
chapter 4 and ordinary people‟s ideas on redistribution of goods, they also present some 
incongruence. This comparison is fundamental to the idea of reflective equilibrium that 
sustains this whole thesis and is recovered in the conclusion. 
 
5.3. Moral development during people’s aging 
 
After reflecting on the influences of reason and different feelings (empathy and compassion) 
towards others in the establishment of people‟s notions of justice, it is important to think of 
how individuals develop their personal moral and civic values through their lives. This is 
different from the historical development of moral and civic values of Western societies 
analysed in 2.4. Regarding individuals‟ moral and civic development, “[t]he capacity for 
reason takes time to emerge, so the moral life of a baby is necessarily limited” (Bloom, 2013, 
p.211). 
 
Bloom, aligned with Piaget‟s and Kohlberg‟s ideas developed below, associates people‟s 
moral/civic maturation with their rational development. Piaget‟s and Kohlberg‟s studies go 
further and consider that, through observing their cultures and learning from their parents and 
community, children start embodying these values and practicing them. This point is 
associated with the Aristotelian idea presented in Nicomachean Ethics of learning virtues by 
the habit of practicing them.  
 
112 
 
Though most of Piaget‟s studies are focused on people‟s cognitive development, he also 
investigates their moral/civic developments. Throughout these studies, Piaget (1932) 
identifies in individuals‟ moral developments periods of anomy, heteronomy and autonomy. 
According to him, anomy is the total absence of understanding of moral/civic rules, 
something identified in babies and toddlers
46. It is slowly replaced by children‟s perception 
that the world is full of rules that they have to respect, though they do not understand exactly 
why. This is the typical period of heteronomy, normally associated with childhood. Later on, 
people identify in themselves a wish to follow internal rules. When they reach this stage, they 
are being autonomous. In this context, “a person is morally autonomous if, in spite of 
changing contexts and the presence of social pressures, he/she remains, in practice, faithful to 
his/her values and principles of action. Thus, the heteronomous person will be the one who 
changes moral behaviour in different contexts” (La Taille, 2001, p.16). In Piaget‟s view, 
autonomy is the last stage, reached in adolescence and adulthood, though, in these phases of 
life, autonomy and heteronomy also coexist. 
 
It is important to clarify that, during Piaget‟s stage of heteronomy, when rules are not applied, 
individuals also consider to follow themselves. However, in this case, they would be 
following their emotions, desires and volitions, rather than their reason. Autonomous people, 
on the other hand, follow rational self-imposed rules. Kant‟s (1785) moral ideas are the 
obvious inspiration behind this proposal. However, this moral/civic development, mainly in 
its heteronomous stage, is also aligned with the above mentioned Aristotelian idea of the 
cultural transmission of values in which people first conform to duty, and the practice of it 
(habit) makes them, later, desire that and act by duty. 
 
Reason and habit are also in the basis of Kohlberg‟s (1971; 1976) project, a refinement of 
Piaget‟s notions of moral/civic development that introduces the ideas that human beings 
develop their moral/civic values from pre-conventional to conventional and, finally, to post-
conventional periods of moral development.
47
 Though the order of these stages is 
controversial, it is widely accepted that there are different stages of moral/civic reasoning and 
that cognitive-developmental approaches are useful for understanding them (Kohlberg et al, 
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 This proposal, actually, goes against Bloom‟s idea that babies are born already with some moral ideas in their 
DNAs. 
47
 Rawls (1970) somehow also suggests this, but without presenting empirical evidences. 
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1983, p.2). Thus, it is interesting to understand Kohlberg‟s proposal, along with some 
criticisms of it, mainly from Gilligan, and a certain middle ground solution. 
 
Kohlberg (1971; 1976) investigates different levels of willingness to follow rules. Through 
developing Piaget‟s (1932) concepts he distinguishes three main stages of people‟s civic 
development. These are: pre-conventional (acting thinking of the consequences), normally 
identified in children; conventional (acting based on what society defines as just), a 
characteristic of adolescents and many adults; and post-conventional (acting based on a deep 
reflection about what is just), quite rare, even among adults. Following rules orient the three 
stages, but in distinct ways. First, rules are perceived as punishment and reward. People do 
not embody rules, they only try to follow them in order to avoid being punished and to 
maximise their chance of being rewarded. Later, through a process of habituation – an idea 
suggested by Aristotle in Nicomaquean Ethics – individuals embody the rules, but somehow 
uncritically. They understand the broad advantages for everyone living in societies ruled by 
laws, but they do not reflect about the correctness of these rules. Only those few people who 
reach the final stage transcend this understanding and deeply reflect about the meaning of fair 
rules. These people live their lives in this way, imposing self-rules and practicing what they 
consider fair, even when this goes against societies‟ rules. 
 
Kohlberg, thus, claims that people, in different stages of their lives, are motivated to follow 
rules (i) because they identify advantages of following rules; (ii) because “rules are rules”; 
(ii) because rules promote justice. Kohlberg, considers than that it is a movement towards a 
less self-centred attitude of individuals motivated first by habits (conventional level) and later 
by reason (post-conventional level). Interestingly, longitudinal studies have shown that, 
though it is impossible to guarantee such a progress, regression in this is very rare, that is, 
very few people become more self-centred throughout their lives (Colby et al, 1983). 
 
It is important to realise that, according to Kohlberg, the idea of social responsibility is 
composed by different layers. He contrasts social responsibility with duties in the personal 
sphere. Kohlberg understands the acquisition of these “situation-oriented” virtues as part of 
the process of development of social virtues that ends with the acquisition of the capacity of 
abstracting principles of justice (1983, p.22) – a difficult capacity achieved by few. 
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However, it is not simple to draw a line between virtues in personal/private and social/public 
spheres. Personal virtues such as care and empathy are many times, as mentioned in 5.2 
considered equally important in the social sphere. Gilligan (1982), a student of Kohlberg, 
agrees that there is a moral development throughout people‟s lives, but disagrees that 
following abstract principles of justice is the highest stage in this development. Opposing this 
idea, she considers that people who “finish” their civic development behaving based on care 
and empathy are not less virtuous. According to her, they are only different from those who 
can abstract principles of justice. Like many others (Baron-Cohen, 2004; Pinker, 2009), she 
claims that this is a characteristic more associated with women‟s behaviour, while abstraction 
is more related to men‟s. Gilligan does not say that one is better than the other, nor that it has 
any basis in biology
48
. Rather, she proposes that, as important as abstraction and separateness 
of individuals, it is the moral reasoning located in concrete and integrated situations (Wolff, 
1996, 213). 
 
This discussion, however, counterposes two different ways to understand how people should 
orient their thoughts and actions in the social/public sphere. This is a subject discussed in 
chapter 8, where certain values expected from Western citizens are presented. That chapter, 
then, contrasts Kohlberg‟s defence that everyone should be stimulated to follow abstract self-
imposed moral/civic rules and Gilligan‟s view that care ethics is not inferior to this 
abstraction. 
 
Related to what should be cultivated, it is important to extend the reflection on what is 
possible to cultivate. Interestingly, Kohlberg understands that, though the stage of abstract 
moral/civic values is superior, very few people reach it. In this way, the reflection on civic 
education helps to determine if such values can be cultivated and how it should be done. 
Gilligan‟s attention to care ethics can be an alternative. Chapters 9 to 12 take this discussion 
forward. 
 
Thus, it is only in the conclusion that this opposition between justice and care ethics can 
receive a better analysis. There, ideals of justice (ideal end) are compared with real people‟s 
possibilities to build a just society (real end). Citizenship education is presented as the means, 
and, again, ideal means are compared with real means. It is exactly in this comparison that 
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 Gilligan bases her analysis on Chodorow‟s (1978) work, which is to do with the social construction of gender 
through child-rearing practices. 
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Kohlberg versus Gillingan‟s debate is placed. In summary, in the conclusion, their ideals of 
education for justice and care are compared with the Brazilian reality of citizenship 
education. 
 
5.4. The three dimensions of justice and the previous empirical observations 
 
The natural and cultural developments of people‟s understandings and practices towards 
justice can be analysed from the perspective of the three dimensions proposed in chapter 4. 
First, observing the economic dimension, it seems that people indeed have a notion of 
equality of opportunities, as presented by empirical research studies previously discussed 
(Goya-Tocchetto, 2016; Freiman & Nichols, 2011; Gaertner & Schokkaert, 2012). However, 
individuals, even theoretically, do not seem to defend total equality of opportunities, since, 
though they defend eliminating differences based on social luck, they accept differences 
based on natural luck. A possible reasoning behind this difference is that they, probably 
intuitively, perceive that, though unfair, the acceptance by society of this difference produces 
positive results for all, since “the most naturally skilled” are stimulated instead of refrained. 
 
Observing what is developed from the cultural perspective, the conclusion is that the idea of a 
nation where people do not have direct contact with their co-citizens, but have some 
responsibilities towards them, is not natural. People‟s natural developments make them care 
only for in-group members. However, human rationality and compassion (Bloom calls it 
“wisdom”) can expand people‟s empathy towards out-group members. Interestingly, the 
development of communication of individuals who share a similar narrative helps this 
expansion, as shown in 2.4. Actually, this is a process developed throughout history and 
throughout individuals‟ aging. In the opposite direction, the oppression of black people and 
the LGBT community does not have biological origins. Maybe oppression of women, on the 
other hand, has origins in patriarchal families structured a long time ago upon the natural 
higher strength of men. Even so, people‟s rational development has shown that all of these 
oppressive structures are unfair.  
 
Finally, this chapter did not develop any observation about how important democracy is for 
individuals of current Western societies. However, the pressures for universal suffrage, the 
human rights movement in the 1960s in the US (2.5) and alike can be good empirical 
indications that the ideals of democracy are also present in ordinary people‟s imaginary. 
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*** 
 
Chapter 5 analyses natural and cultural influences over people‟s understandings and practices 
towards justice. In parallel, individuals‟ rationality, also a natural human characteristic, 
developed through their aging, is also taken as a fundamental on these regards. Added to 
theoretical reflections about ideals of justice (chapter 4) and observations of the Brazilian 
society (chapter 6), these characteristics empirically observed serve to identify civic virtues 
that people can possess to participate of the improvement of justice in their societies.     
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6. History and current situation of justice and citizenship in Brazil 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 investigate ideal theories of justice and democratic procedures grounded in 
general Western values. Chapter 5 presents a general view of biological and cultural 
influences over human beings practices in the social sphere. However, in order to establish a 
better dialogue between theory and practice, it is fundamental to observe more carefully how 
Western people – specifically Brazilian people – behave. Thus, the current chapter associates 
historical and sociological characteristics of Brazilian society with the national development 
of a sense of justice and citizenship. This chapter starts by exploring (6.1) some important 
historical factors related to the expansion of the idea of “belonging” amongst Brazilian 
people. Following this, (6.2) the ideas of patrimonialism and patriarchalism are identified in 
Brazilian social development. Then, (6.3) Brazilian people‟s passivity and lack of capacity of 
mobilisation is associated with a non-logical development of their rights. Having presented 
this historical analysis, some aspects related to social justice are further analysed. (6.4) Data 
about how unequally wealth and opportunities are distributed in Brazil are presented. Finally, 
(6.5) data on the violence suffered by some minorities, unequal job opportunities and lack of 
political representation of certain groups are also presented to show that inequalities in Brazil 
are not restricted to the economic dimension.  
 
6.1. Belonging and citizenship 
 
The previous chapter explores some people‟s broad views about the economic and cultural 
dimensions of justice. People‟s views regarding these dimensions depend on, besides their 
natural development and cultural bias, the way that their sense of unity is established. In 
order to present a brief historical reflection on how Brazilian people have developed their 
notion of unity and belonging to the country, this section follows Carvalho‟s suggestion that, 
“[i]n general, the national identity comes from language, religion, and, above all, fights and 
wars against common enemies” (2002, p.12). 
 
The unification of the language in Brazil (currently, 97%
49
 of the population speaks 
Portuguese) is something remarkable, since the nation was formed through the integration of 
                                                          
49
 In 2013, 194.9 million Brazilians (https://www.publico.pt/culturaipsilon/noticia/ha-244-milhoes-de-falantes-
de-portugues-em-todo-o-mundo-1610559) of a total of 201 million 
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very different cultures (indigenous (natives), Portuguese (colonisers), Africans (former 
slaves), and other immigrants (Italian, German, Japanese, etc.). Interestingly, until the middle 
of the seventeenth century, the most spoken language was Tupi-Guarani (Ribeiro, 
2015[1995], p.92), since the huge Brazilian coast, “was inhabited by the same indigenous 
family, which from north to south spoke the same language” (Holanda, 1995[1955], p.105). 
However, when slaves, “captured randomly in hundreds of tribes [from the West coast of 
Africa] which spoke languages and dialects unintelligible to each other”, (Ribeiro, 
2015[1995], p.87) came to Brazil, things changed. It was necessary for the colonisers to 
establish a common language amongst slaves and Portuguese fulfilled this role (Ribeiro, 
2015[1995], p.74), and such unification of the language was almost completed at the end of 
the eighteenth century (Ribeiro, 2015[1995], p.93). 
 
However, a huge number of immigrants, most from Europe, but also from Japan, came to 
Brazil mainly during the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries 
to replace slave labour
50
. In the 1930s, this immigration came to be understood “as 
responsible for problems and obstacles to the project to create Brazilian nationality” 
(Schwartzman et al, 1984, p.171-2). As explored in 10.1, the government from that time 
nationalised schooling, something that shows “the content of the nationalist project of post-
1937 period. Conservative and authoritarian in nature, it was marked by the exclusionary 
character, averse to pluralist and diversified coexistence” (Schwartzman et al, 1984, p.181). 
Such a model “sought to transform the nation into an organic whole, a moral, political, and 
economic entity whose ends would be realised in the state” (Schwartzman et al, 1984, p.183). 
At least regarding the language, it has succeeded. 
 
Reflecting on the impact of religion, there is no doubt that Catholicism was spread in Brazil 
by the colonisers reaching indigenous and African slaves. However, the process in Brazil has 
been much more idiosyncratic than in other Latin American countries, also colonised by a 
strongly Catholic nation, Spain. If Jesuits worked hard to convert indigenous peoples to 
Catholicism in places colonised by Spain, there was less commitment from the Portuguese 
Catholic Church, which was subjected to the Monarchy, rather than to the Vatican in that 
time. This subjection to a non-ecclesiastical power made Brazilian priests more “averse to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(http://www.brasil.gov.br/governo/2014/08/populacao-brasileira-ultrapassa-202-milhoes-de-pessoas) were able 
to speak Portuguese.  
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social discipline and even respect for legal authority” (Holanda, 1995[1955], 118), something 
that favoured syncretism. 
 
Two other phenomena related to religion deserve attention. One is the dispute within the 
Catholic Church in the second half of the twentieth century between conservatives and the 
Catholic liberation theology. As explored below, the first group supported Vargas‟ (1937-45) 
and the Military (1964-85) dictatorships. The second group was (and continues to be) very 
close to social movements and has been active from the Military dictatorship onwards. The 
other phenomenon is the enlargement of Neo-Pentecostal churches in the last 40 years. These 
new churches started working much more closely with poor communities offering help to 
lonely poor people, normally those who migrated from countryside areas to big cities. Thus, 
these churches have increased exponentially. Their moral and civic agenda is very 
conservative and have clashed with avant-garde cultural movements, especially LGBT and 
feminist (Nunes, 2006). Religion, in this case, has been a matter of political disputes, but still 
in the domain of reasonable debate, though an increase in fundamentalism can be identified, 
as explored below. 
 
Regarding the importance of wars as a unifying element of nations, though Brazil has a 
peaceful history with few minor conflicts. The exception was the Paraguay War (1864-70). 
Regarding this war, it is important to start by saying that the revisionism about the 
motivations of that conflict have shown that Brazilian people should not be proud of their 
victory (Chiavenato, 1985; Doratioto, 2002). Thus, the Paraguay War is no longer cultivated 
as a memory that makes people proud and unifies the nation – something which is at least 
partially perceived, for example, in the UK‟s education system regarding the First and the 
Second World Wars memories. Still, the Paraguay War was important in that moment for the 
development of the idea of the nation: “The national flag began to be reproduced in 
newspapers and magazines, […] [t]he national anthem began to run, the Emperor Dom Pedro 
II was presented as the leader of the nation. [...] The press also began to try to create the first 
national military heroes” (Carvalho, 2002, p.78). 
 
Related to this, it is also worth mentioning Brazilian performance in football as something 
that has also developed national attachment based on people‟s sharing common heroes. 
Though Carvalho doesn‟t include the importance of sports performance in his list of unifying 
elements (language, religion and wars), at the same time, he says how significant it was, for 
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the development of patriotism in Brazil, that the country won the third Football World Cup in 
1970. It happened during the Military Dictatorship and was massively exploited by the 
government to agglutinate the nation (2002, p.168). 
 
Additionally, it is worth mentioning the existence of few other examples of athletes who 
occupied this place of hero, probably the most important being Ayrton Senna, a Formula 1 
pilot three times World Champion who died racing in 1994. The commotion because of his 
death stopped the country. Other aspects of Brazilian culture could also be mentioned, as 
certain expressions of music and dance. Samba and Carnival, for example, are symbols of 
national identity and pride, and often cut across social class and racial divisions. A deep 
reflection on these things is not possible within this thesis. 
 
These different factors allow Ribeiro to highlight that positive aspect of Brazilian unity: 
 
It is worth saying that, although made by the fusion of such different matrices, Brazil is one of 
the most linguistic and culturally homogeneous and also one of the most socially integrated 
peoples in Earth. They speak the same language without dialects. They do not have any 
vindication for autonomy and are not attached to the past. We are open for the future. 
(2015[1995], p.331) 
 
Obviously Brazil is a composition of cultures. Even so, black, indigenous, white, mixed-
races, direct descendants of immigrants, individuals whose families are in the country from 
several generations, all of them call themselves Brazilians. 
 
However, only as a final observation about this homogeneity, it is important to highlight that 
the monopoly of mass media by a specific TV channel (Rede Globo) – though this monopoly 
has been decreased not simply by the introduction of digital media but also by a political 
rejection by key political sectors of society – has significantly standardised the way that 
Brazilian people think of several things. This fact has good and bad effects. On the one hand, 
for example, its soap-operas, by presenting homosexual relationships as normal, help to 
challenge conservative values of Brazilian society such as homophobia. On the other hand, 
Rede Globo has strong influence over people‟s political views and this power challenges 
democracy (Souza, 2017). 
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6.2. Social gap, patriarchalism and patrimonialism  
 
However, this Brazilian process of building a nation in which people feel attached to their co-
citizens has other characteristics that reduces the spirit of national unification. If, as presented 
above, all Brazilians feel part of the same nation, as explored below, their feeling of 
attachment with unknown co-citizens is very low. The first reason for this is related to the 
Brazilian process of colonisation that was quite different from what happened in the US. 
Thus it produced peculiar types of miscegenation and racism. Holanda presents important 
characteristics of the origins of this difference:  
 
If the first settlers of English America had been moved by desire of building, overcoming the 
wilderness, a Blessing community, free from the religious and civil oppression that they 
endured in their homeland, and where they could finally realise the pure evangelical ideal, the 
Latin Americans were attracted by the hope of finding in his achievements a paradise made of 
mundane wealth and heavenly beatitude, offered to them without demanding higher labour, 
but as a free gift.” (Holanda, 1992[1959], p. xvii, Apud. Fonseca, 2016, p.146-7) 
 
As a consequence of this, overall the Portuguese mingled much more with the indigenous and 
African peoples than British colonisers, who essentially decimated North-American 
indigenous people (Cardoso, 2013, p.113). Two main factors were decisive for this 
difference. Firstly, instead of British colonisers, who travelled to the US with their families, 
the Portuguese normally migrated alone to Brazil (Ribeiro, 2015[1995], p.173). Thus, some 
kind of miscegenation based on sexual needs simply happened. Moreover, the Portuguese, 
because of geographical and historical reasons, already considered themselves a mixed race, 
and consequentially were more open to integration, unlike the British, who had the tendency 
to keep themselves more “pure” (Ribeiro, 2015[1995], p.54). In Brazil, this “milder” process 
was the beginning of the “coexistence of the contraries”, something that Freyre (1933) 
identifies even more in the relation among slaves and their owners. 
 
Slaves came to be brought from Africa to Brazil in the sixteenth century and slavery was 
abolished only in 1888, with Brazil being the last Latin American (and Western) country to 
stop this horrendous practice (Villa, 2011, p.21). However, it is possible to say that, in Brazil, 
slavery was less perverse than in other countries, mainly in the US
51
. As mentioned before, 
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 Obviously, slavery is always perverse, and, also in Brazil, lots of terrible things were also perpetrated. 
122 
 
Freyre (1933) calls attention to the fact that the Portuguese felt less racial superiority over 
African slaves, since they were also quite mixed with Moors (Cardoso, 2013, p.111-2). This 
allowed a kind of coexistence based on “harmony or balance of contraries” (Cardoso, 2013, 
p.109-11). It is this “peaceful” coexistence, something not necessarily good, that promotes 
closer proximity amongst different races in Brazil, something that allows Freyre to propose 
something that is known as the “Brazilian myth of identity based on miscegenation” 
(Cardoso, 2013, p.293). 
 
From this interpretation, social problems in Brazil are seen by some as basically related to the 
huge gap between rich and poor people. Magnoli, for example, cites the Brazilianists Pierson 
and Wagley, who wrote about Brazil in the middle of the twentieth century. They, though 
recognising the presence of racial discrimination in Brazil, counterposed “the American 
panorama, characterized by remarkable mobility classes” and “impenetrable barriers in the 
race system”, with Brazil, marked by “obvious distances between the social classes, but with 
diffuse racial boundaries” (2009, p.158).  
 
Cardoso, however, sees the question of racial discrimination from a different point of view. 
Though he agrees with Freyre, Magnoli, and others that “miscegenation, hybridism, and even 
(mystification apart) cultural plasticity of coexistence of the contraries are not only a 
characteristic, but an advantage of Brazil” and “an input letter of Brazil in a globalised 
world” (2013, p.90), he also sees lots of problems related to this. Following Bastide and 
Fernandes (1955), Cardoso argues that, after abolition, “colour and racial discrimination 
completed themselves in order to preserve the slavery times establishment”, and that “colour 
and racial differences are remade in their cultural meanings to maintain an unequal 
interethnic situation, potentially violent, highly exploitative, but which are accommodated, 
based on those cultural redefinitions, avoiding the explosion of that order” (2013, p.197). In 
this sense, “colour has a role, evidently, but a role of a symbol, that is, a well identifiable 
criterion, which situates the individual in a certain rung of the social ladder” (Bastide & 
Fernandes, 1955, p.161). In other words, in Brazil there is class prejudice, and, since most of 
poor people are black, then, at the end, the class segregation promotes race segregation. Some 
data analysing this gap between white and black people, as well as between poor and rich, 
men and women, hetero and homosexuals, are presented in 6.4. 
 
123 
 
Thus, because of its peculiar process of miscegenation, Brazil developed a huge social gap in 
which black people are normally in the position of submission, but, at the same time, there 
are not strong social or racial conflicts in the country. In Bastide‟s view, this fact is related to 
people‟s capacity to “accommodate” conflicts (Bastide & Fernandes, 1955, p.11). 
 
Cardoso distinguishes between racial prejudices “of origin”, based on ancestry and common 
in the US, and “of mark”, occult and dissimulated, based on appearance and common in 
Brazil. According to Cardoso, because of this: 
 
Black Americans acquired awareness of the oppression that they were subjected, what made 
them to react and vindicate their rights; in Brazil, on the contrary, racism was consolidated in 
the hearth of social relations and was incorporated passively by the black people. (2013, 
p.159)  
 
Pointing to the same direction, and calling this Brazilian tradition as “assimilationist racism”, 
Ribeiro also identifies the passivity which maintains the status quo in such a society, 
differently from the US: 
 
The most perverse aspect of assimilationist racism is that it passes an image of greater 
sociability, when in fact it disarms lack people to fight against the poverty that is imposed on 
them, and masks the conditions of terrible violence to which they are subjected. (2015 [1995], 
p.170) 
 
Related to this perverse assimilationism, another historical and anthropological characteristic 
of Brazilian people is their “cordiality” that diminishes their social/public virtues and 
produces a “patrimonialist” society. In his classic definition of “cordial man”, Holanda 
contrasts cordiality, a personal/private virtue, with civility, a social/public virtue:   
 
[T]he Brazilian contribution to civilization will be of cordiality – we will give to the world the 
“cordial man”. The gentleness, the hospitality, the generosity, virtues so boasted by foreigners 
who visit us, represent, in effect, a definite trait of the Brazilian character, in the measure, at 
least, in which the ancestral influence of the patterns of human relations, coming from the 
rural and patriarchal world. It would be a mistake to suppose that these virtues could mean 
“good manners,” civility. They are, above all, legitimate expressions of an extremely rich and 
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overflowing emotive background. An idea of coercion is associated with the concept of 
civility – civility can be expressed in commandments and in sentences. (1995 [1955], p.146-7) 
 
Holanda, then, says that Brazilian people, in general, do not have social/public virtues 
sufficiently developed. They actually tend to behave only based on personal/private virtues, 
even in the social/public sphere: 
 
It was not easy for the holders of the public positions of responsibility [in Brazil], formed by 
such an environment, to understand the fundamental distinction between the domains of the 
private and the public. Thus, they are characterised precisely by what distinguishes the 
“patrimonial” official from the pure bureaucrat according to Max Weber‟s definition. For the 
“patrimonial” official, political management itself appears as a matter of its particular interest; 
The functions, the jobs and the benefits which they derive are related to the personal rights of 
the official and not to objective interests, as in the real bureaucratic State, where specialisation 
of functions prevails and the effort to ensure legal guarantees for citizens prevails. 
(1995[1955], p.145-6) 
 
Similarly to Holanda, this thesis understands such “cordial” characteristics as virtues in the 
personal/private sphere, but, vices when practiced at the social/public sphere. The Kohlberg 
versus Gilligan debate, introduced in 5.3 and developed in 8.5, investigates this difference 
between the personal/private and the social/public spheres, but, in order to explore this 
specific characteristic of Brazilian people, the following example is elucidative. It seems 
quite obvious that the Western people consider it a virtue to care more about relatives and 
friends in the personal/private sphere, though it is considered a vice to do so in the 
social/public realm – for example, should a civil servant use his/her position to favour a 
friend or family member. In Brazil, however, such examples are quite common, as shown in 
6.4. More than this, this attitude seems not to be seen as something wrong, since there is a 
widespread idea that duties towards family/friends are always prior than towards strangers 
(Holanda, 1995[1955], p.145-6). 
 
Related to this, Fonseca sees an evident split between how the two different strands of 
Christianity influenced North and South America: 
 
On the one hand, the Catholic Counter-Reformation, with a strong Jesuitical, missionary and 
inquisitorial accent; the attachment to medieval scholastic coupled with resistance to the 
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winds, methods and ideals of Enlightenment; the centralised and bureaucratic absolutist 
Crown; and the parasite mercantilism of a rentier elite. And, on the other, the Protestant 
Reformation, with strong Puritan and Calvinist waves (“among the things of this life, the 
work is what most resembles the man to God”); vigorous adherence to the Enlightenment 
project of science and technology at service to rescuing the human condition through 
dominating nature and rational action; the institutional monarchy; and the primacy of 
competitive market and free enterprise as instruments of economic efficiency and capital 
accumulation. (2016, p.148) 
 
Following this, unlike Freyre, Holanda is much less optimistic about the role of family ties in 
Brazilian development: 
 
[Holanda] criticised what was valued at his time and still today: the cordial character – 
emotional, personal – of Brazilians, our cultural specificities. He showed the unfortunate 
political consequences of the Iberian heritage baked in the sun of the Tropics: personalism, 
strong leadership, lack of rules and hierarchies that mean much more of an arbitrariness of the 
masters than comradeship among equals. [Freyre] rarely speaks of equality, and with respect 
to the notion of “balance between opposites” – essential in its interpretations – passes the 
impression of accepting inequality, although he reacts against the idea of racial inequality. 
[Holanda] shows that, without the abstract, formal equality of the law, and without the 
practical exercise anchored in political culture, there is no democracy. (Cardoso, 2013, p.132)  
 
Here, the main difference between Freyre‟s and Holanda‟s analyses is that the latter puts 
much more weight on the need to promote justice based on the notion of civility and abstract 
rules, whilst the former sees Brazilian historical stability as something much more important. 
 
Thus, if “accommodation of contraries” keeps power relations based on hierarchical 
structures that have origins in slavery period, Brazil also keeps power relations based on 
“patrimonial” structures that are perpetuated throughout history. According to Faoro (1958; 
1975), from the colonial times until, at least, the Vargas Era (which finished in 1954) more or 
less the same “caste” of people founded the state and ruled the country, taking advantages for 
themselves, instead of sharing the goods and giving voice for the worst-off. Faoro considers 
that this caste is basically located in the public sector: 
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[T]he State projected itself, independent and autonomous, over the social classes and the 
proper nation. State and Nation, government and people are distinct realities, which don‟t 
know each other and, frequently, are antagonists. (1958, p.45) 
 
Souza (2017), however, presents strong criticisms against such an interpretation. In his view, 
this narrative only blames corrupt bureaucrats for the inequalities in Brazil and through this, 
hides the real responsible for this: rich people from the private sector that inherit unfair 
advantages since the times of slavery. Souza completely disagrees with Faoro‟s historical 
analysis: “Brazil does not inherit from Portugal its social structure; this heritage comes from 
slavery, which did not exist in Portugal” (2017, p.200). Actually, “the colonisation of the 
country was left in the hands of private individuals. [...] The Portuguese State, only very 
dimly, could impose its will” (2017, p.205) 
 
However, a balanced interpretation of this debate seems more accurate. According to 
Cardoso, “the plot between the State and bureaucracy, on the one hand, and civil society, 
classes and market, on the other, is more complex” (2013, p.231). Nevertheless, Cardoso 
endorses Faoro‟s idea that the lack of feudal tradition in Portuguese history made Portugal 
centralise power before the other absolutist states, and this fact contributed to the 
transmission of the feudal tradition to Brazil (2013, p.230-4). The US, where civil society 
was prior to the state, was founded on a pact that gave strong power to the different 
federations. In Brazil, where the state was prior to civil society, political power is very 
centralised and the laws of the federations hold no weight (Faoro, 2007, p.13-4). 
 
Moreover, Cardoso agrees that, until now, this element is very present in Brazilian political 
structure – though the bureaucratic establishment has shifted from the aristocracy to the 
military and, later, to certain sectors of civil society. In this way, he considers that the private 
sector is also part of the Brazilian current structure of power. Through a direct criticism of 
some policies of the Workers Party, which succeeded him in the national government
52
, 
Cardoso says: 
 
The confusion between governing parties and public machine has control instruments to co-
opt both the business sector (via credit and various advantages of concessions), and workers 
                                                          
52
 Cardoso was president from 1995 to 2002. 
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and dispossessed masses (via union benefits and direct income transfers). (Cardoso, 2013, 
p.261) 
 
This claim is very controversial for several reasons. First, defenders of the Workers Party 
policies accuse Cardoso‟s government of having done the same kind of co-opting, and of 
being extremely neoliberal in its policies, something that made urgent this direct income 
transfer (Bolsa Família) to help such dispossessed people. More importantly, when Cardoso 
says that the public sector co-opts the private, he seems to put the centrality and protagonism 
of this process in the former. Souza‟s (2017) reverse analysis, however, seems to be more 
accurate. It seems right to say that rich people who belong to the private sector are those who, 
throughout history, have unfairly concentrated wealth and only have used the public sector to 
create laws and policies that keep this unfair structure. 
 
However, though the private sector seems to lead this process, it also seems that private and 
public sectors depend on each other. Lazzarini (2011), appealing to several data showing the 
historical and current entrenched relation between private companies and the Brazilian state, 
demonstrates this. He calls the spurious relation of exchange of advantages between the 
public and private the “capitalism of ties” (2011, p.38). Such a relation is currently the basis 
of huge scandals of corruption, one of the main problems of Brazilian society, presented in 
the introduction and also approached in the conclusion of this thesis. 
 
6.3. Top-down changes 
 
Independently of whether Freyre‟s, Holanda‟s, Faoro‟s or Souza‟s narrative is the most 
“correct” way to describe how Brazil was built, it is a matter of fact that Brazilian people 
never achieved a proper revolution. Differently from, for example, the US, UK and France, or 
even neighbouring countries in South America, the six most important changes of Brazilian 
political regimes – Independence (1822), Republic (1889), the 1930s Revolution (1930), New 
State (1937), Military‟s coup d‟état (1964), and Re-democratization (1985) – happened 
without participation from the general public, strong riots, or large numbers of deaths. These 
processes were always top-down (Carvalho, 2002, p.26; 95-6; 106; 144; 173)
53
. 
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 It is not being said that there were or are not popular mobilisations in Brazilian history. In the past, there were 
several unsuccessful attempts to change the regime in local and national levels. At the end of military 
dictatorship, strong but peaceful demonstrations ask for direct elections for president. At the same time, 
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It is, then, possible to identify in Brazilian social dynamics what Cardoso, through expanding 
Freyre‟s idea of “harmony of contraries” and appealing to Hegelian categories, calls a 
“contradiction without dialectic – without properly producing a synthesis” (2013, p.111). 
This process of harmonization probably made Brazilian minorities less conscious of their 
situation and their rights. Thus, they were less likely to make a claim for significant cultural, 
political and economic changes. As also mentioned above, in the US, the lack of this 
harmonisation of contraries, even though creating a strong segregation, at least allowed 
black/poor communities to be aware about their situation and fight for their rights. On the 
other hand, in Brazil, these “harmonisation” of cultures produced usual political passivity and 
the lack of spirit of indignation in minorities – with few exceptions as 2013 mass 
mobilizations. 
 
Taking Faoro‟s analysis, it is possible to suggest that, in Brazil, centralised power in the 
bureaucratic establishment is related to the Brazilian people‟s passivity. The history of 
centralisation of power made Brazilian citizens always wait for changes from the top. At the 
same time, the fact that Brazilian people are not attached to their national institutions results 
in their lack of feeling of belonging to these institutions, something that opens space for the 
same groups keep occupying the bureaucratic establishment. Thus, it seems that 
centralisation reinforces passiveness and vice-versa. 
 
Actually, a comparison of the development of civil, political and social rights between Brazil 
and the UK reinforces this understanding, and gives some other clues regarding why 
Brazilian people have been so passive about the neglecting of their rights. Carvalho, based on 
Marshall ideas (2.5), defends that the sense of citizenship developed in the UK had a 
“logical” chronology: first, during the eighteenth century, civil rights were established, then, 
subsequently, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, political and social rights were 
promoted. Carvalho also says that this order can be broken, and that “[i]n theory, [social 
rights] can exist without civil rights and certainly without political rights. But in the absence 
of civil and political rights, its content and range tend to be arbitrary” (2002, p.10-1). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
different sectors of society started to fight for their rights. Landless Movement (MST), certainly the largest 
social movement in Latin America, started protesting for agrarian reform, and trade unions organised several 
strikes. 
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Reflecting specifically about Brazil, Carvalho identifies this non-logical development by 
saying that, in this country, social rights came before civic and politic rights. From this 
perception, he suggests that it generates lots of problems in the process of incorporating the 
rights of Brazilian people. 
 
The main problem, as mentioned above, is that the social advances were promoted in general 
in a top-down way. Through highlighting this point, Carvalho calls attention to the fact that it 
was exactly during the period between 1930 and 1945, a very authoritarian moment of 
Brazilian history in which civil and political rights were denied, that social rights, such as 
laws protecting workers rights, were more developed (2002, p.110-26). Of course, this 
situation was possible because these social policies were implemented by the dictator of that 
time, Getúlio Vargas. From 1945, a democratic period was instigated and inspired by the 
victory of Allies in the Second World War. Civil and political rights were increased, but not 
social ones. 
 
However, the Brazilian government remained strongly centralised in the executive power. As 
evidence, parliamentarism was proposed and rejected through a plebiscite in 1963 and 1993. 
In Carvalho‟s words: 
 
This orientation towards the Executive reinforces the long Portuguese or Iberian tradition: the 
patrimonialism. State is always seen as the all-powerful, at worst hypothesis, as the repressor 
and tax collector; at best, as a paternalistic dispenser of jobs and favours (2002, p.221)  
 
Carvalho, thus, agrees with Faoro‟s point about patrimonialism and adds that this is 
reinforced by people‟s search for a “political messiah”, which promotes “valuation of the 
Executive and the devaluation of the Legislative” (2002, p.221-2). Cardoso calls this system 
as “imperial presidentialism”, which remains until the current time (2013, p.130). 
 
Thus, following the same pattern, during the Military Dictatorship (1964-1985), civil and 
political rights were lost, but some other social ones, such as more laws protecting workers, 
were conquered. However, as mentioned before, again, these social advances always 
happened based on roughly arbitrary decisions by the president. It was only after the re-
democratisation, in 1985, that people came to be listened to, and really started participating in 
the process of deciding their own destinies. Reflecting on the history of Brazilian 
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constitutions, Villa endorses this point by saying that Brazilian people fought 200 years 
against the arbitrary state, and that, only from 1988 (with the last Constitution), full 
democracy was reached (2011, p.9-10). It is worth mentioning that in the other two 
“democratic times”, the 1930 and 1960 elections, respectively only 7% and 18% of people 
voted, while, in 1986, 47% did (Carvalho, 2002, p.146; p.167). 
 
This discussion is directly related to the debate about the decision-making dimension of 
justice (4.4). In these regards, almost all reasonable ideas on what is a good democratic 
system proposed in that debate are far from being achieved in Brazil. This country has a type 
of democracy that, at the same time, gives little voice to citizens and to specialists. Only a 
bureaucratic establishment formed by a cast of politicians and certain representatives of 
private capital ends up by determining the directions of the country. 
 
6.4. Data about social inequality 
 
In 6.3, historical characteristics of Brazilian society are presented. No doubt, huge current 
inequalities of wealth and opportunities result from this. Here, some data showing the gap 
between rich and poor people (men and women, white and black, heterosexuals and 
homosexuals) in Brazil are presented in order to identify its stage of political development. 
As discussed in 4.2, one of the dimensions of reflection of justice is associated with economic 
factors. In this way, per capita Gross Domestic Product
54
 (GDP) is sometimes used as an 
indicator to measure how developed a country is. However, a high GDP per capita does not 
imply that the wealth produced is fairly distributed amongst the population. Some countries 
have a high GDP per capita, though only a select few are very rich whilst most are poor – 
Qatar, is an example
55
. In order to deal with this, Gini
56
 is a coefficient widely used to 
measure how well wealth is distributed among citizens. However, it is possible that some 
developing or underdeveloped countries present a good Gini score, despite its citizens being 
equally poor – Bangladesh and Ethiopia have a very low GDP per capita 57  and present 
income Gini index as good as developed countries as Canada, UK and US
58
. Then, another 
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 A country‟s GDP represents the aggregation of the value of every final good and service produced in the 
country in a certain period.  
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 Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html  
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 It is called Gini in homage to its developer, Conrado Gini. 
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 Year base 2016; source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html 
58
 Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html 
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important and, perhaps, more comprehensive index is the United Nations‟ Human 
Development index (HDI
59
). It is composed of three dimensions: (1) life expectancy at birth 
index; (2) education index, composed of the average number of years of schooling and of the 
expected years of schooling for children in school age; (3) Gross National Income (GNI) per 
capita.  
 
In all these indexes, Brazil does not hold a good position. According to data of the Work 
Bank for 2016
60, Brazil‟s GDP per capita in current dollars (US$ 8,649.95) is far less than the 
average for high income countries (US$ 40,677.48) and OECD members (US$ 36,741.36). 
Brazil‟s GDP per capita is lower than China owned territories, as Macao and Hong Kong 
(US$ 73.186,96 and US$ 43.681,14, respectively), and Russia (US$ 8.748,365). Moreover, 
Brazil is a highly unequal country: its Gini coefficient in 2014 was 0.518, which shows much 
more inequality in comparison to developed countries‟ average61 (IPEA, 2014). In addition, 
in 2014, Brazil figured only at the 75
th
 position in the HDI rank, after Mexico (74
th
) and 
Russia (50
th
) (UNDP, 2015)
62
. 
 
Nevertheless, a longitudinal analysis (Figure 14) shows that the income inequality has been 
reduced in Brazil in the last 14 years, during a period in which a nationwide income transfer 
programme towards the poorest – Bolsa Família – was implemented. Bolsa Família is a 
conditional cash transfer programme implemented by the Brazilian government since 2003 
that provides benefits up to R$95 (£24) per month to each child of poor families whose 
monthly per capita income is less than R$100 Brazilian reals (£25) and who are registered in 
the government unified system. To keep the benefit, families with children in school age must 
guarantee their minimal school attendance over 85%. The improvement in Gini index from 
2003 (Figure 14) has been used to support the importance of such a programme to promote 
distributive justice throughout the country. 
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 Sen was a key player in designing HDI. 
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 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?year_high_desc=true 
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 In 2014, the average Gini of OECD countries was 0.318 (OECD, 2016). 
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 http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI 
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Figure 14 
 
Nevertheless, even whilst there has been a reduction of income inequalities, the Brazilian 
educational system perpetuates the unjust socioeconomic structure of society. Undoubtedly, 
there was an expansion and certain democratisation of the access to basic and higher 
education in the last decades. This process, however, did not represent significant changes in 
Brazilian structural inequalities. The inequality of opportunities between rich and poor people 
remains. An important reason for that gap resides in the fact that poor people still have much 
less access to a quality school education and, hence, to good universities and to the high 
skilled jobs. The equation is simple: middle class and upper-middle class young people study 
in private schools which in general are far more effective than state-run schools; this fact 
implies that these students are much better prepared to compete for places in the country‟s 
best universities and, therefore, in the job market
63
. 
 
Observing some general data related to this comparison, it is possible to realise that the 
average school drop-out rate in state-run primary and secondary schools in Brazil are, 
respectively, 12 and 17 times bigger than the school drop-out rates for private schools
64
 
(INEP, 2015). State-run schools also present a much higher rate of students who are two or 
more years older than the standard age for the school year that they are attending (INEP, 
2015). Moreover, in comparison to OECD countries, Brazil figures as one of those with the 
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 Data from the Ministry of education of Brazil show that, in 2015, students from private schools performed 
45% better in the national standardised exam than students from state-run schools in the final years of the 
primary school, and 51% in secondary school. (INEP, 2015). As a consequence, students from private schools 
present a better performance in the national standardised tests that give access to state-run universities, which 
are, in Brazil, the most prestigious ones. 
64
 The drop-out rate is 2.4% against 0.2% for primary schools, and 6.4% against 0.4% for high schools, in state-
run and private school, respectively (INEP, 2015). 
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highest percentage (almost 40%) of adults between 24 and 34-years-old who have not 
completed high school (OCDE, 2015).  
 
Part of the distortion that can be observed in Brazil‟s system of education has its origins in its 
tax system.  Differently from European welfare states, Brazilian poor people pay 
proportionally more taxes than rich, and receive, under the form of public services, 
proportionally less. The Brazilian state‟s regressive system of tax collection, instead of 
minimally equalising rich and poor people, works in the opposite direction. This fact goes 
against the main idea of welfare states, where rich people, through a progressive system of 
tax collection, pay proportionally more taxes in order to subsidise part of services received by 
poor people.  
 
Indeed, a significant part of Brazil‟s tax revenue (45% in 2010) comes from indirect taxes 
that are charged over the consumption of goods and services (Afonso, Soares & Castro, 2013) 
and poor people consume a greater percentage of their earnings than rich people, who expend 
their earnings in distinct ways (investments, etc.). In the UK, for instance, indirect taxes 
represent only 26.5% of the government`s revenue, with the major part of the it coming from 
direct taxes such as income, capital and company taxes (IFS, 2016).  
 
The regressive process of Brazilian tax collection is not the only factor that reproduces 
inequalities and diminishes the opportunities of those worse-off in relation to the non-poor. 
According to the World Development Report (WORLD BANK, 2004), in most developing 
countries, the 20% wealthiest part of the population tend to take more advantages from the 
government aggregated expenditure, when compared to the 20% poorest, mainly with regards 
to health and educational services. Policies designed to give advantages for rich people, 
corruption and poor people‟s difficulties to implement their rights favour this scenario.  
 
Analysing Brazilian education policies, it is possible to realise that they concentrate the major 
part of public investments at tertiary levels of education, predominantly accessed by middle-
class and upper middle class students. In 2011, for example, the investment per student in 
higher education was 5 times higher than the investment per student in basic education (in 
2000, this investment was 11 times higher)
65
. Additionally, Brazil‟s state-funded health 
                                                          
65
 http://portal.inep.gov.br/indicadores-financeiros-educacionais  
134 
 
system (SUS) works against the poor. Expensive treatments, mainly those that demand 
surgery, expensive medicine or exams, are scarce. They should be distributed based on 
impartial criteria. However, in practice, two things usually occur. Firstly, some people are 
able to skip this impartial criterion through patronage and, thus, receive treatment first. Most 
frequently, these are rich people who know powerful civil servants to help them through 
patronage. This is not simple to demonstrate, but is easy to observe in Brazilian everyday life. 
Secondly, some people manage to get their treatment by appealing to lawsuits against the 
government. Since normally rich people are those have access to good lawyers, they are 
hugely favoured
66
. These three situations are strong examples of the instantiation of the ideas 
of patriarchalism and patrimonialism developed above. 
 
The discussion presented at the beginning of this section reflects on some elements of 
Brazilian general inequalities that promote evident injustices. From the perspective of wealth, 
access to education and health, the opportunities gap between rich and poor is evident. This 
analysis of inequalities and injustices, however, can also be achieved with regard to 
differences in between people from different regions, men and women, white and black, 
heterosexuals and homosexuals, etc. So many different data can be chosen to show such 
inequalities and injustices.  
 
Starting with the analysis of regional differences, they can be identified through observing 
specific data regarding, for example, education. According to the 2000 census, 47.6% of the 
young people of the Southeast from 15 to 17 years attended high school; in the Northeast this 
was only 19.9% (Dayrell, 2009). In 2007, enrolment ratio on secondary school students in the 
South-Southeast was 58%, compared to 33.3% in the North-Northeast (IPEA, 2008). Thus, 
the opportunities of someone from the North are likely to be lower than of a person from the 
South. 
 
Associating the discussion presented here with reflections on the economic dimension (4.2), 
it is easy to perceive that Brazil is far from being a just country. The huge inequality of 
access of good education and the regressive tax system are two strong reasons for this 
conclusion. Moreover, as presented in 6.2, free enterprise is not stimulated and this makes 
economic growth difficult. In this way, Brazil does not promote anything close to the idea of 
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a positive balance between equality of opportunities and economic development, either 
analysed from welfarist, or from a liberal perspectives. 
 
6.5. Injustices against minorities 
 
In 6.4, apart from general inequalities of wealth and opportunities, only regional differences 
are explored. Here, the intention is focusing the analysis on some specific dynamics of 
Brazilian society in order to show how certain unfair inequalities are not restricted to the 
economic dimension. Violence against black people, women and homosexuals, unequal job 
opportunities and lack of political representation of these groups are, then, used as examples 
of these dynamics. (Obviously, many other social analyses could be made to show the 
problem of intersecting inequalities.) 
 
The reflection on violence is useful for this analysis, since urban violence is a massive 
problem in Brazil, and minorities – mainly black people, women and members of the LGBT 
community – are the more vulnerable groups. Reflecting on the first issue, the fact that 
Brazilian history (6.3) shows people‟s passivity with regard to political changes could give 
the impression that Brazil is a peaceful country. However, it is quite the opposite. Actually, 
people, instead of strongly protesting for social changes, express their violence within the 
private sphere. This becomes a huge social problem in Brazil, which has the ninth highest 
homicide rate in the world
67
. These high rates of homicides are characteristics of all Latin 
American countries. Compared to Europe, Oceania and Asia (continents which have more or 
less the same homicide rate), Brazil‟s rate is nine times higher68.  
 
Looking more carefully at this homicide rate, it is easy to show that black people die 
proportionally more than white people. The first obvious reason is that black people in 
general belong to lower classes in which homicide rates are much higher. However, studies 
show that, even excluding differences of age, schooling, place of residence, and so on, black 
people have 23.5% more chance of being murdered than white people
69
. Regarding how 
violence impacts men and women differently, men‟s homicide rate is much higher than 
women‟s. OMS (2015) informs that around the world 80% of homicides are of men. A first 
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reading of this data can give the impression that women are safer, however, while most of 
men are killed in situations that they put themselves into risk, 38% of murdered women are 
killed at home by their husbands
70
. Observing this situation in Brazil, its feminicide rate is the 
fifth highest in the world according to the UN
71
. Finally, if compared to a large number of 
non-Western countries, violence against homosexuals in Brazil is not institutionalised – 
several African and Asian countries consider homosexual practices illegal and some condemn 
homosexuals to death (Stewart, 2010). However, this does not mean the violence provoked 
by homophobia is not a social problem in Brazil. For instance, almost one person per day is 
murdered motivated by hate against homosexuals
72
. 
 
Regarding job opportunities, black people receive lower salaries, since they start from a 
poorer position, they do not have the same educational opportunities, they still suffer racism 
from certain parts of the population, their network means it is difficult to access good job 
positions in a culture of nepotism, and their self-expectancy about getting good jobs is very 
low. Reflecting on gender inequalities of income, it is widely known that, around the world, 
women receive considerably lower salaries than men, even when they exercise the same 
function. In Brazil, the same happens
73
. Moreover, compared to Western countries, mainly 
the Scandinavian ones, laws and policies that also implicate fathers in raising their children 
are very narrow. This situation forces Brazilian women to have double shifts, and 
consequently earn less in their paid jobs. On the other hand, interestingly some data show that 
homosexual couples usually earn more than heterosexual ones
74
.  
 
If it is possible to identify huge inequalities in between white and black peoples, men and 
women, and hetero and homosexuals analysing data about violence and job market, the 
analysis of the profile of representatives in Brazilian congress shows a similarly and 
significantly unequal situation
75
. Regarding black people and mixed-races MPs, though these 
ethnic groups represent slightly more than a half of Brazilian population, only 20% of 
congress is composed by them. The proportion of women is even lower: only 10%. Finally, 
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the data related to sexual orientation is the most impressive: of 513 MPs, only one declares 
himself as homosexual.  
 
However, though it is undeniable that black people, women and homosexuals are more 
susceptible to violence, have lower salaries and are misrepresented in politics, it is also 
important to observe some avant-garde laws and policies that aim at fixing this unfair 
situation have been implemented in Brazil. From the last decade, 50% of places in federal 
universities (the most reputed ones) are reserved for poor and black
76
 people. These 
affirmative actions, that come 40 years after a similar initiative in the US, are revolutionary in 
order to give real opportunities to black people to obtain good instruction and further good 
jobs. In 2010, these policies became part of a Federal Law (12.288) about racial equality. 
Actually, this law determines several policies towards “guaranteeing to the black population 
the realisation of equal opportunities, the defence of individual, collective and diffuse ethnic 
rights and the fight against discrimination and other forms of ethnic intolerance” (Article 1 of 
the 1988 Constitution) through actions in the spheres of health, education and culture. More 
directly related to this thesis (and discussed in 10.3) the introduction of black and indigenous 
history in Brazilian curriculum (Article 11 of the 1988 Constitution) has been determined. 
 
Apart from this law about racial equality, another Federal Law (11.340) known as Maria da 
Penha, passed in 2006, focused on protecting women against domestic violence, establishing 
preventive and protective measures, and instituting state assistance for all female victims of 
such violence. The Maria da Penha law represented a huge advance in terms of women rights 
in Brazil, not only because of the assistance it establishes, but also because it recognises some 
fundamental women – and human – rights, including the right to live without suffering from 
any kind of violence, the right to dignity, to respect, to health, to education. 
 
With regards to homosexuals‟ rights, the Brazilian laws and policies are quite insipient. As 
mentioned above, in many non-Western countries, homosexuals are considered criminals. 
Brazil‟s Constitution, on the contrary, forbids any type of discrimination (Article 5). 
However, if Brazilian law does not consider homosexuals criminals, on the other hand, 
homophobia is not considered a hate crime, differently from racism. Even so, at least the 
Resolution 175 of the National Council of Justice (Conselho Nacional de Justiça – CNJ), 
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passed in 2013, guarantees same-sex unions and stimulates homosexuals to make official 
their relationships. 
 
The discussion above focuses on legal changes towards guaranteeing the same rights to these 
groups. More important than this, is how civil society is mobilising itself to reinforce this 
process. No doubt, social media gives a fundamental help for members of these groups 
finding their peers. This brotherhood/sisterhood empowers them. It is mentioned in 6.2 that 
such an internal protection has been a characteristic of black Americans for a long time. In 
Brazil, however, social relations were based on the “coexistence of contraries”. This situation 
has made black people less united and protective. Interestingly, the democratisation of the 
internet has created this spirit of internal protection also in Brazilian black, female and LGBT 
communities. It is not the intention of this chapter to go deep into this reflection, nor 
necessarily endorsing such practice. In the next chapter, a few reflections on the best ways to 
deal with this cooperation among peers are presented. 
 
Only as a final summary of this subject, it is possible to say that, observing this description 
from the point of view of the cultural dimension of justice (4.3), on the one hand, avant-garde 
laws that protect minorities, while incipient, have been implemented in Brazil; on the other, 
situations of oppression and discrimination against minorities normally motivated by 
conservative behaviour of several sectors of society are still highly embedded in Brazilian 
society as the data here presented can show. 
 
*** 
 
Chapter 6 observes how Brazilian society has been organised. These historical characteristics 
show that, though culturally unified, this country currently presents several problems 
regarding strong inequalities, reduced communal responsibilities and an incipient 
understanding of the democratic process. These facts, in comparison with ideal reflections 
(chapter 4) and human characteristics (chapter 5), draw attention to the civic virtues Brazilian 
people should possess in order to participate in the process of improving justice in Brazil.   
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PART THREE: CITIZENSHIP CURRICULUM  
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7. Methodology for Part Three 
 
In the introduction, overviews of different methodologies that orient the writing of each 
chapter and an approach that guides the themes of the chapters and how to connect them – 
ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium – are presented. Chapter 2, then, explains and justifies 
this approach. The methodologies behind the next five chapters, however, deserve a bit more 
attention, particularly the methodology behind chapters 11 and 12, the only ones written 
based on primary data collected in Brazilian schools. In this way, (7.1) the criteria of choice 
of the seven civic virtues that should be taught in schools (chapter 8) and (7.2) of the five 
levels of citizenship curriculum that facilitate the analysis of the curriculum (chapters 9, 11 
and 12) are explained. Moreover, it is also important to briefly explore (7.3) how the 
documents which explain Brazilian policies towards citizenship education were selected. In 
addition, to make more solid the ideas presented in the empirical chapters, this thesis has to 
explain how this data collection was undertaken. The present chapter does mainly this. Thus, 
in 7.4, an overview of the empirical research is presented. Then, it is explained (7.5) how 
observations were carried. Next, the processes of (7.6) designing and (7.7) executing the 
interviews are detailed. Finally, (7.8) the process of analysing data and writing the two 
chapters is explained, followed by (7.9) some reflections on ethical issues. 
 
7.1. The criteria of choice of the seven civic virtues 
 
Chapter 8 proposes a list of seven civic virtues that is central for this thesis‟ rationale. The 
achievement of these virtues serves as the basis for theoretical reflections and empirical 
observations regarding the five levels of citizenship curriculum (chapters 9, 11 and 12). 
These virtues, however, are not based on any previous list. Thus, the “methodology” behind 
the definition of this list is presented in the present section. Moreover, since the distinction of 
the different levels of curriculum proposed by this thesis is quite unusual, the next section 
also explains how this distinction was established. Both discussions, nevertheless, are only 
briefly presented, since the main aim of this chapter is to present the methodology behind the 
collection of primary data analysed in chapters 11 and 12.  
 
Regarding the definition of the list of seven civic virtues, it departs from an understanding 
that civic virtues can be distinguished in three groups representing civic knowledge, skills 
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and values (Kerr, 2003). First, people have to have knowledge related to how their society is 
constituted and works – its laws and customs. Second, they have to possess certain skills – 
like thinking critically or imagining other people‟s situations (cognitive empathy) – in order 
to make a good use of the knowledge described. Finally, more than knowing about their 
societies, thinking critically or imagining the others, people seem to have the duty of 
possessing certain values: willing the good of the rest of their community, participating in 
democratic processes, respecting social decisions/laws, and fighting for rights.  
 
However, though this distinction suggested by Kerr exists, no list with civic virtues that 
citizens should possess has been found in the literature. Several thinkers defend the 
importance of cultivating civic virtues but do not present any type of list. Nussbaum could be 
one exception, but her list of ten central capabilities – life; bodily health; bodily integrity; 
senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; 
control over one‟s environment  (2011, p.33-4) – is not clear regarding the important 
differentiation between citizens‟ rights and duties. Thus, the capabilities proposed by 
Nussbaum are not virtues in the sense that the term is being used by this thesis. Other thinkers 
usually focus on specific virtues. Knowledge about constitutional principles, for example, is 
demanded by Rawls (1993); knowledge about social data, by Sen (2009a); critical thinking, 
by Dewey (1915) and many others – this is, for sure, the most discussed civic virtue 
discussed by the literature; democratic attitudes, also by Dewey (1915), Gutmann (1987) and 
so on; empathy, or at least compassion, is discussed by Baron-Cohen (2004), Rifkin (2009), 
Bloom (2016). On the other hand, the duty of respecting fair rules is implicit in general ideas 
of civic values, but was not explicitly found in the literature. Even more difficult is to find 
some scholar suggesting that it is a duty to fight for justice. In addition, though is implicit 
since Smith (1759; 1776), willingness to compete fairly is not in the literature on civic values. 
This list of civic virtues proposed here (civic knowledge, critical thinking, cognitive empathy, 
compassion, willingness to compete fairly, fighting for justice, following rules democratically 
created) is therefore a compilation of different proposals found in the literature about this 
subject. This specific list is unique to this thesis, and the reasons for proposing them, along 
with their underlying ideas, are presented in chapter 8. 
 
7.2. The criteria of choice of the five levels of citizenship curriculum 
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Unlike the literature on civic virtues, the literature related to curriculum presents a variety of 
ways to understand and differentiate types of curriculum. Kelly (2004), for example, 
distinguishes between official (or planned) and received (or actual) curricula, formal and 
informal curricula, “conscious” and hidden curricula. The division proposed by this thesis 
does not follow exactly any of these suggestions, whilst taking into account elements of them. 
For the sake of the particular analysis achieved here, it considers citizenship curriculum 
divided into five original distinct elements: supra official, wide official, narrow official, 
unofficial, and hidden curricula. 
 
In Kelly‟s definition, official or planned curriculum is “what is laid down in syllabuses, 
prospectuses and so on” (2004, p.6). In order to analyse the official curriculum in this way, 
the present thesis reflects on the need for a specific subject to work with citizenship 
education, and other alternatives as the introduction of citizenship contents in humanities and 
even in subjects like mathematics. Certain official schools‟ activities such as compulsory 
involvement with the community are also analysed. This official curriculum, however, is not 
only limited to subjects, contents and activities linked to them. Such things are associated 
with a “narrow official curriculum”. Nevertheless, the proper school organisation can be a 
strong way to cultivate citizenship. The present thesis calls this “wide official curriculum”. 
Moreover, policies towards the school system‟s organisation – that is, how schools‟ external 
influences are embodied in schools‟ ethos and how educational resources are shared – equally 
influences students‟ civic virtues. In the present thesis, this is named “supra official 
curriculum”.  
 
Schools and their subjects, however, are dynamic and also do not usually work as planned. 
These facts give room for “unofficial curriculum” initiatives. Kelly counterposes the “official 
or planned curriculum” and the “actual or received curriculum”, the latter being “the reality 
of the pupils‟ experience” (2004, p.6). This thesis presents a distinct opposition. It discusses 
which types of initiatives teachers and students, apart from the curriculum, could propose. In 
this way, unofficial curriculum means something different from the received one (though it is 
equally received), since the latter only pays attention to actual practices, while what is being 
analysed here is the space that could be occupied by teachers and students beyond the official 
curriculum. For example, how should teachers deal with their own political views if and 
when they propose debates about social justice. 
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Finally, the last dimension of schools‟ curriculum that can help or hinder the promotion of 
citizenship is called “hidden curriculum”. Kelly defines it as: 
 
those things which pupils learn at school because of the way in which the work of the school 
is planned and organized, and through the materials provided, but which are not in themselves 
overtly included in the planning or even in the consciousness of those responsible for the 
school arrangements. Social roles, for example, are learnt in this way, it is claimed, as are sex 
roles and attitudes to many other aspects of living (2004, p.5). 
 
Given this division, unofficial curriculum is the space for teachers‟ (and also students‟) 
creativity towards activities related to civic education. These initiatives are important 
because, many times, the environment creates so many opportunities for discussions and 
actions that are unpredictable. A natural disaster can stimulate civil engagement; a terrible 
murder might prompt discussions about capital punishment, and so on. Hidden curriculum is, 
somehow, a reverse image of unofficial curriculum. While the latter is related to activities 
that are not on the curriculum, but are explicitly developed by teachers and students, the 
former is associated with certain curricular elements which implicitly influence civic 
knowledge, skills and values, many times with teachers and students remaining unaware of 
these. 
 
Normally when pedagogues and sociologists of education, for example, Apple (1979) and 
Ball (2013), write about the hidden curriculum, they appeal to this concept in order to 
criticise current curricula which, “sneakily”, act as mechanisms to maintain the status quo 
and power relations. In this way, governments (which would have hidden interests of 
favouring those who are behind them) would be basically designing curricula in order to 
cultivate subservience and refrain progressive thoughts and practices. The active role of the 
teacher in this process is seen as minimal. 
 
However, this seems exaggerated. Teachers and students are much less subservient than 
certain interpretations make appear. Nonetheless, exactly because unofficial curriculum is the 
space for individual creativity, by definition, a reflection on an ideal citizenship curriculum 
will welcome such activities. Also by definition, these hidden intentions are important in the 
analysis of the real socio-political structure, but do not have space in a discussion about ideal 
curriculum. However, it is important to discuss these practices in order to make school 
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communities aware about eventual hidden intentions behind the curriculum proposed. Thus, 
while the hidden curriculum is frequently associated with top-down practices with 
spurious/illegitimate intentions, the unofficial curriculum is related to bottom-up initiatives 
which normally intend to improve positive points that are not reached by the official 
curriculum. 
 
7.3. The documents behind Brazilian policies on citizenship education 
 
Chapter 9 analyses the history and the current situation of citizenship education in Brazil 
from the perspective of Brazilian laws and policies. The dynamics of hierarchy and 
importance of these laws and policies is complex. Thus, the methodology that oriented the 
selection of documents to be analysed by this thesis deserves some attention. The historical 
research was based on papers that investigated former constitutions and laws. However, for 
the present work, current laws, policies and certain documents produced by civil society are 
more important. 
 
The reflection has to start from the 1988 Constitution (Brasil, 1988). A direct consequence of 
the Constitution is the 1996 law – LDB, Guidelines and Bases Law (Brasil, 1996, n.9394), a 
law which almost copied in its Article 2 Article 205 of the Constitution. This law, however, is 
not enough. A more specific guide to orient policymakers and schools about how to organise 
their educational system and curricula was needed: the 1997 PCN – National Curricular 
Parameters (Brasil, 1997). These parameters were strongly criticised by certain sectors of the 
educational field, and received in 2013 a rereading, the 2013 DCN – National Curricular 
Guidelines (Brasil, 2013), after the Social Democrat Party (PSDB) was replaced by the 
Workers Party (PT) in the national government. This rereading did not substantially change 
the 1997 PCN, and the latter continues to be the reference for academic reflections on 
citizenship education. Regarding laws and policies currently applied, it is worth also 
mentioning a local policy – different states define their curricula based on PCNs but 
differently – implemented in Rio Grande do Sul just before this thesis‟ data collection. It was 
called “Polytechnic Teaching (Rio Grande do Sul, 2011)”. However, after the change of the 
government in 2015, this Polytechnic Teaching was partially abandoned.  
 
Finally, at least two national government attempts to implement new policies and a civil 
society reaction to certain practices related to citizenship education deserve to be mentioned 
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and the documents behind them cited. In 2011, the Brazilian government prepared a series of 
materials (press publications and videos) defending the acceptance and celebration of non-
heterosexual behaviour. This material was called by the government “School Without 
Homophobia”. In 2015, the same government proposed radical changes in the history 
curriculum of secondary education through the expansion of studies about African and 
Indigenous history. Both attempts are still under debate and they are far from being 
consolidated. The last document that deserves attention because of its repercussions for the 
debate about citizenship education is a 2015 project of law (n.867) that summarises a current 
conservative movement against teachers‟ presentation of their political positions in 
classrooms. 
 
7.4. Overview of the empirical research 
 
In order to develop the empirical chapters of this thesis (11 and 12), case study, a method for 
analysing examples of real-life situations, is chosen. Such a method helps to understand 
abstract ideas (Nisbet & Watt, 1984, p.72-3) and recognise how complex and entrenched 
social knowledge is (Adelman et al, 1980). However, this method usually limits the 
generalisation of its conclusions. Thus, it is important to highlight that the environments 
selected were information-rich schools, as claimed below. Then, intensity and criterion 
sampling (Patton, 1990) is employed, something that increases the possibilities of seeing a 
more general idea about the reality of Brazilian education.  
 
This case study appeals to three different sources of data: semi-structured interviews, 
questionnaires and school observations. The interviews and questionnaires with school 
community members demanded much more research than the observations. Thus, the 
processes of designing, applying and analysing the interviews and questionnaires are 
presented in more detail. In 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8 each one of these processes are developed, while 
observations are briefly explained in 7.5.  
 
Related to this process of observing and distributing interviews and questionnaires, it is 
important to say that this gathering of school communities members‟ opinions suffered a 
considerable influence of my previous understanding of justice and my reading on ideal 
citizenship curriculum, something consistent with the approach proposed. Thus, the 
interviews and questionnaires were designed based on my notions of justice and curriculum. 
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Additional questions and even notes taken during the interviews, and all observations also 
suffered influences of such notions
77
.  
 
While it is assumed that all the process behind writing these empirical chapters has 
theoretical influences, the choices of the city and schools where data was collected tried to 
reduce as much as possible the influences of the environment on the production of an 
overview about Brazilian citizenship education. Obviously, in one sense, it is impossible to 
present this overview through qualitative research, since Brazil is a country with almost the 
same area as Europe, 26 states, 5,570 cities
78
 and roughly 200,000 schools (in 2015)
79
. 
Moreover, as explored in chapter 6, there are huge differences in levels of development 
between South-Southeast and North-Northeast states. Thus, by following the demands of 
qualitative research design, focusing the analysis on selected places (in this case, three 
schools in only one city), several details of other places are omitted. 
 
One alternative in order to reduce this problem would be draw on quantitative research 
methods that normally collect data from a much higher number of cities and schools – 
sometimes trying covering all. Yet this type of research is also limited. Supposing that the 
budget is not massive (differently from, for example, state investments in a census), the more 
the number people‟s ideas are collected, the less attention to detail can be accomplished. No 
doubt, reaching ideas of peoples from different states and many schools could be very 
interesting and it would give interesting data to be examined. This thesis, however, opted for 
a more careful analysis of few people from only three schools in order to obtain more focused 
and detailed data. Even so, the idea is to map, as much as possible, the reality of citizenship 
education in Brazil. The choice of an information-rich city and schools is therefore 
appropriate for this.  
 
The chosen city is Porto Alegre, the capital of the southernmost Brazilian state with a 
population of 1.4 million. Two reasons led to this choice of research site. Firstly, Porto 
Alegre is the city that I have lived all my life and where I taught for 15 years. Thus, my 
existing network made it easier to find appropriate schools to develop the research. 
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Moreover, it is an urban area reflecting the lived reality for 76% of the Brazilian population 
(IBGE, 2017). The main limitation of this choice is that Porto Alegre belongs to the South 
and, in Brazil, the South-Southeast and North-Northeast realities are very different (6.4). In 
addition, it is important to highlight the fact that I am familiar with the local reality and that 
this fact can hindered or blinded me of some routine subtleties. Conversely, my proximity 
with the local culture made easy my approximation with the interviewees and the whole 
environments. 
 
All the sample schools are located in Porto Alegre and represent a cross-section of society 
and schooling types, differing regarding the socioeconomic statuses of their students. Whilst 
one school houses some of the richest students due to its high fee
80
, another is composed of 
poor students
81
 as it is located near a disadvantaged neighbourhood and is free of charge. The 
third has its population composed of students with mixed statuses due to its location in a rich 
area and its lack of fees. In doing this, a quite good map of at least Porto Alegre‟s secondary 
schools can be presented. Actually, students from the second year of secondary education (in 
average, 16 year-olds in the private school and 18 year-olds in the poor state-run school) were 
observed and interviewed. Moreover, since most black people are poor (6.2), the number of 
black students in the rich school is considerably reduced, while this number is proportionally 
higher in the two state-run schools. 
 
7.5. Observations 
 
Some reconnaissance visits were made from November 15, 2014 to December 23, 2014, 
when the s of interviews and questionnaires were also applied. The proper observations were 
carried out from February 22, 2015 tom May 31, 2015. In total, I spent around 200 hours 
more or less equally distributed in these three schools. This time allowed me to attend 4 days 
of classes that lasted 4.5 hours in the second year of secondary education of each school. 
Moreover, the rest of the time was spent in between the teachers‟ staff room and the 
schoolyard, and in the interviews. During this process, around 18,000 words – basically ideas 
from what I was seeing and hearing (for example, students‟ interactions and dialogue) – of 
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notes were the result of 38 visits to these schools. These notes were taken in a notebook 
without any kind of specific template or frame.  
 
Differently from the interview and questionnaire, which demanded a long process of 
preparation that (as mentioned above) suffered influences of my previous ideas of justice and 
curriculum, thinking of how to execute observations only demanded some reflections on my 
ethical behaviour (explained in 7.9). In summary, I was silent in classes and had few 
conversations with students outside classrooms, rather than assume an interventionist attitude, 
as action research proposes (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007, p.297-315).  
 
Thus, the observations were accomplished following two different strategies. The first month 
was used to acclimatise to the schools‟ environments and collect some important information 
for applying the interviews. Thus, I tried to identify the more reasonable moments to 
accomplish the interviews. Moreover, I was able to have an overview of the number of 
female and male teachers and students and identify possible interviewees following criteria 
explained below. In the last two and a half months in the field, I analysed more carefully the 
distinct environments of each school. Though I started taking notes in the first month, the 
most important ones came from this second phase of the research collection. I was able to 
identify teachers‟ and students‟ recurrent practices with more clarity, and the notes became 
more focused.  
 
7.6. Preparing interviews and questionnaires 
 
As explained above, interviews and questionnaires have a central role in the following 
chapters. Thus, the processes of designing, applying and analysing them deserve a more 
detailed description. Regarding the design of the interview and questionnaire, their pilots 
were elaborated from July, 2014 to October, 2014. In January, 2015, after the pilots of the 
interview were applied and analysed, some changes were implemented. The changes on the 
questionnaires, on the other hand, were achieved only after the end of the interviews and 
schools observations in June, 2015. The reason for this was to identify some important 
information that other tools did not provide properly.  
 
As mentioned, the interview and questionnaire were designed based on certain readings of 
theories of justice and curriculum. These readings have been foundational in structuring 
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chapters 2, 3, 4, 8 and 9. Thus, interview and questionnaires questions touch upon several 
issues developed in these chapters including questions in which teachers and students could 
express their opinions about civic virtues that should be cultivated, how to do this and their 
perceptions on how it is being done. However, since studies for writing these chapters 
continued after the empirical research, some theoretical ideas that were finally approached in 
them were not included in the interviews and questionnaires. For example, no discussion on 
how to deal with political anger was presented. (Interestingly, considering the back and forth 
process proposed since the beginning of this thesis writing process, some ideas that came 
from data collection oriented further search for topics developed in the theoretical chapters. 
Such a writing attitude, aligned with reflective equilibrium, differs from the usual process of 
building a thesis in only one way: from the analysis of the theory to the practice.) 
 
Thus, oriented by some theoretical ideas, the pilot of the interview was formed by 12 
questions. This pilot already presented something in between a semi-structured and structured 
interview (this idea is explored next). Its format and most of its questions were preserved in 
the final version. The pilot of the questionnaire, equally oriented by theoretical ideas, was 
designed with 30 questions which appealed to Likert scale methodology (this idea is also 
developed next). However, differently from the interview, the format of the questionnaire and 
most of its questions were changed from the pilot to the final version. 
 
Once the pilots had been applied, few changes were made in the final version of the 
interview
82
 (Appendix 1). They were focused on avoiding respondents‟ misinterpretation of 
certain questions. Thus, in the end, a hybrid, in between a semi-structured and a structured 
interview, was designed. This means that, on the one hand, questions were very open, a 
characteristic of semi-structured interviews; on the other, as structured interviews, questions 
were thought to avoid an excessive dialogue in between the interviewer and the interviewees 
(Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007). This hybrid strategy reduced the influences of the 
interviewer‟s (my) previous ideas (which already oriented the questions) over the 
interviewees. The result was an interview with 15 quite general questions, and the definition 
of a procedure that only allow the interviewer‟s interventions to clarify some points. Finally, 
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 In the interviews, few more questions were presented. Being more specific, the definition of “empathy” was 
inserted in a question about this subject. Moreover, a direct question comparing education for competition and 
for collaboration was presented. Similarly, a direct question comparing how talent and effort are stimulated in 
schools was also introduced. Finally, a question aiming to measure the impacts of the Brazilian educational 
system, which admits the existence of private and state-run schools, on school actors‟ civic values was also 
added. 
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it is important to say that the interview was designed to be applied in the three schools to two 
head teachers, six teachers and twelve students, being the students interviewed in focus 
groups of 4 students. (The questions presented in the interviews and questionnaires are 
attached at the end of the thesis.) 
 
The process of designing the final version of the questionnaire (Appendix 2) was a bit more 
complex. It is divided in two moments. First, as with the interviews, it was observed from the 
analysis of the pilot answers that some questions were not clear to the respondents. For 
example, it was asked in the pilot if teachers and students consider that “empathy” should be 
cultivated, but the answers showed that this concept is not taken for them in a standardised 
way. Second, after the interviews and observations process were finished, several important 
questions arose, and it was apparent that some of these could be answered through the 
questionnaire. Thus, from January, 2015 to July, 2015, the pilot questionnaire underwent lots 
of improvements until the final version was produced. Subjective questions (asking teachers 
and students to present the three main civic virtues that should be taught) were introduced; 
objective questions were modified and expanded. At the end, the questionnaire was 
compounded by three open-ended and 37 multiple-choice questions. 
 
Since these questionnaires were aimed to be applied to around 100 teachers and 500 students, 
the three subjective questions were designed to require simple answers which should be 
presented in three words. The objective questions, which appealed to Likert scale based 
methodology
83
, though applied to a considerable number of people, did not produce results 
that change it into quantitative research, since no statistical inference about the whole 
Brazilian schools‟ communities is produced from this.  
 
This questionnaire, thus, helps to endorse some of the views presented in the interviews. In 
one way, information collected through questionnaires is stronger, since it is associated with 
a larger number of people. On the other, it is weaker, since a deep reflection associated with 
given opinions is not presented, rather than what happens in the interviews. Though this 
questionnaire cannot be identified with quantitative research, the comparison presented 
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 Two types of questions with different alternatives were presented. In the first group, the alternatives were: the 
claim is true; the claim is partially true; the claim is false; I don‟t know. In the second, they were: I completely 
agree; I agree; I disagree; I completely disagree; I don‟t know. 
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reminds the comparison of advantages and disadvantages of quantitative and qualitative 
researches (Smith, 1983).  
 
7.7. Interviewing and applying questionnaires 
 
Data collection through interviewing was carried out in parallel to the second half of the 
period of observations. As explained below, six head teachers, 18 teachers and 36 students (in 
groups of four) were invited to participate in interviews after a process of selection from 
April 1, 2015 to May 31, 2015. As explained above and below, questionnaires depended on 
an overview of the interviews and observations to be finished. Thus, only after the fieldwork, 
in August, 2015, questionnaires were answered by 69% (74 in 107) of the secondary school 
teachers and 48% (285 in 593)
84
 of the second year of secondary school students. (The aim 
was to send these questionnaires to all teachers and students at the sample schools, but 
different logistical problems have made this impossible.)  
 
The first important observation about the interviews is the way that teachers and students 
were invited
85
. Overall, the research design followed a random selection process since the 
idea was to avoid only selecting those who already reflected upon the issue of citizenship (for 
instance, philosophy teachers or highly engaged students) by choosing “average” people. 
However, at least some criteria were applied to select participants. First, gender 
proportionality was preserved in the choice of teachers and students. Specifically, regarding 
teachers, the distribution of age and subjects that they teach was also observed. 
 
Regarding how the interviews were organised and led, participant interviews were scheduled 
at least one week in advance and usually lasted between 40 minutes and 1 hour. Respondents 
were instructed to develop the answers instead of simplifying them, and few interventions 
during the process, normally clarifications, were made. Teachers and head teachers were 
interviewed individually, while students were interviewed in groups of four. This idea of 
interviewing students in focus groups was successful, since it was created a type of 
conversation between the students which enabled students to develop points that some had 
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 Some teachers denied answering the questionnaires (around 10%) and others (atound 20%) were not found for 
different reasons (they were sick, had appointments, etc.). Most of students that did not replied were from the 
two state-run schools (mainly the poorest one) that had partial strikes during that period. Very few students 
denied answering the questionnaires. 
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 All teachers invited accepted the invitation, and only three students rejected it, due to their embarrassment. 
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never thought of before. Teachers, on the other hand, usually had some idea about most 
topics of this research and the interviews with them flowed normally. 
 
All interviews were audio-recorded and I took several notes about the points that called my 
attention. These notes and some ideas highlighted in the observations were fundamental for 
doing two different things. First, they oriented several changes in the questionnaires that were 
applied a couple of months after the end of my fieldwork. Moreover, they serve as one of the 
basis for defining the codes in the analysis of the interviews that, later, were central in the 
process of writing the thesis. 
 
As mentioned, questionnaires were distributed following the fieldwork. They were applied 
with the help of some colleagues of the three schools. Head teachers stimulated the teachers 
to complete them; some teachers who worked in all high school second-year classes 
distributed the questionnaires in class-time, encouraged and monitored the students during the 
process of answering. On average, the questionnaires were answered within 20 minutes, and 
as such did not demand too much of the participants.  They were completed by 69% of 
secondary teachers and 48% of second-year students. 
 
The first versions of these two chapters were written at the beginning of 2016. However, 
since more ideas about citizenship curriculum arose after this, these new ideas could not be 
directly addressed in the observations, interviews and questionnaires. A new reading of these 
notes allowed the identification of some elements that were not forecasted to be analysed. 
Maybe the most important one was the lack of concern of observing in which measure school 
members understood citizenship education as a right, instead of only taking this as a duty. 
This is because, at the beginning of the presented research, such virtues were only treated as 
duties, and this previous understanding limited data collection about citizenship education as 
a right. 
 
A different limitation is related to the scope of interviewees. Due to lack of time and logistic 
problems, parents, policymakers and civil society‟s average members were not listened. Their 
opinions about citizenship education, however, seemed fundamental in order to design a 
better picture of the Brazilian education system.  
 
7.8. Organising data and analysing 
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The final part of developing the empirical chapters was transcribing the interviews, coding 
the main ideas presented in them and in the observations and writing the chapters. The whole 
transcribing process was accomplished by me from August, 2015 to October, 2015. After this, 
the process of coding the transcriptions and observations‟ notes was achieved from 
November, 2015 to January, 2016. Finally, the writings of chapters 11 and 12 were developed 
more or less in parallel from February, 2016 to April, 2016, and retaken from July, 2017 to 
August, 2017. 
 
The process of transcribing the interviews was developed through using Transcribe tool
86
. 
All the transcriptions (and the coding process) were made in Portuguese, and only the parts 
that were included in the empirical chapters were translated to English. This option facilitated 
the process, since my mother-tongue is Portuguese. It is important to reinforce that the all 
interviews were transcribed by me, since this option made me even more connected to the 
answers given by the school community members, and allowed me to start highlighting some 
important points during the process. During this process, there were no translation problems. 
 
After finishing the process of transcription, a huge amount of data was available for the 
empirical chapters: not only the transcriptions, but also the notes taken during the 
observations. Separating and merging all this data demanded organisation. In order to do this, 
I made use of NVivo. This is a powerful tool, but only one of its resources was used: the 
possibility of coding written texts and allowing the software join passages marked by the 
same codes in separate files.  
 
However, one of problems of this process of coding is defining how to choose the codes. In 
this research, some codes were determined before the transcriptions, based on the main 
concepts linked with its theoretical ideas. This included the codes: competition/cooperation, 
school rules, empathy/solidarity, respect, teachers‟ influence, etc. In a second phase, new 
codes were created from ideas highlighted during the interviews and observations. These 
included, for example, the split of the concept “respect” into two different ideas: respect for 
the rules and respect for other people/cultures/habits. Finally, the process of transcribing and 
reading the transcriptions and other notes allowed the establishment of new codes, such as the 
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aforementioned theme of rights, expanding on the theme of duty. After defining all these 
codes (Appendix 3), NVivo was nourished with this information. Then, through NVivo, claims 
linked to the codes were joined. Different files related to distinct elements of citizenship 
curriculum were, then, created.  
 
Thus, through associating and differentiating these codes, the structures of the empirical 
chapters were designed. It was only in this moment that the ideas obtained from this primary 
data were compared with some secondary data that came from readings of similar researches. 
From this moment, the writing process became similar to the writings of the rest of the 
chapters.  
 
7.9. Ethical issues  
 
It is important to finish this reflection on methodology by demonstrating that I undertook all 
reasonable and expected steps to respect and allow for ethical considerations Ethical 
problems in research can arise in different stages: 
 
They may arise from the nature of the research project itself (ethnic differences in 
intelligence, for example); the context for the research (a remand home); the procedures to be 
adopted (producing high levels of anxiety); data collection methods (covert observation); the 
nature of the participants (emotionally disturbed adolescents); the type of data collected 
(highly personal and sensitive information); and what is to be done with the data (publishing 
in a manner that may cause participants embarrassment). (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2007, 
p.51) 
 
In this research, however, these problems were significantly minimised, since: (i) different 
ideas of justice and education, and different practices about how to cultivate citizenship 
identified in a comparison between rich and poor schools hardly create any type of harm in 
the communities; (ii) the three schools frequently receive researchers; (iii) the method did not 
produce any negative psychological effects in the participants; (iv) and there was minimal 
invasion of their intimacy; (v) questionnaires were applied only with their consent, allowing 
them to withdraw if they wished to do so; (vi) the research was not conducted with vulnerable 
people, that is, with those who have special issues and could be warmed by the process; and 
(vii) the participants‟ and schools‟ anonymity was guaranteed. 
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Exploring a bit more items (ii), (iv) and (vi), it can be said that there were minimal risks of 
harm to the participants of interviews and questionnaires, since questions about their ideas of 
justice and citizenship education probably did not produce in them any negative 
psychological effect, such as invasion of intimacy. Even so, during the interviews, situations 
in which people could be more exposed to feelings anxiety, discomfort or embarrassment, 
anonymity were feasible and I paid special attention to how best to sensitively approach 
questions about racism, homophobia, and sexism. Thus, no difficult situation was registered. 
The same happened during the application of questionnaires. 
 
Specifically regarding item (v), the interview participants were personally invited and 
received a previous written explanation on how the interviews would be conducted. All 
participants signed a consent form. Regarding the students‟ consent, teachers – in loco 
parentis – also gave their permission. It was made clear to all participants that it was possible 
for them to withdraw from research, even after the interview, but no one opted for this. 
 
In addition to these points, some other demands of UCL Institute of Education Ethical 
Committee
87
, which approved the conducting of the research, were successfully 
accomplished. Disturbance in schools and disruptions of students‟ learning were minimal. 
Teachers responded to the questionnaires in one of their week meetings. Students did this 
during their normal classes. Both were asked to respond a 20 minutes questionnaire and were 
left free not to perform such a task. Interviews were achieved in their free times. 
Observations in schools‟ playgrounds were also allowed by the managers, and specific class 
observations were allowed by the teachers. 
 
Moreover, the data were kept securely in folders in my house (questionnaires) and in digital 
files (interviews) on my personal computer, and the names of the interviewees were not asked 
in both processes. These data were not shared with my supervisors or any other person, since 
I personally accomplished all the transcriptions and tabulations of data. In the findings 
presented at the final text, participants and schools were not named. 
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Finally, my personal contacts in the three schools helped to guarantee full support to my 
work. Moreover, because of these connections, it will be easier for me to return to the 
schools‟ communities the results of the research. The idea is to organise some talks and other 
consultancies in order to improve their pedagogical processes of cultivating citizenship.  
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8. Civic virtues 
 
Up until now, this thesis has counterposed ideal ways to understand a just society, with 
certain analyses of natural/biological characteristics of humankind and cultural/historical 
contingent aspects of Western societies – in particular, Brazil – related to people‟s 
understandings and practices towards justice. Aiming to put these two sides of the reasoning 
in equilibrium, it is fundamental to reflect about what are the necessary but possible civic 
virtues to be expected from Western citizens (or, more specifically, Brazilian citizens) in 
order to refine justice in their societies. To develop this discussion, at the beginning, (8.1) 
citizenship is defined and linked with people‟s social rights and duties. People‟s rights, 
however, are presented in chapters 3 and 4, from different perspectives. Thus, this chapter 
reflects on the virtues that people have to possess in order to be good citizens, their 
citizenship duties. Regarding this, it is firstly defended that (8.2) people have to possess 
different types of civic knowledge in order to make a just society possible. Then, (8.3) critical 
thinking is also presented as a fundamental skill. Next, (8.4) cognitive empathy is considered 
another important civic skill. Nonetheless, more than knowledge and skills, people have to 
possess certain civic values. Thus, (8.5) compassion is taken the central civic value. 
Moreover, (8.6) competitive spirit is considered a civic virtue only if softened by willingness 
to cooperate, that is, willingness to compete fairly.  (8.7) The duty of fighting for justice is 
also defended as another important civic value, (8.8) however, this is balanced by the need to 
accept and follow rules democratically created. At the end of the chapter, after reflecting on 
these knowledge, skills and values, (8.9) the ideas of tolerance, engagement and celebration 
of difference are introduced in order to conclude whether tolerance is the maximum that can 
be demanded from citizens or whether engagement and celebration of difference are also 
necessary attitudes in Western societies. 
 
8.1. Defining citizenship 
 
In order to identify civic virtues, it is central to previously determine the sphere of life in 
which such virtues are expected. In 5.1, it is shown that individuals‟ natural development 
makes them more prone to care about other people in the personal/private sphere (in-group) 
and that concerns towards the social/public sphere (out-group) comes from their civic 
awareness developed through reason. In 6.2, it is presented how difficult it is for Brazilian 
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people to develop concerns towards out-group members. The difficulty people experience in 
being virtuous within the social/public sphere is normally caused by a confusion between 
what personal/private and social/public virtues are. In order to clarify this point, a reflection 
on the situations in which someone should be impartial is helpful. 
 
When a professor has to choose between two PhD candidates – one of them being his/her 
friend – he/she should appeal to the social virtue of impartiality/fairness, rather than 
favouring his/her friend. Through being impartial/fair, this professor would be considered 
just. However, when the same professor receives two invitations for different birthday parties 
occurring at the same time – one from a good friend, another from an acquaintance – he/she 
should appeal to the personal virtue of friendship and go to his/her friend‟s party, rather than 
considering both invitations impartially (and, for example, flipping a coin to decide). In this 
case, justice is disregarded.
88
 
 
Following Kohlberg (5.3), social/non-personal dilemmas are associated with the idea of 
justice. The examples of using or not the criterion of impartiality help to clarify that, in the 
personal sphere, reflections on justice are not appropriate. People should look for justice only 
when they are in the social sphere. The professor when has to choose a PhD candidate is 
nothing more than the personification of a just social act. This is another way to say that 
justice is the first virtue of societies (2.1), rather than a virtue of individuals. In other words, 
individuals‟ actions in the social sphere are on behalf of the society, and the type of virtue 
expected from them is different than the type of virtue expected of people acting in the 
personal sphere: as is the case in the birthday party‟s example, i.e., friendship.  
 
However, it is not simple to draw this line between virtues in the personal and the social 
spheres. Personal virtues, such as care and empathy, are frequently considered equally 
important in the social sphere. As discussed in 5.3, Kohlberg (1971; 1976) understands the 
acquisition of these “situation-oriented” virtues as part of the process of development of 
social virtues that ends with the acquisition of the capacity of abstracting principles of justice 
– a difficult but superior capacity achieved by few. Gilligan (1982), on the other hand, 
considers that care and empathy are virtues as important as justice in the moral development 
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 In the same way, Taylor, paraphrasing Sandel, says: “to insist punctiliously on sharing expenses with a friend 
is to imply that the links of mutual benevolence are somehow lacking or inadequate. There is no faster way to 
losing friends.” (1995a, p.183) 
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of individuals. In this way, two characteristics that are virtues in the personal/private sphere 
would be also virtues in the social/public one. This point is explored later in 8.4 and 8.5. 
 
“Citizenship” is, then, a virtue related to the social/public sphere. But, what does this concept 
mean exactly? McCowan points out that this concept can be understood in two different 
ways:  
 
Citizenship, at base, refers to membership of a state or political unit. […] [T]here are two 
distinct uses of the term. In the first, citizenship refers to an official status: as, for example, in 
the statements, „I am a Canadian citizen‟ or, „I have dual citizenship‟. The second usage, 
however, refers not to the possession of the official status, but the fulfilling of those 
expectations associated with membership. So we can speak of „good‟ citizens as people who, 
say, participate constructively in political life, or of „ineffective‟ citizenship when people‟s 
rights are not upheld in practice. (2009, p.5) 
 
Kymlicka, in turn, affirms that “[c]ivility refers to the way we treat non-intimates with whom 
we come into face-to-face contact” (2002, p.301). Similarly to McCowan, he is also 
committed to the idea that citizenship is a concept associated with the relations of the 
individuals with all of society. According to Osler and Starkey (2005), these relations are 
based on practices, but also on a feeling of belonging that follows Kymlicka‟s idea of the 
expansion from the personal/private to the social/public sphere of a certain sense of intimacy. 
This line between the personal/private and the social/public sphere is significant and orients 
several points of the further discussion of this chapter. 
 
Coming back to the examples of the professor in two different situations, it is possible to 
identify that he/she is confronted with two distinct types of duties, the first is associated with 
his/her social/public life, the second with his/her personal/private life. Reflections on 
citizenship are focused on the social/public one, though Gilligan‟s ideas make questionable 
how detached a person acting in the social/public sphere has to be from his/her 
personal/private values. Once one has identified the sphere in which citizenship virtues are 
expected, it is also important to reflect about civic rights and duties. The reflection on the 
normative perspective of citizenship is normally presented as a double-implication of 
demands of rights and duties (Mccowan, 2009; Callan, 2004; Osler & Starkey, 2005).  
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However, though rights and duties are necessarily connected, they orient different 
discussions. Chapters 3 and 4 present some ideas on how a just society should be organised. 
This discussion allows some conclusions on how a state should treat its citizens, that is, what 
are people‟s civic rights. The fulfilment of people‟s civic rights by the state, however, 
demands that individuals fulfil their duties. In this way, the present chapter is interested in 
reflecting about civic duties. 
 
Through exploring this point, it is possible to identify different civic duties. They represent 
civic knowledge, skills and values (Kerr, 2003). Each one of them is discussed across this 
chapter. However, before exploring these virtues, it is interesting to mention that civic 
knowledge, skills and values are interdependent. For example, the value of compassion is 
probably dependent upon individuals‟ skill in understanding other people‟s feelings, desires 
and ideas, namely cognitive empathy. Compassion is probably also dependent upon 
individuals‟ values of feeling sorrow for the pain or happiness for the success of the others, 
namely, sympathy. These and other relations are explored in greater depth below. 
 
Apart from this, it is also important to discuss some virtues that could be inserted in the list 
discussed in this chapter but are not explored by this thesis. An important one is resilience. 
Actually, in some way, resilience is further taken into consideration. Firstly, although it is 
different from following rules, these features are associated. Moreover, because resilience 
“enables [individuals] to appreciate the consequences of [their] actions in the future” (Bloom, 
2016, p.235), avoiding that they respond to the first impulse of emotional empathy, 
something presented below as a vice. 
 
Another one is effort/dedication towards the community. Reflecting on the hypothetical duty 
of working to promote the development of society and, then, to favour unknown others, it is 
possible to find some link with the virtues of being compassionate and cooperative. Since 
society is also composed of people who have special needs, such as blindness, it seems a duty 
of capable people to produce additional goods for those who cannot achieve the same ends by 
themselves. However, whilst in a low scale it seems acceptable, an excessive demand for 
such extra work seems demanding and unreasonable. Boxer, one of the central characters of 
Orwell‟s Animal Farm (1945), is an example of a horse that possesses much more strength 
than the all others animals, and, because of this, is pressured to work incessantly to achieve 
the good of his society. Orwell, however, develops this character exactly in order to make it 
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evident that Boxer should not be forced to do this, that such a demand goes much further than 
what the group should expect from him, crossing all limits of his liberty of self-
determination.  
 
After reflecting on this list of virtues, two opposite views can be presented. Libertarians 
consider that people should not be obliged to possess most of the civic knowledge and skills 
mentioned. As explored in 8.6, they think that being ignorant is a right. Republicans, on the 
other hand, think that being informed and prepared to think critically is a duty. The duty of 
compassion is even more controversial. Libertarians consider that a true liberal theory cannot 
demand this value from citizens. Liberal egalitarians, who add to their theories elements of 
communitarianism, on the other hand, defend that individuals have to be reasonable, that is, 
rational and compassionate (Rawls, 1993; 2001). 
 
In both cases, libertarians support liberal neutrality with regard to duties in the social sphere. 
However, this thesis is aligned with Gutmann‟s criticism of neutrality. She claims that 
“[n]eutrality is no more acceptable as a solution to [the problem of bias towards one‟s own 
children] than the use of education to inculcate a nonneutral set of virtues. Neither choice – to 
teach or not to teach virtue – is uncontroversial” (1999[1987], p.36). It is obvious, though, 
that those people who do not learn from the state learn from their parents, peers, civil society, 
etc. However, as Gutmann says, “[c]hildren are no more the property of their parents than 
they are the property of the state” (1999[1987], p.33). Thus, from the conclusion that children 
are biased anyway, this agrees of Nussbaum‟s defence of: 
 
a type of liberalism that is not morally „neutral,‟ that has a certain definite moral content, 
prominently including equal respect for persons, a commitment to equal liberties of speech, 
association, and conscience, and a set of fundamental social and economic entitlements. 
(2013, p.16) 
 
Amongst the main values that Nussbaum (2013) considers essential are critical thinking, 
compassion and (non-nationalist) patriotism
89
. This idea is supported in the previous chapters 
and explored below. 
 
8.2. Civic knowledge 
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If people realise that their societies‟ laws and customs are the result of a communal 
enterprise, it is easier for them to accept how it is organised. First, through understanding the 
process of producing their laws and customs, people can see that they have a rationale behind 
them (of course, assuming that laws are not arbitrarily imposed). This makes people more 
willing to respect them. Moreover, knowledge about laws and customs associated with 
knowledge about history make people feel like members of this social project, something 
fundamental in order to reinforce social ties. 
 
Regarding the importance given by Rawls of knowing (and respecting) the constitution, it is 
possible to realise that, though being a liberal, he is aligned with a conservative view that 
certain principles strongly established – constitutional principles – have to be honoured. In 
the same way, this thesis, though it gives high importance to the liberal ethos, understands 
that a certain conservative attitude helps to improve justice (as discussed in 4.3). It is why, in 
the introduction, this thesis claims that if the reader does not believe that it is possible to 
solve Brazilian social injustices through trusting in institutions that already exist, then he/she 
will disagree with the reasoning proposed here. He/she will not accept one of the first pillars 
of this thesis: keeping institutions in order to improve justice.  
 
Besides, it is important to remember that any reasoning starts from certain basic premises. As 
discussed above, for people developing their ideas of what is fair, it is fundamental that they 
depart from trustworthy data about their societies. In this way, knowledge of things like 
history, economic aspects, individuals‟ psychology, etc. are fundamental for people to reach 
their conceptions of justice in a more structured way. For example, many people believe that 
the main reason for poverty is poor people‟s lack of effort, while this is a very superficial 
psychological understanding of this issue. In addition, many rich people believe that they 
belong to the middle-class, however their earning put them within a very restricted group of 
the 10% (or 5% or even less) richest. A reasoning developed by someone does not only 
depend on his/her critical capacities. His/her knowledge about the subject – and his/her 
willing to promote justice
90
 – are also fundamental. As developed in 3.7, Sen (2009a) defends 
coherently the expansion of people‟s informational basis about people‟s welfare or about 
different states of affairs in order to solve problems related to Arrow‟s theorem of 
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 Willingness to promote justice is a value explored later. 
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impossibility. Thus, through endorsing some of Condorcet‟s proposals in this regard, Sen 
claims that people‟s more just decisions depend on broadening information and spreading 
general knowledge, enriching societal statistics and promoting public discussion (2009a, 
p.94). From this, it is not difficult to extend this idea including knowledge about historical 
injustices, people‟s psychological behaviours, etc. 
 
However, producing knowledge is useless if people do not reflect about it correctly. In the 
post-truth era, it is not simple to obtain accurate knowledge. Regarding this, part of the fault 
can be identified in the lack of production of good content. A reduced number of experts 
and/or their biased procedures can be in the origins of this. Nevertheless, following 
inaccurate “knowledge” can be caused by a sense of illusory superiority that people with low 
knowledge have, the so-called Dunning-Kruger Effect: 
 
It suggests that some voters, especially those facing significant distress in their life, might like 
some of what they hear from Trump, but they do not know enough to hold him accountable 
for serious gaffes he makes. (Dunning, 2016. Apud. Nichols, 2017, p.213). 
 
From this analysis, Nichols suggests the existence of a “vicious circle” between people‟s lack 
of knowledge and their lack of trust in policymakers and experts:  
 
People know little and care less about how they are governed, or how their economic, 
scientific, or political structures actually function. Yet, as all of these processes thus become 
more incomprehensible, citizens feel more alienated. (2017, p.217) 
 
And he says that, “[i]n order to trust on leaders and experts, people have to know a bit” 
(2017, p.231). 
 
Thus, it is a person‟s duty towards others to look for trustworthy information. Against this 
claim, sentences like “I reserve the right to be ignorant. That‟s the Western way of life”, from 
the best-seller The Spy Who Came In from the Cold, from John le Carré (1963) (Nichols, 
2017, p.209), are taken as true for “[m]any people [that] think that it is undemocratic to 
contradict their ideas, even if they are stupid” (Nichols, 2017, p.232). However, this is not 
correct. As suggested in 8.3, citizens frequently fail in their reasoning about public affairs 
because of their lack of information. It is not a moral fault if these mistakes happen 
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unconsciously. Nonetheless, if they deliberately disregard experts‟ opinions, it turns into 
something morally unacceptable. In this way, people have a civic duty of engaging in a 
public debate but taking seriously into consideration experts‟ opinions, that are, by definition, 
more qualified than theirs. 
 
Interestingly, the way that Foucault and his followers make any kind of data suspicious of 
being produced to keep structures of power actually reinforces this post-truth atmosphere 
which misguides people. The defence of critical thinking is against this Foucauldian 
suspicion. Associated with the development of rational skills, it is important that people also 
have the openness for experts‟ claims, even when the latter oppose some opinions supported 
by the former. Of course, democratic regimes, in the end, have to respect people‟s opinions. 
However, this only can be followed if people put into practice their duty of forming these 
opinions through listening to experts.  
 
8.3. Critical Thinking 
 
Apart from different types of knowledge introduced above, a good citizen has to possess 
different skills. A central one is critical thinking. Since Socrates, critical thinking has been 
defended as fundamental for the development of a fair society. However, alongside history, 
this concept assumes different meanings. Given the fact that Dewey is “widely regarded as 
the „father‟ of the modern critical thinking tradition” (Fisher, 2001, p.2), this thesis recurs to 
his definition of critical thinking: 
 
Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in 
the light of the grounds which support it and the further conclusions to which it tends 
(DEWEY, 1909, p.9). 
 
In this way, critical thinkers actively take their own conclusions based on reason, rather than 
only following their feelings or other people‟s opinions. Glaser explores Dewey‟s ideas 
defining critical thinking in an even clearer way:  
 
Critical thinking calls for a persistent effort to examine any belief or supposed form of 
knowledge in the light of the evidence that supports it and the further conclusions to which it 
tends (1941, p.5). 
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Constantly reflecting about the evidences that support the reasoning. These are the “grounds” 
mentioned by Dewey. In 5.1, Haidt (2001) showed that even when undeniable reasons are 
presented against people‟s strong beliefs, it is very difficult for them to change their ideas. 
Regarding this, it is quite normal to observe people finding reasons only after having made 
their conclusions. In this way, while possessing logical skills is necessary for thinking 
critically, departing from reliable sources and willingness to respect the right direction (from 
the reasons to the conclusion, rather than starting from the conclusion) are also fundamental. 
Certain people appeal to inaccurate sources of knowledge because they want to support their 
opinion and are willing to be dishonest about the state of affairs in order to „win‟ the debate. 
This is a lack of an important civic value explored in 8.6. However, following inaccurate 
“knowledge” can be caused by a sense of illusory superiority that people with low knowledge 
have. This limitation is developed in 8.2.  
 
8.4. Cognitive empathy 
 
Apart from critical thinking, empathy has been strongly considered an important civic virtue. 
During the eighteenth century, Hume (1748) and Smith (1759) appealed to the current idea of 
empathy (however calling it sympathy
91
) associated with impartiality in order to base their 
reflections on morality. In this regard, they claimed that the individual‟s capacity to put 
himself/herself in other people‟s shoes is fundamental virtue of a moral agent who acts in 
private and public sphere. 
 
Before exploring if Hume, Smith, and many other defenders of the importance of empathy in 
building a more just society, it is central to distinguish two understandings of such a concept. 
Bloom (2016, p.39) proposes that there is a difference in between “cognitive empathy” and 
“emotional empathy”. According to him, “if I understand that you are in pain without feeling 
it myself, this is […] a form of empathy – „cognitive empathy‟” (2016, p.17). Based on this 
definition, he considers cognitive empathy a skill like critical thinking, and, because of this, 
he says that it is neutral in regards to moral values. 
 
                                                          
91
 Sympathy, differently from empathy, is currently defined as a desire to make other people feel well, usually 
those who are suffering. This value is investigated in 8.5. 
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In this way, cognitive empathy differs from emotional empathy. Those who experience the 
latter have not only an understanding of others‟ feelings, but also feel their pain or pleasure. 
In 8.5, it is discussed if emotional empathy is a positive or negative characteristic. Here, the 
focus of the analysis is on its cognitive side. 
 
As a positive element of it, Bloom suggests that, if people understand that unknown others 
also feel pain and pleasure, it can make them see themselves as less special (2016, p.76), and, 
in turn, more accepting that everyone has the right to have their wishes considered by the 
state. Of course, only understanding that others have wishes does not make people think that 
these wishes have to be considered. A sadist can completely understand others‟ pain, but 
simultaneously, and in spite of this, desires to make others suffer. In this sense, a desire to 
make other people feel well is necessary as a complement to the empathetic capacity. Thus, 
associated with the capacity to imagine others‟ pain (or happiness), a desire to stop (to 
promote) it is also necessary. This desire is associated with the feelings of compassion and 
sympathy and discussed in 8.5. 
 
8.5. Compassion 
 
Having defended the importance of cognitive empathy as a civic skill, it is time to analyse if 
emotional empathy should be cultivated as a civic value. It is widely defended that the more 
emotionally empathetic someone is, the better this person is towards others (Baron-Cohen, 
2004; Rifkin, 2009, De Waal, 2010). Obviously, such a defence considers that someone who 
feels empathy towards someone else also desires that this person feel well, have success, etc. 
In this way, it is considered that empathy entails sympathy. However, located empathy and 
sympathy can be the wrong moral guide for a person who acts in the social/public sphere, 
since these feelings stimulate someone of paying excessive attention to certain individuals 
rather than to others or even to some abstract idea of justice.  
 
Bloom supports this idea by saying that individuals‟ civic reasoning has to go beyond located 
empathy and sympathy towards specific other people. He gives different examples regarding 
this. One is an interesting test that shows that located empathy and sympathy normally 
produce myopia instead of producing fairness: people after knowing the name and other 
details of a person in a queue for a treatment – and developing some type of empathy towards 
this person – increase their wish to pass him/her to the front, something generally considered 
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unfair (2016, p.86). Regarding the duty of preserving the environment, Bloom claims that this 
is based on responsibilities with next generations, rather than on empathy and sympathy, 
since it is not possible to feel something for someone who does not even exist. Thus, in this 
case, emotional empathy and sympathy are useless (2016, p.23). Another interesting 
reflection presented by him concludes that, when someone thinks of paying taxes, empathy 
and sympathy towards co-citizens hardly ever orient such practices (2016, p.22). The tax 
system demands rational policies and people have to trust in the government‟s capacity to 
manage this. Otherwise, they would have to defend a minimal state in which the reallocation 
of goods is made in the private sphere.  
 
Bloom also defends that the stimulus of located empathy and sympathy are not good starting 
points to generalise wide concerns for others. According to him, empathy and sympathy can 
make people expand certain circles of care, but restrict others. He claims that people tend to 
donate much more money not for the charity organisations that prove they are helping more 
people, but for those that make them to feel more attached with the receivers of help. Bloom 
also claims that it is quite common for politicians to stimulate people‟s inaccurate views of 
reality through overemphasizing certain situations despite a more holistic view of it. 
 
Another criticism Bloom makes is against stimulating located empathy and sympathy in the 
social/public sphere, which he argues can work against the civilisation process. He suggests 
that located empathy and sympathy are vectors that transfer feelings of anger and resentment 
from someone who suffered a certain injustice to other people. Thus, amongst a very 
empathetic population, such feelings end up guiding public decisions. However, in his view, 
this is a guide that goes against wise decisions that have been built alongside the development 
of societies (2016, p.191). Regarding this point, a very interesting dialogue can be found in 
the film The Ides of March (2011). There, Morris, a fictitious pre-candidate for the US 
presidency declares in a TV show that he is against the death penalty, but at the same time he 
says that, if someone kills his wife, he would find a way to kill the murderer. In face of that 
unusual answer, the interviewer asks: “[If you judge it the right thing to do], why not let 
society do that?” In this moment, Morris gives an illuminating answer: “Because society has 
to be better than the individual. If I were to do that, I would be wrong”. The point behind this 
idea is that strong emotions should not guide public decisions.  
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Bloom‟s reflection on this point orients a last thought. The world is full of sad stories. Very 
few people, if any, can endure all of them. Thus, the attempt to make people expand their 
feelings of empathy and sympathy towards a large group can make them burn out (Bloom, 
2016, p.138-9). It is possible to imagine that this feeling, instead of helping to build a better 
society, paralyses people. However, in order to achieve a more just society, citizens need to 
be actively engaged in positive social practices, rather than only feel discomfort with social 
injustices. 
 
Nonetheless, whilst it is argued that citizens should avoid following strong emotions, it is 
simultaneously suggested that citizens should not only appeal to their rationalities when they 
participate in decision-making processes in the public sphere. As the debate Rawls versus 
Gauthier developed in 3.4 shows, a just society depends on individuals transcending their 
rational and instrumental view of unknown others. Nonetheless, this transcendence does not 
seem to be towards located empathy and sympathy. This seems to be towards a conjugation 
of feelings of communal/social responsibility and a more diffuse compassion for strangers in 
general. These feelings are more comprehensive and do not result in a restrictive moral circle 
of care. 
 
This approximation between communal responsibility and compassion is important. It is 
mentioned in chapter 2 that the responsibility towards co-citizens, the right to equal liberty 
and democratic procedures are the three main pillars shared by Western individuals. Such 
pillars sustain these societies. In this way, it makes sense that compassion is defended as a 
value that should be cultivated. Here, in addition, it is suggested that to try to expand this 
responsibility towards all individuals could be interesting, even if they do not live in the same 
country. This point, however, demands much more debates about how to implement global 
citizenship education, exceeding the aims of this thesis. 
 
Regarding to this general idea, Bloom defends exactly a conjugation of self-control, 
intelligence and diffuse compassion as better than emotional empathy in order to orient 
people‟s feeling in the public sphere (2016, p.35). It is possible to think that it would make 
people engage themselves into politics and support the state‟s actions towards fair 
redistribution of goods (2016, p.103). Helping the less fortunate would be understood as a 
duty, rather than a favour (2016, p.102). It seems that the main difference between located 
empathy plus sympathy and public duty plus compassion is that the latter demands a feeling 
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towards others linked with a rational capacity to understand the big picture, something 
associated with critical thinking. Thus: 
 
In contrast to empathy, compassion does not mean sharing the suffering of the other: rather, it 
is characterized by feelings of warmth, concern and care for the other, as well as a strong 
motivation to improve the other‟s wellbeing. Compassion is feeling for and not feeling with 
other. (Singer & Klimecki, 2016. Apud. Bloom, 2016, p.138) 
 
This point returns us to the Kohlberg versus Gilligan debate (5.3). This thesis is committed 
with Kohlberg‟s idea, but, as discussed below, it does not mean that the cultivation of 
empathy is not seen as a good way to reach this at a higher level. 
 
Defending the superiority of compassion in comparison to empathy to orient participation in 
the social/public sphere is not defending that empathy has not to be cultivated. Bloom, as 
well as Kohlberg, sees that, in the personal/private sphere, the capacity for empathy and 
sympathy makes people develop strong family and friendship ties, something fundamental for 
a happy life. Moreover, besides the importance of empathy in the personal/private sphere, it 
is possible to defend that these kinds of close affections are important for the development of 
broader and milder feelings of compassion towards strangers. Kohlberg does not disagree 
with this, but defends that societies have to try to go further and see that, in the end, public 
decisions depend on abstraction. Thus, if maybe formal education ought to stimulate 
students‟ empathy and sympathy, at the same time, it has to make them more aware about the 
importance of thinking clearly, and then avoid that their emotions make them blind about 
what is fair or not.  
 
Further research is required to provide more concrete and also more abstract reflections on 
this point in order to improve social justice. On the one hand, caring too much for a particular 
individual can lead to wrong decisions. One good example is a quite common situation in 
which a judge obliges the state to pay for a very expensive treatment for a specific patient 
whose life story the judge becomes aware of. The empathy and sympathy felt by the judge 
makes him/her quite often decide to rule in favour of a treatment that helps that particular 
person but cannot be made universal (because the state has no budget to offer that treatment 
to everyone). In this way, his/her decision is unfair.  
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On the other, it has to be mentioned that the excess of abstraction can promote indifference 
towards others. Maybe, if decisions in the social/public sphere are only based on rational 
reflections, the fact that the person who does not receive the treatment will die is simply 
disregarded. Exclusive rationality could make society blind to people‟s real problems. In 
general, it can be claimed that it is only empathy towards the worst-off that makes elite 
individuals who rule the state act in order to create a more just society. For example, a white 
person who cannot imagine how it is to suffer racism, even not being racist, is hardly prone to 
support laws that effectively combat this situation if they do not develop empathy. This idea 
is aligned with Mills‟ criticism of Rawls‟ hypothetical contract defended in 3.8. 
 
8.6. Competition in a cooperative system 
 
The previous reflection about compassion maybe give the false impression that only desiring 
to help those in lower social positions is enough. However, as Rawls suggests, societies are 
“fair systems of cooperation over time” (1993, p.14). In this way, as developed in chapters 3 
and 4, it is defended that reasonable people consider fair a system that reduces inequalities of 
opportunities by somehow balancing competition and cooperation. This balance is behind the 
hypothetical social contract, a contract amongst equally free individuals who understand that 
they have some responsibility towards their co-citizens (Nussbaum, 2006, p.25). Stability 
depends on this balance between equal liberty and communal responsibility. Thus, it is 
supposed that people possess the virtue of being cooperative, not only the desire for 
competing for obtaining scarce goods. 
 
Even so, humans have not only a natural predisposition to compete (5.1), they take 
competition also as a right. In Western societies, people‟s entrepreneurship and desire to 
improve their lives are seen as a virtue (Ferguson, 2011). It is consensual that people are free 
to seek after their own goods. Moreover, when they make effort to improve their lives, in a 
fair system which distributes part of people‟s goods, they improve, as a side effect, the lives 
of the others. In this way, cooperating with others is not only good for the latter; competing 
with them in a fair system also is. Willingness to compete, supposing that the competition is 
fair, is, then, a virtue in welfare state societies, not only in neoliberal societies. 
 
8.7. Fighting for justice 
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People‟s feeling of compassion and willingness to balance cooperation and competition, 
however, is useless if they do not turn into action. In the private sphere, people help those 
whom they feel empathy and sympathy for or join in cooperative ventures. In the democratic 
sphere, the best way to do these things is through supporting and checking the state‟s actions. 
This behaviour depends on engagement in public debates and elections. Regarding this, 
though citizens‟ voice in democratic states is normally considered a right, participating in this 
decision process is also a duty towards co-citizens, since people are masters of the decisions 
that have impact upon the lives of all. Thus, a certain democratic behaviour is expected from 
everyone. 
 
However, regarding many aspects, the democratic system produces decisions that are not just, 
and democratic processes sometimes seem inefficient to deal with this. In these moments, 
other instances of political engagement, like the involvement in demonstrations and even the 
practice of civil disobedience are defended as also being civic duties. Nevertheless, these 
fights for rights can stimulate people‟s anger towards those who seem responsible for 
promoting injustices. Is anger, in these cases, a vice or a virtue? Does anger help to improve 
social justice? 
 
From the beginning, it is important to distinguish anger felt at the personal level from 
political anger, the anger against institutions and individuals that rule society and promote 
injustices (White, 2012). It is the latter that is in question. Two different views are, then, 
compared. Nussbaum (2016) considers that people‟s anger is counterproductive in order to 
promote unity and stability for the right reasons. This thesis is committed to the search for 
social stability. Thus, Nussbaum‟s argument that sees anger as a vice is promising. Her 
reasoning associates anger with a retributive attitude that reinforces a social clash in which on 
side demonises the other (2016, p.207). Nussbaum mainly based on the way that Mandela led 
South Africa after the end of Apartheid, says: 
 
Significantly, Mandela frames the entire question in forward-looking pragmatic terms, as a 
question of getting the other party to do what you want. He then shows that this task is much 
more feasible if you can get the other party to work with you rather than against you. Progress 
is impeded by the other party‟s defensiveness and anxious self-protection. Anger, 
consequently, does nothing to move matters forward: it just increases the other party‟s anxiety 
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and self-defensiveness. A gentle and cheerful approach, by contrast, can gradually weaken 
defenses until the whole idea of self-defense is given up. (2016, p.230) 
 
It is important to reinforce that Nussbaum is not defending that wrongdoing should be simply 
forgiven. Nevertheless, she express that the development of societies depends on “forward-
looking effort of reconciliation”, and that (cognitive) empathy towards those who harm, 
instead of feel anger towards them, is the best way to unite the whole society in this effort. 
(2016, p.238) Thus, though Nussbaum agrees that anger has evolutionary roots, she also says 
that it is partially cultivated. If this is true, societies could cultivate the opposite. In her view, 
“it seems simply inexcusable to tolerate and even encourage political and legal institutions 
that embrace and valorize the stupidity of the retributive spirit”, something that, in her view, 
is in the basis of anger feelings (206,p.249). 
 
Srinivasan (2017), on the other hand, detaches anger from revenge, and identifies such a 
feeling as a form of appropriate communication for those that, otherwise, never have voice. 
In this way, she draws attention to the fact that those who defend that avoiding anger is a sign 
of a more rational and civilised way to lead public debates disregard that certain people are 
always excluded of the main decisions, and that expressing anger is the only way that they 
have to express themselves: 
 
The question was whether such men should make themselves into a new kind of man, with 
the power of a civic ruler rather than a tribal warrior, but powerful nonetheless. […] 
Invoking the spectre of the raging Achilles, we condemn anger. But in so doing we neglect, as 
we have always neglected, those who were never allowed to be angry, the slaves and women 
who have the power of neither the state nor the sword. (2017, p.20) 
 
In her view, these people have the right to feel anger, since forgiving or understanding the 
oppressors can be excessively demanding, even painful for them. In this way, Srinivasan 
claims that is wrong to expect that the “primary locus of responsibility for fixing the problem 
lies with the victim rather than the perpetrator” (2017,p.11). More than this, since she does 
not expect that the perpetrators of injustices start this process, she understands that expressing 
anger is a good way for the oppressed to start: 
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It is historically naïve, after all, to think that white America would have been willing to 
embrace King‟s vision of a unified, post-racial nation, if not for the threat of Malcolm X‟s 
angry defiance. It is perhaps similarly naïve to think anger contains no salutary psychic 
possibilities for someone whose self-conception has been shaped by degradation and hatred. 
(2017, p.4) 
 
Regarding this two different points of view, this thesis defends that a certain type of feeling 
that make people fight for justice is an important civic virtue. As mentioned above, many 
times protesting is the only way to open a space for dialogue. However, against what 
Srinivasan says, solid historic changes in Western democracies seem to come from those who 
protested peacefully. King or Mandela probably felt angry, but they controlled it when they 
were in the public sphere doing politics. Obviously, it is expected that the dominant class has 
compassion towards the oppressed and put efforts to improve social justice. However, it is 
also expected that the oppressed protest, but that they also try to understand that, at the other 
side, there are people who can be partners in the process of building a better society for all. 
And anger does not seem the best attitude to establish this partnership.  
 
8.8. Following rules 
 
In 8.2, it is defended that people have to take seriously experts‟ claims. In parallel, 
individuals have to respect other people‟s reasonable opinions that go against what they 
think. When people are defeated in an election, it is obvious that they disagree with the result. 
However, though these people strongly disagree with the directions of the government‟s 
decisions, they have to cooperate with this government without anger. Obviously, as explored 
above, protests are legitimate, but with some limits. At the end, it is fundamental to celebrate 
that people think differently – however, respecting certain limits – and from this a better 
society can be developed. 
 
Thus, one of the characteristics of a good democratic behaviour is the willingness to respect 
what is decided democratically. If the process is fair and some legitimate limits of what can 
be voted upon are established, the laws and policies that result from this process are just. 
Given this, for democratic societies to work, all citizens have to develop their willingness to 
respect these laws and policies. Thus, the willingness of following rules is an important civic 
value, something related to Kohlberg‟s (1971; 1976) stages of moral development (5.3). 
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However, since it is very difficult for people to completely reach the last Kohlberg‟s stage of 
development, the conventional stage is seen by this thesis as a positive stage. In democratic 
regimes, accepting the rules is an attitude based on the autonomous trust on collective 
decisions. This has two main advantages. First, if the process is well executed, based on ideas 
presented in 3.7, there is a high chance that these decisions are right. Moreover, societies 
where people follow rules are more stable, something that favours the improvement of 
justice, as suggested in 2.6. 
 
Nonetheless, this defence of the importance of following rules suffers several criticisms, 
mainly from those who see the societies as fundamentally unfair. In this, it is worth analysing 
Foucault‟s criticisms against social norms. He, through different studies, defends that rules 
and institutions exist to normalise unfair relations, to keep the status quo in which some have 
power and others are dominated. Studying different genealogies of unfair power relations 
throughout history, he suggests, for example, that is not an aim of societies “to punish less 
but to punish better” (1979, p.76). 
 
However, the present thesis disagrees with this. “Punishing better” is something good. 
Punishment is important. It is part of the lesson of the passage of the film The Ides of March 
quoted above: following rules is an important value in Western societies, since, regarding 
several subjects, these societies developed their civic values more than individuals‟ biological 
capacity to follow them. As mentioned in 5.1, people are not born feeling the necessary 
commitments towards strangers. Thus, either by habituation/education, or by law, they have 
to be “indoctrinated” to do this. At least, at the beginning, the existence of laws helps 
individuals to develop “good” habits. Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1971; 1976) do not 
consider it wrong that part of the process of embodiment of rules happens in this way. 
Moreover, when rules are not embodied, in order to make possible societal life, law has to be 
imposed. Depending on how civic education is conducted, societies need to appeal more or 
less to the law in order to keep this organisation. 
 
8.9. Engagement and celebration of difference behind civic duties 
 
Individuals‟ will to develop civic knowledge, skills and values depends on their acceptance 
that they belong to a state, an organisation where they have rights and duties. This acceptance 
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depends on the existence of certain social ties amongst them. The present section investigates 
these ties through reflecting on whether tolerating other people is enough or if engaging with 
unknown people and celebrating differences are also necessary attitudes.  
 
Most current political philosophers, if not all, agree that tolerating other individuals is a duty 
of all citizens. Many of them go further and claim that, somehow, the state should stimulate 
people to get closer. From this view, people should not only tolerate but also engage 
themselves with unknown people and be encouraged to share some views with them. In 3.4, 
Rawls‟ defence that individuals have to possess certain civic values that make them morally 
connected to co-citizens is endorsed, in opposition to Gauthier‟s suggestion that no moral 
duty of individuals towards others should be demanded to anyone. In this way, though being 
a liberal rather than a communitarian, Rawls cannot escape from appealing to a sense of 
community in his theory. Given this, it seems fundamental to determine which civic values 
are needed to guarantee a fair society. Thus, at first, Galston and Macedo, thinkers who 
disagree about the extension of these values, have their ideas compared in order to clarify if 
only tolerance should be expected from citizens or if also engagement and celebration of 
difference should be stimulated.  
 
Galston proposes a very limited intrusion of public policies into the private lives of 
individuals. He does not expect any sentimental involvement of individuals with other 
people‟s problems, rather merely some consideration for their conditions as human beings. 
Based on Walzer‟s suggestion that even tolerance is rare in our history (1999, p.xi.), Galston 
assumes that engagement is excessively optimistic. In this way, he proposes a struggle to 
develop a society based on the principle of tolerance, defined by him as the “refusal to use 
coercive state power to impose one‟s view on others” (2002, p.126). In this sense, it seems 
that he supports the idea that a government should not interfere in the practices of any 
specific culture within its state.  
 
Galston, for example, considers acceptable cultures which do not treat equally certain 
individuals who belong to them (homosexuals, women, etc.). To solve this problem, by 
assuming “the fact that we are born into certain groups to which we do not choose to belong”, 
Galston says that all individuals have to be guaranteed awareness of alternative‟s lifestyles, 
assess to them, freedom from brainwashing and chances for leaving their social groups (2002, 
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p.122). In his words, “Securing this liberty will require affirmative state protections against 
oppression carried out by groups against their members” (2002, p.122-3). 
 
Thus, Galston‟s claims seem to be under a minimal consensus. However, there is a main 
problem that makes such claims incompatible with the limited theory proposed by him. It is 
impossible to make a society as a whole accepting of these policies without making 
individuals engage with co-citizens‟ issues. For example, it is possible to suppose that, in a 
small community quite detached from the rest of the society, women are treated as inferior 
and have much less opportunities to project and implement their life plans. If there is not a 
social commitment amongst different groups, there is no reason why the rest of the society 
would care about the internal problems of that small group. The lack of proximity results in 
lack of knowledge and intimacy amongst groups. It makes the internal unjust inequalities in 
this small group almost impossible to be fixed by the state. 
 
Individuals care about injustices towards oppressed people – and then feels responsibility in 
the process of building a legitimate society – only if all citizens feel somehow close to each 
other. Thus, going further than Galston‟s narrow proposal, Macedo says that “a merely 
„tolerant‟ community does not really stand out as one that is flourishing as a community. 
Liberal justice is compatible with forms of community and conditions of human character 
that fall below what could be considered „excellent‟” (1990, p.266). He, then, defends that: 
 
[t]he allegiance of liberal justice in a diverse society should encourage attitudes of tolerance 
and sympathy among people who disagree. As we come to realize that those who engage in 
lives different from our own are nevertheless like us in important ways, we may come to 
sympathize not only with these persons but also with their projects and commitments, with 
choices different from our own, with careers and lifestyles not seriously considered before 
(Macedo, 1990, p.267). 
 
Through this defence, Macedo focuses on the importance of stimulating people‟s engagement 
with those that otherwise would not be close to them. 
 
Engagement depends on the establishment of certain limits on private attachments. 
Necessarily, to some extent, self-interest and the importance of family, small community and 
friends have to be relegated to a second plan when compared to common good. There is no 
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doubt that, as discussed in 2.4, family attachments are one of the pillars of contemporary 
Western societies and there is a consensus that such special ties have to be protected. 
However, there are two main reasons, also based on shared consensus of Western individuals, 
to limit families‟ and small communities‟ special attachments. Firstly, it is a broader 
attachment that allows societies to build special conditions for stability, something that is in 
the interest of all. Moreover, as discussed in 4.3, Okin (1999) calls attention to the fact that it 
is exactly within the family that certain strong kinds of injustice are established. Her analysis 
examines gender inequality, however, this reasoning can be extended to other injustices 
against minorities within families and small associations. 
 
In order to advance this reflection, it is important to observe that, though a kind of 
engagement is needed for developing communal ties, getting people closer is not an easy 
task. Individuals in plural societies differ from each other regarding several things: gender, 
race, social class, sexual orientation, faith, political position, cultural tastes, etc. Thus, how 
should the state act towards creating conditions for these different people living together? 
Should some differences be reduced? Should differences always be seen as something good 
and celebrated? Or should they be seen as inevitable and tolerated? 
 
Firstly, it is fundamental to clarify the meaning of tolerance and celebration of difference, the 
main concepts involved in this reflection. The LGBT community usually demands positive 
attitudes of people towards lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans people. They differentiate 
between people who only tolerate, from others who also accept and finally from those who 
celebrate different sexual orientations. These three very useful concepts, however, are barely 
found in academic papers about this subject. One exception is Riddle‟s (1994) work, which 
proposed an even more sophisticated list of eight different attitudes towards the LGBT 
community: repulsion, pity, tolerance, acceptance, support, admiration, appreciation, and 
nurturance. This thesis defends that, more than tolerating and accepting, people should 
celebrate difference of sexual orientation. (The same idea can be expanded towards other 
groups, for example, ethnical minorities.) 
 
Obviously, specifically this defence of celebration of different sexual orientations finds 
resistance in lots of conservative groups, mainly the religious ones. They are not willing to 
celebrate sexual orientations (for many of them, “options”) different from heterosexuality. 
They, at most, accept homosexuality. And the number of people with this behaviour is huge. 
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For example, in a 2012 opinion poll conducted in the US, 42% of people declared that they 
consider homosexuality immoral (BLOOM, 2013, p.143). On the other hand, there is no 
doubt that these numbers are decreasing and laws protecting LGBT rights are being 
multiplied in Western countries. However, is state protection of LGBT rights enough or 
should it cultivate on people the willing of celebrating such idea?  
 
Regarding this specific point, given the fact that the lack of celebration of LGBT people 
invades the public sphere and implies lots of unfair inequalities (for example, LGBT people 
have more difficulties finding jobs, like black people in racist societies), proactive state 
actions are needed in order to stimulate celebration of plurality of sexual orientations, even if 
it goes against the beliefs of many people. It is a typical case in which the ideal has to 
pressure the real. This reflection touches on a central aspect of this thesis, and receives more 
attention in the conclusion. 
 
However, it has to be done in a very mild way, since a radical attitude towards this can 
promote clashes in the family and in broader society. Part of this problem is associated with 
lack of knowledge of people in general, though the other part depends upon democratic 
decisions in which some groups will be defeated. For example, the allowance of LGBT 
people to get civil union or adopt children seems to be an immediate consequence of the 
constitutional right of equal treatment under the law; on the other hand, a hypothetical law 
obliging churches to celebrate same-sex marriage is something much more difficult to derive 
from the constitution, and, though it seems fair, the reactions against such decision could be 
more problematic than the eventual benefits from it. 
 
Regarding this discussion of celebration of differences, in 6.3, it is presented a fundamental 
difference between how black people historically supported themselves in the US and in 
Brazil. In the US, the process of miscegenation has been much slower than in Brazil. On the 
one hand, this fact has made the American society much more racist and divided than the 
Brazilian one. On the other hand, American segregation had created a stronger sense of 
brotherhood/sisterhood amongst black people that make them have more conditions to fight 
for their rights and to celebrate their culture. 
 
In Brazil, this process has been more fluid, the cultures are more mixed, but still black people 
are occupying the lower positions in society. The mobilisation of the black community, to a 
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high degree favoured by the democratisation of internet access and by the legal stimulus to 
race self-identification that comes with affirmative action, however, is creating a space for 
black people to develop this brotherhood/sisterhood atmosphere. Regarding this, it is 
mentioned above in several different discussions that this thesis defends that social 
integration should be cultivated, since it stimulates social responsibility. However, recovering 
the partial defence of multicultural practices developed in 4.3, it can be understood that, 
before such integration, people from oppressed groups need to feel pride in their origins in 
order to participate in equal conditions of recognition in this process. Chapter 9 and the 
conclusion return to this discussion.  
 
*** 
 
Chapter 8 represents the transition from a discussion about justice to a reflection on 
citizenship education. It proposes a list of civic virtues that individuals should theoretically 
possess to participate well in democratic processes. A list of seven civic virtues is, then, 
presented: civic knowledge, critical thinking, cognitive empathy, compassion, willingness to 
compete fairly, fighting for justice, following rules democratically created. From this, a 
theoretical debate about ideal citizenship curriculum (chapter 9) and the observation on how 
civic virtues are cultivated in Brazilian real curriculum can be developed (chapters 10 and 
11).  
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9. Ideal theory of citizenship curriculum 
 
Chapter 8 presents certain civic virtues that individuals have to possess in order to sustain just 
societies, based on what is discussed by the previous chapters. Related to this, the present 
chapter proposes an ideal theory of citizenship curriculum that is linked with the 
improvement of justice in Western societies, more specifically, in Brazil. This chapter, 
however, only develops an ideal proposal on this regard, being empirical observations 
achieved by chapters 9, 11 and 12. It, then, starts by (9.1) showing that, though Western 
citizenship values are roughly shared, different countries have distinct interpretations of them 
and this fact produces significant differences in their citizenship education projects. Next, it is 
shown that (9.2) neutrality in education does not exist. Then, (9.3) the importance of the 
family in this process is defended, but (9.4) the importance of formal citizenship education is 
also defended in order to balance the influences of the family, media, civil society over 
children and youngsters. From this, ideas on how schooling can and should work towards 
cultivating the civic virtues presented in chapter 8 are developed in the next sections. First the 
chapter investigates (9.5) how the state should manage, through a “supra” official citizenship 
curriculum, the whole school system – distribution of educational resources, parental 
intervention on what is taught, etc. Next, it is proposed (9.6) how a “wide” and (9.7) a 
“narrow” official citizenship curricula should be designed. Finally, (9.8) a debate between 
two powerful and partially opposed theories – critical thinking and critical pedagogy – on 
how dealing with citizenship curriculum is presented in order to make clearer the ideal 
pedagogical position towards citizenship education defended by this thesis. This chapter is, 
then, concluded by (9.9) anticipating, still from a theoretical perspective, some limitations 
regarding the implementation of citizenship curriculum. 
 
9.1. Social justice and citizenship curriculum 
 
Chapter 3 claims that there is a consensus within Western nations towards guaranteeing equal 
basic civil and political liberties and equality of opportunity for all individuals. Chapter 8 
suggests that, more than through toleration, unknown co-citizens should be connected 
through stronger feelings like engagement with unknown others and celebrate their 
differences. This balance between public and private is, then, a real challenge.  
 
181 
 
This balance between private and public spheres resonates in the balance between the ideas of 
tolerance and engagement. Engagement is a much stronger attitude than tolerance. It is a 
practice towards connecting unknown people who do not have private ties. It is quite 
common that the lack of public connection between people increases their differences, 
something that, in turn, goes against this connection. As discussed in 8.9, there are two 
different, eventually complementary, ways of reinforcing this connection: by making people 
accept and celebrate the distinct others; or by reducing the visibility and salience of their 
differences in public sphere. Chapter 3 presents certain minimal state attitudes related to each 
practice. Chapter 4 goes further defending deeper policies towards such attitudes. Regarding 
this, two different Western social dynamics are usually presented as representing each of 
them: the English
92
 and the French approaches. This also has obvious implications to these 
countries‟ citizenship curricula. 
 
Levinson (1999), Osler and Starkey (2009), and some others appeal to the empirical analysis 
of English and French social organisations and curricula to present different approaches on 
how to promote tolerance, engagement and celebration of difference in civil society. These 
two countries are usually analysed, because they have quite opposite and paradigmatic ways 
to understand citizenship. While the former is much more focused on respecting/accepting 
(not necessarily celebrating) different cultural practices, the latter aims to foster a national 
unity (for some, “forced” engagement) around certain values93. 
 
These main differences impact in distinct ways that these two countries foster the idea of 
citizenship in general. This thesis, however, is interested in one specific practice of the state: 
formal education or schooling. Regarding this, the French model is seen as top-down, with 
cultivation of national symbols and values. The English model is (or used to be) bottom-up 
and “does not require either citizenship or citizenship education to be linked necessarily to 
nationality.” (Osler & Starkey, 2009, p.340)  
 
Regarding this, citizenship education is something quite new in the English curriculum. It 
was only in 2002 that citizenship started making part of secondary schools curricula. In 
                                                          
92
 English and not British curriculum is mentioned here, because there are differences between how education 
policies are implemented in the different nations that compose UK. 
93
 These models serve as paradigms for analytical development of this subject. Their realities are much more 
sophisticated than presented here. For example, the introduction, in 2010, of the cultivation of “British values” 
in English schools (discussed below), has moved the English curriculum towards French one. 
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France, on the other hand, such a subject is more than 130 years old (Osler & Starkey, 2009, 
p.336). 
 
These two different views of unity have implications for how these educational systems 
foster cultural and socio-economic integration. In England, schools are extensions of 
communities where students are inserted (Levinson, 1999, p.111), while “[t]he basis of 
national education in France is initiation into a common culture through a single curriculum 
(Osler & Starkey, 2009, p.336), “the aim of the curriculum is to teach students to be 
„French‟” (Levinson, 1999, p.123). 
 
In this way, there are also differences with regard to what subjects and syllabuses are 
cultivated in schools. In England, citizenship as a subject is focused on civic knowledge and 
skills like, respectively, notions of laws and critical thinking more than on civic values 
(DfEE(S) & QCA, 1999). The focus is on political literacy, that is, on preparing “an active 
and politically-literate citizenry convinced that they can influence government and 
community affairs” (QCA, 1998, p. 9). In France, the civic education approach is completely 
different, since the values of freedom, equality, and solidarity and human rights are explicit 
central contents of such a subject (Osler & Starkey, 2009, p.336)
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. 
 
The comparison of these two systems is very useful to orientate the discussion of this chapter. 
However, since the present thesis is focused on Brazil, it is important to highlight some 
elements of Brazilian people‟s notion of citizenship (developed in chapter 6 from a historical 
perspective) that do not conform to this dichotomy. First, the need to deal with different 
cultures – through accommodating them, in the case of England, and through inculcating 
some national values, in the case of France – is not a central problem in Brazil. While Brazil 
has significant regional differences, and historical ethnic diversity, these groups have been 
living together and mixing for a significant period of time. This process results in 97% of 
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 Related to this, it is interesting to observe how a proposal for introducing the cultivation of “British values” in 
schools suffered resistance amongst English schools‟ communities. Though the values proposed (democracy, 
the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs 
(DfE, 2014, p.5)) are completely in accordance with Universal Human Rights, the mere reference to something 
that is “British” goes against a multicultural ethos, and was massively rejected by teachers and parents. This 
rejection has, however, an explanation based on how these ideas were put in to practice. Those who criticise this 
policy say that the requirement for schools to actively promote “fundamental British values” is part of the 
government‟s strategy for countering radicalisation and extremism; a strategy that was developed not by 
educationalists or political philosophers concerned with democratic civic education, but by the Counter 
Extremism Division of the DfE staffed by the British Security Services. 
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people speaking Portuguese, no significant religious disputes, and so on (6.1). However, there 
are problems related to Brazil‟s specific process of integration that have to be addressed and 
need development. These include but are not limited to issues concerning: a well-known huge 
socio-economic gap identified everywhere (6.4 and 6.5); the explosion, in the last 40 years, of 
Neo-Pentecostal churches which defend a very conservative agenda and have increased 
impact in public arena (6.5). 
 
Regarding citizenship education, it is quite common that Brazilian people are suspicious 
about cultivation of civic virtues in schools, much more so than what happens in the countries 
quoted above. National symbols like the flag, the national anthem, and the cultivation of such 
“virtues”, for many people, are linked with a recent dictatorship (1964-1985). Thus, avant-
garde people are usually afraid of the return of such situation. Since Brazil‟s current 
democracy has now lasted thirty years, the fear of authoritarianism has significantly 
diminished, yet it is still common for communal ties to be widely seen as placing limitations 
on one‟s civil liberties. On the opposite side, conservatives think that this civic education 
allows teachers (who are normally avant-garde and pro strong redistribution of wealth) to 
cultivate political ideas in students, something that, in their view, would not be the role of the 
school. The following chapters investigate in more detail laws and real practices towards 
citizenship education in Brazil in order to identify the realities linked with these things. 
 
9.2. Non-neutrality: family, media, civil society and state formal education 
 
As discussed in 5.1, Bloom (2013) claims that the roots of certain moral and civic virtues are 
partially the result of natural selection. However, even Bloom accepts that many 
characteristics of human behaviour are learned, that cultural patterns matter. Regarding this 
process of learning moral and civic virtues, psychology of education tries to define how much 
peoples‟ civic ideas and behaviours are associated with their aging process. Kohlberg, 
amongst others, developed Piaget‟s ideas in this way (5.3). However, apart from aging, 
different upbringings result in distinct civic ideas and behaviours. 
 
Accepting the hypothesis that civic knowledge, skills and values are at least partially learned, 
it is suggested that neutral citizenship education is impossible, since people are not born with 
their morality already totally established and so must learn these virtues from somewhere. It 
is this human propensity for learning that makes different societies have distinct 
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characteristics and transmit culture in so many different ways. Civic virtues are part of what 
is passed through generations, just as scientific knowledge, aesthetic notions, ideas of what 
comes next after death, and so on, are passed on. Regarding this, the state, family, media, 
civil society, etc. are different influencers on people‟s private and public morality.  
 
In this way, normally those who ask for neutral civic education are asking for the state to be 
neutral regarding the cultivation of certain civic values, such as compassion. The supporters 
of neutrality in civic education are normally not against teaching civic knowledge and skills 
(chapter 8). However, neutrality means that, for them, the influence of family, media, civil 
society, etc. on young people‟s values should not suffer any interference from the state. They 
understand that the state should not cultivate civic values through formal education, intervene 
in media, in civil society and family practices, etc. Specifically regarding formal education, 
they consider that teachers should not present any political statement
95
. Extremists say that 
teachers should not even propose political debates. Reflecting on this defence of teachers‟ 
neutrality, two questions arise: Is it possible? Is it desirable? In 9.8, this issue is discussed. 
 
Illich (1971), amongst others, defends “deschooling society”. In this case, without the 
existence of the school as institution it would not make sense to imagine moral values being 
taught through formal education. Alternatively, if the school exists, the school structure 
fatally inculcates minimal civic “values” on students. Students learn at school that they have 
to follow certain rules – that they are not completely free to do anything they want. However, 
defenders of neutrality in citizenship education could say that these minimal civic values are 
necessary, even though they have to be aligned with parents‟ wishes, rather than with a 
specific state‟s moral and political view. Schools, in this way, should be the image of parents‟ 
ideas, rather than something that orients a project of nation. 
 
Nevertheless, without any type of proactive intervention of the state, values cultivated by 
families and private institutions, such as church communities, can cultivate certain characters 
in youth that make them disrespect current Western values and promote instability. It is not 
unreasonable to suppose that youth who have their lives restricted to their families and small 
communities will usually develop concerns only towards close people, and can become even 
intolerant to different ones. A society composed by this type of individuals is, invariably, 
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 Proposals like the Brazilian group “School Without Party” (Escola Sem Partido – 
http://www.programaescolasempartido.org/) defend exactly this point.  
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conflictive. Obviously, such a society can exist and even survive, but not in a stable (for the 
right reasons) mode. As defended in chapters 3 and 4, some communal spirit and equality of 
opportunities are necessary for a healthy community to survive. 
 
This does not mean that the connection between parents and strict communities has to be 
nullified. Brighouse and Swift (2013), for example, defend that “family values” can be 
adequately respected and promoted without granting parents the right either to entirely 
determine the content of their children‟s education or to confer advantage on them in ways 
that undermine equality of opportunity. For example, certain cultural traditions and affections 
that develop strong ties between parents and children do not need to disappear. 
 
9.3. The importance of the family  
 
Following these ideas, the English model does not defend teachers‟ and schools‟ neutrality 
towards civic values, though strong national unity is not stimulated. In the English and 
French models, stability is aimed for, and, in lower or higher levels, not only tolerance but 
engagement and celebration of difference within the nation are defended through active 
schools‟ and teachers‟ practices. Chapter 3 defends that Rawls‟ hypothetical contract based 
on moral individuals is superior to Gauthier‟s neo-Hobbesian proposal. Moreover, the 
argument presented in 8.9 endorses Macedo‟s defence of engagement and LGBT-based 
arguments towards celebration of difference, since for Galston education for tolerance is 
shown to be insufficient. In the following sections, possibilities and limits for the 
implementation of such educational policies, that is, reflections on levels of non-neutrality, 
are discussed. 
 
This reflection on how to cultivate values in schools depends on a more careful analysis of 
relationships within the private sphere. There is no doubt that the nuclear family is the first 
place where love and affection are cultivated, even though plenty of families do exactly the 
opposite, unfortunately. The ties between parents and their children (and between other 
relatives) can be explained biologically and culturally (5.1). Independently of the reasons for 
the establishment of these strong bonds, it seems obvious that developing love and affection 
is something good, and it is unlikely that a social format different from the one based on the 
nuclear family would be more effective for developing these feelings. Moreover, though 
Plato‟s suggestion in The Republic to split parents from their children in order to build a more 
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united society can be theoretically defended, this social structure would hardly be accepted 
currently, since family ties are one of the main pillars of Western societies (Munoz-Darde, 
1999). 
 
Apart from love and affection, families are important starting points for socialisation. Even 
when parents try to impose certain “truths” for their children and keep them quite isolated 
from the broader society, children are at least inserted in small communities, and this narrow 
contact is enough to help them to learn certain civic skills and values (Levinson, 1999, p.57). 
 
The existence and encouragement of familiar organisations has another reason. It is possible 
to imagine a society – like that proposed by Plato in The Republic – in which children are 
taken by their parents and raised by the state. Apart from this lack of parental love, which 
maybe could be replaced by the love of the carers or mates, such an organisation would 
standardise the way that children understand civic values. An evident lack of plurality would 
be the result of this. In this sense, in order to enrich the moral spectrum of the society, it is 
important that children are raised by different parents with reasonable distinct moral views, 
rather than by civil servants with the mission of cultivate specific “virtues” on them. This 
argument is associated with Mill‟s idea of the importance of liberty of thought in order to 
achieve progress (Levinson, 1999, p.66). 
 
9.4. School as a complement to the influence of the family, community and media 
 
However, excesses of private relationships jeopardise children‟s civic values. They can orient 
children‟s affections only towards their relatives and damage the development of compassion 
towards strangers. Schooling, further democratic participation and exposition to others 
through media and civil organisations balance these things. 
 
Certainly, the most important virtues learned by children outside the family is the notion that 
they have rights and duties towards unknown people, something intimately related, as 
defended in chapter 8, to compassion towards them. This sense of collectiveness is barely 
developed within the family. Small communities can serve as midpoints as presented above, 
but they cultivate values not necessarily shared by a wider spectrum. Thus, the school – if it 
is minimally plural and has some common practices oriented by the state (common school) – 
is the first environment where children are obliged to build relationships with (at the 
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beginning) strangers, and to accept sharing spaces with people that they do not have affinity. 
Above, it is mentioned that it is important that families with different views of the world raise 
their children in quite different ways, otherwise, children‟s education would be excessively 
standardised. However, this is only positive if all children are exposed to different world 
views, and school is much better than family and small communities to provide this. 
 
Media can also be an interesting channel for exposing children to different people and plural 
ideas, though, as explored in chapter 6, in countries like Brazil, it frequently does not happen. 
National and international channels show realities and problems which happen far from the 
local realities of people. Thus, people can feel empathy and compassion for these distant 
fellow citizens, though certain thinkers, such as Sontag (1977), defend that this exposure can 
promote compassion fatigue. Moreover, free media reach children who, otherwise, would be 
strongly influenced or pressured by their parents or even by school colleagues in order to 
think like them. Imagine the liberating power of the existence of TV discussions about sexual 
orientation and social medias which put into contact young people who do not conform to a 
conservative pattern of sexuality. 
 
Associated with this idea of exposition to diversity, are the ideas that both cooperation and 
also competition are constitutive parts of Western ethos (chapter 2). Family can be the first 
locus for developing these values, however not the best one. Celebration of difference, 
willingness to compete but also to cooperate are public values associated with people‟s 
interactions that are not based on love or affection. Individuals help their children or partners, 
because they love each other, rather than, because they feel a sense of cooperative enterprise. 
It is not being said that individuals‟ cooperation with unknown people should be based on 
mutual self-interest, but it would be too much to expect that cooperation should be based only 
on love or strong affection. At the same time, compassion towards unknown co-citizens 
makes people willing to share part of their surplus with strangers (through paying taxes, for 
example).  
 
In the same way, in capitalist societies, it is outside the family bubble that real – and, many 
times, unfair – competitions occur. School, in this way, has to educate for competition, 
however for a competition that helps societies to progress but does not promote unfair 
inequalities. Thus, it is further discussed how schools should balance these two values and 
how they should be associated with the sense of collectiveness.  
188 
 
 
This thesis does not deeply reflect on the participation of family, media, and civil 
organisations in citizenship education. However, since these institutions can reinforce but 
also damage the development of civic values, and since school eventually has to counter-
balance them, it is important to identify the family‟s, media‟s, and civil organisations‟ main 
possible negative impacts. First, as mentioned above, the excessive influence of family over 
children can promote three main damages. The development of family love and affection can 
be exaggerated and children can lose their capacity for feeling compassion for unknown 
people. This possibility is linked with another even worst problem, individuals‟ lack of 
respect for cultures that are different from the cultures supported by their families. These two 
problems make social cohesion and stability very difficult. Finally, such exaggerated 
influence of the family over children can oppress the latter independence of thinking and 
acting. A typical example is about a homosexual who are born within a very conservative 
family and would suffer if his/her life are limited to that environment.  
 
Media can also have very bad influences on the development of people civic knowledge, 
skills and values. Mass media, if not regulated and balanced, can brainwash people. If, a 
“healthy” mass media can be a way to spread plural values, “unhealthy” media can be a 
vehicle of indoctrination. Additionally, the new phenomenon of social media is making 
exchange of information more democratic. Because of this, new sources of information are 
being produced and, where it exists, the private monopoly of communication seems to be 
“informally damaged”. Moreover, people who do not follow the pattern of behaviour of the 
main society and used to have difficulties of finding their peers (for example, homosexuals) 
are now using social medias to do this, and, as a consequence, in this case, social media is 
helping to empower them. 
 
However, social media is far from being perfect. More and more, social networks like 
Facebook are realising that “consumers” “prefer” being connected with people who share 
their ideas. The fact that people are basically only dialoguing with their peers has stimulated 
political polarisation (Ferguson, 2017). Moreover, the anonymity (or at least the lack of real 
personal contact) allowed for these devices stimulates hatred instead of pacific dialogue 
amongst those who disagree. Finally, lack of responsibility in producing news is producing a 
strong new phenomenon of fake news (8.2). Polarisation, lack of dialogue and fake news are 
strong components of unstable societies and have to be reduced as much as possible. 
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Given the discussion above, this thesis agrees with Lipman‟s claim that school is an 
institution between private and public, between family and state (2003, p.9). However, there 
are strong pedagogical disagreements about the role of school in individuals‟ transition from 
family protection to integration in public life. As seen below, some scholars defend a “more 
natural” process of socialisation, others see the school as the key-agent of this. Some think 
that schools should basically cultivate civic knowledge and skills, like knowledge of laws and 
critical thinking, whilst others think that schools also should cultivate values like compassion 
towards unknown people. 
 
Roughly speaking, the former are more aligned with the English model presented in 9.1 the 
latter with the French one. Regarding this disagreement on how to prepare future citizens, the 
two models consider formal education (schooling) as something important. However, while 
the English model gives also important room for family and community in this educative 
process, the French model defends schools‟ environment from practices within families and 
communities, and orients the education for preparing citizens to act in the public sphere. 
French schools are closer to the idea of common schools. For this reason, schools have a 
more active participation in citizenship education in France than in England. Indeed, these 
two different practices are anchored in two distinct theoretical references. Some thinkers 
(Galston, 1991; McLaughlin, 1984; Alexander, 2015) defend state‟s openness for various 
types of school, including faith schools. Others (Macedo, 1990; 2000; Guttman, 1987; Callan, 
1997; Levinson, 1999) defend certain common project of school for everyone. 
 
In this chapter, a proposal between the English and French models is defended, mainly 
because such an intermediary approach seems to be a more consensual way to foster 
citizenship curriculum without facing excessive resistance from different parts of society. 
Thus, the discussions presented in 9.5, 9.6 and 9.7 propose how to teach/cultivate knowledge, 
skills and values through formal education in order to balance the influences of 
family/community and school/teachers over children.  
 
9.5. How supra official curriculum should be designed 
 
In order to reflect on different levels of citizenship curriculum, it is important to realise that 
parents‟ rights over their children are limited by the rights of the latter and the rights of other 
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individuals. This section explores exactly this point and supports the idea that of common 
schools, schools in which the state defines the main curricular orientations and are basically 
equal in quality, should be provided for all. It is quite obvious that children are neither the 
property of their parents, nor of the state. It is also quite obvious that they have rights that 
have to be respected by all. This fact does not mean, however, that they are completely free 
from their parents‟ or state‟s decisions about their lives. As Levinson says: 
 
Paternalism and limitations on the child‟s freedom are required to foster the development of 
her autonomy, it is true; they are also required to inculcate in her a restricted, heteronomous 
conception of the good. The child is inevitably treated paternalistically, by her parents, the 
state, concerned adult friends and relatives, teachers, doctors, and so forth (1999, p.47). 
 
In this way, thinkers such as Galston (1991) suggest that it is the duty and the right of parents 
to exercise this paternalism over their children. He is not afraid of children being 
brainwashed since “the basic features of liberal society make it virtually impossible for 
parents to seal their children off from knowledge of other ways of life” (1991, p.255). 
However, current massive offer of information is not enough. In this world full of 
information, children need certain guidance that does not come from the family (LEVINSON, 
1999, p.94-5). 
 
Nevertheless, even whilst considering the state‟s interference fundamental, Levinson equally 
claims that the existence of special affection between parents and children “offers children 
essential emotional support and sustenance” and “inspires parents to further their children‟s 
interests more than other agents would, by giving them greater insight into their children‟s 
needs and greater forbearance and understanding when their children fail to live up to certain 
ideals” (1999, p.55-6). Going further, she also supports that families need a space of 
independence from the imposition of cultural values from the state by saying that “only the 
family whose integrity is respected is able (in conjunction with other secondary institutions) 
to provide children the cultural coherence that constitutes one of the essential preconditions 
for autonomy” (1999, p.56). Following Levinson, this thesis agrees with the balance between 
the family‟s and the state‟s influences over children to guarantee their best interest. 
 
The previous topic claims that is not for the best interest of children to have exclusive 
influence of parents in their upbringing. Here, it is defended that, for reasons which go 
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beyond children‟s best interest, the state has to participate in the upbringing of children. In 
this sense, common schools are defended. The first reasoning in favour of this is aligned with 
the idea that more than tolerance, engagement amongst unknown people and celebration of 
difference are fundamental for stability and refinement of justice in Western societies.  
 
It is presented in 8.9 that Galston (1991) does not think that any state‟s procedure towards 
cultivating more than tolerance is justifiable. He considers that, if parents‟ and communities‟ 
rights to sustain their cultures are guaranteed, stability based on tolerance is achieved. Thus, 
he is a critical of common schools. However, it is developed in 3.4 that, in situations of 
constant disrespect of minorities, such stability is only circumstantial and based on wrong 
reasons. In this sense, more engagement and celebration of differences are necessary. 
 
Differentiating himself from Galston, Alexander (2015) is aware of this problem, but tries to 
find educational solutions without appealing for the model of common schools. Following 
McLaughlin (1984), he proposes to cultivate more than tolerance in young people. He, 
however, suggests openness to different beliefs and cultures in a much milder way than what 
is proposed by supporters of common school. Alexander defends that children‟s moral and 
civic learning has to be structured over the values of the community where they are inserted, 
since “there are no grounds upon which to base these decisions and responsibilities outside of 
the traditions of conscience that foster human agency” (2015, p.138). 
 
Regarding this point, Alexander, through proposing a “pedagogy of difference”, supports the 
idea that different cultures should teach their own values, while opening themselves to other 
traditions and respecting differences. However, through this, Alexander‟s project admits that 
faith schools cultivate certain elements of religious doctrines that work against engagement 
and celebration of differences. He says that “Catholic students whose faith tradition does not 
sanction homosexuality should learn civic respect for [LGBT] people [...] but without 
undermining respect for their non-public religious inheritance” (2015, p.214). Thus, 
Alexander endorses the right of distinct cultures (in this example, Catholic culture) to educate 
their members for, in its non-public domain, distinguishing people based on (in this case) 
their sexual orientations. 
 
However, “[t]his seems patently to violate the public–private distinction central to political 
liberalism” (Levinson, 1999, p.121). Exactly in order to challenge these types of practices, 
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thinkers like Levinson (1999) and Callan (1997) defend that school is the adequate place to 
integrate people and to reduce these non-public borders. As explored in 2.4, familiar ties are 
considered essential values for Western people. It is also defended that Christian doctrine is 
one of the pillars of Western societies. However, balanced by Roman legalism and Greek 
rationalism, it is equally supported that a secular ethos integrated with communal 
responsibilities produced, in a broad sense, an idea of equal liberty shared by Western 
individuals. Based on these ideas, Macedo (1990) defends that social cohesion depends on 
the cultivation of values that surpass the promotion of local communities‟ and family‟ values 
and tolerance among them (8.9). Engagement and celebration of differences are fundamental 
for this. 
 
In this way, though Alexander (2015) aims to guarantee a healthy democracy through his 
proposal, his defence of splitting public and private domains seems naive, since it does not 
work in practice. For example, supposing that Catholics learn in schools that they cannot vote 
against same-sex unions, since such unions are part of public domain. However, if the Church 
cultivates that homosexual practices are wrong, they will respect homosexuals in public, but, 
at the same time, will disfavour (sometimes unconsciously) them in private, for example, in a 
job selection or will not be as friendly (again, sometimes unconsciously) with them in a 
simple conversation.  
 
In summary, it is much more difficult to split private and public spheres in everyday life than 
Alexander suggests. Because of this, schools have to work towards creating healthy 
interactions amongst different social groups. In order words, schools are the right places to, 
slowly, mix private and public domains, private and public understanding of what is right and 
wrong. In this way, Callan sees the school as the place for challenging ideas learned at home: 
 
[Future citizens] must become critically attuned to the wide range of reasonable political 
disagreement within the society they inhabit and to the troubling gap between reasonable 
agreement and the whole moral truth. This will require serious imaginative engagement with 
rival views about good and evil, right and wrong. […] The moral authority of the family and 
the various associations in which the child grows up must be questioned to the extent that the 
society contains reasonable alternatives to whatever that authority prescribes. (Callan, 1997, 
p.40)  
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Regarding this point, a conflict has to be resolved. On the one hand, as Callan puts it, schools 
ruled by the family‟s/community‟s values can dismiss children‟s engagement with other 
cultural values. On the other, common schools can distance children from their parents. This 
thesis considers the first problem more serious, since parents and children have lots of other 
spaces for living together and building their ties. Moreover, as suggested above, completely 
intolerant parents have to be challenged and eventually it is better for children to be far from 
them. In this way, as defended by Gutmann (1987, p.41-47) parents and the state have to 
share the authority of cultivating moral and civic values in children. Thus, common schools 
counter-balance parents‟ influence in their homes. 
 
In 9.4, the common school model is defended by arguing that it is not in children‟s best 
interest to be educated in community schools, and that engagement and celebration of 
difference are above children‟s individual rights to be protected by their parents. However, 
common schools are challenged by a different problem. There is a risk that formal education 
promoted by common schools reduces social positive diversity. Two scenarios, 
totalitarianism and “sameness”, can be presented (Levinson, 1999, p.65-74). First, the 
common school model can be a very important vehicle for implementing or sustaining 
totalitarian regimes. It is not by chance that dictatorships usually have a unified educational 
system with strong cultivation of nationalistic values. As explored in 10.1, Brazil is one of 
many examples where societies have reinforced a unified programme of citizenship education 
as part of its totalitarian era. Nevertheless, the democratic atmosphere in Western countries 
makes this thesis defend that the advantages of common schools overcome the potential risk 
of them serving the interests of totalitarian countries, something considered very unlikely to 
happen. 
 
Even assuming that many Western societies have low risk of becoming dictatorships, there is 
another problem with this standardised educational model. The lack of parents‟ liberty for 
raising their children and, consequently, the reduction of the plurality of ideas within the 
nation. In other words, through limiting different types of schools, the plurality of scientific, 
aesthetic, moral and civic ideas which could produce different solutions for many social 
problems is reduced. However, this thesis considers that the influence of parents/community 
over children is very strong even when their schools have a standardised curriculum. Thus, 
the continuity of plurality of ideas in society is guaranteed in a system in which only common 
schools exist.  
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Nevertheless, it is very important to say that these common schools have to have special 
concerns to protect minorities. Of course, the mere fact that these schools are naturally plural 
promotes plurality and less prejudice. Even though minority groups like black, poor, women, 
the LGBT community, special needs people, people who do not follow beauty patterns
96
, and 
so on are still target of many types of prejudices. Schools have to actively not only protect 
these minorities but also educate the rest of the students to celebrate instead of bullying those 
different from them. Common schools that promote plural activities (such as valuing different 
artistic talents, their social engagement, etc.), instead of only promoting one type of activity 
that represents students‟ success (like obtaining good grades), can also limit students‟ 
feelings of inferiority. Through this plurality, they have several options to be productive and 
feel useful. This is another way to reduce bullying in schools and integrate students by 
affinities. These attitudes, however, should be part of schools‟ wide and narrow official 
curricula discussed in 9.5 and 9.6. 
 
Finally, regarding how the school system should be organised in order to help the promotion 
of civic values, the equalisation of the school choice process has to be discussed. Western 
countries like France, Germany, Japan, and Denmark have strong state schooling systems and 
“[p]rivate schooling in these countries is thus perceived as being less prestigious than, or at 
best equally prestigious to, state schooling” (Levinson, 1999, p.163). In contrast, some 
developed countries and also most underdeveloped countries have very unequal systems. 
“Private schools in the US and Britain draw about 10 per cent of the school-age population 
and are generally perceived as elite institutions that are presumptively better than local state 
schools” (Levinson, 1999, p.16397). In Brazil, 17% of students are in private schools9899 and 
there is huge quality gap between these private schools and state schools (and amongst 
private schools), as discussed in 11.2.  
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 Prejudices against those who do not follow beauty patterns are usually ignored. However, this is a real 
problem mainly amongst the youth (11.3). 
97
 These data are from 1999, but these situations do not seem to change significantly. 
98
 In 2013: https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/educacao/rede-publica-perde-alunos-para-escolas-privadas-
segundo-censo-11730917. 
99
 In addition, in 2014, 13% of young people in between 15 and 17 years-old dropped out of school 
(http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/educacao/noticia/2016-02/13-milhao-de-jovens-entre-15-e-17-anos-abandonam-
escola-diz-estudo). Moreover, 41% of 19 year-old people did not finish school – the correct age for this is 17 
years-old (https://oglobo.globo.com/sociedade/educacao/pesquisa-revela-que-415-dos-jovens-de-19-anos-nao-
concluiram-ensino-medio-21162505). 
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Given this, either governments of countries like the US, UK and Brazil simply admit that 
they do not promote anything similar to equality of opportunities and continuing sending 
such message through their educational systems, or they reform their systems. There is a 
great chance of this reform reducing the existing social cleavage and promoting more 
stability. Obviously, this process demands good strategies, which might not necessarily be the 
same as those applied in France, Germany, Japan, or Denmark. One of these main strategies 
is to actively mix students, avoiding that schools located in rich neighbourhoods have only 
local students. 
 
As an additional effect, if students perceive that their educational system promotes equality of 
opportunities (or, at least, reduces the inequalities), they also perceive that they have to work 
hard to obtain good positions in the future. However, if the system does not promote equality 
of opportunities, the unprivileged students know that they do not have a chance of success, 
and the privileged ones know that they do not have to make much effort to be successful. 
Obviously, this equality has to be balanced by different offers of life choices. Through this, 
students with different interests focus their effort on something that they can achieve better 
and with more pleasure. 
 
9.6. How the wide official curriculum should be designed  
 
Besides educational policies, school organisational structure (wide official curriculum) can 
help or hinder the citizenship learning process. The school organisation has impact upon the 
teaching-learning process of all subjects. For example, depending on how students are 
evaluated, they are more or less stimulated to memorise, build reasoning, practice what they 
learned, etc. The impact of school organisation over civic knowledge, skills and values, 
however, is even higher than over other subjects. Schools are constituted by rules and, in 
certain degrees, are linked with the communities around them. The ways that these two 
elements are managed by the schools‟ administration body impacts significantly upon 
students‟ development of citizenship. They learn about processes of decision-making and 
develop social relations with the known and unknown fellows. 
 
The first way to develop civic knowledge, skills and values through school practices is 
making students participate in the school‟s creation and implementation of their rules. As 
mentioned above, schools play a fundamental role in the transition from family to public life. 
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For several reasons, families (mainly when children are young) are non-democratic places. 
Whilst parents decide things, they can be susceptible to, amongst other things, accepting 
emotional blackmail of their children. Likewise, children follow their parents – though, many 
times, equally amongst other things, only after being threatened. Western public life is largely 
democratic. Regarding this difference, school is (or should be) a place in between family and 
public life. Not all students‟ wishes should be followed, since they are not mature enough for 
taking all the decisions about how their learning process should be. However, for two 
reasons, they should be truly listened to. 
 
First, school is the best place for youth to start developing democratic knowledge, skills and 
values, something presented above as a central concern in the French educational model. As 
suggested in chapter 8, democracy actually demands that citizens possess certain manners. 
They have to defend their ideas appealing to reason, but, at the same time, understanding, as 
discussed in 2.6, that Western societies are plural and different people can have good reasons 
for disagreeing with them. People can identify through reasoning that their opponents are 
wrong but, in many cases, the former have to accept that this is part of the latter‟s burdens of 
judgment (Rawls, 1993). Having accepted this reasonable pluralism (Rawls, 1993), they also 
accept dissensus and defeats in democratic disputes. Thus, practices of democracy in schools 
which make students real decision-makers on certain subjects help the development of 
deliberative procedures – the capacity of being clear and making an effort to listen and 
understand others‟ ideas – and respect for majorities‟ decisions, that is, respecting fair rules. 
Moreover, through practicing democratic processes, students likely develop the wish to be a 
part of democratic regimes. Associated with this, they learn that, in democratic processes, 
they have to fight for their rights. 
 
Regarding this discussion on cultivating youth willingness to respect fair rules and fight for 
rights, it is important to briefly reflect on how to deal with their feeling of anger. In 8.7, it is 
defended that political anger undermines social stability, something fundamental for justice 
being promoted. Interestingly, even White (2012), who considers political anger a virtue 
(against Nussbaum‟s (2016) and this thesis‟ understanding), says: 
 
[C]hildren in school will not need to be encouraged to feel anger. When things they have been 
encouraged to care about – fair treatment, the rule of law, human rights – are threatened, they 
will feel it. (2012, p.9) 
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On the other hand, she says that “[c]ivic education should also contribute to understanding 
anger in the democratic process” (2012, p.10). This claim is important, since a central point 
that sustains this thesis‟ argument is that, in a debate or in a social dispute, the other side has 
to be understood. 
 
Going in a different direction, it is important to say that listening to students has another side 
effect: their opinions are useful for improving school practices. Regarding specifically 
citizenship education, it is valuable since the participation of students in decisions develops 
their sense of belonging to a cooperative venture, the school. This is connected with Dewey‟s 
(1915) and Piaget‟s (1930) ideas of learning by doing. Some strategies are very important for 
this. First, producing very clear rules and publicising their reasons. In this sense, a reduced 
number of rules is much more efficient. For example, legislating about hats, and, even worse, 
forbidding them without a reasonable explanation can produce these negative effects of 
imposed rules (Vinha, 2017). Second, as far as possible, students‟ opinions should be heard. 
For example, participatory counsels, classes‟ and schools‟ regular assemblies are good 
mechanisms. Related to this, Puig (2003) defends stimulus to assemblies instead of 
authoritarianism or coercion in order to, through repetition, crystallise democratic values. 
 
Moreover, certain room for discussions about subject content should be institutionalised. For 
example, some mathematics classes should be used to reflect on the importance (or not) of 
learning certain contents: logarithms, geometry, etc. In this process, teachers‟ opinions should 
be considered more important, since they are specialists, however students should also have 
voice. The opposite is “a teacher who justifies a course of study to her students in terms of a 
state mandate or her own expertise and takes this justification to be final and sufficient. 
Secure in her justification, she can fail to take seriously her students‟ criticisms of her 
decisions” (Laden, 2013, p.67). Avoiding this imposition, not only students but equally 
teachers would train their capacity for deliberation, and, at the same time, the importance of 
specialists/experts opinions would be reinforced (disregard to experts‟ opinions is a current 
problem discussed in chapters 4 and 8). 
 
Through this, it is possible to imagine that, at the end of the debate on the importance of 
teaching logarithms, the only reason for such classes is preparation for national exams. This 
conclusion would eventually put teachers and students in the same side on questioning the 
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purposes of these exams. Of course, these discussions can also generate conflicts. However, 
democratic environments are naturally conflictive – differently from dictatorships in which 
conflicts are repressed – and conflicts are “natural in any relation and necessary for the 
development of the child and the young” (Vinha, 2017, 17-8). 
 
This defence of introducing democratic practices in schools has to be at least balanced by 
Peters‟ (1974) view. He presents an apparent paradox of moral education: in order to 
guarantee that individuals think freely in the future, their liberty has to be limited in school. 
This attitude is even related to the safety and health of children. For lack of knowledge and/or 
imprudence, children often put themselves at risk, and it is the school‟s and parents‟ duty to 
watch over them. 
 
The two models of teaching/cultivating citizenship presented in 9.1 are, somehow, oriented to 
these two ideas on how to deal with democracy in schools. If the French model presents a 
clear focus on developing democratic practices within the school, the English model 
emphasises another important structural element of the school in order to develop citizenship 
knowledge, skills and values: openness for the surrounding community. As discussed above, 
these two countries have opposite school practices towards promoting engagement and 
celebration of difference. France tries to cultivate national values in all students, while 
England is more concerned with creating strong ties between students and their communities. 
This thesis, agreeing with a middle ground in between republican (France) and multicultural 
(England) ideas, considers that the school has to be completely open to its surrounding 
community and that students have to be stimulated to engage with it as long as such an 
engagement is useful for a wider engagement in the future (Arthur & Wright, 2001, 86-7). On 
the other hand, schools have to be aware of communities‟ oppression over members that not 
follow certain patterns of behaviour. For example, schools should encourage sexual diversity 
(celebrate difference) instead of simply accepting the impositions of certain communities‟ 
practices.  
 
After presenting the importance of students‟ participation on the process of creating and 
implementing school rules and of schools‟ insertion in the community to citizenship 
education, it is interesting to present an idea of how to develop in students a sense of 
cooperation and healthy competition. As a good example of cultivating cooperative values, 
Benjamin describes the routine of Japanese schools in which better students help the slower 
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ones, almost all activities are in groups, including competitions that are won or lost by 
everyone (Benjamin, 1997. Apud. Levinson, 1999, p.90). Analysing US and UK schools, 
Levinson identifies the opposite, and says that, in these countries, teachers “do use 
cooperative learning techniques, [but] they usually do so to help students develop group-work 
skills, not to teach collective responsibility” (1999, p.90).  
 
This comparison of two different systems shows one type of school‟s system focused only on 
individual achievement which stimulates excessive competition and individualism, and 
another focused on balancing cooperation and competition which prepares students for 
capitalist societies, but, at the same time, develops communal values. No doubt, the 
extremely capitalistic world outside the school teaches enough (even excessive) skills and 
values linked with competition. Thus, it is reasonable to think that the school has to 
counterbalance this in order to make social stability possible. 
 
9.7. How narrow official curriculum should be designed 
 
Finally, after reflecting on some unusual ways to understand the curriculum, it is a moment 
for a brief discussion on how the narrow official curriculum should approach civic issues. 
Regarding this, it is possible to start reflecting on the need or not for a specific subject. This 
thesis considers that a subject like civic education would be very useful and, at least in 
secondary schools, would establish deep theoretical discussions on certain themes related to 
citizenship that are fundamental. Theoretical reflections on the meanings of certain concepts, 
such as “liberty” and “equality”, have to be more discussed than they usually are. Spending 
more time with these discussions can bring positive spill-over effects. Reflections on moral 
and political issues normally mobilise students and can be used as bridges for developing 
their interest in other subjects. In history, it is possible to talk about slavery and the 
development of equal rights; in literature, to stimulate empathy through reading good books; 
in geography, to identify zones of poverty nearby schools; in languages, to develop text 
analysis skills; in mathematics, teaching logical skills; in biology, to compare humans‟ and 
other animals‟ behaviours. There are many other opportunities that could be identified within 
existing subjects to discuss issues of citizenship and develop civic skills as well as 
knowledge. 
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However, though citizenship can be introduced within other subjects, diluting citizenship 
contents amongst them without an effective strategy seems ineffective, as the observations 
presented in chapter 11 show. If teachers do not have an idea of the aims of such discussions, 
it is very difficult for them to deal with these things. For this reason, a subject lead by a 
teacher with knowledge of how to integrate these reflections is needed. Sociology and 
philosophy teachers seem to present this characteristic. 
 
Social practices that make students experience social realities, instead of only learning them 
theoretically, are equally essential. As moral and political discussions make the development 
of traditional subjects more interesting, social activities give concreteness to theoretical 
reflections and make their learning more effective. This point is closely related to Dewey‟s 
and Piaget‟s proposals of “learning by doing” mentioned also in 9.6. In psychological 
treatments normally against depression, the technique of “act as if” is used. Thus, for 
example, stimulating students to care more about the environment, even if at the beginning 
they do this because they expect a good grade, is a good way to involve them with these 
issues. 
 
Following this idea, if the aim is developing critical thinking, debating groups (or even 
contests) seem very effective. The same can be said for learning laws through visiting the 
legislative house and talking with MPs, or – and maybe the most important – opening the 
school to the problems of the community, raising awareness in students, through the contact 
with real problems, to the need for engagement, celebration of difference and so forth.  
 
Thus, an open ethos has to be developed in schools and practical mechanisms ought to be 
built. This is an attribution of “wide official curriculum”. In this way, schools have to 
establish several different connections with civil society in order to find the right places for 
implementing such activities. However, the “narrow official curriculum” is also useful, since 
activities like these ones quoted above can be inserted in mandatory subjects and can be part 
of the process of students‟ evaluation. The discussions presented below are useful to develop 
these ideas. 
 
This section, among other things, reflects on the Aristotelian idea presented in Nicomachean 
Ethics of learning the cultural civic virtues by living/experiencing these virtues (habit), and 
the fact that this process happens in different stages, as proposed by Piaget and Kohlberg 
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(chapters 5 and 8). In this way, this thesis only suggests that, before adolescence, children 
have to experience communal life and differences, learn that they have to respect rules, etc. 
Only from early adolescence, when their capacity for abstraction starts being developed (as 
deeply studied by Piaget (1930), critical thinking, in its more structured way, and an 
introduction to democratic practices have to be cultivated. Only after students develop the 
capacity for thinking by themselves, can they start discussions on deep political ideas and 
democratic practices (Levinson, 1999, p.95).  
 
Levinson, then, suggests which subjects are more appropriate for each age: 
 
[T]he school might help children to develop community awareness, creativity, and basic 
writing and listening skills in lower grades, and critical thinking, advanced writing skills, 
political awareness, and independence in upper grades. (1999, p.144-5) 
 
This reduces the criticisms from certain sectors of society that accuse many teachers of trying 
to brainwash students, since it is being proposed that only those who can form their own 
political ideas should be exposed to deep political debates. Obviously, all this discussion 
demands much more reflection – maybe a full thesis – but the idea here is only to introduce 
the subject. (Regarding the concerns with brainwashing, 9.8 develops this point a bit more.) 
 
Having presented these initial reflections, it is possible to identify a list of civic knowledge, 
skills and values that are appropriate to develop in the classroom through the narrow official 
curriculum, and how this might be achieved. Regarding this point, it is important to reinforce 
that the present thesis is specifically focused on secondary schools‟ formal education.  
 
Thus, this reflection starts by analysing how critical thinking should be developed in youth. 
Among all civic skills, it is probably the most important one. As Fisher says: 
 
In recent years „critical thinking‟ has become something of a „buzz word‟ in educational 
circles. For many reasons, educators have become very interested in teaching „thinking skills‟ 
of various kinds in contrast with teaching information and content. (2001, p.1) 
 
Obviously, this skill is not only important for the purpose of preparing a good citizen, and it 
is commonly invoked in contemporary discussions of employability and twentieth century 
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skills. Critical thinking helps the learning process in general and the development of this 
capacity to connect ideas in a logical sequence allows students to understand more 
sophisticatedly relations between means and ends, and to project their life plans not only in 
short- but also in middle- and long-terms. It is part of so called process of “learning how to 
learn” that is related to the process of identifying trustworthy information amongst endless 
options. Specifically related to civic skills, critical thinking helps the development of a 
qualified opinion of the direction in which societies should go. In 9.8, critical thinking is 
compared with critical pedagogy in order to make this concept even clearer. Here, some ideas 
of how to develop this skill through formal education are suggested. In his book on this 
subject, Fisher develops fundamental skills associated with how critical thinking can be 
taught in schools: 
 
identify the elements in a reasoned case, especially reasons and conclusions; 
identify and evaluate assumptions; 
clarify and interpret expressions and ideas; 
judge the acceptability, especially the credibility, of claims; 
evaluate arguments of different kinds; 
analyse, evaluate and produce explanations; 
analyse, evaluate and make decisions; 
draw inferences; 
produce arguments. (2001, p.8) 
 
Regarding these things, it is quite obvious that such skills could be developed for any subject. 
For example, an algebra account used in physics, at the end, is an argument. Actually, 
mathematics can be a great ally for developing critical thinking skills. From mathematical 
knowledge, certain logic skills can be easily developed. A proper course of logics, either 
inserted in mathematics, or as a special subject is very useful. However, as Fisher (1988) 
iscusses, it is very problematic to detach the process of teaching formal logics to the real 
analysis of everyday life arguments. Thus, through an articulated work with languages and 
literature, this process can be developed in a much better way. In doing this, most of the items 
cited above are contemplated.  
 
However, one demands more attention: “judge the acceptability, especially the credibility, of 
claims”. A long reflection on how fallacies are permeated in all types of reflections is 
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mandatory. In this way, it is fundamental that teachers of all subjects are aware of this and 
help the development of this process. This is very useful for protecting new generations from 
the “bad politicians”, those who, for example, appeal to generalisation fallacy, as is 
happening in the post-truth era discussed in 8.2.  
 
Besides thinking critically, something essential for students to build their own conclusions 
from basic information obtained by them, this basic information also needs to be qualified. 
Youth have to understand their societies, that is, they have to have civic knowledge. Notions 
of history/sociology, social psychology, economics and law are fundamental for this. Basic 
knowledge about history and sociology avoids people‟s misinterpretation of the reality. For 
example, certain people‟s understandings of affirmative action in Brazil show this. Many 
people simply do not understand the series of elements behind the discussion and take one 
party‟s position based on their shallow reasoning on it. Basic knowledge about social 
psychology makes people demand less from their fellow citizens, if, for example, they learn 
that part of people‟s behaviour comes from their nature and cultural influences (5.1). Basic 
knowledge about economics, for example, helps people know that taxes in Brazil are 
regressive. It also helps them to identify a social gap and make a comparison amongst 
countries. Knowledge about laws and deep reflections on the purpose of them help young 
people to understand that they participate in a collective venture. Knowledge and discussions 
about documents like constitutions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, etc. (Rawls, 
1993, p.199) are very useful for cultivating in students the idea of social contract. 
 
In particular, the knowledge about the history of their societies helps youth to be better 
citizens through being more aware about their belonging to a bigger social project. Through 
this, they are able to identify that most current inequalities are based on historical facts 
perpetuated over time, but, at the same time, that lots of rights applied today are the result of 
a long process of social improvement. For example, students learn that, because of historical 
racism, Western societies keep achieving conscious and unconscious biases in the selection 
of employees. On the other hand, because of the historical development of the notion of 
equality, any type of racism is currently condemned as a serious moral fault. History, in this 
way, gives a common narrative for a nation
100
, showing characteristics that citizens should be 
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 Obviously, supposing that this narrative is presented without any manipulation. 
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proud of but also ashamed. In both cases, it gives to them elements to build a future narrative 
together. 
 
However, the understanding of history/sociology, psychology, economics and law systems is 
important but far from being enough. The understanding of what is behind them is also 
essential. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, most Western people share, for instance, the value 
of equality of opportunity, but, at the same time, in chapter 6, the series of examples 
demonstrated that, at least in countries like Brazil, laws and policies that go against this idea 
are applied (and are at least accepted by people). The huge quality gap between rich and poor 
students‟ education is obviously evidence of this. Sometimes this incongruence happens only 
because individuals do not genuinely believe in these values. However, as education is a 
value endorsed by Western societies, it has to be cultivated. Cultivating feelings of 
compassion towards unknown others, as discussed below, is a good way to implement this. 
 
Nevertheless, in many cases such lack of synchrony between people‟s ideas of equality of 
opportunities and their expressed political positions is caused by their superficial 
understandings of liberty and equality. It is possible to perceive through reading the 
discussions in chapter 3 and 4 that these are two very difficult ideas that deserve deep 
investigations to be minimally understood. In this sense, reflections about these concepts are 
fundamental, and philosophy is the appropriate subject to promote such reflections.  
 
All these points discussed above are somehow connected with the development of democratic 
spirit. Reflecting specifically on how to cultivate this in youth, three different issues have to 
be addressed. Firstly, it is important that students develop knowledge about the democratic 
system of their nations and have a chance to compare it with others. Some theoretical classes 
about this are necessary. This can be inserted in subjects like philosophy and sociology, or be 
part of a special subject called “government”, which can involve reflections of what is 
guaranteed by the constitution, as it is done in (certain states of) the US. 
 
However, knowledge is not enough. There are skills that also have to be developed. Students 
have to learn how to behave within the democratic sphere. Thus, practices that start within 
the classrooms with debates, elections of class leaders, for example, are good ways to build 
and exercise democratic skills. As discussed in 9.6, school organisations that stimulate 
student unions, participation of students in determining some school rules, or the like, are 
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powerful loci for such practices. In this way, as described in 9.1, the French model seems 
more appropriate to develop these skills than the English one. 
 
These two complementary ways for developing democratic knowledge and skills are 
powerful tools for building the third aspect of democracy, the value given by students to 
democratic societies. In this way, a strong belief in the value of democracy reinforces the 
belief in the current Western project, something that develops an ethos that helps democratic 
Western societies to guarantee their stability. It is through the incorporation of this ethos that 
voters, when their preferred candidate does not win, understand that this is part of the 
process, and, when he/she does, realise that this does not mean the right to oppress those who 
lost. As explored in 2.6, Western democracies are based on certain foundational and 
consensual ideas, and dissensus is only accepted – and encouraged – regarding what is not in 
this list. Thus, for example, even if a sexist, racist or homophobic group wins the election, 
they cannot implement laws against minorities, since minorities rights are guaranteed by 
Western constitutions and are above temporary mandates. 
 
Through mentioning a last set of interconnected civic skills and values, it is central for this 
thesis to discuss how/if empathy and sympathy ought to be cultivated. Though empathy is 
important, such individuals‟ capacity to put themselves in other people‟s shoes is useless if it 
not associated with the desire of help the others to have good lives, also called sympathy. 
Moreover, it is suggested that empathy and sympathy have to be cultivated in a way that 
these virtues can be oriented to, at least, all strangers who belong to the nation (and, 
somehow, to the whole of humankind), what this thesis calls compassion. 
 
Regarding how to cultivate these virtues, the mere fact that students from different 
backgrounds share common spaces like the school helps such development. As discussed in 
9.6, the more plural the school is, the higher the chance to develop empathy, sympathy and 
great compassion towards unknown people. However, aesthetic knowledge is defended by 
scholars like Nussbaum (1990; 1998; 2010) as very useful for making people imagine the 
lives of strangers without sharing spaces with them, and as a form of moral understanding. 
For example, literature, theatre, and the arts are strong tools for making people better 
understand specificities of unknown people‟s lives:  
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What storytelling in childhood teaches us to do is to ask questions about the life behind the 
mask, the inner world concealed by the shape. It gets us into the habit of conjecturing that this 
shape, so similar to our own, is a house for emotions and wishes and projects that are also in 
some ways similar to our own; but it also gets us into the habit of understanding that that 
inner world is differently shaped by different social circumstances. (1998, 354) 
 
It is not the concern of this thesis, but it is interesting to highlight, since it has been highly 
observed in Brazil, that media can also be a powerful tool to expand empathetic feelings 
towards strangers (Bloom, 2013, p.200). 
 
However, as Bloom (2013) warns, literature, cinema and the arts in general can also develop 
hate towards certain groups. He presents examples including books like The Birth of a 
Nation, a 1915 movie that portraits black men as stupid and aggressive and Ku Klux Klan‟s 
members as heroes, to illustrate this point
101
. In this way, the national curriculum and 
literature teachers should choose their list of books and plays also based on the current ideas 
of equality of opportunities and compassion towards strangers. This association with 
historical and sociological knowledge, also helps students to develop such imagination 
through learning about people from whom they are disconnected in space and time. In this 
sense, students‟ exposition to arts and humanities is fundamental.  
 
9.8. Critical thinking and critical pedagogy  
 
Beyond the reflections on how cultivating citizenship through supra, wide and narrow 
curricula, there is a dispute on how to develop students‟ criticality. This issue goes further 
than different proposals on how to teach critical thinking skills, since many thinkers consider 
that a “critical” citizen also has to have a strong social consciousness. Regarding this, two 
different views, which at least agree that a central “educational goal” is “to help students [to] 
become more skeptical toward commonly accepted truisms” (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p.190), 
strongly disagree on how teachers should behave in these regards. Burbules & Berk 
counterpose defenders of critical thinking (Ennis, 1962; Siegel, 1988, Fisher, 2001) and 
critical pedagogy (Freire, 1970a; Apple, 1979, Giroux, 1983) by saying: 
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The primary preoccupation of Critical Thinking is to supplant sloppy or distorted thinking 
with thinking based upon reliable procedures of inquiry. […] 
The primary preoccupation of Critical Pedagogy is with social injustice and how to transform 
inequitable, undemocratic, or oppressive institutions and social relations. […] [T]hey are in 
the service of demonstrating how certain power effects occur, not in the service of pursuing 
Truth in some dispassioned sense (1999, p.???). 
 
Critical thinking skills are defended by both groups, however a question remains: is it enough 
to grasp “procedures of inquiry” as the first group suggests? Should teachers actively defend 
political positions that challenge the status quo, which maintains economic inequalities and 
conservative social practices? Critical pedagogy is a theory that goes further in the defence of 
an active participation of teachers in the process of raising students‟ awareness of the 
injustices around them. In this way, “Critical consciousness is brought about not through 
intellectual effort alone but through praxis – through the authentic union of action and 
reflection” (FREIRE, 1970a, 48).  
 
In order to explore this comparison, it is interesting to start by analysing the difference 
between three possible teachers‟ attitudes – apart from total avoidance of any political 
discussion – regarding the way that they deal with citizenship education: teachers can always 
be neutral (neutral chairman), they can present the other side to almost all students‟ 
statements (balanced), or they can defend certain positions (stated commitment) (QCA, 
1998). The first, and the second attitudes are aligned with the idea defended by critical 
thinkers. Still, most supporters of critical thinking would also go further believing that, 
regarding some issues, teachers should not be neutral or balanced. For example, teachers have 
to present their position against racism, sexism and homophobia.  
 
Nevertheless, these types of statements are not enough for supporters of critical pedagogy 
tradition. Thinkers like Freire (1970a), Apple (1979) and Giroux (2004), understand that, 
because societies are too biased in favour of maintaining unfair status quo, teachers have the 
duty of going much further than critical thinking demands. Youth should understand the 
hegemonic power structures behind their everyday lives in order to, in the future, fight 
against them (McCowan, 2009, p.60). “For Freire, Critical Pedagogy is concerned with the 
development of conscientização, usually translated as „critical consciousness.‟ Freedom, for 
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Freire, begins with the recognition of a system of oppressive relations, and one‟s own place 
in that system” (Burbules & Berk, 1999, p.???).  
 
However, “from the perspective of Critical Thinking, Critical Pedagogy crosses a threshold 
between teaching criticality and indoctrinating”. On the other hand, “Critical Pedagogy sees 
this threshold problem conversely: indoctrination is the case already” (Burbules & Berk, 
1999, p.???). Based on this supposed current indoctrination, following Freire, “[t]eachers, 
therefore, have an ethical obligation to be „biased‟, that is, to direct their teaching towards the 
construction of a just and humane society” (McCowan, 2009, p.65). In this way, Freire 
defends the social transformation through education, rather than through a top-down 
revolution (McCowan, 2009, p.64). And, replying to the accusation presented above, rather 
than seeing education as indoctrination, Freire believes in the dialogue between teachers and 
students. According to him, the role of critical pedagogy is not “explaining to the masses, but 
dialoguing with them about their actions” (1970a, p.55).  
 
Rocha – despite identifying in Freire‟s intentions “to combat revolutionary dirigisme” (2017, 
p.67) – is suspicious about the success of this process. Rocha claims that “[i]t is evident that 
at the centre of [Freire‟s] dialogical theory and generative themes beats the heart of Mao, as 
Freire does not stop insisting” (2017, p.74). According to Rocha, when Freire claims that the 
educator, through a dialogical process, has to give back to the masses the knowledge received 
by them in an organised, systematised but with additions way, a top-down practice associated 
with Chinese revolution is established (2017, p.74-5). 
 
As discussed above, defenders of critical pedagogy support this additional knowledge that the 
teacher gives back to the masses by saying that teachers‟ attitudes have to be subversive, 
since they have to go against the hegemonic status quo. Thus, it is possible to suggest that 
Freire and other critical pedagogues like Apple and Giroux propose a certain type of 
resistance (that can also be called as a different type of “hidden curriculum”) that goes 
against the hegemonic official curriculum. This interpretation puts the idea of hidden 
curriculum not only as something used by the “oppressors”, but also by the “oppressed” or at 
least by those who want to help the oppressed to liberate themselves from this condition. This 
understanding gives to educators a central role in this process. 
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However, this central role of teachers to drive social change is seen as excessive by the 
reasoning that supports this thesis. Overlapping consensus cannot be established regarding 
this, since Freire‟s positions are so radical that right-wing people, “as a general rule, ignore 
his opus entirely” (McCowan, 2009, p.62). Though Freire‟s radical ideas can make sense in 
an undemocratic regime (the situation in Brazil when they were proposed), this thesis defends 
that, in democracies, cultivating students‟ critical reasoning, rather than making them 
“conscious” of injustices previously determined by teachers, is the best way to develop their 
civic virtues, since, through this, all the time, a space for dialogue and, in turn, for a possible 
agreement is created. This criticism of Freire‟s position does not mean that it is being 
defended a total neutrality of teachers in regards of social justice. As mentioned above, some 
issues like minorities‟ rights, equality of opportunities, and compassion towards worst-off are 
seen as consensual in Western societies, and it is the duty of teachers cultivating such values. 
In this way, teachers should not all the time be neutral or balanced in their ideas of justice. 
They, sometimes, have to be stated committed. However, this thesis considers exaggerated 
taking for granted that, in Western societies, “hegemonic power structures” are behind the 
unfair status quo, and defending that cultivating “critical consciousness” is a duty of teachers. 
Students have to learn critical thinking skills, have to have access to trustworthy data, and 
have to develop compassion. Often critical pedagogy proposes that presenting trustworthy 
data is drawing students‟ attention to the possible existence of certain structures of power. 
However, students, by themselves, have to judge if the power structures behind social 
institutions are oppressive or not.  
 
9.9. Practical limitations on the implementation 
 
All discussions presented in this chapter deal with an ideal proposal on citizenship education. 
Several practical problems are addressed in chapters 11 and 12. Here, still from a theoretical 
perspective, some limitations on how to implement citizenship curriculum can be anticipated. 
Firstly, tests like PISA are some of the most important instruments used by societies to 
evaluate their educational systems. From this, their internal evaluations are being developed. 
However, most of these tests do not measure any civic knowledge, skill or value of students. 
For example, societies which follow PISA consider that they have a good educational system 
if their students are well prepared in mathematics, languages and sciences. Most societies 
barely evaluate student‟s civic virtues. Thus, in schools, students are “rewarded” if develop 
knowledge in mathematics, but not if they are cooperative. 
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One of the reasons for this is that national economic development still is the primary source 
of government evaluation and concern. “The cult of GDP as the metric of success of nations 
has become a kind of religion of our time” (Fonseca, 2016, p.57). Even more sophisticated 
indexes like HDI, which evaluate countries based on GPD, average life expectancy, and years 
of education, do not measure the type of education received by youth. Of course, the present 
thesis is not saying that governments‟ focus on economic development is not important. 
However, it is far from being enough. By focusing on these limited indexes, governments do 
not take into account other aspirations of Western human beings such as, for example, the 
reduction of inequality of opportunities.  
 
Associated with this external encouragement to focus on economic growth, there is a pressure 
of parents (and, sometimes, students) – based on their selfish interest to develop job market 
skills in students – towards teaching only scientific knowledge. Part of this pressure is the 
result of a system which rewards – for example, with places in good universities – people 
who possess scientific knowledge, rather than those who developed civic virtues. As 
developed in the next chapter, in Brazil, for example, students‟ civic virtues are not even 
considered in these selections. This is a failure from the top, from the state. However, at the 
bottom, the individuals also fail, since most of them are much more interested (based on their 
selfishness) in what is taught in math, languages and sciences, rather than in the development 
of civic skills. 
 
Finally, the natural resistance of youth against “imposed” values makes the cultivation of 
them even more difficult. The French model, whilst intending to develop important virtues, 
probably promotes more resistance than the English system. In this case, the “learning by 
doing” process, more aligned with community involvement, seems to be more effective in 
producing such civic results. The point, which is not developed in this chapter, is that youth 
openness to this learning cannot be ignored.  
 
*** 
 
Chapter 9 investigates, from a theoretical point of view, how the civic virtues previously 
defined should be cultivated through formal education. It, then, analyses the citizenship 
curriculum suggesting the existence of five different levels, and draws attention to an 
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important debate between critical thinking and critical pedagogy. In this way, this chapter is 
useful for the development of a feasible theory of citizenship curriculum in two different 
ways. First, the distinct levels proposed help a better analysis of the data empirically 
collected. Moreover, some idealistic suggestions serve to be balanced with this data (chapters 
11 and 12).  
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10. Citizenship education in the Brazilian socio-historical context 
 
In this chapter, the development of laws and policies towards citizenship curriculum in Brazil 
is analysed. This analysis is fundamental in order to compare ideal, legal (something in 
between ideal and real) and real practices towards citizenship education. The feasibility of a 
curriculum aligned with virtues proposed in chapter 8 depends on theoretical ideas, the state‟s 
willingness to put them into practice and a proper environment to develop them. Thus, before 
analysing the reality of Brazilian schools (chapters 11 and 12), the historical and current state 
initiatives towards this are investigated. At the beginning, (10.1) the history of the 
implementation of the Brazilian national curriculum focused on moral and civic education is 
observed. Then, it is explained (10.2) how citizenship education is currently structured. 
Finally, (10.3) some challenges and pressures from different sectors of society towards such 
education are presented. 
 
10.1. The development of citizenship curriculum 
 
In 6.4, huge historical inequalities within Brazilian society are presented, and the educational 
gap between rich and poor people is shown as an example of these inequalities. Here, the 
development of education policies alongside history is analysed, but less attention to how 
such goods are distributed is given. The main focus of this analysis is on elements of 
citizenship education in such policies. As presented in 6.1, Brazil declared independence 
from Portugal in 1822. Until 1889, however, Brazil was a monarchy led by the same 
Portuguese royal family. From 1889 to 1930, a period known as the First Republic, the 
agrarian aristocracy ruled the country, and poor people had little space to participate in that 
“democratic” regime. Some things changed in the Vargas Era (from 1930 to 1945, and from 
1951 to 1954). During this time, several social rights were implemented, though, between 
1937 and 1945, the regime was a dictatorship. 
 
Regarding education policies, before the 1930s, federal policies towards promoting public 
education were almost non-existent (Regatierri & Castro, 2013, p. 16). However, from 1930 
to 1945, two important national education policies were implemented, and three forces 
disputed the prevalence of their ideas towards it. The New School movement defended a 
“state-run, universal and free of charge” school that “would create thus a basic equality of 
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opportunities, from which flourish differences based on personal qualities of each” 
(Schwartzman et al, 2000[1984], p.70). The Catholic Church, in turn, attacked such proposal 
of “laicisation, standardised school, coeducation, state monopoly of education, free 
education, liberal school” (Schwartzman et al, 2000[1984], p.75). The third power in this 
process was the Military forces which increased in relevance during this period. As can be 
imagined, “order, discipline and hierarchy and the love of country get priority in [the 
Military‟s] proposal of pedagogical action” (Schwartzman et al, 2000[1984], p.87). However, 
it is interesting to notice that, though the New School project opposed most military ideas of 
education, at least one central point was shared by them: the belief in the importance of 
building national ties through state centralisation of education (Schwartzman et al, 
2000[1984], p.194). 
 
The process of implementation of such policies started in 1930 with Campos
102, Brazil‟s first 
minister of Education and Health. Identifying the Church as an important supporter of the 
new regime, he worked to consolidate the alliance of this institution and the state. After 
Campos (1930-34), Capanema replaced him having a long (1934-45) and quite ambiguous 
time as minister. In essence, there was a fundamental shift from Campos‟ to Capanema‟s 
policies: the former tried to balance sciences and humanities, while the latter emphasised 
humanistic education (Schwartzman et al, 2000[1984], p.90-3). Exploring moral and civic 
content, it is possible to say that it aimed to “transfer family or local to national „fidelity‟” 
(Schwartzman et al, 2000[1984], p.208).  
 
Such educational policies remained, at least by law, some years after the end of the Vargas 
dictatorship. In 1946, a new democratic constitution determined that a Guidelines and Bases 
Law (LDB – Lei de Diretrizes e Bases) should be elaborated to orient the Brazilian 
educational system. However, after a long debate, only in 1961, the first LDB of Brazilian 
history was promulgated. This process was very long because two different powers – again 
New School educators and Catholic Church – disputed the main decisions. Interestingly, both 
sides, though disagreeing completely about the participation of the state in defining 
curriculum and subsidising education, appealed to democratic and liberal arguments to 
underpin their positions (Montalvão, 2010, p.11). This dispute, was, then, solved by a 
negotiated agreement that resulted in the aforementioned LDB. The law “reconciled the two 
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projects guaranteeing to the family the right to select the type of education that they should 
give to their children, and establishing that education is an obligation of the public power and 
free to private enterprise” (Saviani, 1996, p.46). 
 
This LDB, however, did not have enough time to be applied. In 1964, a Coup D‟état led by 
the Military changed completely the organisation of several Brazilian institutions. For 21 
years, Brazil lived under a dictatorship in which basic civic and political rights were 
supressed. Teachers, students, schools and universities, suffered strong interventions. In 
1971, a new Guidelines and Bases Law (LDB) reflected the political and economic 
atmospheres of that period orienting the two main changes in basic education. First, the 
development of teaching focused on a “productivist conception of education” based on 
principles of “rationality, efficiency and productivity” in order to develop human capital 
needed to promote economic growth (Saviani, 2008, p.297). 
 
Second, the introduction of two new subjects – Moral and Civic Education, and Brazilian 
Social and Political Organisation – aiming to “brainwash” students to support the 
dictatorship. In general terms, the objective of teaching these subjects was the “generic 
formation of a citizen who loves the nation and defends moralising principles” (Martins, 
2003, p 159). Thus, the idea behind this civic education was guided by “passivity, obedience, 
fulfilment of its professional and social roles, faith and hope that the problems were solved by 
those whose social function is to make politics” (Cerri, 2003, p. 112). Several discussions on 
this subject could be developed, being one of the most important the fact that if Moral and 
Civic Education became mandatory, philosophy and sociology were considered not only 
useless, but also against the regime (Brasil, 2006, p.102). 
 
This authoritarian period finished in 1985, and, in 1988, what is widely known as the “Citizen 
Constitution” was promulgated. In its Article 205, it is expressed that: 
 
Education, universal right and duty of the State and the family, will be promoted and 
encouraged with the cooperation of society, aiming at the full development of the person, its 
preparation for the exercise of citizenship and its qualification for work. 
 
In this main article about education, it is important to notice that preparing students to 
exercise citizenship is one of the three central aims of the Brazilian educational project. 
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Apart from this, as the focus of this thesis is the development of citizenship through 
education, it is also important to reflect on what the 1988 Constitution says about the main 
structure of the education system. As suggested in the previous chapter, how the educational 
system is built impacts on the cultivation of civic virtues. Regarding this, Article 206 
guarantees the right to public, high quality and free of charge education, freedom of thinking, 
but it does not guarantee equal quality of education for all, since it allows private education in 
which teachers can be better paid and improvements in facilities can be promoted
103
.  
 
10.2. Current citizenship curriculum 
 
This historical reflection helps to understand the current laws and policies related to Brazilian 
citizenship curriculum. This section starts by highlighting that the contemporary structure of 
Brazilian education is now based on the 1996 LDB (Brasil, 1996, n.9394). Such a Law was 
approved to guide a new educational approach, a direct consequence of the ideas of the 1988 
Constitution. Already in Article 2 of the LDB (which closely follows Article 205 of the 
Constitution), citizenship is cited as one of the three central aims of Brazilian education. 
 
In LBD‟s Article 36, which defines contents, methods and forms of assessment of secondary 
education (the specific educational phase analysed by this thesis), citizenship is again 
highlighted as one of its three aims: 
 
I – Domain of scientific and technological principles which lead the modern production; 
II – Knowledge of contemporary forms of language; 
III – Domain of Philosophy and Sociology knowledge as necessary for the exercise of 
citizenship. 
 
Considering these three aims, it is interesting to notice that the development of citizenship is 
directly associated with only two curricular subjects: philosophy and sociology. As cited 
above, one hypothesis for this is that, during the Military Dictatorship (1964-1985), such 
subjects were replaced by moral and civic education (subjects thence removed from the 
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curriculum in 1993), and the intention of this mention was to reintroduce them in a new 
democratic curriculum. However, this only happened in 2008. 
 
Nevertheless, LDB is not sufficient in order to cover all aspects that guide policymakers and 
schools about how to organise their educational system and curricula. Then, in 1997, the 
Brazilian Ministry of Education launched the National Curricular Parameters (PCN – 
Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais) aiming to address this. This document identified 
citizenship as the “vertebral axis of education” (Brasil, 1997, p.23), and philosophy and 
sociology as pieces of knowledge inserted in all other subjects, with the function of making 
interdisciplinary practices possible. This is associated with the idea that certain contents, such 
as “Ethics, Cultural Plurality, Environment, Health and Sexual Orientation”, have to be 
discussed through cross-curricular activities (Brasil, 1997, p.15).  
 
Regarding the pedagogical theory behind these PCN, it is possible to highlight Piaget‟s and 
Kohlberg‟s influences on it (VIVALDI, 2013, p.96). It is explored in chapters 5 and 8 that 
Kohlberg defends the existence of a higher level of abstract values which should be reached 
by a moral agent. In this sense, “[a] non-relativist conception [founded in the principle of 
human dignity: mutual respect, justice, dialogue, and solidarity] is presented at PCN” (Vinha, 
2017, p.8). 
 
Since 1997, the PCNs have been associated with the Social Democrat Party (PSDB) 
government (1995-2001), and it is important to mention that, in 2013, the Workers Party (PT) 
government launched the National Curricular Guidelines (DCN – Diretrizes Curriculares 
Nacionais) as a “need to update the National Curriculum Parameters” (DCN, 2013, p.146). 
However, regarding citizenship education, the idea is that civic virtues should be developed 
within each one of the subjects and through interdisciplinary projects remained.  
 
This document, then, served as basis for the National Plan of Education, a 2014 Law which 
intended to design the national plans for Brazilian education for the next 10 years. In its 
Article 2, the plan presents ten guidelines: 
 
I – Eradication of illiteracy; 
II – Universalization of school attendance; 
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III – Overcoming educational inequalities, emphasizing the promotion of citizenship and the 
eradication of all forms of discrimination; 
IV – Improving the quality of education; 
V – Training for work and citizenship, with emphasis on moral and ethical values; 
VI – Promoting the principle of democratic management of public education; 
VII – Humanistic, scientific, cultural and technological development of the country; 
VIII – Establishing a goal for the application of public resources in education as a proportion 
of Gross Domestic Product – GDP, which assures the fulfillment of expansion needs with 
quality and equity; 
IX – Valuation of education professionals; 
Promoting the principles of respect for human rights, diversity and environmental 
sustainability. 
 
Analysing such guidelines, it is possible to identify how important education for citizenship 
is. Half of them (III, V, VI, VII and X) quote directly an orientation for cultivating citizenship 
and some correlated values: non-discrimination, moral and ethics, democracy, humanism, 
human rights, diversity and sustainability.  Some other items (I, II, IV, V, VIII, and IX), 
though not concerned with cultivating citizenship virtues, guarantee through education some 
citizenship rights: eradication of illiteracy and investments for promoting good education and 
preparing for the job market. 
 
A few months before this chapter was finalised, Dilma Rousseff, Workers Party president, 
was impeached. Regarding specifically educational policies, the transition government (as 
many others), is now announcing a complete change in the secondary level curriculum. In the 
following analysis, given the forthcoming elections (scheduled for October, 2018), such 
policies, which have low chances of being implemented, are not covered. 
 
Returning to policies that were already in practice, secondary education is the responsibility 
of states, though they have historically complained that they cannot manage it without 
Federal Government investments. Apart from this budget quarrel, there is another important 
element that is within the Federal Government and states‟ jurisdiction: responsibility for the 
definition of the educational plans which are implemented in schools. In the particular case of 
this thesis, it is worth analysing some innovations of the Rio Grande do Sul education 
policies, the state in which the empirical research of this thesis, reported in chapters 11 and 
12, was carried out. In Rio Grande do Sul, a new curriculum was implemented in 2012 in all 
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state-run schools (private schools have more independence in these regards). It was called 
“Polytechnic Teaching”. Such an initiative introduced a new subject called “Integrated 
Seminar”, a three-hours per week space in the three years of Secondary Education created for 
developing activities that connect humanities, natural sciences, languages, and mathematics 
and develop students‟ research skills. More than this, research studies associated with real 
problems of their communities were stimulated. In addition, a new system of assessment was 
implemented and students would be evaluated no longer by test scores, but according to 
teachers‟ descriptions. Thus, while the first change opens more space for students to discuss 
their communal issues – which clearly works towards the development of civic virtues – the 
second allows teachers to value other virtues (for example, civic virtues like cooperation), 
rather than only academic skills.  
 
This was the reality of state-run schools when the field work of this thesis was carried out in 
2015. However, a distinct party (PMDB) started a new government in 2015, and, since 2016, 
this Polytechnic Teaching was partially abandoned. However, this is very recent change that 
cannot be analysed yet. 
 
10.3. Pressures over citizenship curriculum 
 
Though this development of the LDB presented a great improvement regarding citizenship 
education in a democratic regime, there is no doubt that it is far from being consensual. Even 
before the PCNs were published in 1997, protests in academia against such parameters were 
frequent. The criticisms against such policies labelled that government as neoliberal.  
 
Neoliberals are those who demand education policies that promote efficiency based on 
production management and competition (Gentili, 1996, p.17-9). From this perspective, in 
order to be improved, “educational institutions have to be thought of and evaluated (that is, 
their results have to be judged) as if they were profitable companies” (Gentili, 1996, p.25). 
This observation allows Gentili to identify neoliberal public policies on education: (i) 
national systems of evaluation; (ii) curricular reforms based on a National Curriculum; (iii) 
centralised continuous preparation of teachers (1996, p.27). According to him: 
 
The neoliberal state is minimal when has to finance public and maximal when it centralises 
the official knowledge that must circulate by educational institutions, when it establishes top-
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down and undemocratic mechanisms of evaluation, and when it removes pedagogic autonomy 
from institutions and collective school actors. (1996, p.27) 
 
This understanding of neoliberalism was used by the Faculty of Education of Federal 
University of Rio Grande do Sul (FACED), one of the most important in Brazil, to criticise, 
in 1996
104
, the PCN proposal of that time. In a political manifesto, this Faculty strongly 
criticised what they considered an attempt to preserve cultural unity and reinforce inequalities 
through education policies. According to them, firstly, the term is a euphemism, since these 
“parameters” are already a “mandatory curriculum” (1996, p.112-5). Moreover, there was a 
lack of democratic debate on the elaboration of them, since only few specialists were listened 
to, whilst teachers, unions, and social movements were silenced (1996, p.116-8). In addition, 
such parameters did not mention two fundamental elements towards improving educational 
quality: increasing teachers‟ salaries and improving school infrastructure. The lack of such 
concerns reinforced inequalities, because poor people were (and continue to be) those who 
study in state-run schools (1996, p.19-20). Finally, the PCN favoured “partial knowledge 
(based on male, rich and white hegemonic views)” (1996, p.111-2), and did not give voice for 
gender, ethnicity, and class minorities (1996, p.123). Associated with this, they criticised the 
fact that such an approach is centred in transmission of contents and based on a depoliticised 
and “neutral” character. 
 
These criticisms were presented twenty years ago, yet, since this time, after a further six years 
of Social Democrats (PSDB) and thirteen years of Workers (PT) in power, few things have 
changed. The three main characteristics of neoliberalism noted by Gentili were applied – 
maybe even strongly – by Workers Party: national systems of evaluation; curricular reforms 
based on a national curriculum; centralised continuous preparation of teachers
105
. The 
National Pact for the Reinforcement of [State-Run] Secondary Education is a massive 
programme which intends to centralise continuous preparation of state-run school teachers. 
This practice, based on a national curriculum, is completely in accordance with the new 2014 
Law [National Plan of Education]. Regarding this law, it is worth saying that one of the most 
criticised attitudes of Social Democrat‟s government was reinforced by the Workers‟ one: the 
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implementation of a huge system of evaluation and a national curriculum (Articles 5 and 
11)
106
.  
 
Regarding the three main specific criticisms made by the Faculty of Education of UFRGS, 
the situation does not seem to have advanced much: it is not clear if more voice was given to 
teachers; the salaries are still humiliating and infrastructure terrible; though actively the 
Workers have attempted to empower minority groups through the introduction of education 
for diversity and reinforcement of black and indigenous history, the implementation of them 
was postponed by the government because allied parties were against some of them.  
 
Since this last point is an ongoing process, it deserves a bit of reflection here. Education for 
diversity has been stimulated to a degree since 1997 (Brasil, 1997, p.28) It is remarkable the 
suggestion that sexuality has to be problematised at school, and that family values about it 
should be questioned. The text suggests that such “contents can be addressed in any cycle [of 
Primary School], varying only the degree of depth and breadth that will be worked” (Brasil, 
1997, p.39). Expanding these ideas, in 2011, the Federal Government, in association with 
LGBT movements, prepared a series of materials (press publications and videos) defending 
that non-heterosexual behaviours should be accepted and celebrated (Brasil, 2011, p.75). 
Such material, called by the government “School Without Homophobia”, intended to 
stimulate in school “actions that promote political and social environments favourable to 
ensuring human rights and respectability of sexual orientation and gender identity in the 
Brazilian school environment” (Brasil, 2011, p.9). Associated with this, it also aimed “to 
unveil the order that puts heterosexuality as natural, normal and a single possibility of the 
subjects live their sexuality” (Brasil, 2011, p.12). Moreover, the videos only presented certain 
situations of non-heterosexual relationships and non-cis behaviour as also valuable, 
encouraging students who do not identify with heterosexual or “cis” patterns to be 
themselves. As an extrapolation of its aims, the material equally reflects on social impositions 
about gender differentiations – such as the stereotypes that girls should play volleyball, and 
boys football – and the examination of perpetuation of sexism through the use of language. 
 
It is natural to imagine that conservative sectors of society, most of them associated with 
religious beliefs, are against education for sexual diversity. These critics called such material 
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the “Gay Kit” and repeated exhaustively that, through them, youth would be stimulated to 
have homosexual behaviours, which, in their view, is wrong. This does not seem to be the 
case. However, the pressure of religious groups within Congress, who hold significant power 
and whom the Workers government depend upon for support, made the government give up 
distributing these materials.
107
  
 
Recently, another dispute associated with citizenship education divided Brazilian educators‟ 
opinions. In 2015, the Ministry of Education presented a proposal to be discussed with 
society suggesting radical changes in the history curriculum of secondary education. The 
1988 Constitution suggested valuing minority cultures – indigenous peoples and Africans – 
and approximation with Latin American countries. Following this, it was proposed to 
strongly reinforce in the History curriculum knowledge about Africa and (Latin) America. 
This curriculum, which used to be equally divided between documenting Brazil‟s and 
Western societies‟ history, now talks about American Indigenous peoples, Africans and Afro-
Brazilians in the first year, all peoples in the America in the second, and Europeans and 
Asians in the third (Brasil, 2015, p.243). Black and indigenous movements for a long time 
pressured the government to have “their” history also discussed in schools. More 
conservative sectors of society, on the other hand, see such change as reducing excessively 
discussions about Western values. 
 
Finally, there is another strong debate in Brazil related to citizenship education that deserves 
to be mentioned. There is a group self-proclaimed “School Without Party” which defends 
that, in all classrooms, the following list of teachers‟ attitudes should be hung in order to 
remind all teachers and alert all students about how teachers have to deal with political 
discussions: 
 
1. The teacher will not take advantage of the students‟ captive audience to promote their own 
ideological, religious, moral, political, and partisan interests, opinions, conceptions or 
preferences. 
2. The teacher will not favour or hinder or constrain students because of their political, 
ideological, moral or religious beliefs, or their lack of such beliefs. 
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3. The teacher will not make political-party propaganda in the classroom nor incite his 
students to participate in demonstrations, public acts and marches. 
4. In dealing with political, socio-cultural and economic issues, the teacher will present to 
students, in a fair way, the main versions, theories, opinions and perspectives which compete 
in this respect. 
5. The teacher will respect the right of parents of pupils to have their children receive 
religious and moral education that is in accordance with their own beliefs. 
6. The teacher will not allow that the rights secured in the previous items are violated by the 
action of students or third parties within the classroom.
108
 
 
This list of duties seems aligned with the balanced attitude described in chapter 9. However, 
opponents to these rules defend that teachers have the right (and, perhaps even the duty) to 
present their political opinions, and consider this proposal a type of censorship. And, 
following critical pedagogy criticisms (9.8), most of these thinkers defend that, indeed, the 
dominant group‟s ideas end up being the ones defended in classrooms. 
 
This thesis also returns to the issues of sexual education, African studies and the liberty of 
teachers present their political opinions at the conclusion.  
 
*** 
 
Chapter 9 observes the development of the citizenship curriculum through analysing the 
history of Brazilian laws and policies in these regards. A special attention to the current 
Brazilian situation is given. Finally, some pressures of certain groups towards different 
directions are also briefly discussed. This perspective somehow connects idealistic views of 
citizenship curriculum (chapter 8) and the reality of it application in Brazilian schools 
(chapter 11), as presented at the conclusion.  
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11. How citizenship education happens in Brazil 
 
The previous chapter described the main procedures of data collection accomplished in three 
schools in the South of Brazil to develop the debate about citizenship curriculum. The present 
chapter, written as the result of this data collection, presents some specific ideas about how 
these schools are practicing citizenship education. It is important to reinforce that this 
chapter only describes how citizenship education is manifested within these schools, in the 
hope of better understanding the current reality within Brazil, rather than presenting 
normative ideas on how citizenship education should be developed or practiced. Ideas of 
school communities‟ members in this way are presented in the next chapter. Thus, at the 
beginning, (11.1) teachers‟ and students‟ overall ideas about the most important civic virtues 
that are or are not encouraged at their schools are presented. Then, (11.2) the impacts of 
educational policies in the development of civic values (supra official curriculum) are 
analysed. Following this, it is observed (11.3) how schools‟ official organisational structures 
act to help (or to hinder) the promotion of citizenship values (wide official curriculum). Next, 
(11.4) syllabuses and subjects related to the narrow official citizenship curriculum in these 
schools are identified. Later, (11.5), some individual initiatives achieved in such schools 
(unofficial curriculum) are also investigated. Finally, (11.6) some elements hidden in the 
curriculum that help (or hinder) citizenship education are problematised.  
 
11.1. Overall view 
 
At the beginning of this analysis, it is interesting to briefly present some overall view 
obtained through the main instruments of data collection applied in this empirical research, 
and some inconsistences amongst them. In the questionnaires, after facing the question as to 
whether their school is more concerned with teaching scientific syllabuses than with 
encouraging citizenship virtues, 61% of teachers and 58% of students claimed that this is at 
least partially true
109
. Moreover, a higher number of teachers and students said that it is 
completely true that all civic virtues proposed (critical thinking, solidarity, following rules, 
politicisation, fight for rights) are encouraged by their schools than the number of those who 
said that it was false. Though these results remain general, the data does allow the conclusion 
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that teachers and students do not generally perceive their schools as being totally neglectful 
of citizenship education. 
 
However, during the interviews, teachers and students showed a lack of clarity regarding 
moral and civic education, and were able to present only a few examples of practices in their 
schools. For instance, only one student and one teacher mentioned empathy/compassion as a 
virtue that should be promoted through different activities. Furthermore, neither teachers nor 
students showed any deep knowledge regarding the concepts of equality and liberty. Even 
when questions about specific problems that put those ideas in evidence were presented, 
normally simplistic answers were given: for example, when asked about same-sex marriage, 
no one explored the idea of equal civil rights between hetero and homosexuals. (It is 
important to say that the ability to understand and build concepts is generally a skill 
associated with philosophy, and only one teacher from this specific area was interviewed.) 
 
Observations of school environment demonstrated an even worse picture. Having spent three 
months immersed in all three schools, I identified very few activities related to citizenship 
education. Almost all classes were focused only on specific contents. In the private school, 
teachers were mainly concerned with university admission tests. In the state-run schools, the 
commitment towards citizenship education was also low, and even philosophy and sociology 
classes were focused on their own contents, such as Plato‟s metaphysics, and the difference 
between Marx and Weber. Of course, the syllabi of both subjects present discussions on 
analysis of arguments, justice, organisation of societies, etc. However, cultivation of civic 
virtues did not seem to be the central aim of these classes. 
 
This impression is aligned with other empirical studies. After meticulously filtering papers 
about primary observations on moral education in Brazil, Vivaldi also presented a negative 
conclusion regarding how it is developed in different Brazilian schools. She identified in her 
literature review only “one-off activities, most of the time, aimed at improving situations of 
indiscipline” (2013, p.209) and even violence that has turned mainly state-run schools into 
dysfunctional places.  
 
Nevertheless, it is wrong to say that it was not possible to find any good initiatives related to 
citizenship education in my observations. First, certain individual practices introduced some 
debates about themes associated with this subject. For example, in a Portuguese class, 
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homophobia was a point discussed within a text; in a physics class, the impacts of different 
sources of energy oriented the debate about the importance of associating this reasoning with 
reflections about global warming. It is important to say that, in some cases, teachers‟ 
behaviours positively nurtured citizenship education, while in other cases, they did not. 
Moreover, reflecting on the institutional level, some good intentions towards cultivating 
citizenship were perceived, though the practices were very incipient. Details on the data 
introduced in this topic are provided throughout this chapter. 
 
11.2. How supra official curriculum is applied  
 
Education policies can cultivate civic virtues in students simply by defining how public 
resources are redistributed and how students are allocated in schools. A progressive system of 
collecting and redistributing taxes sends a message of equality of opportunities. Providing the 
same quality schools for all is a way to do this. Making students from different social groups 
share the same spaces by stimulating them to attend the same schools integrates them. This is 
a way to develop cognitive empathy and compassion in them. The Brazilian educational 
system goes in the opposite direction. 
 
Firstly, the structural abysm between the quality of Brazilian state-run and private schools is 
a symbol of failure of the Brazilian state in promoting equality of opportunities. As an 
evidence of this abysm, it was observed that, while in the state-run schools the facilities are 
very bad and teachers‟ salaries are shameful forcing them to work double or triple shifts, all 
classrooms in the private school observed have a computer, multimedia projector, air 
conditioning, and teachers‟ salaries are four times what their colleagues from state-run ones 
earn
110
. Of course, these things directly impact the quality of teaching and promote an 
obvious inequality of opportunities between rich and poor. 
 
Thus, this unequal education system itself produces the first “lesson” about citizenship, 
exposing that equality of opportunities does not exist in Brazil.  
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However, the impacts of this situation over students seem not clear for the observed school 
communities, since this was the only reflection about such influences identified in the 
interviews. 
 
Associated with the situation described, a second problem of Brazilian education system is 
that, as perceived in the observed schools, there is lack of integration/engagement between 
social classes. Regarding the vast distance between these poor and the rich students‟ worlds, a 
teacher claimed: 
 
I don‟t see the relation of the upper classes [students from private schools] with people from 
state-run schools. 
 
This reality not only perpetuates inequalities of opportunities, but also reinforces a social 
reality in which rich and poor people do not share spaces, and are not integrated/engaged with 
each other.  
 
In the private school, however, one attempt to deal with this situation was observed. This 
school sustains a poor primary school, and gives scholarships for their best students to join 
them at the secondary school. Moreover, some sport activities integrating the two schools are 
organised annually. Thus, the reality of these poor students becomes part of the imagination 
of teachers and students in the rich school. As a teacher said:  
 
The issue of [integrating schools] is something else. Because we start to have another view. 
 
This project of integration/engagement, however, seems to have low impact over the 
students. Two students from the rich school exposed the spread lack of knowledge about 
realities different from theirs: 
 
S1 (Student 1): There are people in [the school helped by the rich school] who finish primary 
school, and don‟t go to secondary school, because they have to work and sustain the family, 
did you understand? And we don‟t have any idea of what it is like. And, then, people, they 
have, I think, we have a prejudice, because we don‟t live together, did you understand? 
Because we think that they are different people, but we are the same, did you understand? 
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S2: I think that empathy and proactivity, which are things that we need in today‟s world, are 
not developed [in the school]. Because we are not encouraged to live with people of the lower 
classes, we are not encouraged to live with people of different faiths. 
 
This lack of cognitive, and, by consequence, emotional empathy and compassion reinforced 
by this system makes rich students not perceive important injustices in Brazilian society.  
 
Finally, it is also important to draw attention to the fact that university admission tests hardly 
take into account the level of civic virtues of students. For example, they are not rewarded for 
having been cooperative or engaged in politics. At least, some changes in these tests with the 
introduction of a new national test called “Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio” (ENEM – 
High School National Exam) are demanding more students‟ critical thinking and some 
knowledge related to citizenship. 
 
11.3. How the wide official curriculum is applied 
 
After reflecting on how the whole education system impacts students‟ development of civic 
virtues, the next step is to consider how the school environment impacts these skills and 
knowledge. In 9.5, schools are presented as places that promote the transition from the 
private sphere (family) to the public (society), that is, the transition towards a civic life. 
Regarding this, schools help students‟ adaptation to two different situations: there, they know 
people that are not part of their inner circle; in school, they experience social dynamics that 
are not based on family values. Knowing other people can develop students‟ cognitive 
empathy, compassion, and celebration of differences. Sharing spaces and responsibilities can 
make students learn how to live in democratic societies and engage with the others through 
balancing competition and cooperation. Brazilian schools are equally not very successful in 
these regards. 
 
The first achievement, the development of a wider cognitive empathy, is dependent on how 
school organisation brings different people together, and on how plural the school is (an issue 
more related to public policies that stimulate such a plurality). As described in 11.2, the 
observed schools are not very plural – at least regarding economic conditions. Moreover, 
though obviously there are other types of differences amongst students within each school 
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observed, it was not perceived in these schools‟ organisation any concern in actively 
approximating their students. 
 
Reflecting on a different but related issue, more than only putting different people into 
contact, schools can make students know different life styles by stimulating them, for 
example, to act in plays or read books. Such practices, however, were not clearly identified in 
the schools observed. Reading was strongly stimulated in the private school, but not in the 
state-run schools. Even so, it was not possible to identify in this reading encouragement any 
clear intension of expanding students‟ cognitive empathy or compassion.  
 
However, though the intention of cultivating empathy and compassion was not evident in the 
abovementioned activities, there were some projects in the private school clearly focused on 
this. Firstly, the aim of promoting cognitive empathy could be identified in one of them. As 
the secondary school head teacher of this school said: 
 
There is a group of international relations whose main objective is to make the student think 
of a particular position of a country or people under the optics of a particular country, not the 
one I think, but from the point of view of the country I am representing.  
 
Moreover, developing emotional empathy and, through this, compassion/solidarity, was also 
a much more identifiable concern in the private school. They were encouraged to do 
voluntary work, and this seemed to have impact, as reported by a teacher: 
 
Those who participate in volunteering love it. They are few, but they love it. […] A girl who 
is politically right but is sensitive (she respects, she hears), this girl that we were talking about 
was one of the most active in the volunteering group. 
 
On the other hand, another teacher from the same school is critical of volunteering activities: 
 
We have a volunteering group, but, as I say, [they] think “it‟s cool”, “it is important”, but I 
still think that it is that thing of a European coming and wanting to see the Indian, that 
different thing. And that this is not part of them, their world. So they go there, try the 
different, but not as if it were theirs. [...] They participate without being, without identifying 
themselves. 
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Different criticisms come from the students. Some consider these solidarity activities as being 
promotional rather than having a genuine intention to help. Others see these activities as 
having low impact on its students. In the state-run schools, similar initiatives also seem 
ineffective. Though both have a calendar day called “The Day of Volunteering”, in one 
school, the participation of teachers and students was very low, while, in the other, this 
activity was cancelled. 
 
However, the problems presented above are not the only limitations regarding the 
development of empathy and compassion in students. The process of socialisation, which 
favours such development, depends on the promotion of integration/engagement and 
celebration of differences. Nevertheless, it is explored in 11.2 that the schools in this study 
are socially segregated, something that disfavours integration/engagement. Regarding 
celebration of difference, no direct action that reinforces this or avoids practices of bullying 
was identified in any of the schools visited. 
 
Since bullying is almost always practiced against people who belong to minorities, while in 
the same social group, it is important to reflect if certain prejudices happen in these 
environments. Regarding this, no teacher or student mentioned any situation of either racism 
or sexism, and most of them declared a strong development of respect towards homosexuals. 
Interviews and questionnaires did not pay special attention to racism and sexism. Some 
questions, however, were focused on how homosexuality is approached by school actors. A 
positive view on this respect was presented by a teacher from the state-run school with a 
more heterogeneous group of students: 
 
A thing that is very well handled is the question of girls having their girlfriends, and boys 
having their sexual options
111
. This is very well managed amongst [the students]. It is 
managed in a very respectful way by the school. 
 
Nevertheless, this optimistic view about how students deal with homosexuality is only 
partially true. First, this friendly atmosphere is stronger in the school where the student 
population is more heterogeneous than in the other two schools. Second, some conservative 
ideas regarding adoption of children by same-sex couples are still shared by some students, 
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mainly from the poorest school. The following dialogue presented in one interview with this 
school students – but also identifiable in my observations – shows this: 
 
S1: I think [the adoption by same-sex couples] is wrong, as well. Depends, he wants to have 
children, and such. But it can be prejudice or not, but how would I feel having two fathers? It 
would be, wow, are you crazy? Having two fathers? 
S2: Because it is, like, let‟s say: “I will call your parents at school”. Then, it comes two men 
[laughs]. I will suffer bullying.  
 
Given this fact, it is interesting to add that more than 50% of students say that LGBT rights 
are not discussed in their schools. 
 
Regarding other prejudices, if racism and sexism were not strongly identified, prejudices 
experienced by students that do not follow the standards of beauty established by society 
were perceived in some reports and observations. One teacher had a strong claim related to 
this: 
 
Nowadays, we don‟t see jokes anymore about a guy who is homosexual, or who seems to be 
homosexual, we don‟t have this discrimination any longer based on the fact that a guy wears a 
piercing. […] [But], sorry, the one who always suffers is the fat boy. Oh, the fat boy, he still 
suffers bullying. [...] The chubby girl, then, she is destroyed. This is something from the 
society. The beauty standard is a strong reason for joking.  
 
Observing students‟ practices, this prejudice seems stronger than it was reported. Many jokes 
in classes and playground endorsed this impression. 
 
In general, regarding the prejudices based on race, gender and sexual orientation, it seems 
that these schools‟ communities do not spread them, though their practices towards 
diminishing society‟s prejudices are timid. Few discussions aligned with the claims of black, 
LGBT and feminist movements were identified. And some prejudices, such as those against 
overweight students, seemed to be completely ignored. These observations can be a symptom 
of the lack of preparation of teachers regarding civic education. 
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Apart from promoting integration and celebrating differences, schools‟ organisation can also 
improve students‟ socialisation through preparing them to live in a democratic society and to 
compete in a cooperative system. Thus, the first analysis related to this reflects on students‟ 
participation in determining school rules and syllabuses taught. It was perceived that this 
participation is minimal in this process. In all interviews, a question was posed on whether 
students participate in elaborating school rules and in determining what they learn. In general, 
students claim that they have very limited space to share opinions on both of these levels. 
 
Regarding students‟ participation in the process of elaborating school rules, no concrete 
mechanisms were mentioned. Many students reported lack of substantial justification behind 
school rules and the fact that they were not properly called to participate in the decision-
making process. It is possible to imagine that this make the students feel that they are only 
passive recipients of things that come from the top, rather than feeling part of a cooperative 
venture. Regarding this, it is possible to find a significant literature reflecting on the role of 
students on defining school rules. For example, Devries and Zan (1995) identify in the socio-
moral environment of most schools the practice of fostering submissive students. Vinha and 
Mantovani (2007) and Vivaldi (2013, p.132) insist that rules are regularly imposed arbitrarily 
and that schools do not distinguish between rules that are negotiable and those that are not. 
These research studies are aligned with what was perceived in the three schools observed.  
 
In the private school, the lack of opportunity to discuss the syllabuses is related to a higher 
pressure for preparing students for universities admission tests. As two students said: 
 
S1: We don‟t participate in the syllabus decision, no way. I think because it has to be the 
syllabus of ENEM [university admission test], it has to be in accordance with ENEM. 
 
S2: We are stimulated to think on school structural issues, on curriculum, etc. But, in the end, 
[...] it is very difficult to tell the head teacher: “look, the teaching practice of this place, even 
if it has success at ENEM, is not preparing citizens”.   
 
Interestingly, the private school teachers give much more attention to ENEM, since their 
students have much more chance to succeed in this exam. 
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Besides the fact that the practice of democracy does not have an important place in these 
schools‟ dynamics, it is also remarkable that teachers‟ reflections and schools‟ debates on 
different ideas of democracy were neither observed nor cited in the interviews. This situation 
deserves to be highlighted, since it seems that Brazilian society more broadly is having for 
the first time since its re-democratization (30 years ago) a process of self-reflection about its 
democratic system, and the need for a political reform has been discussed in the media 
exhaustively.  
 
Though students‟ input on rules and curricula definition remains limited, some space for 
students to criticise the establishment does exist, though this is limited. Students from the 
private school frequently expressed the difficulty in establishing a dialogue with their head 
teacher, despite the practice of a project that holds weekly meetings between the head teacher 
and various groups of students. As students have expressed, this context fails to provide them 
with a proper voice. My observations of the school structure confirm a deep-rooted distance 
between students and the head teacher. It was noticed that her office is on a separate floor, 
and that she has two secretaries, facts that ingrain this distant contact. For this reason, the 
secondary school head teacher assumes an important role in bridging this gap, though still 
insufficient for creating a more horizontal dialogue. As two different students voiced: 
 
S1: There is much more [hierarchy] inside [our school] than in any other school.  
 
S2: I think that [the head teachers] pay more attention to parents than students.  
 
However, this school Students‟ Union seems to compensate this lack of communication 
through its active political involvement. Students fully supported and praised their 
representatives‟ activism: 
 
Normally, those who are concerned about the others are those who are part of the Students‟ 
Union or are classroom representatives. 
 
My observations confirm the students‟ union‟s activism. They distinguished themselves 
through establishing contact with me, and proposed to develop channels of support and 
collaboration. 
 
233 
 
Regarding these two issues, the existing situation in the two state-run schools is totally 
different: the implication of their Student‟s Unions is limited, whereas communication 
between students and head teachers happens in a more direct way. 
 
In one of the state-run schools, the Students‟ Union with direct elections was re-established 
two years ago, and its activities are still very limited, since there is not a culture in these 
regards. In the other, some interviewed students have shown total distrust in their Student‟s 
Union. One, for example, opined that: 
 
There is room [for criticism], because there is the Student‟s Union. But that Union is useless. 
[...] The only thing that they did for the school was to put some music on at break time, 
nothing else. 
 
In contrast to the private school, the head teachers and supervisors of the two state-run 
schools circulated through classrooms frequently and their offices were always open. These 
attitudes facilitated direct dialogue between students and managers. Moreover, a new policy 
implemented in state-run schools as part of the new Polytechnic Education was remarkable. It 
stimulated students to participate in their quarterly evaluations. Through these Participatory 
Councils, students had the opportunity to evaluate themselves, their teachers and their 
schools. As one student said: 
 
Now, all the class listens to the problems of the class, not just the representatives. And also all 
the class can give their opinions, not only them. 
 
All these reflections are focused on how schools stimulate students‟ fight for rights within the 
schools. The cultivation of such a civic value could be expanded to the development of 
students‟ fight for rights in the whole society domain. However, it was not possible to 
identify any trace of teachers‟ reflections about how to deal with students‟ anger, the 
importance of stimulating them to participate in demonstrations or practice civil 
disobedience. Even so, regarding the stimulus to participate in demonstrations, only one 
situation could be perceived. A history teacher of the poorest school called up, in a very top-
down way, students to participate in a demonstration against some government austerity 
policies. A type of assembly was organised in the playground, but basically only this teacher 
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expressed his view on the subject and invited the students to join him in the demonstration. 
Actions directly organised by students or through their Students Unions were not noticed. 
 
After analysing the extent to which students are stimulated to elaborate and criticise schools‟ 
rules and curricula, and mobilising themselves against unfair public policies, it is also 
important to think about how schools cultivate the willingness to obey rules. Thinking of 
internal rules and curriculum, in general, teachers and head teachers identify two main 
problems regarding this: lack of reflection on the reasons behind them; and lack of inspection 
over their enforcement. 
 
At the start of the academic year, teachers from the private school attended a lecture by 
Telma Vinha, professor at one of the most reputable universities in Brazil (Unicamp), on the 
importance of presenting reasons behind rules. The influence of her teachings is noticeable, 
as three of six teachers quote her ideas in this thesis‟ interviews accomplished three months 
after the lecture. One of them mentioned: 
 
We have a disruptive generation, with a critical view that do not accept simple rules. Wow, 
[Telma] made me think a lot. 
 
However, this private school teachers‟ awareness (motivated by these type of lectures and 
other activities) was not identified in the two state-run schools observed. Apart from one 
tangential mention regarding this, no other teacher from either two schools presented any 
kind of comment in this line of thought. 
 
In state-run schools, besides the lack of teachers‟ awareness regarding this issue, structural 
difficulties impede teachers in having students follow certain rules. The absence of regulated 
punctuality has allowed students to arrive very late or even skip their classes. Though one of 
the state-run schools has improvised the presence of a doorman, the other simply does not 
have such a person. As one student noted: 
 
There are rules [about arriving at the time], but I think that 90% of the students don‟t follow 
the rules. Especially because there is not a person, a doorman, to push. They enter the time 
they want, they leave the time they want.  
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Additionally, the constant lack of teachers makes their timetable completely erratic, which 
develops in students the idea that schedules do not need to be followed. The head teacher of a 
state-run school says: 
 
[There is] lack of teachers, teachers arriving late. Students demand this. Because I‟m always 
demanding punctuality. […] And they: “but teacher X arrived late, teacher Y doesn‟t come”.   
 
My observations in both state-run schools confirm these problems. In the poorest school, 
students were left without a Spanish and Integrated Seminar teacher for two months. 
Moreover, first classes regularly started with a 15-minute delay, as was the case in sequential 
classes throughout the day. In the private school, more than a five-minute delay were scarcely 
perceived. On average, students from both state-run schools were frequently left without 
instruction for an hour per day, in most cases due to teacher absence. Additionally, it was a 
common practice of state-run school teachers to “administer” two classes at once, which 
posed obvious quality issues and added to the psychological stress of teachers. Finally, in the 
poorest school, classes were usually attended by only half of the students enrolled, while in 
the private school, it was rare to notice even one absence. 
 
However, the private school‟s control over attendance through the use of doormen and 
monitors posed privacy problems for some students. Some of them complained about this: 
 
The school put a camera in the classroom. I think that is an abuse of privacy, even of the 
relationship between teachers and students. 
 
Finally, some changes in the way state-run schools evaluate their students led teachers to 
believe in the progressive decline of the importance of rules. Changes in Polytechnic 
Teaching evaluating policy have relaxed end-of-year passing criteria. This, according to 
certain teachers, diminishes students‟ commitments to their duties. As one teacher argued: 
 
A fundamental rule is punctuality. [...] In the past, when [the grading system was based on 
numbers], the student who handed in [his works] on the right day and time had not any 
discount in their grades. [...] Then, all students ran to hand in on time. With this new 
evaluation, the student knows that, if he didn‟t hand in today, he can hand in tomorrow, and 
so on. 
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Apart from these different school organisations, reflections on the importance of respecting 
rules for the development of a stable society were not identified. 
 
A last reflection on how the organisation of these specific schools helps in the transition from 
family to public sphere is focused on how these institutions establish a balance between 
cooperation and competition. Regarding this, it is quite clear that, in the private school, 
competition is strongly encouraged, as a teacher‟s quote exemplifies: 
 
We encourage the students to excel, to be the best. 
 
The secondary school head teacher of the private school acknowledged that competition is 
important for them. However, he claimed that, through stimulating the practice of sports, this 
virtue comes with others: 
 
[Through stimulating sports practice], the school has a very clear idea of working 
simultaneously on the issue of competitiveness along with other values such as respect, ethics, 
solidarity.  
 
The practices of both state-run schools go in the opposite direction. Two teachers from these 
two schools identified this and expressed frustration with this situation: 
 
T1: The school does not stimulate competition very much, on the other hand, the school, we 
warn [the students] that there is a competition in the world. In the university entrance 
examination, to get a job, there are selections there [...] And school must do this. 
 
T2: The competition is healthy. [...] School is dedicated to university access. And that access 
passes through the competition [...] And our school has failed [regarding encouraging 
competition]. 
 
Interestingly, both state-run schools seem to focus their activities on cooperation. This aim 
was presented by the head teacher of one of them: 
 
I believe that we work hard the issue of cooperation, more in state-run schools than in private 
ones that the cooperation is worked. 
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It is also worth mentioning that, according to some teachers, the state-run school system of 
assessment mentioned reinforces this gap. It is quite common to hear that a new state-run 
school‟s system of evaluation, which reduces the declared differences amongst students‟ 
performances, makes them study less, because they do not have grades anymore to reward 
their effort: 
 
Today, [...] we don‟t give any priority for the student who studied, [...] the student who [used 
to score] top marks, who did everything, who should be appreciated. 
 
In the private school, on the other hand, students are rewarded when they have good 
“academic performance”. As a dialogue amongst three of its students shows: 
 
S1: There is a prize [if you have good academic performance]. 
S2: It depends on your score at the end of the year. It is not a competition, buuuut… 
S3: If you give your best, then you win. 
 
Such competition helps them to have a better performance in university admission tests, 
which enlarges the opportunities gap between private and state-run students. 
 
Moreover, another characteristic of all systems of assessment is that they rarely reward 
students who cooperate. Only one teacher of sociology from a state-run school clearly 
mentioned that he includes cooperation in his evaluations: 
 
Durkheim also said that what constitutes society is, as well, this solidarity chain amongst 
individuals. [...] Obviously, you have to have this notion of collectivism. [...] Part of my 
evaluation is qualitative. 
 
A student from the private school, on the other hand, denounces what seems to be usual 
practice in all three schools, mainly at his own: 
 
Officially, [cooperation amongst students] never had any recognition. 
 
11.4. How the narrow official curriculum is applied 
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After observing some evidences of the Brazilian education system and schools on students‟ 
development of civic virtues, the specific syllabuses oriented to cultivate civic virtues are 
analysed. In general, it can be said that the fact that there is not a specific subject responsible 
for discussing these issues associated with the lack of teachers‟ general preparation on these 
regards makes what this thesis calls narrow official curriculum ineffective in cultivating civic 
virtues. The scenario is, however, complex and deserves a careful analysis. 
 
First, through examining the development of schools‟ National Curricular Guidelines (10.2), 
it is remarkable that Brazil‟s official secondary schools‟ curriculum does not include a 
subject called “citizenship education”, as is the case in England, France and other countries 
(9.1). However, in the private school observed, the primary level dedicated one hour per 
week to discuss students‟ conflicts and to promote certain virtues through general class 
assemblies. Moreover, their idea is to expand this practice for the older students. On the other 
hand, the construction of state-run schools‟ official curricula depends largely on states‟ 
government decisions, and such a subject was not introduced. 
 
Though no subject is specifically designated to teach these virtues, school communities 
believe that some subjects are oriented to implicitly cultivate citizenship. In the schools 
observed, 18% of teachers who answered the questionnaire consider that this subject actually 
exists. This assumption is presumably rooted in these teachers‟ impression and understanding 
of subjects such as philosophy and/or sociology. When asked about explicit curricula that 
develops civic virtues in students, a state-run school teacher said: 
 
I see all the time philosophy and sociology teachers approaching [the development of moral 
values]. 
 
It is possible to explain why school communities‟ belief that philosophy and sociology are the 
main subjects responsible for developing citizenship education. In 10.1, it was discussed that, 
during the Dictatorship in Brazil (1964-1985), philosophy and sociology were “replaced” in 
basic curriculum by a subject called “moral and civic education”, which was used for 
spreading propaganda of that regime. Then, after re-democratization, in 1993, moral and civic 
education was banished from the curriculum and, in 1996, the Brazilian Guidelines and Bases 
Law of Education (LDB – Lei de Diretrizes e Bases) associated philosophy and sociology 
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knowledge with citizenship education (Article 36). In 2008, these subjects were considered 
mandatory, though their syllabuses were not focused on citizenship education. Thus, many 
people think that the main purpose of philosophy and sociology is to discuss citizenship. 
 
Observing teachers‟ and students‟ discourses, all subjects labelled by the name of humanities 
(philosophy, sociology, history and geography) are broadly considered by most as oriented to 
teach citizenship. For example, a history teacher endorsed the association of her subject with 
citizenship debates: 
 
If I don‟t discuss [gay rights] here, will it be up to the physics teacher? Yes, he can discuss it, 
but it is not from his syllabus, it‟s not his cup of tea. It is my cup of tea. 
 
Interestingly, “gay rights” is not part of history syllabus, but this teacher “unofficially” (as 
discussed in 11.5) introduces such issue in her discussions, since she considers herself able to 
do so. 
  
However, as equally discussed in 10.2, curricular guidelines presented by different 
governments in the last 20 years claim that all subjects, rather than only the humanities, 
should participate in cultivating civic virtues. Indeed, such guidelines have defended the need 
to cultivate moral and civic virtues through cross-curricular themes activities developed 
across all subjects (Brasil, 1997; 2013, p.187). 
 
Even so, this rarely happens in subjects such as mathematics, Portuguese or natural sciences. 
In the interviews, even when directly asked about them, few teachers and students cited any 
related activities. Teachers from the private school often mentioned the pressure for 
developing syllabus specific to the demands of university admission exams. One of them, for 
example, said: 
 
The teacher‟s problem is almost always the same: we have a prison, which is the vestibular 
[the university admission test].  
 
Teachers from state-run schools also develop only a few interdisciplinary activities, but for 
different reasons. Given the low salaries these teachers receive, they have to work much more 
hours and do not have extra time to develop new ideas. For these reasons, it is very difficult 
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for state school teachers to organise meetings to discuss existing and potential avenues of 
interdisciplinary activities.  
 
In addition to being unable to run interdisciplinary activities, teachers seem to be unqualified 
to teach citizenship. Only 30% of teachers from the schools observed considered themselves 
well trained to discuss citizenship with their students, while 35% considered themselves 
completely unprepared. These data are aligned with the literature on this subject. As Vinha, 
for example, says, in Brazil, “very few undergraduate courses effectively address, in their 
curricula, contents related to the development of autonomy and moral education in a 
systematised way” (2017).  
 
Careful exploration of this issue in the interviews further revealed that almost all teachers and 
head teachers admit that they are not at all prepared to deal with this syllabus in their 
classrooms. As the secondary school head teacher of the private school said: 
 
The secondary school teacher received, most of time, preparation for being a mathematician, 
chemist, physicist, biologist, historian, and very little emphasis is on questions related to 
pedagogy and cross-curricular discussions. And he has many difficulties to insert into the 
classroom issues like violence, alcohol, drugs, “homosexualism”. 
 
Reflecting specifically on the syllabus related to civic knowledge suggested in 9.7, it was not 
observed any development of knowledge of constitutional and civic rights, or notions of 
economics, individuals‟ psychology, etc. Only Western and Brazilian history are part of 
schools‟ curricula. Even the way that the history of peoples who formed Brazil is discussed is 
questionable. African and American Indian history is almost ignored, though current debates 
on the amplification of it in formal curriculum are happening (10.3). 
 
Besides, teachers‟ reflections on three concepts related to equality of opportunities – equality, 
liberty and meritocracy – were, then, investigated. In general, they showed very restricted 
knowledge about these ideas. Related to this, the attention given by the three schools for 
reflections on the concepts of equality and liberty was almost unperceivable. Investigations 
on such concepts are not in the official curriculum, and most teachers do not show enough 
knowledge to lead discussions on them. Of course, sometimes teachers mention equality and 
liberty in their classes. However, at least in the classes observed, no one presented any 
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reflection on their meanings, even less the relation of them with equality of opportunities. 
During the interviews, as mentioned above, only one mentioned that the opportunities of rich 
and poor people in Brazil are very unequal. 
 
Reflections about merit – actually associated with the idea of equality of opportunities – were 
a bit more present in the interviews, however, quoted only by a few of them. The two most 
interesting teachers‟ comments about this point were: 
 
T1: Meritocracy doesn‟t fit the Brazilian reality. Maybe [it fits the reality of] several countries 
like US, that is the great seller of this idea, or GB, which offers good basic education for all 
people.  
 
T2: The reality is: who has more money put [their children] in the best school. [..] There is not 
meritocracy, there is no merit in being son or daughter of rich people. 
 
Yet, when teachers were asked if their schools promote debates on merit and on the 
difference of quality between state-run and private schools, they claim that such things do not 
happen. This fact indicates that deep theoretical discussions on economic inequalities are not 
promoted in any of the schools in this study. 
 
This was also the case for general theoretical discussions on equality of rights between, for 
example, people with different sexual orientations. Most teachers said that they usually do 
not approach this theme. One added that he felt frustrated with the omission of reflecting 
about these “progressive” questions within his (private) school: 
 
I think [LGBT rights] are too little [discussed]. [...] The institution [school] doesn‟t discuss 
these frontiers of thinking of civil society. 
 
Critical thinking is presented in 9.7 as one of the main syllabuses to be developed in schools. 
Unlike the development of values like compassion, it is rare to find someone against 
cultivating critical thinking. Even so, critical thinking was not perceived as central to the 
curriculum. No one, for example, drew attention to the importance of learning how to learn. 
Moreover, there is not a dedicated subject focused on cultivating critical thinking skills, and, 
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when such a syllabus is developed in subjects like languages, this is much more the result of 
certain teachers‟ individual initiatives, as discussed in 11.5.  
 
Nevertheless, the private school made some effort in this regard. As the head teacher of the 
secondary education said: 
 
We are also working to establish a group for debates. […] We don‟t want the discussion for 
the sake of it: I think this, I think that. No! [We want to know] what the authors who defend 
such points of view think.  
 
However, while this project is emerging in the private school, it remains absent in the state-
run ones. 
 
11.5. How unofficial curriculum is applied 
 
The underlying impression concluded from the descriptions of 11.3 and 11.4 iterates the 
dysfunctional integration of citizenship education within official curricula. Teachers have 
attempted to compensate for this gap through a limited number of “unofficial curriculum” 
initiatives. In the interviews, teachers describe two types of individual initiatives towards 
citizenship education: direct practices that help students to develop some virtues; and 
adaptations of the syllabus to talk about certain issues. A teacher from one of the state-run 
schools presented an example of this first initiative. She reported an action that produced a 
good result, and involved students with social causes: 
 
[A certain teacher] is collecting food to take to Padre Cacique Nursing Home.  
 
However, it was not possible to identify any other similar initiative through observations or 
interviews.  
 
The other type of practice occurs during classes. Some teachers adapt their syllabus to talk 
about civic virtues. A Portuguese teacher from the private school, for example, said that she 
usually presents texts about controversial issues like adoption by same-sex couples in order to 
develop critical thinking. 
 
243 
 
Though uncommon, a few similar individual initiatives were identified in other observations.  
 
Beyond introducing political debates to classrooms, certain teachers presented their personal 
political views to students. There is a longstanding debate in Brazil on whether teachers have 
the right to do this. This point is treated theoretically in 9.8, in which three different attitudes 
towards this (neutral chairman, balanced approach, state commitment) are discussed, and is 
further developed in the next and final chapters. The intention of this section, however, is 
only to present some teachers‟ existing practices regarding this. Some promoted political 
discussions, but assumed the position of the neutral chairman, as described by a private 
school teacher: 
 
A priori, I‟m in favour [of same-sex couples adoptions], insofar as we have so many orphans 
in the world. [...] This only touches [my] classes. [...] I, particularly, avoid giving my opinion, 
[...] not only about this issue, but in political issues.   
 
However, in the same school, another teacher also discusses politics, but assuming an 
opposite behaviour. She described her practice thus: 
 
During my time as teacher, I have always presented my [political] positions. And until now, I 
have not had major problems. I have always worked in important schools, in private schools, 
exactly for opening up this possibility. 
 
On the other hand, in the two state-run schools, teachers have many more opportunities to 
present their own political opinions. First, since they are public servants, they have stability 
and are not afraid of any pressure from parents or their managers. Moreover, their own 
oppressive conditions, as well as those of their students, incentivise them to fight for more 
equality. Finally, parents are quite absent, and few complain against such practices. This 
environment creates conditions for some teachers to strongly present their political ideas, as 
one history teacher assumed to do: 
 
I fight against all prejudices, I fight everyday against sexism, [...] against prejudices of 
gender, ethnicity, race. [...] I bring many daily issues, situations that happened, and I align 
[these things] with more academic theories. [...] I talk on the issue of inequality that is the 
great motive for violence.  
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Related to this, during my observations in the poorest state-run school, I identified some 
political actions led by this teacher. He mobilised students at the playground to protest 
against austerity policies calling them up to participate in a demonstration.  
 
11.6. How hidden curriculum is “applied” 
 
The last dimension of schools‟ curricula related to the cultivation of the sense of citizenship 
is called “hidden curriculum”. As discussed in 9.8, such a curriculum is usually mentioned to 
criticise school practices which keep structures of power that harm the worst-off. Here, 
however, positive and negative elements of hidden curriculum are investigated. As section 
11.3 presents, the processes of elaborating, criticising and applying rules and curricula are 
connected with the development of students‟ civic virtues. Such development prepares 
students to actively participate in democratic societies. However, depending on how schools 
practices really happen, they can either reiterate the status quo or stimulate new ideas towards 
building a more just society. Here, the ways teachers challenge students to think about the 
status quo and to project their futures are analysed. 
 
At the beginning, it is important to highlight that some teachers express several concerns 
about how certain sectors of society, mainly the media, cultivate in young people values that 
make them to perpetuate unjust structures. Two examples of these concerns are presented: 
 
T1: The lack of interest in politics happens because people are politically illiterate. And this is 
a project [...] of Capital. [...] [The capitalists] dominate the major media, which makes people 
get into these individualistic fights. 
 
T2: State-run schools have been gradually run down, and this is the fruit of a project, this is 
not by chance. It is increasingly a way to transform the masses, to increasingly dumb them 
down, to make them increasingly stupid. The more stupid, the easier they are to control. 
 
It is mentioned in 6.1 that mass media, certain organisations of civil society (such as Neo-
Pentecostal churches) and family attachments have a huge influence on Brazilian people‟s 
behaviours in the social/public sphere. In 9.4, the school is presented as an institution that 
should counterbalance this influence. 
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Regarding this, the two teachers mentioned above have slightly different interpretations of 
what has been the role of schools in societies that are strongly influenced by the media. 
Whilst the former believes that schools are places that fight against this status quo, the latter 
understands them only as its by-product: 
 
T1: State-run schools, in general, [...] stimulate collectivism, but this is a very difficult 
practice, because we have to combat our strong enemy, which is much stronger than us: the 
television. 
 
T2: There is certain hypocrisy of thinking that the school can change society. [...] It would be 
weird the school producing vanguard and inquiring people. It was not for this that it was born. 
[...] It is a production line of minds. 
 
The first opinion – which defends that the school stimulates cooperation – is shared by most 
of the 18 teachers interviewed, while the second – which understands school only as an 
instrument that perpetuates structures of powers – does not have another identifiable 
supporter amongst the interviewees. They believe that schools already help (though not 
decisively) students to understand, criticise, and fight against injustices, that is, to challenge 
the status quo. 
 
Nevertheless, students from all schools see hidden in teachers‟ practices an imposition of 
ideas, instead of stimulating free thinking. One student from the private school and another 
from the poorest school, respectively, presented similar impressions: 
 
S1: I don‟t feel encouraged to think, did you understand? It is something like paraphrase a 
thing that you already read. [...] I think that we should think more about what we learn.  
 
S2: Sometimes there are teachers that think that the guy [...] is bad mannered, because the guy 
said something. But the guy didn‟t have bad manners, he wanted to dialogue. He wanted to 
say that that thing is not right, that is wrong. He wants to give his opinion. 
 
The supervisor of one of the state-run schools, however, does not consider teachers‟ practices 
as the origin of this lack of students‟ critical attitude. In the following claim, she summarised 
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a general impression of teachers that associated the lack of critical thinking with the apathy of 
students: 
 
One of the issues that I see in this year is the relation that these students have with the 
government. It is a relation of fatalism, like “I can‟t do anything, I can‟t act, it is impossible”. 
 
This lack of activism is reinforced (or at least not reduced), since many teachers avoid 
discussing these issues. They do not even assume the position of a neutral chairman, the 
attitude of promoting political debates but not presenting any position. Related to this, as 
presented in 11.5 there is a huge debate in Brazil on whether teachers should present their 
political positions to their students, that is, to be stated committed. Through my observations, 
it was possible to perceive that some state-run school teachers, mainly those from the 
humanities, presented certain political views to their students. They cannot be fired and they 
are also poor, things that make them fight more for change. This does not mean that private 
school teachers do not present their political opinions. Actually, it was observed, that most of 
the time these teachers were equally pro social change. Even so, some of the latter are afraid 
of losing their jobs, since they feel that their opinions can collide with parents‟ ideas on 
justice. It is possible to say that this fear is hidden in the private school‟s curriculum. Without 
threatening any teacher, though reinforcing that political positions have to be balanced, the 
head teacher of the private school in the interview explicitly said:  
 
[At our school, the teacher] has to show the different sides of the story. One cannot frame an 
issue on ideological bias. [...] The teacher can only say what socialism is, but he or she cannot 
say that socialism is good or bad. 
 
Regarding these two different practices, it is possible to identify two hidden practices. On the 
one hand, in the private school, parents‟ and community‟s pressures discourage teachers to 
present their ideas of justice. On the other, state-run school teachers, many times, apply a 
“hidden curriculum” through cultivating their political ideas on the students without an 
appropriate dialogue with them. The example presented in 11.5 of a teacher that called 
students up to participate in a demonstration is emblematic.  
 
Interestingly, however, it is clear that this teacher moves students from their passivity, a 
problem identified in the above by a supervisor of the other state-run school. Actually, 
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students tended to appreciate his practices, and usually referred to him as a teacher concerned 
with their well-being: 
 
The teacher that I admire most here in the school is [the above mentioned one]. With him I 
learn loads. [...] He tells us that we have to fight for what we want, to fight for our rights.  
 
Besides schools‟ and teachers‟ hidden practices towards making students accept or question 
the status quo, some school actors‟ discourses and procedures that are fundamental in shaping 
students‟ future aspirations are also hidden in the curriculum. Regarding this, it is remarkable 
to notice that the private school prepares the future leaders, while the state-run schools try but 
are unsuccessful in preparing their students for the future. As a state-run school teacher said, 
leadership is intimately connected with the structural gap between the two types of Brazilian 
schools: 
 
Why is state-run schooling so precarious? Because it is not interesting that people think. [...] 
There is a private school oriented to prepare leaders, and a state-run school oriented to prepare 
subalterns. And this is not in the project, it is not in the curriculum, but it is evident at the 
practice. 
 
In this study, the practice of preparing leaders was being institutionalised in the private 
school through a project called “The Leader in Me”112 which aimed at developing in its 
students virtues linked to leadership. It is interesting to highlight that half of the private 
school teachers interviewed explicitly mentioned the vocation of the school to prepare future 
leaders. As three of them claimed: 
 
T1: [At Farroupilha, students] are extremely competitive and encouraged to compete, 
knowing that they will be the leaders that will give orders. 
 
T2: Because [students] have a very high purchasing power, they will fill in a role of taking 
decisions within society. At least, we expect this. It doesn‟t mean that the others cannot, 
anyway, but they already have a predisposition for this, by the fact their parents have much 
                                                          
112
 “The Leader in Me” is an international platform which helps schools to develop leadership skills in “every 
student”. In its website (http://www.theleaderinme.org/what-is-the-leader-in-me/), these skills are identified as: 
leadership, responsibility, accountability, problem solving, adaptability, communication, initiative and self-
direction, creativity, cross-cultural skills, teamwork. 
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money. [...] School has tried to promote a reflection [on moral values], not only with students, 
but with the school community in general. 
 
T3: When I talk [on issues linked with Geography], I‟m thinking of the student that will be a 
politician, [...] engineer or architect [...], lawyer [...], doctor. 
 
In the first quote, it is possible to identify a strong influence of a certain type of neoliberal 
ethos behind this stimulus for developing competitive skills. Such an influence cannot be 
perceived in the second one. On the contrary, the fact that students will probably be leaders 
makes this teacher realise that it is even more important to cultivate moral values in them. 
Additionally, in the private school, students are involved in projects like “Junior 
Achievement” which focuses on shaping future entrepreneurs113. This emphasis is evident in 
the third statement which shows the focus of this private school on preparing skilled workers 
and policymakers. 
 
Actually, in the private school, political leaders‟ preparation was clearly identifiable. This is 
exemplified by the importance given by students, teachers and managers to its Student Union. 
Some practices also corroborate this, such as one described by a geography teacher: 
 
I put it, I make a point of putting the student in the place of a mayor, a town planner, a 
construction secretary and thinking about the city in the long run. 
 
It is interesting to notice the completely different realities of students attending the poorest 
school. In general, they present much lower ambitions. Some students, for example, consider 
not finishing their secondary school: 
 
S1: If they were not forced by their parents, most would stop studying. In a thousand students 
here, [...] it would have only a hundred studying.   
 
S2: One is formed [at the primary school], one already knows the things, [...] already learned. 
Several people sometimes leave school because of this. Because they have to work. 
 
                                                          
113
 The project‟s official website (https://www.juniorachievement.org/web/ja-usa/home) says: that “Junior 
Achievement‟s Purpose” is to “inspire and prepare young people to succeed in a global economy”. 
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The fact that many students from the poorest school in this study start working during 
secondary school (and nobody from the private one) implies less time for them to study and 
acquire fundamental knowledge to obtain good jobs. As the head teacher of this school 
commented, students‟ inclination towards consumerism and their feelings of immediacy 
stimulate them to start working so early: 
 
Sometimes they think that they need that money to buy a fashion trainer, but cannot see the 
other side: what they could gain if they pass that time studying and preparing themselves for a 
certain undergraduate course. 
 
In the other state-run school however, only few students work. In fact, many take university 
admission tests seriously. Two reasons are behind this difference between the two state-run 
school students: on average, its students are richer and have less need to earn money; and, 
since the affirmative action for students from state-run schools were implemented, they now 
have a real chance of being admitted – this does not happen with students of the poor school, 
because, on average, they do not have even the minimum grades to be approved. 
 
*** 
 
Chapter 11 is based on primary data collected during three months of observations in some 
Brazilian schools. The five different levels of curriculum proposed in chapter 9 are observed 
separately in order to show how citizenship education happens. Only an initial analysis of this 
process is carried out in order to establish a comparison with what is ideally proposed 
(chapter 9) and the laws determined (chapter 10). From this comparison, and with some 
teachers‟ and students‟ suggestions (chapter 12), a feasible theory of curriculum is outlined in 
the conclusion.  
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12. How citizenship education should happen in Brazil (from school actors’ 
perspectives) 
 
As a complement to the theoretical-practical analysis on citizenship curriculum, this thesis 
presents some school actors‟ ideas on how civic virtues should be taught/cultivated. Such 
ideas are important for two reasons. First, views of teachers and students based on their daily 
classroom practices dialogue with the debate about citizenship education by presenting more 
feasible ideas related to this than theoretical academic work which rarely engages with these 
realities. Moreover, though certain teachers‟ and students‟ ideas on this are superficial and 
sometimes misleading, it is important to take these reflections into account. In this case, such 
knowledge becomes additional data about how things in schools happen and how schools 
actors think towards teaching/cultivating citizenship. In order to accomplish these things, the 
present chapter starts (12.1) by reflecting on teachers‟ and students‟ overall ideas about the 
most important civic values that should be encouraged at home and at school. Then, school 
actors‟ impressions on (12.2) how the Brazilian education system (supra official curriculum) 
and schools‟ internal structures (wide official curriculum) should be organised to promote 
citizenship education are taken into account. Following this, (12.3) their proposals of 
syllabuses and subjects related to citizenship (narrow official curriculum) that should be 
developed are presented. Finally, (12.4) school actors‟ opinions on how to promote civic 
values through individual initiatives (unofficial curriculum) are also investigated. 
 
12.1. Overall view 
  
At the beginning, it is interesting to present a very wide view on teachers‟ and students‟ main 
ideas about what should be taught/cultivated at schools regarding citizenship education. 
Analysing the questionnaires, it is possible to identify an overall idea that citizenship 
education should be further developed. The answers to some pre-established questions have 
shown that about 85% of teachers and 75% students agreed that schools should have more of 
an impact on teaching/cultivating citizenship virtues
114
. From the answers to other oriented 
questions, it is possible to perceive that the vast majority of them also agreed that schools 
should encourage, more than they do, students‟ critical thinking, solidarity, respect for rules, 
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 Of course, this result was predictable and probably is similar all over the world, since people are normally 
not satisfied with education in general. However, it still is data that reinforce the point presented. 
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political awareness and fighting for rights. At least 90% of teachers and students defended 
these ideas. The only slightly different pattern was identified in private school students‟ 
impressions about political awareness, where a lower number, 76%, believed that the school 
should encourage this. 
 
The first two questions of the questionnaires appealed to a different strategy. They were 
open-ended and asked teachers and students to write what they consider the three most 
important citizenship virtues that, respectively, should be encouraged at home and in school. 
More than one hundred different answers were presented. A few of these ideas were 
preponderant (that is, cited by at least 10% of teachers and/or students). This list is composed 
of the following virtues: respect, education/manners/upbringing
115
, solidarity, ethics, honesty 
and responsibility: 
 
 
Teachers say that it should be 
encouraged at 
Students say that it should be 
encouraged at 
 
Home School Home School 
Respect 73% 59% 83% 59% 
Education/manners/upbringing 18% 15% 45% 34% 
Solidarity 38% 26% 12% 10% 
Ethical behaviour 20% 24% 4% 6% 
Honesty 22% 11% 19% 12% 
Responsibility 11% 11% 7% 8% 
 
The analysis of answers does not make clear whether teachers and students differ in their 
views as to which virtues that should be cultivated at home compared to those that should be 
cultivated in school. Normally, the quotations presented the same values as those that should 
be taught/cultivated at both. A claim from the head teacher of one of the state-run schools 
summarises a very common idea about this: 
 
I cannot separate values [in two types]: these which have to be worked with in schools and 
those in families. In my view, it is a continuity. Bases are seeded at home, and these values 
have to be enlarged at school. 
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Moreover, it is possible to identify a lack of respondents‟ deep reflection through analysing 
the main answers of the two open-ended questions. For example, “respect” was by far the 
most quoted virtue that, in their views, should be encouraged both at home and in school. 
However, due to the limitations of the survey design, it is not clear whether most respondents 
shared the same idea of respect. In the interviews, the predominance of this idea could also be 
perceived, but teachers‟ and students‟ precise understanding of respect lacked clarity. Whilst 
some defended that students should obey parents‟ and teachers‟ orders, others expressed that 
students should tolerate and accept people who think and behave differently from them.  
 
“Educação” was the second most cited civic virtue. However, in Portuguese, this term can 
mean not only “education”, but also “manners” and “upbringing”, that is, everything that 
parents and teachers/schools transfer to children and learners in general. Thus, no doubt, this 
term is even more undefined than “respect”. This lack of precision makes students quote this 
concept much more than teachers, since the former have more difficulty in elaborating their 
ideas. 
 
As also presented above, “solidarity” is, as well, highly cited. Differently from the other two 
concepts, the definition of solidarity seems to be more precise: something like “helping other 
people in general”. It is interesting to notice that most people cited this concept, while few 
appealed to ideas like “altruism”, “fraternity”, “care”, “compassion” and “empathy”.  
 
“Ethical behaviour” was highly cited by teachers as a virtue that should be encouraged. 
Students, in a much smaller number, also recalled this idea. Though not as ambiguous as 
“educação”, “ethical behaviour” is also very difficult to define. However, it is worth realising 
that a higher number of teachers and students considered school as the appropriate place to 
encourage such a virtue, and this fact may indicate that ethical behaviour is seen by them as a 
type of correct attitude towards the community in general. 
 
“Honesty” – and associated ideas such as sincerity, integrity, truth – was equally highly cited 
virtue. Such a virtue, it is worth saying, is constantly mentioned in the media, since Brazil is a 
country with high levels of corruption in different sphere. Related to this the introduction 
mentions research from Latinobarómetro Corporation (2010) which says that Brazilians have 
very low level of trust in their institutions. 
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“Responsibility”, the sixth most cited concept, also deserves to be mentioned. As with most 
of the others, it is a very ambiguous concept. It could mean, at least, our responsibilities 
“towards our personal tasks” or “towards the well-being of the others and the environment”.  
 
From these analyses, the first impression is: citizenship education is considered very 
important for most school actors, but they do not have a clear idea of what it means. The 
following sections pay more attention to how teachers and students understand these concepts 
and present with more detail their suggestions about how to implement civic education in 
schools. 
 
12.2. How supra and wide official curricula should
116
 be applied 
 
This section explores discussions related to wide official curriculum, since almost nothing 
was said in the interviews and questionnaires about the connection between the way that the 
current education system is carried out and citizenship education. In the interviews, when 
directly asked if all students deserve schools with the same quality, only one teacher said that 
parents who desire to pay for a better school should have this right; the other teachers 
defended the same quality of education for all. This opinion was also held amongst managers 
and students. 
 
Reflections on how the educational system could impact on students‟ civic knowledge, 
however, were quite rare. For example, only one teacher suggested that an unequal system 
sends a wrong message about justice and equality of opportunities for students.  
 
Changing the focus from supra to wide official curriculum, in the questionnaires and 
interviews, it was not very easy to identify suggestions on how schools‟ organisational 
structures could help students to develop certain civic virtues. Few new procedures were 
proposed. At the beginning, it is worth mentioning that almost none associated school 
procedures towards democratic participation with citizenship education. Only one teacher 
(among 74) and three students (among 285) mentioned “political awareness” (or some 
concept directly correlated) as one of the three most important civic virtues that should be 
encouraged at schools. At the interviews, this idea was only identified in a very broad way.  
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On the other hand, ways to enhance student‟s autonomous choices were vindicated by some 
students and teachers. In the open-ended section of the questionnaire, very few respondents 
mentioned the concepts of liberty or autonomy as one of the most important values to be 
encouraged in schools. In the interviews, some approached indirectly the importance of 
autonomous choices when they defended the idea of students choosing, at least partially, their 
own subjects. One student, from the private school, and one teacher, from a state-run school, 
respectively, proposed: 
 
S: [The school] should have all the basic subjects, but some of them you should choose. Like 
in the US, where you can advance in mathematics if you want.  
 
T: A school should not be formatted. It should have guidelines, but completely flexible. […] 
It is useless for me to come here to teach the beauty of Beethoven‟s works, if the guy likes to 
listen to funk. 
 
However, if stimulating democratic practices was not something that school actors strongly 
defended, on the other hand, when directly asked, almost all teachers were in favour of 
encouraging students to respect rules. Interestingly, most students are also in favour of this 
(94% in the private school and around 80% in state-run schools). However, though they 
massively agreed on the issue of respecting rules, again, only one simple suggestion was 
presented in the interviews: to respect deadlines. 
 
At the same time, also when directly asked, at least 90% of teachers and students think that 
students should be stimulated by the school to fight for their rights. However, apart from one 
teacher that actively stimulates his students to participate in demonstrations (mentioned in the 
previous chapter), no other suggestions on how to do this were presented.  
 
Regarding the development of empathy, surprisingly, this idea was spontaneously mentioned 
very few times by schools‟ actors as something that should be cultivated in schools. Three 
suggestions towards developing (cognitive) empathy, however, can be presented. The first is 
an activity already implemented in the private school (and mentioned in the previous 
chapter). After describing a project in which students were appointed to represent different 
countries in simulations of UN debates, the head teacher of secondary education said:  
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This has a fantastic result. Because sometimes we have students who condemn certain 
positions, but who are forced to develop arguments of protection, defence of the same 
position.  
 
The other two reflections presented by one student and one teacher, both from the private 
school, suggested the importance of integrating/engaging different social classes: 
 
S: What [school] should promote, but it doesn‟t, is to make [students] see other social realities 
beyond theirs. It is marvellous that foreign schools come here to lecture showing that they can 
study in England, Canada and US, but they don‟t know how Bom Jesus117 is, which is nearby. 
[…] It would be a very nice interaction. 
 
T: I think of practices like “From the school to life”. I think of bringing students to poor areas. 
[...] It would be a unique experience. When we live something, experience something, this 
marks us much more than a short rational memory that enters and leaves flying. 
 
School actors strongly defended the development of compassion/solidarity through formal 
education. More than 90% of teachers and 80% of students directly asked about this were in 
favour of the idea that solidarity towards unknown people should be encouraged at school. 
Solidarity was also highly mentioned in an open-ended question as one of the three most 
important virtues to be encouraged in schools (38% of teachers and 10% of students 
suggested this). However, few and unelaborated proposals on how to develop solidarity were 
presented in the interviews.  
 
Moreover, deep reflections on what empathy and solidarity really mean, and how (and if) 
these concepts can reinforce each other were rarely perceived. 
 
Concerning ideas on how to cultivate empathy and solidarity, reflections on how (and if) 
developing senses of competition and cooperation were also not deeply developed by school 
actors. Certain ideas, however, were presented. Through reflecting on this, no teacher 
presented any radical position against stimulating competition. Some said that the world is 
competitive, others that this behaviour is good for the whole society. On the other hand, all 
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teachers called attention to the importance of cooperation, and said that a central role of 
schools is to develop this virtue. Nevertheless, few proposals on how to achieve this were 
presented. Three teachers highlighted the vague idea that more group work should be 
promoted. The impact of the systems of assessment towards this received very few 
comments, as well. One private school teacher, however, proposed: 
 
Why do we not also evaluate students based on their citizen practices, everyday life 
interventions, collaboration?   
 
A different idea on how schools should be organised to develop civic virtues calls attention to 
the importance of their approximation with families. It is mentioned in 12.1 that most 
teachers and students did not differentiate the types of virtues that families and school should 
encourage. Even so, some teachers highlighted the importance of connecting schools and 
families in order to encourage closer ties between the former and society in general. As one 
state-run school teacher said: 
 
Basic school, in my view, is that which really brings parents into the school. Because you 
cannot implement an activity with children if you don‟t know the environment in which they 
live. […] Usual daily facts have to be brought to the classroom. 
 
In this way, a state-run school teacher ponders that, for example, the process of celebration of 
differences related to sexual orientation has to be promoted slowly, since family‟ 
environments are usually more conservative than schools, and can strongly oppose such 
radical changes:  
 
[The issue of prejudice against homosexuals] is getting better over the years. [...] You are 
going to break some paradigms while generations are renewed. I don‟t think it is easy to touch 
on this content now. [...] Maybe if you are more prudent, you can reach more people. 
 
A different understanding in this regards is, however, presented by a teacher form one of the 
state-run schools:  
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The school, indeed, has to work on the acceptance of [the fact] that human beings are diverse 
and that each one has his own path, his own characteristics, and has as many rights as I do, 
and there is not a standard individual, a normal one. 
 
12.3. How narrow official curriculum should be applied 
 
After reflecting on how teachers and students think that school environments should promote 
citizenship education, this section presents their opinions on how these virtues should be 
taught/cultivated through syllabuses and subjects. It, then, starts by analysing which kind of 
changes in the narrow curriculum they consider essential. In the questionnaires, five claims 
related to this were presented. These claims asked whether teachers and students agreed with 
expanding classes related to different areas of knowledge: sports, arts, humanities, sciences, 
and languages
118
. More attention to sports was defended by at least 69% of students of each 
school, and by at least 81% of teachers of state-run schools. However, 54% of the private 
school teachers were against it. There, sports projects are already very well developed and 
probably considered exaggerated by some. More attention to arts, humanities and languages 
was supported by at least 88% of teachers and 72% of the students in all schools. Regarding 
natural sciences and maths, the picture was a bit different. In general, among all the five 
areas of knowledge, maths and natural sciences were considered by school actors as those 
subjects that need being reinforced the least. In the private school, this difference was more 
evident: only 54% of its teachers considered that it should be better valued compared to 88% 
and 75% of the state-run schools; only 39% of private school students thought in this way 
against 67% and 48% of the state-run schools
119
. These data may show that knowledge in 
maths and in natural sciences – something very important for university admission tests – is 
quite well developed in the private school, but not in its state-run counterparts. Actually, it 
strengthens the idea presented in the previous chapter that private schools are much more 
concerned about preparing their students for competition. 
 
Through analysing this data, it is not easy to identify how strongly teachers and students 
claim for more humanities in the official curriculum. During the interviews, however, this 
fact became clear. Interestingly, even a physics teacher highlighted the importance of more 
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and languages. However, such a distinction presents an unnecessary (for these purposes) separation between 
mathematics and natural sciences, and diminishes the importance of arts and sports. 
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humanities in this process: 
 
It should be increased the number of hours of humanities‟ subjects like philosophy, sociology, 
history, geography, because they reflect much more. And, look, such a shot in my own foot: 
fewer hours of physics and chemistry. 
 
Students frequently agreed, with comments like the following from this state school student 
being common:  
 
There should be at least three hours of philosophy and sociology, which are subjects that 
make you think. 
 
After this broad view focused on curricular subjects, four claims were presented to teachers 
and students suggesting different alternatives on how civic virtues should be developed: 
through (i) a specific subject; (ii) transverse issues crossing (almost) all disciplines; (iii) 
direct interaction with social problems (for example, integrating students with voluntary 
works); (iv) a good organisation of the school (for example, demanding students to meet 
schedules and deadlines). Analysing their answers, most teachers (around 90%) and students 
(around 75%) said that citizenship should be taught/cultivated through transverse issues, 
direct interaction with social problems and better organisation of the school. However, while 
almost no teachers and only around 15% of students were against the practices mentioned 
above, more than 50% of teachers and 35% of students were against the implementation of a 
specific subject to discuss citizenship. Through the analysis of the interviews, these different 
ideas on how to teach/cultivate citizenship can be better understood. 
 
For those that considered that citizenship skills and knowledge could be cultivated through a 
specific subject, most school actors considered that humanities, mainly philosophy and 
sociology, should fulfil this task. For example, a private school student said: 
 
There should be at least one hour for [reflections and debates], did you understand? Though it 
would happen in philosophy or sociology classes, for us to debate about society.  
 
The idea of reinforcing critical thinking through creating a subject focused on it was 
identified in some other answers. 
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Analysing teachers‟ ideas about civic knowledge that should be taught/cultivated in schools, 
few points are aligned with what is suggested in 9.7. For example, only one teacher 
highlighted the importance of introducing knowledge about laws: 
 
It would be important that students studied more, for example, the Constitution, the Child and 
Adolescent Statute, Elderly People Statute. Anyway, all these norms of society for you to 
know your rights and your duties.  
 
In a different direction, some suggestions towards opening and connecting certain syllabuses 
with real social problems were presented. In the previous chapter, it is easy to identify in 
teachers‟ and students‟ claims criticisms related to what is being taught/cultivated through 
their official curricula. However, only few of them really brought creative new ideas, though 
all of them were directly asked to do this. Of these, some very interesting suggestions were 
presented: 
 
T1: I would start with nutrition education, respect to animals, even the issue of vegetarianism. 
[...] Depart from individualism to altruism. Think about what is good for the common good. 
Because of this, [we use the word] citizenship: citizen, city, live in community. [...] The 
question of safe traffic education, the question of environmental education, [...] taxes/fiscal 
education, [...] social education.  
 
T2: In my school, [students] would have classes of psychology, [...] of understanding on how 
they proceed, on how they react to emotions. I think it is very important. They would have 
nutrition education, what I put inside my mouth. They would have classes about where things 
come from, where this milk in the carton comes from. Basic things that would make them 
understand that things do not come from nothing. 
 
T3: We would have lots of gains if people had moments of reflection, moments of dialogue, 
even moments of meditation. 
 
In these three answers, deep reflections on self-knowledge and how societies should be 
structured were proposed. 
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When school actors were directly stimulated to say if they consider that schools should 
discuss issues related to redistribution of goods and equal rights among hetero and 
homosexuals, the vast majority of them were in favour of both. However, as already 
mentioned, it was rare to find a teacher‟s proposal encouraging the development of any civic 
virtue different from respect or solidarity. 
 
Regarding critical thinking, when teachers and students were directly asked if such a skill 
should be encouraged at school, they almost unanimously agreed. On the other hand, very 
few teachers and students (four in over 300 participants) put virtues connected with critical 
thinking in their list of the three most important civic virtues to be encouraged in schools. 
During the interviews, maybe because a direct question about the importance of critical 
thinking was presented, some school actors‟ interesting ideas have arisen. However, almost 
all of these suggestions came from the private school, where discussions and practices related 
to this seemed to be much more developed. Respectively, two students‟ and two teachers‟ 
reflections on the importance of critical thinking education deserve to be mentioned: 
 
S1: This class of International Relations. It is as we were doing a debate. I think that the 
school should have, at least a period for this. 
 
S2: [School] should have more discussion groups for us to develop our ideas, because, if a 
teacher says something (I am not saying everyone, but) some will stay with the thought that 
this is the only thing that exists. However, if you discuss with other people, maybe you will 
have a different idea. 
 
T1: It is not that affection is not important, but I think that we can be more effective on 
reflexive issues. […] Because, many times, it is not done in the family, between friends. Then, 
I think the school would be a more pertinent forum. 
 
T2: The main role [of the school] should be [to make] students know themselves and the 
others [...] in order to allow them to look around themselves more critically. 
 
However, even these teachers and students did not present suggestions on how to improve 
students‟ critical thinking. 
 
As a final strategy on how to develop civic virtues in schools, most teachers agreed that it is 
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helpful to connect different subjects through an interdisciplinary project. The idea of 
considering certain civic virtues as cross-curricular themes is in the core of interdisciplinary 
activities proposed by National Curricular Parameters (PCN, discussed in chapters 9 and 10). 
These parameters, however, were totally ignored in teachers‟ comments.  
 
12.4. How unofficial curriculum should be applied 
 
Proposals presented in 12.2 and 12.3 are associated with official curriculum. Some school 
actors, though rare, also suggested some individual initiatives that could be implemented 
beyond the official curriculum. These initiatives can be simply qualified as belonging to the 
unofficial curriculum, or can be taken as subversive and, in turn, considered hidden in the 
curriculum. The first reflection on this issue analyses how teachers should deal with political 
debates and students‟ political awareness. Few teachers mentioned points associated with the 
comparison between three different attitudes – stated commitment, neutral chairman and 
balanced approach – explored theoretically in 9.8. Even so, it is interesting to mention two 
opposed ideas about this point which were presented, respectively, by a private school 
teacher and a state-run school one: 
 
T1: Can‟t [a teacher] discuss party politics? C‟mon! Let‟s clarify this, we really have to 
discuss this! [...] It doesn‟t hurt. I have this position. I respect yours [students‟], as you have to 
respect mine. I‟m not a candidate for anything. 
 
T2: Teachers are opinion makers, and it is obvious that they will put forward what they think. 
But, as much as they can be exempted from that, I believe it is fundamental. [...] I avoid this, 
for example: “who did you vote for?” 
 
Interestingly, the teacher of the private school, where there are more restrictions regarding 
these practices, defends more liberty to present their political opinions. The state-run school 
teacher, on the other hand, considers that these issues should be developed with some care, 
maybe because she identifies some attitudes that are exaggerated. It was rare, however, to 
identify more teachers‟ opinions on this controversial point. 
 
Besides this controversy, a private school teacher presented another criticism regarding 
individual initiatives towards citizenship education. She defended that:  
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[Moral education] should be in the curriculum and systematised. Because we do this in our 
classes. But what if there was no time? [...] Teachers already do an individual work. But we 
don‟t have a homogeneous, organised work. For example, if I leave the school, it is not 
guaranteed that the teacher who will replace me will continue doing those kinds of things.  
 
However, some plurality of attitudes was viewed as positive by the supervisor of one of the 
state-run schools:  
 
There are teachers who can work with [moral issues] and can see this as part of the syllabus 
that they have to teach. I think that there is another part of teachers who define that this is not 
their role. […] But, even so those more traditional teachers have an important role, they can 
help to create a sense of organisation and give a sense of commitment. And a more open 
teacher can create a situation of more negotiation, more empathy. Then, I think that there is 
space for many types of action, for many values, worked by example or by discourse.  
 
This suggestion, thus, opens some room for the defence of more plurality in citizenship 
education. 
 
It is possible to go a little bit further in this analysis of such distinct attitudes, and present, 
based on teachers‟ impressions about how parents raise their children, three ideas on how to 
take affection into account during the educational process. The previous chapter suggested 
that some parents are too distant from their children, whereas others usually influence too 
much their sons and daughters. Because of this, teachers understand that they, somehow, 
have to act to balance it. Some teachers believe that they have to provide affection, others that 
they have to stimulate students to think critically. Most understand that they have to provide 
both. These different views, however, are not elaborated and no suggestion about how to 
develop more affection or reflectivity came with them. 
 
*** 
 
Chapter 12 is based on primary data collected during three months of observations in some 
Brazilian schools. The five different levels of curriculum proposed in chapter 9 are observed 
separately in order to show how, in the opinion of students, teachers and head teachers, 
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citizenship education should happen. An initial discussion of these opinions is provided to 
enrich the debate between an ideal proposal of citizenship curriculum and what is actually 
observed in schools.  
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PART FOUR: CONNECTING IDEAS 
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13. Conclusion 
 
After this long journey through theoretical approaches and empirical observations about 
justice and citizenship curriculum, it is time to join these different types of knowledge in 
order to answer this thesis‟ main research question: how can a dialogue between “feasible” 
ideas of justice and the citizenship curriculum contribute to building a more just society in 
Brazil? This conclusion, then, can be understood as an answer to this, since it is an example 
of a possible way to achieve this dialogue in order to offer useful reflections on how to 
improve justice in this country. The outlines of ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibria regarding 
reflections on justice and citizenship education, and the suggestion of how these equilibria are 
related to the theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium accomplished through this 
conclusion are examples that serve to answer the sub-questions proposed – SQ1: In what 
ways does the development of ideal proposals and empirical studies contribute to build 
“feasible” ideas of justice and citizenship curriculum? SQ2: What are the basic 
characteristics of “feasible” ideas of justice and the citizenship curriculum? SQ3: How can a 
“feasible” idea of justice and a “feasible” idea of citizenship curriculum improve each 
other? – and, in turn, the main question. Thus, at the beginning, (13.1) an ideal proposal and 
the Brazilian situation regarding the three suggested dimensions of justice are compared in 
order to forward some feasible improvements of reality. The achievement of these 
improvements depends on Brazilian people‟s possession of civic virtues. Consequently, 
(13.2) an ideal view of different levels of citizenship curriculum and the reality Brazilian 
educational system are also compared, equally aiming to present suggestions on how to 
ameliorate this reality. (Taken together, 13.1 and 13.2 answer SQ1 and SQ2.) Then, (13.3) it 
is proposed how these suggested feasible theories can favour the development of the 
theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium, though this equilibrium can only be achieved in 
public sphere. (13.3. answers SQ3.) At the end, (13.4) some general reflections about 
moderation and persuasion related to the approach chosen by this thesis are made in order to 
finalise by presenting the style of writing aimed throughout the whole thesis. 
 
13.1. Ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium towards improving justice in Brazil 
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Outlining an ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium of reflections of justice
120
 depends on 
balancing ideal proposals and the Brazilian reality regarding economic, cultural and decision-
making dimensions
121
. Through observing these three dimensions, it is possible to identify a 
huge gap between what is proposed theoretically (chapters 3 and 4) and what is practiced in 
Brazil (chapter 6). Brazilian laws regarding economic, cultural and decision-making 
dimensions are not sufficiently developed when compared to an ideal theory of justice. Taxes 
are regressively collected and redistributed, cultural minorities are not protected enough, and 
the democratic procedures disfavour a wider and more qualified participation of people. This 
comparison allows this section to outline an ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium in order to 
offer some directions towards proposing a feasible theory of justice. 
 
The economic dimension 
 
This analysis, then, starts by outlining an ideal proposal related to the economic aspect of 
justice. The reasoning developed in 4.3 suggests that reasonable neoliberal and welfarist 
theoretical proposals agree that equalising opportunities – differing people‟s earning only 
based on their choices and effort, rather than on their natural and social luck – should be 
balanced with preparing better those most talented and favour economic development. Such a 
balance produces a sensation of equality of opportunities and, at the same time, stimulates 
scientific and economic development, both characteristics that reinforce stability. However, 
while welfarists consider equalising opportunities – particularly through reducing the weight 
of social luck – more important, neoliberals understand that economic development is more 
important. Thus, the latter are more concerned with stimulating those more talented and those 
who are willing to choose professions which, though risky, can increase GDP and the goods 
of all, even if this can promote unequal final results.  
 
It is difficult to identify the optimal point between these two ideas. Even so, it is possible at 
least to realise that ordinary people understand equality of opportunities in a slightly different 
way than opposite ideal theories propose. As discussed in 5.2, ceteris paribus, individuals 
tend to accept that those who are born with more natural talent earn more, but do not consider 
fair that the same happens with those who simply belong to wealthy families. And this can be 
associated with the idea that stimulating those who are naturally talented increases the gains 
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of all, while allowing the advantages of those socially lucky only serves to maintain unfair 
privileges. Moreover, as also developed in 5.2, this defence of promoting equality of 
opportunities but stimulating competition is based on people‟s rational understanding of the 
existence of certain duties towards others, however limited by their higher natural concerns 
towards those close to them. 
 
Thus, a first step towards outlining a non-idealised theory regarding the economic dimension 
of justice seems to indicate that stability of Western societies based on values of equal liberty 
and communal responsibility demands a balance between equality of opportunities and 
economic growth. In this way, theoretically, taxes should be collected and redistributed 
progressively and be high enough to increase the opportunities of those who were born 
without social or natural luck, however without discouraging the most talented to achieve 
their talents or inhibiting entrepreneurship. 
 
The analysis of the current Brazilian situation in these regards, on the other hand, shows huge 
injustices. First, a historic structural gap between rich and poor people (6.2) has strong 
impacts on the current inequalities of wealth and opportunities, something reflected in the 
Brazilian position in Gini index list (6.4). Its regressive system of taxes increases these 
inequalities. Moreover, Brazil‟s “capitalism of ties” discourages entrepreneurship, and, in 
turn, economic growth. Brazil also has a low position in the GDP per capita list, mainly in 
comparison to high income countries. The invasion of private relations in public affairs is 
also very influential on determining who gets public positions in Brazil (6.2). Since political 
and scientific offices are many times chosen based on these influences, it is not difficult to 
conclude that this fact impacts negatively on Brazilian organisational and scientific 
developments.  
 
Thus, there are much higher inequalities of wealth and opportunities in Brazil than what is 
identified in developed countries. These inequalities have to be reduced, but Brazilian history 
cannot be ignored in this process. For example, Brazil‟s so called Citizenship Constitution 
(4.1) guarantees the right of wealthy parents to provide better education for their children 
(10.2). Theoretically, this seems wrong, but changing this is not simple in the Brazilian 
context, in which schooling is a consolidated business and there is a strong belief in the right 
of parents to guarantee the best they can for their children. However, at least reflections on 
the need for equalising opportunities can be enough to make policymakers more conscious 
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that they have to increase significantly investments in public education. In the same way, a 
progressive system of taxes has to be implemented. Theoretically, it seems obvious and 
totally feasible, if Brazilian socio-economic policies are similar to developed countries. 
Nevertheless, the fact that many Brazilians suspect that any proposal for greater taxation is 
subject to corrupt practices and does not lead to a great public benefits turns difficult to 
implement any type of increasing in taxes. In this way, and in order to stimulate genuine 
entrepreneurship, corruption has to be strongly punished and restrained. 
 
The cultural dimension 
 
Besides reflecting on the economic dimension, dealing with improvements in the cultural 
dimension is also an important task in order to improve justice. From a theoretical point of 
view (4.3), avant-garde proposals normally seem to be the correct ones. However, it is also 
important to realise that conservative views and practices about several issues are widely 
spread and cannot be simply disregarded in public debates. This is because it is also defended 
theoretically by this thesis the importance of reinforcing stability and respect to democratic 
decisions, something that depends on taking conservative views into account. Thus, for 
example, it is quite obvious to anyone operating with a broadly liberal commitment to 
freedom and human rights that heterosexual and LGBT community members should possess 
the same rights of heterosexuals, and that LGBT practices have to be celebrated. 
Nevertheless, conservative rejection of same-sex marriages has to be minimally taken into 
consideration, even because many people only have this view based on their burdens of 
judgment, rather than on any intrinsic bad intensions, such as keeping unfair status quo. 
 
Given this scenario, two different considerations have to be addressed. First, theories of 
justice have also to deal with the issue of recognition of minority groups, something related to 
overcome several unfair traditional practices. Thus, it makes sense to defend theoretically 
some policies towards recognising minorities (laws against prejudices, affirmative action, 
etc.), since it seems obvious that, given the existence of structural/traditional inequalities 
(sexism, racism, homophobia), governments have to intervene (not to be neutral) in order to 
reduce this. In 5.1, for example, evidence is presented that homophobia and racism do not 
have natural roots, but are social constructions. On the other hand, going in a completely 
different direction, if the aim is to engage most of the population in public debate, more 
conservative views of the development of culture have to be taken seriously. Individuals from 
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certain groups, such as older generations, people from rural areas, some members of religious 
communities, etc. take longer to accept new ideas (burdens of judgment). Thus, in order to 
keep stability, cultural changes could be defended in a more nuanced way than what is 
proposed by extreme avant-gardists. 
 
In this regard, at the beginning it is possible to say that Brazil is a quite united country. 
Though Brazil has almost the same area of Europe, 97% of its people speaks the same 
language and most of them have a certain pattern of customs, exaggeratedly moulded by 
private mass media (6.1). On the one hand, the social conditions of women, black people and 
LGBT members is much worse than the conditions of heterosexual white men (6.5). Though 
Brazil has a history of huge inequalities, the “coexistence of contraries” has avoided major 
conflicts between black and white, as well as between poor and rich (6.2). Conservative 
practices, increased by the expansion of Neo-Pentecostal churches and lack of education, are 
strong in maintaining sexism and homophobia (6.1). Regarding reducing all these prejudices, 
laws protecting women, black people and LGBT members have been created in the last two 
decades (6.5) as result of avant-gardists pressures.  
 
In Brazilian history, it cannot be said that the development of celebration of differences and 
overall integration has fared as badly as attempts to reduce inequalities of wealth and 
opportunities. Observing the current situation, Brazilian laws and policies seem to follow 
most of what have been implemented in developed countries where respecting minority rights 
is a well-established value. On the other hand, a series of problems related to remaining 
prejudices make the situation of minorities worse than in these countries. Thus, changes have 
to happen much more in civil society than in government policies. This is an ongoing 
process. Minorities have mobilised themselves (social networks are important tools towards 
this), and, through these mobilisation, they are gaining more voice in public sphere. However, 
it is important that black, feminist and LGBT movements realise that, though they are right in 
pressuring civil society for more recognition, current changes towards this should be taken 
with some care. Anger makes them aggressive, and these attitudes promote a reverse anger on 
the other side. Polarisation, instead of plurality and integration, is the result of this (4.1 and 
8.7). Given this scenario, the way to advance seems much more related to improvements of 
people‟s civic virtues, specially their capacity to protest peacefully. This point is discussed in 
13.2 and 13.3.  
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The decision-making dimension 
 
Finally, improving justice through keeping institutions and reinforcing stability depends on 
improving the decision-making dimension. Democracy is currently a consensual Western 
value. Related to this, it is suggested (2.4) that the stability of Western regimes depends on 
ordinary people feeling part of decision-making processes. On the other hand, constitutional 
limits on what can be democratically decided also help to guarantee stability (3.2). They 
make people trust that certain fundamental rights are respected and that social justice is based 
on certain principles. On the other hand, the discussion presented in 4.4 allows the 
identification of how an efficient democratic regime should be. First, representatives who 
have more time and skills than ordinary people to think about the importance of these things 
are fundamental. In addition, these people and their representatives have to take seriously 
experts‟ opinions, otherwise important knowledge that can help improvements of justice will 
not be instantiated. Finally, avoiding centralisation of power seems the best way to facilitate 
the dialogue between ordinary people, policymakers and specialists. In this way, 
parliamentarism is, then, defended as the best regime to connect these different actors. In 
addition to this final idea, a healthy representative regime depends on people really being 
represented. Inequalities of opportunities and recognition, however, cause inequalities in 
political representation. In some way, political systems should guarantee the representation of 
minorities, such as women and black people. 
 
The Brazilian political system, however, is too centralised, something directly associated with 
the tradition of personalism and concentration of power in the hands of few who rule the 
country. Interestingly, though this practice is one of the reasons of inequalities, even poor 
Brazilian people usually prefer strong leaders than a more decentralised structure of power. In 
this way, presidentialism is their favourite political regime, this option having historically 
defeated parliamentarism in popular consultations. Consequently, as a vicious circle, 
centralised historical practices prevent Brazilian people from developing democratic skills 
and values, since they tend to await top-down solutions for their problems, and this absence 
makes people believe in centralisation (6.3). 
 
The Brazilian situation regarding decision-making dimension is far from ideal. However, 
since there is still a widespread belief in the figure of a strong leader who will save the 
country, it is likely that changing the law towards parliamentarism and decentralisation of 
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power can be understood by citizens as an assault on democracy. Nevertheless, if currently 
such changes would not be well accepted by Brazilian people who would see them as giving 
even more power to untrustworthy policymakers, at least some improvements on how to 
connect voters and their representatives should be implemented. This change could be a way 
to prepare the terrain for more changes towards the ideal in the future. Moreover, in particular 
regarding this third dimension, citizenship education is fundamental to make people better 
participate in democratic processes, as explored in 13.2 and 13.3.  
 
13.2. Ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium applied to improve citizenship curriculum in 
Brazil 
 
The theoretical suggestions towards improving justice in Brazil should serve as a reference 
for ordinary people and policymakers to build their own ideas. In this way, though the 
theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium that balances these people‟s ideas and theories of 
justice only happens in the real public sphere, the proposal of a non-idealised theory 
presented above is the first step towards the achievement of this second reflective 
equilibrium. However, the limited development of certain (this thesis suggests seven) civic 
virtues
122
 makes Brazilian people not give a good contribution for the reduction of injustices 
in any of the dimensions cited. In other words, it makes them not be good agents of the 
theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium. Taking this into consideration, this section 
outlines another ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibrium in order to propose a feasible theory of 
how to develop those civic virtues in Brazilian people through five levels of citizenship 
curriculum
123
. This outline is the second step towards favouring theoretical-practical 
reflective equilibrium
124
. 
 
Supra official curriculum 
 
At the beginning, from a theoretical reflection, education policies (supra official curriculum) 
towards guaranteeing common schools with equal quality for all are defended (9.5). These 
schools have to be plural in order to engage different social groups and make each one 
celebrate those different from them. In this way, schools have to challenge certain values 
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learned at home, rather than reinforce them. Since parents and children have plenty of other 
spaces for interaction, and children are not property of their parents, the theoretical approach 
followed by this thesis considers that reducing the influence of the latter over the former is 
more than a possibility, it is a way to advance towards a society with more engagement and 
celebration of differences. Through this process, it is possible to expand the care ethics from 
the nuclear family to a wider and wider group. This “situation-oriented” procedure is part of 
the process towards reaching a more abstract sense of justice (5.3). This abstraction, however, 
is not absent of emotion, but is a type of emotion mediated by reason, something called 
“reasonableness”, “wisdom” or “great compassion” (5.2 and 8.5), and defended by this thesis 
as an important civic virtue. 
 
However, plural common schools with equal quality are far from being a reality in Brazil. 
Brazilian law allows the existence of basically two types of schools: private, on average, with 
much higher quality; state-run, normally with low quality (10.2). The system, then, 
obviously, does not promote equality of opportunities at all. This is an “anti-lesson” given by 
the system to the students (and the rest of the population) about citizenship (11.2). Moreover, 
as mentioned above, the lack of contact between rich and poor worlds damages the 
development of cognitive and emotional empathy, and, in turn, compassion and spirit of 
cooperation. In addition, it was possible to identify at least two other problems in the 
Brazilian education system regarding the cultivation of civic virtues. First, the preparation of 
teachers to deal with these issues seems very limited. Second, university admission tests 
hardly takes into consideration any civic virtue – only civic knowledge and critical thinking, 
but very superficially, though the current tests (ENEM) are amplifying some demands of 
these virtues. 
 
Given this scenario, implementing common schools in Brazil is hardly possible in the short- 
or medium-term. As mentioned above, any attempt to change completely a system would 
suffer different types of resistances from different groups, but this does not mean that nothing 
can be done. Regarding the impacts on citizenship education, such a reflection at least makes 
evident that differences in the school system impact negatively on the view of how just 
Brazilian society is, and that investments in public education would make people perceive a 
reduction in inequalities of opportunities and, in turn, it would increase social stability. 
Moreover, that lack of integration amongst Brazilian students from different social classes 
makes difficult amplifying the range of people‟s compassion. In this way, even without 
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forcing them to attend the same schools, at least some policies towards integrating these 
different schools through stimulating them to exchange experiences and knowledge can be 
carried out. Finally, reflections on possible improvements on university admission exams can 
encourage public examiners to also take civic knowledge, skills and values into account when 
they elaborate these tests. 
 
Wide official curriculum 
 
Besides education policies, schools‟ organisation (wide official curriculum) can also 
influence the cultivation of civic virtues. Being the school a transition from the life within the 
family to the public relations in society, its structure should be the locus for the expansion, 
from the nuclear family to a wider community, of the feeling of care, the great compassion. 
In this way, schools have a powerful mechanism to cultivate this compassion in students: 
creating as much as possible a simulacrum of public sphere within that environment (9.5). As 
developed in, besides democratic knowledge (discussed below), it is important that people 
possess democratic skills and values, and the school is a perfect place for introducing them. 
These skills and values are basically related to students‟ critical thinking and their 
encouragement for fighting for justice and, at the same time, respecting the rules. Their 
wishes have to be listened to and partially put into practice through a type of organisation that 
allows several democratic decisions, from school rules to syllabuses. This partially 
democratic system can be the first opportunity for students to feel that they are part of a 
cooperative venture, the school, rather than only passive recipients of something from the top 
(9.5). However, it is important that students also perceive that teachers‟ and head teachers‟ 
opinions are more important than theirs, since the latter have more knowledge and experience 
on several subjects. This can help them to realise that, during all their lives, they have to take 
seriously into consideration the opinions of specialists, something that improves their critical 
thinking (8.2 and 8.3). Apart from these democratic skills and values, students‟ sense of 
competition however balanced by the sense of cooperation with the others can be stimulated 
through different practices. Group activities, competitions amongst classrooms, assessments 
that take their cooperative practices into account are examples of ways that schools could 
organise their activities to counterbalance societies‟ encouragement of competition (9.5).  
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However, there is little convergence between what is suggested theoretically and what was 
observed in Brazilian schools
125
. First, the understanding that the school is a transition place 
from the family to the wider community does not seem to be perceived by teachers and 
students, who did not present in the questionnaires significant differences in values that they 
suggested that should be cultivated at home and at school (12.1). Moreover, students‟ 
participation in democratic processes, fighting for their rights and justice were hardly 
perceived (11.3). In general, their participation in suggesting the syllabuses were null, and 
very limited actions of Students Unions and dialogues with head teachers and supervisors 
were identified. In the poorest school, instead of being encouraged to think of what is fair, 
students were only called up by a teacher to participate in demonstrations in a very top-down 
way. A symptom of this is that, in 359 questionnaires with teachers and students, only four 
declared that political awareness is one of the three most civic virtues to be cultivated in 
schools (12.2). More than this, though even the majority of students declared that it is 
important that schools make them to follow rules (12.2), schools did not seem to deal with 
rules in an appropriate way. Rules were always imposed without justification. Much worse 
than this, while in the private school students felt excessively watched, in the state-run, the 
demand for punctuality almost does not exist, being many teachers also terrible examples by 
constantly arriving late (or even missing classes). Additionally, though all teachers 
considered cooperation important and, at the same time, no one presented any radical position 
against stimulating competition (12.2), very few substantive activities that encourage 
cooperation or healthy competition amongst students could be identified. Finally, as a general 
perception, teachers‟ and students‟ lack of deep reflections on how schools should be 
structured has to be highlighted.  
 
Observing ideal and real views of wide official curriculum, it seems that most suggestions 
presented could be implemented without promoting major political conflicts, since they are 
anchored in consensual ideas of justice, democracy and competition in a cooperative system. 
However, it is important to perceive that the implementation of these new ideas is not that 
simple, since they demand strong changes in the traditional model of schooling. And such 
changes depend on school community better information and good will. Thus, at least in 
state-run schools, the lack of instruction of teachers on these regards is the first problem. 
Their shameful salaries (11.2) put an even more difficult problem. It is very difficult to 
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convince them to make any move, since they do not feel stimulated to put any extra effort to 
be better. Increasing teachers‟ salaries and knowledge on how to cultivate civic virtues is 
central for changing this scenario. 
 
Narrow official curriculum 
 
Narrow official curriculum (9.6) is the most obvious tool to cultivate civic virtues. 
Independently if through a specific subject or cross-curricular contents, knowledge of certain 
concepts, such as “liberty” and “equality”, and skills, such as thinking critically, have to be 
deepened. Philosophy classes could deal with these issues in partnership with language 
classes and other subjects, in particular, mathematics. Natural sciences and humanities have 
to inform students and cultivate in them the capacity to find trustworthy information in order 
to diminish their susceptibility to believe in fake news. Moreover, for example, knowledge of 
the constitution, black history, psychological reflections and sociological statistics related to 
women, poor, black and LGBT people‟s lives have to be associated with the idea of equality 
of opportunities in order to enrich debates about current issues related to citizenship, such as 
affirmative action. Similarly, knowledge about different democratic systems is also important 
to help individuals to identify the problems of Brazilian political system, and knowledge of 
some classics of literature and theatre to develop compassion in students. 
 
In Brazil, however, the narrow official curriculum seems hardly deal with this knowledge and 
skills (11.3). The first interesting observation on these regards is that, though Brazilian law 
establishes certain parameters (PCN) on what should be taught, which are not that far from 
what is being proposed, there is a strong movement within the academy against any imposed 
subject. Those who criticise PCN say that such parameters are proposing the transmission of 
neutral contents and do not give liberty for teachers to cultivate “politicised consciousness” in 
students. This issue is intimately related to the defence of critical pedagogy discussed below. 
PCN, however, clearly defend the cultivation of values, such as cultural diversity. In this 
way, PCN are somehow aligned with a proposal of celebrating different sexual orientations in 
schools called “School Without Homophobia”. Conservative groups, on the other hand, 
pressure to impede these discussions in curriculum. Going further, a movement called 
“School Without Party” defends that teachers should not present their own political views. 
Avant-gardists consider that it is hidden in this proposal a conservative desire of keeping the 
status quo which keep unfair inequalities (10.3). 
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Thus, it is not simple to define which contents should be discussed in Brazilian schools in 
order to improve students‟ civic virtues. Regarding several issues, there are strong 
disagreements amongst different sectors of society about what should be taught. In this way, 
it is interesting to start focusing on what is (or should be) consensually accepted. First, a 
serious work towards developing critical thinking is an interesting way to start. Regarding 
this, the fact that critical thinking is almost disregarded by Brazilian teachers and students as 
an important civic virtue to be cultivated in schools (12.3), such a debate has to be better 
developed in the preparation and updating of teachers‟ courses. Moreover, deep discussions 
on data showing, for example, how the tax system in Brazil is and comparing it with other 
developed countries could be very informative and, at the same time, those who present these 
data would not be accused of indoctrination. Other types of statistics that, for example, show 
the differences of salaries between men and women go in the same direction and can also be 
part of classes. Obviously, associated with all these discussions, teachers have the duty of 
seeking for trustworthy information and showing to the students how they can do this by 
themselves. In summary, it is possible for a teacher to present several types of knowledge that 
help the students to develop their consciousness of inequalities without “brainwashing” them 
and defending specific political views. This is a way of introducing important civic 
knowledge and escaping from critics of defenders of “School Without Party” and alike. 
 
Unofficial and hidden curricula 
 
As a final reflection of this section, it is important to compare theoretical reflections on 
teachers‟ individual initiatives (unofficial curriculum) and some possible hidden intentions of 
the official curriculum and how these things could be perceived in the observed Brazilian 
schools (11.5 and 11.6). In theory, bottom-up activities proposed by some teachers should be 
celebrated, since they can aggregate new ideas to something that is rigid when only top-down 
proposals are followed. On the other hand, the critical pedagogy tradition sees hidden in the 
official curriculum normalisation and brainwashing of the new generations in order to keep a 
status quo of domination. Critical pedagogy is, then, defended as a way to counterbalance 
such status quo (9.7). As a reverse attitude, teachers are encouraged to assume political 
positions (stated committed), rather than being neutral chairmen. In their views, it is 
impossible to be neutral, since “neutrality” in these regards would be maintaining the unfair 
status quo. However, given the fact that, many times, doing this is going against the official 
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curriculum, at the end, teachers‟ subversive attitudes have to be defended. In this way, such 
an attitude can also be seen as hidden in what teachers should do. Going in a slightly different 
direction, this thesis considers that the best way to promote sustainable changes in a stable 
democracy is by developing in students critical thinking skills, guaranteeing to them access to 
trustworthy data, and developing compassion in them. Obviously, a deep investigation about 
the status quo, which ends up showing evident injustices, has to be done. However, the 
judgments about the unfairness of the status quo have to come from the students, not from 
teachers in a top-down way.  
 
Observing teachers‟ individual (unofficial) practices in Brazilian schools, it was difficult to 
perceive individual initiatives towards cultivating the civic virtues defended by this thesis, 
and even less attitudes connected with fighting against the status quo, as recommended by 
critical pedagogy. From 21 interviewed teachers, only one presented clear individual 
initiatives towards making students think of questions such as abortion, same-sex marriage 
and so on. Regarding hidden attitudes towards opposing the status quo, only one teacher who 
declared that his role as a teacher is “to fight against all injustices” was perceived as 
practicing this. On the other hand, the observations showed that it is hidden in the private 
schools practices the preparation of future leaders and “strong” competitors, while it is hidden 
in the state-run schools activities the preparation of workers who will assume subaltern 
positions (11.5).  
 
The comparisons between theoretical reflections and realities related to unofficial and hidden 
curricula put some issues on how far teachers can go in presenting their own political views. 
This is the most controversial point of this discussion, as made evident above. Many 
important pedagogues defend that teachers have to be proactive in making students aware of 
how oppressed they and the worst-off are (9.8). Most Brazilian teachers (at least most of those 
observed by this thesis, a work which tries to present a wide sample of this group), on the 
other hand, did not show a real concern regarding the development of students‟ critical 
thinking or consciousness about the unfair status quo (11.6). This thesis considers critical 
thinking fundamental for the development of citizenship, and also defends that this should be 
associated with spread information of important knowledge about different issues related to 
justice. In this way – following what was suggested above about how to introduce discussions 
on tax system, differences of salaries between men and women, and so on – preparing 
teachers committed with debating political issues, but who avoid giving their own opinions 
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seems something feasible to achieve (11.6). 
 
13.3. The importance of ideal-non-ideal reflective equilibria for the achievement of the 
theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium 
 
Since this thesis starts from the ideas that the principles which orient Brazilian institutions 
have the potential to be refined, rather than completely changed, its main aim is to suggest 
how to make Brazil a more just society through keeping stability and without resorting to any 
radical proposal. Thus, given the fact that democracy is currently taken by Western 
(specifically Brazilian) people as the correct procedure to improve justice, Western societies 
are stable only if they are democratic (2.6). Democracy is necessary, however, not sufficient 
for guaranteeing stability, since it is not the only value shared by most Western people. They 
also defend broad views of individuals‟ right to be equally free and their responsibility 
towards their co-citizens (2.4) – values which structure the hypothetical social contract, 
considered by this thesis a good platform to sustain a theory of justice applicable to 
contemporary Western nations (3.9). Thus, stability also depends on the achievement of these 
values. Limiting democratic decisions by guaranteeing equal liberty and requiring from 
citizens certain duties towards the others is also fundamental. In this way, when people 
participate in democratic processes, and when constitutions which instantiate the values of 
equal liberty and communal responsibility are respected (sometimes even through limiting 
majority decisions), the hypothetical social contract becomes a real contract. 
 
This situation of stability creates an atmosphere that allows refinements of the Western 
values presented and, then, favours the improvement of justice. Consistent institutions based 
on constitutional principles help this improvement. Moreover, these institutions help to 
mould people‟s principles, being the school the most important one. This is fundamental, 
since this process of improving justice is anchored on democratic procedures and people have 
to possess certain civic virtues to better participate in them. Interestingly, as a virtuous circle, 
individuals who possess civic virtues are those who, through voting and participating in 
public sphere, improve social institutions. This virtuous circularity is a central point that 
sustains the importance of outlining an ideal-non-ideal equilibrium and developing 
knowledge that favours the achievement in the public sphere of the theoretical-practical 
equilibrium. 
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In this way, the achievement of feasible theories of justice and the citizenship curriculum is 
fundamental in this process. Feasible theories of justice present to ordinary people and 
policymakers the ways to refine institutions towards improving justice. Feasible theories of 
curriculum help educators to better prepare new generations to participate positively in the 
process of refining these institutions. Thus, the two ideal-non-ideal equilibria outlined above 
are helpful for the achievement of the theoretical-practical reflective equilibrium. The latter, 
however, cannot be accomplished by a PhD thesis, since it happens only in reality when 
people‟s and governments‟ attitudes in the public sphere are balanced by theories of justice, 
in other words, when ordinary people, policymakers and specialists actually dialogue
126
.  
 
13.4. Final Reflections 
 
A moderated position regarding different issues sets the tone of this thesis. However, excess 
of moderation can be problematic. Fonseca suggests that “nothing [should be taken] in 
excess, even moderation. […] How to find the right measure? If we never test the limits” 
(2017, p.24). This is an interesting idea that orients a final clarification on the process of 
reflective equilibrium. Regarding this, it is important to highlight that behind such 
equilibrium is not only the idea of balancing ideal and real, but also the idea that this balance 
is achieved by a process of back and forth. Testing the limits is a valuable procedure towards 
finding the just measure. Alternation of power of political parties with distinct views is like 
this. In the same way, it is interesting to observe how that “radical” teacher mentioned in 13.3 
deals with political discussions. As already mentioned in 11.6, this teacher usually behaves 
much more as a union leader who moves his followers than as someone who stimulates 
students to think by themselves. In 13.2, it was suggested that the second attitude seems more 
appropriate for a teacher. However, teachers like him are also necessary, since their attitude 
show something important about certain dynamics that can be followed or examples of what 
should not be done. In other words, it is only through allowing the plurality that some 
excesses can be identified. Even more, observing that specific case, this teacher‟s attitude 
does not seem so wrong, given the fact that the students of that school seemed totally passive 
and, through this, he at least could shake some of them. The Aristotelian idea presented in 
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Nicomachean Ethics that the virtue is halfway between two vices, but that where this falls in 
any given situation is a matter of context-specific judgement, is behind this reflection. 
 
Analysing this problem from the opposite side, most times, an effort to refrain polarisation is 
fundamental for guaranteeing stability. Actually, because of this, the rationale behind this 
thesis is strongly concerned with balancing opposite proposals. In order to have a final look 
on this, the debate of how cultivating the celebration of sexual diversity is appropriate. This 
debate can depart from the idea that discussions about diversity of sexual orientation are 
fundamental in order to counter certain strong prejudices still entrenched in Brazilian society. 
Moreover, the idea that children are not property of their parents, who cannot define 
everything that is taught in schools, is also important to defend the cultivation of such 
diversity. However, since this point is not well accepted by certain sectors of society, the 
process of implementing it has to be negotiated carefully with the whole society, rather than 
simply imposed. In this case, oppressed people (LGBT members) have to put an effort to 
understand the position of those who oppress them, and try to dialogue with the oppressors, 
even knowing that they are wrong. One reason for this is that the alternative attitude, the 
feeling of anger, can create instability through promoting reverse anger and polarisation, 
being counterproductive if the aim is improving justice. The targets of anger tend to be 
reactive instead of reflecting about their mistakes and, in turn, changing their attitudes. This 
does not mean that the feeling that allows people to perceive injustices has to be controlled. 
This is fundamental to engage people in fighting for improvement towards justice. However, 
this thesis defends that this has to be a peaceful fight, rather than a fight oriented by anger.  
 
An example of a counterproductive lack of dialogue seems to be the current pressure of 
LGBT members on schools to introduce lessons on anti-homophobia (this discussion is 
presented in 10.3). The claim is obviously legitimate, however, depending on how it is 
implemented, the reaction of the community can make such a legitimate claim unfeasible. 
Related to this, Gabeira, a defender of human rights and diversity in Brazil, says:  
 
a government could not ignore a large number of families who wants exclusivity in the sexual 
education of their children. The absence of mediation ended up giving rise to heavy criticism 
against the interference of the State in subjects that should pass through the family sieve. 
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The end result of all this was not only a collapse of the left, but also a distrust of many of its 
flags. They are supra-party issues, but they were understood as exclusiveness of a government 
and of a tendency that went into liquidation by its deep errors
127
. 
One of the collateral victims of this failure was the concept of human rights, which only has 
value since it is universal. Many Brazilians saw it as an exclusive struggle of the left, which in 
turn reduced humanity to those who think in the same way. (2017, p.130) 
 
This portrait introduces two important reflections that are appropriate as the last thoughts of 
this thesis. First, it is important for the process of refining ideas of justice to accept that 
people who think differently – even if wrongly – about these issues are not necessarily bad or 
unreasonable. They have at least to be listened to in the public sphere. In the example, parents 
who consider it wrong to celebrate diversity in schools have to be genuinely listened to. They 
cannot be treated as enemies and hated by avant-gardists. In this regard, it worth mentioning 
a huge mistake made by Hillary Clinton in the 2016 US presidential campaign. Though it is 
obvious that Trump based his project on denying a dialogue with those who think differently 
from him, Clinton, by saying (even if regretting it later) that “you could put half of Trump‟s 
supporters into what I call the „basket of deplorables.‟” 128 , created huge difficulties of 
dialogue with almost one quarter of American voters. If she were president, this type of 
discourse would make difficult to guarantee stability in order to make easier improvements of 
justice. 
 
Finally, it is important to realise that merging different debates on justice can create 
difficulties for people to identify their own positions regarding each one of them. This 
situation favours the worst possible scenario in political debates, the polarisation of ideas. 
Polarisation makes people form tribes. Belonging to a tribe, in turn, reduces individuals‟ 
capacity for thinking by themselves. Moreover, the existence of poles makes any point 
disputable, and develops in people the idea that the other is the enemy to be defeated, rather 
than making people see each other as participants in a cooperative venture. 
 
This defence of clarification of ideas and the avoidance of seeing the other as necessarily 
wrong or bad sets the second tone of this thesis. Its intention is only to present a suggestion 
on how to link reflections on justice and the citizenship curriculum. Obviously, this suggested 
                                                          
127
 The president Dilma Rousseff was impeached in 2016. 
128
 https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/republicans-jump-on-clintons-deplorables-
remark/2016/09/10/91a3c148-775c-11e6-8149-b8d05321db62_story.html 
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way to associate these ideas through reflective equilibrium can be mistaken. Even more, 
many claims presented during these 13 chapters are likely wrong. However, this is an 
invitation for debate. And, in order to favour this debate, this thesis gives to the readers a map 
that makes it easier for them, through a comparison with their own structure of thinking, 
identifying with more clarity their own ideas about the discussed points. Thus, a sentence 
presented by Brighouse and Swift in the end of one of their articles is a good way to finish 
this journey: “if we have not persuaded our readers, we hope we at least have helped them to 
identify why not” (2013, p.219). 
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Semi-structured interviews with students, teachers and head teachers 
 
First of all, I would like to tell you that the information recorded here will be heard only by 
me and that in the process of writing my thesis you will be named only by an acronym that 
will prevent your identifications. I can repeat or clarify any question. The duration of the 
interview will be about one hour. 
 
Semi-structured interviews with students 
 
(Identification) 
0. What are your names and ages? 
(Values of the young Brazilians) 
1. Do you, out of school, learn to be more competitive or cooperative? And at school? At 
school, is encouraging competition good or bad? Are the students who cooperate properly 
rewarded? 
2. Does your use of social media make you better or worse? Why? 
(Role of the school) 
3. What do you think should be taught at school? And what, in fact, do you learn? (Is your 
school just concerned with teaching traditional content?) 
4. What moral values do you learn at school? And at home? Can you point out any specific 
activity linked to citizenship teaching at school? 
(Specifying the development of some values) 
5. Do you think there should be rules at school? Are they exaggerated? Which school rules 
are positive and which are negative? 
6. Does the school stimulate your ability to put yourself in the shoes of others and to be 
supportive? Do you like that? There is some prejudice? 
7. Does the school stimulate your fellowship with colleagues from other groups/tribes? For 
example, are you forced to sometimes do work with colleagues who do not have much 
affinity? Do you like that? (7. Does the school stimulate in you the ability to put yourself in 
the shoes of others and to be supportive? Do you like this?) 
(Transmission of and reflection on moral values) 
8. Do teachers tell you what is right to do, or do they encourage you to come to your own 
conclusions about what is right? 
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9. Do you participate in the elaboration of school rules? Do you think you have room to 
criticise what you think is wrong at school? 
10. Do you participate in determining what you learn in class? Does any teacher make room 
for your proposed topics to be discussed? 
(Commitment of teachers) 
11. How often your teachers miss classes? 
12. Do you feel intellectually stimulated by your teachers? And do you realise that teachers 
are dedicated to your learning? 
13. Do you take your teachers as examples? And your parents? (Do you have other 
examples?) 
(Political opinions of students) 
14. Do you consider that people who have legitimately obtained greater wealth should have 
the right to place their children in better schools, or do you consider that all young people 
should have access to the same level of education? 
15. Are you for or against same-sex marriages and adoptions by same-sex couples? 
 
Semi-structured interviews with teachers 
 
(Identification) 
0. What is your name, your age, your education background, the discipline you teach and the 
school you work for? 
(Values of the young Brazilians) 
1. Do you consider that the average Brazilians care only about themselves, their family and 
friends, or re they also interested in the welfare of the rest of the population? Is this related to 
their involvement in politics? 
2. Outside school, do you think the young Brazilians learn to be more competitive or 
cooperative? And at school? Stimulating competition is good or bad? What practices in your 
school end up promoting these characteristics? 
3. Does Brazilian society value talent? And effort? How are these characteristics valued at 
your school? What are the impacts of valuing these characteristics in cultivating students‟ 
morality? 
4. What moral values are developed in the young from the use of social networks? Is there 
any work in your school to make the student reflect on these issues? 
(Teachers‟ and school‟s roles) 
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5. What should be the objectives of basic education? In fact, what is taught in school? 
6. Do the teacher and the school have effective roles in shaping the student‟s moral values? 
Which of these values should be cultivated at school? And at home? 
7. In your school, is there systematic work for the development of moral values in students? 
Are you well prepared to perform such a task? 
8. Are the profiles of the students in your school different or homogeneous? What is the 
impact of this fact on the development of their moral values? 
(Specifying the development of some values) 
9. Should schools encourage students to follow rules? Does your school deal well with this? 
Which rules of the school do you think are positive and which do you think are negative? Is 
there a crisis of authority in education today? 
10. Should school, besides encouraging tolerance, also promote integration among young 
people from different groups/tribes? Does your school deal well with this? 
11. Should the school stimulate empathy (people‟s capacity to put themselves in the shoes of 
others) and solidarity towards other individuals in society? Does your school deal well with 
this? 
12. What is more important for a person to be a good citizen: the development of his/her 
reflective capacity or his/her affectivity? Are you and your school cultivating these virtues? 
(Transmission of and reflection on moral values) 
13. Can the high school student self-regulate? Should the school impose limits over students? 
At what level? How are you and your school dealing with this? 
14. Do you and your school usually directly transmit some moral values or only stimulate 
students to reflect on them? How should this happen? How have you been taught about it? 
15. Is there students‟ involvement in the development of school rules? In determining what 
they learn? Are debates held in classrooms to solve problems? 
(Teachers‟ Political Views) 
16. Do you consider that people who have legitimately obtained greater wealth should have 
the right to place their children in better schools, or do you consider that all young people 
should have access to the same level of education? How should a reflection on this question 
be conducted in school? Is this done at your school? 
17. Are you for or against same-sex marriages and adoptions by same-sex couples? How 
should a reflection on this question be conducted in school? Is this done at your school? 
(Final considerations) 
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18. How specifically can your classes help for the development of student moral values? Can 
you accomplish this task? 
19. Finally, is your school successful in the cultivation of moral values? What effects of this 
work do you perceive in your students? 
 
Semi-structured interviews with head teachers and supervisors 
 
(Identification) 
0. What is your name, your age, your education background, the discipline you teach and the 
school you work for? 
(Values of the young Brazilian) 
1. Out of school, do you consider that the young Brazilian learns to be more competitive or 
cooperative? And at school? Stimulating competition is good or bad? What practices in your 
school end up promoting these characteristics? 
2. In your opinion, what moral values are developed in the young from the use of social 
networks? Is there any work in your school to make the student reflect on these issues? 
(Teachers‟ and school roles) 
3. What should be the objectives of basic education? In fact, what is taught in school? 
4. Do the teacher and the school have effective roles in shaping the student‟s moral values? 
Which of these values should be cultivated at school? And at home? 
5. In your school, is there systematic work for the development of moral values in students? 
Are you well prepared to perform such a task? 
(Specifying the development of some values) 
6. Should schools encourage students to follow rules? Does your school deal well with this? 
Which rules of the school do you think are positive and which do you think are negative?  
7. Should school, besides encouraging tolerance, also promote integration among young 
people from different groups/tribes? Does your school deal well with this? 
8. Should the school stimulate empathy (people‟s capacity to put themselves in the shoes of 
others) and solidarity towards other individuals in society? Does your school deal well with 
this? 
9. What is more important for a person to be a good citizen: the development of his/her 
reflective capacity or his/her affectivity? Does your school work well to develop these 
virtues? 
(Transmission of and reflection on moral values) 
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10. Can the high school student self-regulate? Should the school impose limits? At what 
level? How are you and your school dealing with this? 
11. Is there student involvement in the development of school rules? In determining what 
they learn? Are debates held in classrooms to solve problems? 
(Final considerations) 
12. Does your school face the problem of teacher‟s absence at school? Does this have any 
influence on the formation of students‟ moral values? 
13. Finally, is your school successful in the education of moral values? What effects of this 
work do you perceive in your students? 
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Questionnaires – education for citizenship – students 
 
At the beginning, we would like to invite you to collaborate with the production of 
important data for conducting a doctorate research on citizenship education in Brazil. 
We also thank you for your availability. 
The following questionnaire presents questions related to reflection on citizenship 
education and is directed to students from three schools in Porto Alegre. This 
questionnaire is composed of 3 discursive and 37 objective questions. The estimated 
time for accomplishment is 20 minutes. Respondents’ anonymity is guaranteed. 
 
Your favourite area of study is: 
(A) sports. 
(B) arts. 
(C) human sciences. 
(D) math and sciences. 
(E) languages. 
(F) no one. 
 
In the questions 1, 2 and 3, write your answers in a few words and do not justify them. 
1. What are the main civic values that should be encouraged at home? (cite at most 
three) 
_________________ 
_________________ 
_________________ 
2. What are the main civic values that should be encouraged in school? (cite at most 
three, equal to or different from those presented in the previous question) 
_________________ 
_________________ 
_________________ 
3. What are the main barriers to cultivate civic values in school? (cite at most three)? 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
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In questions 4-21, mark the alternative that is most identified with your opinion about 
possible descriptions of facts presented. So, you just have to say if you believe such 
statements represent facts or not, whether or not you agree with them: 
4. Your school is more concerned with teaching scientific content than with cultivating civic 
values. 
  
5. The need of effective redistribution of wealth between rich and poor in our society is 
discussed in your school. 
  
6. The need of promoting equal rights between heterosexual and homosexual couples (for 
example, adoption) is discussed by your school. 
  
7. Critical thinking and argumentative skills of students are encouraged by your school. 
  
8. The solidarity of students towards strangers is encouraged by your school. 
  
9. Students‟ respect for rules and laws is encouraged by your school. 
  
10. Students‟ involvement of with politics is encouraged by your school. 
  
11. In general, the students at your school fight for their rights. 
  
12. The students‟ struggle for their rights is encouraged by your school. 
 
13. Social networks encourage young people to integrate with other young people like 
themselves. 
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14. Social networks encourage young people to integrate with other young people similar to 
them. 
  
15. Your school develops activities focused on reducing the potentially harmful impacts of 
social networks on building students‟ civic values. 
  
16. Your school has an effective impact on the formation of student civic values. 
  
17. Most of your teachers try to impose their moral values on students. 
  
18. Most of your teachers try to make students think for themselves about moral issues. 
  
19. Most of your teachers do not seek to reflect on moral issues with students. 
  
20. Your family serves as an example for your moral conduct. 
  
21. Your teachers serve as an example for your moral conduct. 
 
 
In questions 22-40, mark the alternative that is most identified with your opinion on the 
proposals submitted. Thus, you must present your opinions on how things should be, 
that is, you must say whether or not you agree with the idea suggested. 
22. In your school, the area of sports should be more valued than it is. 
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23. In your school, the area of the arts should be more valued than it is. 
 
24. In your school, the area of human sciences should be more valued than it is. 
  
25. In your school, the area of math and sciences should be more valued than it is. 
  
26. In your school, the area of languages should be more valued than it is. 
  
27. Your school should be more concerned with teaching scientific contents than with 
cultivating civic values. 
 
28. The need of effective redistribution of income between rich and poor in society should be 
discussed by the school. 
  
29. The need of promoting equal rights between heterosexual and homosexual couples (for 
example, adoption) should be discussed by the school. 
  
30. Critical thinking and argumentative skills of students should be encouraged by the school. 
  
31. The solidarity of students towards strangers should be encouraged by the school. 
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32. Students‟ respect for rules and laws should be encouraged by the school. 
  
33. Students‟ involvement with politics should be encouraged by your school. 
  
34. Students‟ struggle for their rights should be encouraged by the school. 
 
35. Your school should have more impact than it has on the formation of student civic values. 
 
36. Instead of the current format, in rows, the school should promote different organizations 
of the chairs and tables in the classrooms (semicircles or small groups). 
  
37. Civic values should be cultivated in school by a specific discipline. 
  
38. Civic values should be cultivated in school through topics that are cross-cutting to the 
themes discussed in most disciplines. 
  
39. Civic values should be cultivated in school through direct interaction with society‟s 
problems (for example, involving students in voluntary work). 
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40. Civic values should be cultivated in the school through good organisation (for example, 
by meeting schedules and deadlines). 
 
 
 
Questionnaires - education for citizenship - teachers 
 
At the beginning, we would like to invite you to collaborate with the production of 
important data for conducting a doctorate research on citizenship education in Brazil. 
We also thank you for your availability. 
The following questionnaire presents questions related to reflection on citizenship 
education and is directed to students from three schools in Porto Alegre. This 
questionnaire is composed of 3 discursive and 37 multiple-choice questions. The 
estimated time for accomplishment is 20 minutes. Respondents’ anonymity is 
guaranteed. 
You are teacher: 
(A) only at Primary School. 
(B) at Primary and High School. 
(C) only at High School. 
 
The subject that you teach is associated to the area of: 
(A) sports. 
(B) arts. 
(C) human sciences. 
(D) math and sciences. 
(E) languages. 
 
In the questions 1, 2 and 3, write your answers in a few words and do not justify them. 
1. What are the main civic values that should be encouraged at home? (cite at most 
three) 
_________________ 
_________________ 
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_________________ 
2. What are the main civic values that should be encouraged in school? (cite at most 
three, equal to or different from those presented in the previous question) 
_________________ 
_________________ 
_________________ 
3. What are the main barriers to cultivate civic values in school? (cite at most three)? 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
 
In questions 4-21, mark the alternative that is most identified with your opinion about 
possible descriptions of facts presented. So, you just have to say if you believe such 
statements represent facts or not, whether or not you agree with them: 
4. Your school is more concerned with teaching scientific content than with cultivating civic 
values. 
  
5. The need of effective redistribution of wealth between rich and poor in our society is 
discussed in your school. 
  
6. The need of promoting equal rights between heterosexual and homosexual couples (for 
example, adoption) is discussed by your school. 
  
7. Critical thinking and argumentative skills of students are encouraged by your school. 
  
8. The solidarity of students towards strangers is encouraged by your school. 
  
9. Students‟ respect for rules and laws is encouraged by your school. 
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10. Students‟ involvement of with politics is encouraged by your school. 
  
11. In general, the students at your school fight for their rights. 
  
12. The students‟ struggle for their rights is encouraged by your school. 
  
13. Social networks encourage young people to integrate with other young people like 
themselves. 
 
14. Social networks encourage young people to integrate with other young people similar to 
them. 
  
15. Your school develops activities focused on reducing the potentially harmful impacts of 
social networks on building students‟ civic values. 
  
16. Your school has an effective impact on the formation of student civic values. 
 
17. Your degree course prepared you to cultivate civic values on students. 
  
18. Civic values are, in your school, worked through a specific discipline. 
  
19. Civic values are cultivated in your school through themes that are cross-cutting to the 
themes discussed in most disciplines. 
312 
 
  
20. Civic values are cultivated in your school through direct interaction with the problems of 
society (for example, involving students in voluntary work). 
  
21. Civic values are cultivated in your school through the good organisation of the school (for 
example, by meeting schedules and deadlines). 
 
 
In questions 22-40, mark the alternative that is most identified with your opinion on the 
proposals submitted. Thus, you must present your opinions on how things should be, 
that is, you must say whether or not you agree with the idea suggested. 
22. In your school, the area of sports should be more valued than it is. 
  
23. In your school, the area of the arts should be more valued than it is. 
  
24. In your school, the area of human sciences should be more valued than it is. 
  
25. In your school, the area of math and sciences should be more valued than it is. 
  
26. In your school, the area of languages should be more valued than it is. 
 
27. Your school should be more concerned with teaching scientific contents than with 
cultivating civic values. 
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28. The need of effective redistribution of income between rich and poor in society should be 
discussed by the school. 
  
29. The need of promoting equal rights between heterosexual and homosexual couples (for 
example, adoption) should be discussed by the school. 
  
30. Critical thinking and argumentative skills of students should be encouraged by the school. 
  
31. The solidarity of students towards strangers should be encouraged by the school. 
  
32. Students‟ respect for rules and laws should be encouraged by the school. 
  
33. Students‟ involvement with politics should be encouraged by your school. 
  
34. Students‟ struggle for their rights should be encouraged by the school. 
  
35. Your school should have more impact than it has on the formation of student civic values. 
  
36. Instead of the current format, in rows, the school should promote different organizations 
of the chairs and tables in the classrooms (semicircles or small groups). 
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37. Civic values should be cultivated in school by a specific discipline. 
  
38. Civic values should be cultivated in school through topics that are cross-cutting to the 
themes discussed in most disciplines. 
  
39. Civic values should be cultivated in school through direct interaction with society‟s 
problems (for example, involving students in voluntary work). 
  
40. Civic values should be cultivated in the school through good organisation (for example, 
by meeting schedules and deadlines). 
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NVivo codes 
 
Alternative contents  
Ambition 
Autonomy 
Basic school activities 
Basic values 
Brazilian people characteristics  
Brazilian way to solve problems (jeitinho) 
Bullying 
Communities and schools interaction 
Competition and collaboration 
Conflicts resolution 
Creativity 
Criticality  
Critical thinking 
Debates 
Developing curriculum 
Direct transference vs. reflection 
Equality 
Equality and meritocracy 
Evaluation, effort and talent 
Examples (teachers vs. parents) 
Family influence 
Hidden curriculum 
Home vs. school 
Homogeneity vs. diversity 
Humanities vs. sciences 
Ideologies 
Institutions mould societies 
Integration  
Interdisciplinarity and Integrated Seminar  
Lack of a project and individual initiatives 
Lack of teachers 
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Leadership and proactivity  
Legislation 
Moral development 
Open and/or unusual curricula 
Poor students 
Power structures of Brazilian society 
Privacy control  
Respect and tolerance  
Respecting rules 
Same-sex couples adoption 
School impersonality  
Self-regulation and negotiated rules 
Social contract: rights and duties 
Social networks 
Socialization between families and schools 
Solidarity and empathy 
Specific subject 
State-run and private schools differences 
Students‟ communication with teachers and school 
Students‟ immaturity and refractoriness 
Teachers‟ affect and engagement  
Theory and practice 
Thinking-saying-doing 
Tired and uninterested students 
Transversal contents 
University admission tests and scientific content 
Unprepared teachers 
 
